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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aimed to investigate: 
a) the distortions arising from the existing system of indirect taxation of financial 
services in Greece and the EU Member States; 
b) the economic effects of taxing financial services under the V AT system in Greece 
including the estimation of the fiscal revenue loss under the currently applied financial 
exemptions; 
c) the economic effects on total tax revenues, expenditures and growth of the existing 
indirect financial taxes in Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
The research design included a review and synthesis of the academic literature and was 
based on: a) comparative study of the relevant legislation b) construction of input-
output/economic tables for financial sectors and c) analysis of time-series data, employing 
mainly the Johansen methodology to test for cointegration among the variables. The 
analytical research yielded: 
a) a detailed profile, through the study of legislation, of VAT treatment of financial 
services in Greece and the other EU Member States, identifying similarities and 
differences as well as potential sources for distortions of competition; 
b) estimation of the economic effects of taxing financial services under the Greek V AT 
system, using the input-output/economic tables; 
c) a detailed profile of the indirect tax structure in Greece, Spain and Portugal, estimating 
the marginal productivity and elasticity of indirect taxes (i.e. VAT, consumption and 
indirect financial taxes) as well as the average effective tax rates on consumption; 
d) identification of the impact of consumption and indirect financial taxes on total 
revenues, expenditures and growth (employing the Johansen methodology to test for 
cointegration). 
These findings enabled us to draw conclusions about: a) the economic implications of 
taxing financial services under the VAT system in Greece. We obtained an estimate of 
5.51% of VAT revenues over the period 1989-1998 for the fiscal re\,enue loss of 
exempting financial sectors from V AT in Greece; b) the economic effects of consumption 
taxes (i.e. taxes that fall only on final consumption) and indirect financial taxes (i.e. taxes 
that may fall on intermediate and investment goods) identifying similarities and 
differences in Greece, Spain and Portugal. We found that consumption taxes (including 
VAT) may affect permanently the level of real output. This effect could be either negatiye 
or positive depending on the whole tax structure in each country. On the other hand, 
although indirect financial taxes may have a positive impact on total tax rate, their effects 
on growth are minor and negative. However, indirect financial taxes are important for 
spending decisions in Spain and Portugal. In addition, the thesis enabled the deyelopment 
of guidelines and of a transitional operational model for the indirect taxation of financial 
services. Finally, the limitations of this thesis are outlined in the conclusions and concrete 
avenues for future research are provided. 
Some of the findings of this thesis have been published in four articles in Academic Journals as follows: 
Smyth, D and Kaliva, A (2002) "VAT and indirect taxes on financial services in Greece and Ee" The 
Hellenic Banks Association Re\'lew A' Quarter pp 79-92 (Chapter five of the present thesis) 
[1\'H'1I'. hba.grl7pllbllindex 7. deltio. htm] 
Kaliva, A (2002) " The economic performance of VAT in Greece: Comparisons with Spain and Portugal" 
Tax Journal No 638 pp 617-22 (From chapter sewn of the present thesis) 
Kaliva, A (2001) "The impact on Reyenues from Taxing Financial Seryices under the V AT System in 
Greece" The Hellenic Banks Association Review D' Quarter pp 64-71 (Chapter six of the present thesis) 
[1\'1\'1\'. hba.grI7publlindex7.deltio. htlll] 
Kaliva, A (2001) "Average effective rates on consumption in Greece: Comparisons with Spain and Portugal" 
Tax Journal No 632 pp 1785-1791 (From chapter seven of the present thesis) 
.. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
The taxation of financial services in the global Market and trade is of economic as well of 
political significance. The financial services industry accounts for a significant portion of 
GDP in EU Member States affecting levels of employment and income, the balance of 
payments, economic growth and valuable inward foreign investment. In addition, the 
financial system is the medium through which most of the transactions of a market 
economy are conducted. Banks especially play a major role in the transmission of 
monetary policy to the economy; they are also expected to provide safe assets to small 
depositors for whom monitoring and scrutinising financial institutions is costly, and they 
make loans to borrowers who are less visible in capital markets, such as SMEs that require 
credit to carryon their regular business. It has been also argued (Dobson and Jacquet, 
1998) that the development of the whole financial system affects the long term growth and 
development of the economy. 
Few industries have experienced such rapid change in the past three decades as have 
banking and insurance, the principal industries in the financial services sector. Rapid 
innovation and advances in telecommunications and computer technology have facilitated 
the movement of money, domestically and across borders, at ever-faster rates and in ever-
greater volumes. As new financial services have proliferated, additional competitors, such 
as asset management companies, credit card suppliers, and security analysts, now 
challenge the traditional service providers and accelerate the rate of change. Many 
governments have also fanned the winds of competition by removing past regulations on 
ownership, operations, foreign entry etc. In fact financial services are one of three majors 
sectors, along with telecommunications services and information technology products, 
where multilateral liberalisation agreements were reached in the WTO during the 90s. The 
expected total welfare gain from these reforms by 2010 for the EU area according to 
Dobson and Jacquet (op.cit), amounts to 0.69% of the EU GDP. Subsequently, any 
measure (including taxation) that affects this industry and its future operation IS very 
important for the financial sector itself as well as for the whole economy. 
IV 
One of the most difficult areas in the taxation and in the operation of V AT systems has 
been the treatment of financial services. A workable method of taxing such services has 
eluded tax authorities for decades. As a consequence, almost all countries employing a 
V AT have opted to exempt financial services rendered to residents of their countries and 
to apply, other than V AT, indirect "cascade" taxes (e.g. gross sales tax. transaction tax 
etc.). Although the exemption approach has been widely used, there have been significant 
problems in its operation. The resulting tax cascading creates numerous economic 
distortions and adversely affects the competitive position of domestic institutions in 
international markets, while the definitions and allocations needed to operate the system 
have proven to be very complex (Poddar and English, 1997). 
This thesis aims to investigate the application of indirect taxes on financial services by 
taking Greece as a focus. The practices of the indirect taxes on financial services in Greece 
are examined in order to determine whether or not and to what extent V AT on financial 
services is operational. In addition, the practices of the V AT treatment of financial 
services in the EU Member States in the field of legislation are also examined. Finally, the 
thesis clarifies the way in which indirect financial taxes contribute to the total tax 
revenues, expenditures and economic growth. 
Analytically, the basic aim of our research, subsequent to a better understanding of the 
current system of taxing financial services, is to design new VAT structures including 
financial services within the framework and in the light of the EU Member States 
experience. In addition, by establishing empirical relationships, using time series data, 
between V AT revenues, V AT base (exemptions) and VAT rates as well as by assessing 
the economic effect of indirect financial taxes on tax rate, expenditures and growth, we 
hope to give a clear indication of the areas that need special probing and where the risk for 
the revenues and for the whole economy lies when taxing financial services under a 
consumption type VAT. To this end we hope to set out the long run relationship between 
the variables of interest (e.g. consumption and indirect financial taxes and growth) and 
how they interact in a system. Our research will focus on the case of Greece but we will 
compare and evaluate our results with those derived for selected EU countries (Spain and 
Portugal). 
The special features of its indirect taxation of financial services motiYate the choice of 
Greece. Specifically, Greece continues to apply cascade indirect taxes on banking ser;ices 
and a turnover tax on insurance services. In addition, the whole tax system in Greece is 
dominated by indirect taxes other than VAT. During the period 1965-1998 for \\"hich data 
are available (OECD, 2001) indirect taxes are the most important category, constituting 
for the whole period 47% of total taxation (14.8% of GDP). No other EU State depends to 
the same extent on indirect taxation to finance its expenses. Moreover the tax system in 
Greece seems to be rather complicated and inefficient. The level of aggregate taxation in 
Greece for the period 1965-1998 was 25.7% of GDP, quite below the international 
(OECD) and European (EU) standards. It is hypothesised that the existing "cascade" 
indirect financial taxes contribute to this inefficiency. 
Apart from the specific structure of the Greek tax system the financial sector is very 
significant for the Greek economy. Banking and insurance accounted for 3.6 percent of 
Greece's GDP in year 1997 (16.5% annual rate of change) and contributed with 2.4% to 
the total employment in the same year (1.2% annual rate of change) (Greek Ministry of 
National economy, 1998). In addition banks have traditionally dominated the financial 
sector in Greece. As we can see from table 1 the Greek banking sector appears to be 
economically strong and efficient. Moreover, despite the above-mentioned characteristics, 
Greece has not attracted any interest in this field from researchers. Therefore, the subject 
of taxation of financial services is indeed a very interesting one and very challenging, 
especially for the tax authority. 
Table 1 : Greek banking sectors' aggregate data (Amounts 
in million of DRS) 
Banking sector 1998 1997 ! 
Total assets 47924130 38667097 
Total accreditisations 18157371 14668909 
Total deposits 34699088 29840608 
Total Number of branches 2662 2472 
Total number of employees 56493 53208 
Indicators 
I Deposits/Assets 72.40% 77.17% 
Total accreditisations/ Assets 37.88% 37.90% 
Total accreditisationslDeposits 52.32% 49.15% 
Data source: Hellenic Bank Association [\\\yw.hba.grl 
Yl 
On the other hand the European Union has developed several policies for promoting 
economic and social cohesion. Greece, Portugal and Spain are of particular interest 
because those countries benefit from the programmes. Although, Creedy (2001) examined 
for the case of Australia the question whether the different categories of indirect taxes 
should be uniform, there is almost no research on these taxes (i.e. indirect financial taxes) 
and their economic implications for European countries. Furthermore, although the 
Maastricht criteria do not allow for great intervention, fiscal policy is still operative at the 
national level. Some researchers discuss the different fiscal policy effects for OECD and 
EU countries (i.e. Viren, 2000). The results support the view that fiscal policy differs 
considerably between EU Member States. These differences need to be investigated in 
more detail for specific Member States (e.g. Greece, Spain and Portugal) and for current 
tax problems such as the relationship between indirect financial taxation and growth. 
In particular our research seeks to provide empirical evidence on the three mam 
objectives/aims of this study, which are: 
1. to identify the distortions arising from the existing system of financial exemptions in 
Greece and EU (through study of the Greek and EU VAT legislation) 
2. to estimate the economic effects of taxing financial services under the Greek V AT 
system including the estimation of the fiscal revenue loss of the current applied 
financial exemptions in Greece 
3. to investigate the economic effects on total revenues, expenditures and growth of the 
existing indirect financial taxes in Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Principal contribution 
The principal contribution of this thesis lies in extending our understanding of the taxation 
of financial services, especially of the indirect taxes such as V AT and the currently applied 
financial taxes. Empirical research has so far concentrated on direct taxes on financial 
services rather than indirect taxes. The theory on the other hand pays less attention to 
indirect taxes and the economic effects of VAT on financial services. This thesis 
demonstrates the significance of the above-mentioned taxes on financial sen-ices in 
structuring tax policies and possible tax reforms_ 
.-
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Theoretical contribution 
Firstly this thesis, in the case of Greece, confinns the argument (Bo\'enmberg, 1987; 
Gottfried and Wiegard, 1991) that indirect tax on intennediate or investment goods cannot 
be neglected in fonnulating fiscal policy. The economic effects of this part of tax are 
closely linked to the exemptions applied in V A T systems. In our study these economic 
effects have been illustrated with the use of numerical input-output/economic tables for 
the financial sector over the period 1988-1998. Secondly this thesis demonstrates link 
between the average total tax rate of the economy and consumption and indirect financial 
taxes as well as between expenditures and the aforementioned taxes in the case of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. Our results show that, although a long run relationship exists between 
consumption or indirect financial taxes and the average total tax rate of the economy, bi-
directional relationships are difficult to establish. The direction of causality is from the 
different indirect taxes towards the total average tax rate. In addition we found that 
indirect financial taxes are important for spending decisions for Spain and Portugal where 
a long run relationship has been identified. On the other hand for Greece the decision to 
spend Granger causes consumption taxes while these taxes are important for spending 
decisions in Portugal. The findings for Greece are consistent with the findings of 
Anderson (1986) that government expenditures Granger causes taxes, while the findings 
for Spain and Portugal confinn the argument of Owoye (1995) that taxes and spending 
decisions are jointly made. 
Finally, we find that indirect financial taxes (i.e. taxes that might fall on intennediate and 
investment goods) they could only affect negatively the level of the real output. This 
finding contributes to the argument (e.g. King and Rebello, 1990; Slennod, 1995; Karras, 
1999) that taxes (as a percentage of GDP) do not have strong economic effects on growth 
(if any, this is minor and negative). On the other hand consumption taxes (including VAT) 
(i.e. taxes that fall only on final consumption) could affect pennanently the level of the 
real output, through their impact on the main components of growth namely labour force 
supply and/or investment. However, this effect could be either negative or positive 
depending on the whole tax structure. Lastly, the findings suggest that refonns in indirect 
tax systems of the three countries is unlikely to have any direct long run effect on total tax 
rate, expenditures or growth, but rather short run effects on the amount of revenues 
accnling to the tax administration from the relevant taxes (i.e. consumption taxes). 
Vlll 
Methodological contribution 
Difficulties with research methodology as were experienced in this study are recognised in 
the literature. In applying the National Accounts approach in order to estimate the impact 
on total tax revenues of taxing financial services under the V AT system in Greece, 
modifications had to be introduced to capture the dispersions of VAT rates in financial 
sector's V AT base and inputs. This is because the National accounts data refer to final 
expenditure of the economy. These modifications were made by using the ayerage 
weighted V AT rate on VAT base, instead of the statutory V AT rate, and with the 
breakdown of financial sector's inputs in different applied V AT rates. Howeyer \\'c 
recognise that this method does not capture general equilibrium effects, which is beyond 
of the scope of this thesis. Finally, another methodological contribution of this thesis is 
that the Johansen technique is used to assess the impact of the indirect financial taxes on 
the average total tax rate of the economy, expenditures and growth. 
Contribution to the VAT application 
The practical contributions to the V AT application are as follows: 
• a detailed profile of the VAT treatment of financial services in Greece and other EU 
Member States 
• the identification of distortions arising of the above differences between Greece and 
the other ED Member States 
• the identification of specific differences between Greece, Spain and Portugal 
• a detailed analysis of practices used to tax insurance services across the EU Member 
States, an area totally neglected in the academic literature. 
The above work contributes to the argument that in the field of indirect taxation of 
financial services (including insurance services) we are far away from achieving the goal 
of tax harmonisation, which does not serve the aims of Single Market. In addition, for 
fiscal policy issues we confirm that a reform of the indirect taxation of financial services 
(e.g. abolishing of financial exemptions and applying VAT on financial services) could 
contribute to total tax revenues. The final outcome here is a proposed transitional special 
regime for taxing financial services under the VAT system, applicable and worthy for 
further study. 
IX 
Thesis outline 
A brief outline of the structure of the thesis is sho\YI1 in the Figure 1. The thesis is divided 
in four sections with ten chapters. The first section deals with the concept of VA T and the 
indirect taxation of financial services by reviewing the existing literature (both theoretical 
and empirical); the second section with the research methodology and research design; the 
third with the empirical research and data analysis, while the fourth section includes the 
conclusions and recommendations. An overview of chapters 1 to 10 is presented next. 
Figure 1: Thesis Outline. 
PART L Literature review 
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..... 
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Chapter 4 
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Chapter 5 
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.. .. 
Chapter 8 Chapter 9 
Causal relationships in fiscal policy in The effects of consumption and 
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on total tax revenues and expenditures 
I I 
PART IV Conclusions 
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~ 
Main findings: Theoretical implications, I AT implications and proposed solutions, 
Research limitations, Future research. 
Xl 
Overview of the chapters 
Chapter 1: Study of the literature on taxation offinancial sen'ices 
This chapter addresses the significance and problems of financial ser;ices' taxation. It 
provides the theoretical background to the study based on the academic literature. In 
addition, the importance of the V A T treatment of financial services is also examined as 
well as the practical problems of the application of V AT on financial services. A critical 
review of these theoretical and empirical studies contribute to the formulation of research 
questions and guide the research methodology. 
Chapter 2: The structure of VAT and European VAT harmonisation: The impact on 
financial services taxation 
In this chapter we identify the principles of the VAT system applied in ED Member States, 
and the methods of computation including the new approaches developed. Our aim here is 
to explain relevant developments in the ED VAT systems and the need for V AT 
harmonisation in the Single Market. This allows us to investigate at a later stage the 
implication of VAT harmonisation on the taxation of financial services. 
Chapter 3: The VAT system in the Greek tax structure 
This chapter provides the necessary background to understand the main features of the 
Greek tax system. It begins with the special characteristics and components (categories of 
taxes) of the Greek tax system justifying the choice of Greece as a focus in our research as 
well. Then the chapter describes briefly the taxes applied in Spain and Portugal in order to 
facilitate our comparisons by identifying the similarities in their indirect tax system. 
Finally we describe the functional structure of taxation in Greece, with a preliminary 
review of the data (relation between direct and indirect taxes, evolution and recent 
developments etc.). 
Chapter 4: Research methodology 
This chapter presents the methodological considerations to be taken into account for this 
research. It depicts the most appropriate methods of data collection and analysis as being 
the National Accounts method, econometric analysis and secondary research for the study' 
of the applied legislation in Greece and ED. Finally this chapter states the research focus, 
objectives, research questions and theoretical concepts of this study . 
.. 
XlI 
Chapter 5: Comparative study of the indirect taxation offinancial services in EU. Studt' of 
legislation and identification ofdistortioJZs 
In this chapter we study the applied legislation in order to e\'aluate the current indirect tax 
system used to tax a wide range of financial services (including insurance services) in 
Greece and to compare it with those used in other Member States (including Spain and 
Portugal). Our aim in this part of the study is to identify the main differences between the 
Greek and other ED tax systems as well as the major distortions within and across those 
systems. The data have been "content" analysed in order to study the selected areas such as 
the scope and the liability of taxation of financial services (including insurance) and 
instruments. 
Chapter 6: The economic effects of taxation: The impact on total tax revenues of taxing 
financial services under the Greek VAT system 
This chapter analyses the total revenue effect of removing the financial exemptions in the 
Greek VAT system. The analysis of the data has been carried out by using an input-output 
method ("National Accounts approach") modified as necessary to reflect the special 
characteristics of the Greek VAT system and data availability. Our aim in this chapter is to 
compare the present V AT exemption of financial services with a hypothetical benchmark 
case of taxing them as well as the estimation of the total fiscal revenue loss, including the 
estimation of the inputs of financial institutions in Greece. 
Chapter 7: The variability of consumption and financial taxes 1lI Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. Estimation of elasticities and average effective rates 
Our focus in this chapter is to empirically examine with special reference to Greece, but 
comparing the results with those derived in the case of Spain and Portugal, the revenue 
productiveness and the elasticity of VAT, consumption and indirect financial taxes on Net 
National Income. In addition our results have been enriched with the calculation of the 
average effective rates of consumption and indirect financial taxes as well. The period of 
estimation is from 1965 to 1998 for consumption and indirect financial taxes and from 
1986 to 1998 for VAT. Finally, the key features of VAT (VAT base and VAT rates) and 
the impact of exemptions have also been examined. The main method for data analysis in 
this chapter is the use of econometrics (time-series analysis by using the OLS technique). 
Xlll 
Chapter 8: Causal relationships in fiscal policy in Greece, Spain and Portugal: TIle 
effects of consumption and indirect financial taxes on total tax revenues and expenditures 
In this chapter we examine the impact on total tax revenues and expenditures of indirect 
taxes applied in Greece over the period 1965-1998 and over 1965-1999 for Spain and 
Portugal. We examine the causal relationships among the average total tax rate of the 
economy, and consumption and financial taxes as well as between expenditures and the 
aforementioned taxes and how they interact in a system. We employ a multivariate time-
series methodology (Johansen methodology) to test for long run trends and causality 
between the above variables. Finally we investigate the long run stability of the indirect 
tax system by examining the impact of the introduction of V AT in the tax systems of the 
above mentioned countries. 
Chapter 9: The effects of consumption and indirect financial taxes on growth ill Greece, 
Spain and Portugal 
In this chapter we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between indirect taxes 
(consumption and indirect financial taxes) and economic growth over the period 1965-
1999 in Greece, Spain and Portugal (for Greece over the 1965-1998 period) in order to 
assess not only the validity of previous conclusions but also to investigate the direction of 
causality between indirect taxes and growth. Our approach here is to consider, in a 
cointegrating V AR framework, the effects of these taxes on growth and its micro-
components such as investment and employment. 
Chapter 10: Conclusions and recommendations 
The concluding chapter 10 brings together the issues, concepts, and findings of chapters 1 
to 9. The findings are linked to the already existing knowledge, which allows conclusions 
to be formulated on the indirect taxation of financial services as well as implications for 
the existing tax system. It proposes a new special regime for taxing financial services 
under the VAT system in Greece and provides recommendations for the existing 
implications on competition from the indirect financial taxes. Finally, this chapter also 
outlines the limitations of this thesis and suggests further concrete steps for future 
research. 
Xl\, 
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE STUDY ON THE TOPIC. 
1.1 Introduction 
A logical starting point in looking at the issue of VAT and financial services is to consider 
first the reasons for and the merits of a value-added tax (V AT) and then to identify and 
describe the nature of financial services' taxation issues. 
This chapter considers some of the approaches used and the conclusions reached in the 
literature (empirical and theoretical) on this topic. We start with a general overview of the 
theories on optimal taxation and VAT justification, and then we look at the specific issues 
of financial services taxation isolating the relevant problems. This will help us to prepare 
the ground for the empirical analysis, which will follow. 
1.2 The optimal commodity taxation 
1.2.1 The basic framework 
The research on optimal taxation is based on some basic ideas that deal mainly with the 
criteria for optimality, the specification for social welfare, the modelling of disincentives 
and the problems of application. However the level of abstraction of much of the research 
together with the extensive use of mathematical models cast many doubts on its practical 
value (Heady, 1993). 
Many economists since the time of Adam Smith have discussed the effects of taxation on 
the economy. They often tried to describe and define what they regarded as desirable 
characteristics of a tax system. Smith (1776) mentioned four qualities with regard to taxes 
in general: 
• Equality: Peoples' tax payments should be in proportion to their income 
• Certainty: Tax liabilities should be clear and certain rather than arbitrary 
• Convenience of payment: Taxes should be collected at a time and in a mamler that is 
convenient for the tax payer, and 
• Economy in collection: Those taxes should not be expenSl\'e to collect from the 
administrative point of view, and should not discourage business by creating 
disadvantages and distortions. 
In the economic literature the first and and last assumptions have absorbed the mam 
attention of the researchers. However Smith's criteria of equality was the basis of a history 
of differing views of what constitutes a fair and equal distribution of tax burden 
(Musgrave, 1959). 
In general the taxation proposals in the literature have been analysed in terms of the 
following criteria: 
• the need for taxes to be fair (although fairness is interpreted differently by different 
researchers) 
• the need to minimise the administrative and compliance cost and 
• the need to minimise disincentive effects (Heady, 1993). 
The approach of the optimal taxation literature is to use economic analysis to combine the 
above criteria into one, implicitly deriving the relative weights that should be applied to 
each criterion. Diamond and Mirrless, (1971) have done this by using the concepts of 
individual utility and social welfare (which depends on individual utility). It is typically 
assumed that social welfare decreases as inequality of utility increases. By this, the concept 
of social welfare reflects one idea of fairness in the tax system. This means that taxes are 
fair if they reduce the degree of inequality. All of the above-mentioned criteria have 
been incorporated in optimal taxation literature because they affect peoples' utility, and 
hence social welfare, and so the policy that should be chosen is the one that gives the 
highest level of social welfare. Therefore, researchers have been trying to determine the 
tax system that will provide the best compromise between equality and efficiency. 
However they neglect to discuss the administrative costs of tax systems (second criterion 
above) which is recognised as a major shortcoming of much of the literature on taxation 
(Heady, 1993). 
The optimal tax system is seen in the literature as the one in which there are no 
possible reforms that will increase welfare (Ahmad and Stern, 1991; Kay. 1990). 
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In other words the optimal tax system will be the one where it is impossible to 
increase social welfare without reducing overall tax revenues. 
The requirement to raise a specific amount of tax revenues is obviously fundamental. This 
has implications. First it means that the solution to the optimal tax problem will depend on 
the size of the revenue requirement. Second it means that all tax reforms should be neutral. 
The importance of this point is that the optimal taxation literature divides the effect of a 
tax change into an "income effect" (after tax income) and a "substitution effect" (change in 
marginal return to work). These two effects go in opposite directions regarding the labour 
supply. The majority of authors in the optimal taxation literature discuss the optimal 
income taxation (linear and non-linear) (Diamond and Mirrless, 1971). However, there is 
less interest in optimal commodity taxation (indirect taxation) in the literature which, 
is mainly concerned with the design of final sales taxes, such as value-added tax and 
excise duties, as well as the taxation of intermediate goods (Kay, 1990). 
1.2.2 Taxing income versus taxing consumption in optimal tax theory 
It is conventional to distinguish direct from indirect taxation. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines an indirect tax as "one which is not levied directly on the person on 
whom it ultimately falls". In common usage, the distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes reflects two different aspects of tax structures, which, though related, are themselves 
distinct. These are the choice between taxes on income and taxes on consumption. The 
first analysis of an optimal sales tax was undertaken by Ramsey (1927). Ramsey analysed 
the problem of designing sales taxes to raise a given amount of revenue at the least 
possible distortionary cost to the economy. Ramsey showed that when only a very small 
amount of revenues had to be raised, the taxes should produce equal proportional 
reductions in the consumption of each good. Thus, the change in the income compensated 
demand for each commodity should be such that if the derivatives of these compensated 
demand functions were constant, the proportionate reductions in demand would be the 
same for all commodities (Kay, 1990). This has been formulated as an inverse elasticity 
rule: impose higher taxes on goods for which the own-price elasticity of demand is 
low. Ramsey's analysis illustrates that if there were no distribution issues for the 
goven1ment, it would be appropriate to raise taxes principally by direct methods, and it is 
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largely because there are such distributional questions that the need for commodity 
taxation arises. Diamond and Mirrless, (1971) suggested that in two-goods case, optimal 
commodity taxation involve the imposing of a heavier tax on the good that is most 
complementary to leisure. In addition this showed that the introduction of distributional 
considerations alters the equal proportion reductions substantially. The goods which are 
consumed particularly by the low-income groups should face a lower than average 
proportional reduction. In the case of independent demands Diamond and Mirrless, (1971) 
suggested that the optimal tax rate on a good should depend not only on the inverse of its 
price elasticity of demand but also on its income elasticity, which indicates how the budget 
share of a good changes as the income rises. 
In addition introducing distributional considerations into the theory of optimal commodity 
taxation, Diamond and Mirrless (1971) demonstrated an important result about the 
desirability of production efficiency. They showed that even considerations of income 
distribution might justify the use of distortionary taxes on the supply of factors of 
production or the consumption of final goods. However, they did not justify any distortion 
to the way in which production is organised. It follows from this that the case against 
indirect taxes on intermediate goods (other than those implied on externality or other 
market failure considerations) is strong, and that commodity taxes should, as far as 
possible, fall only on final consumption. 
Indirect taxes, whether imposed on particular commodities or on consumption in general, 
may be implemented in various ways. Broad commodity categories may be taxed at either 
wholesale or retail level. But as traditional patterns of distribution have broken down and 
services have come to take a larger share of consumer expenditure, wholesale taxes have 
encountered increasing problems of administration (they do not satisfy the second criterion 
laid down by the optimal taxation literature). Retail sales taxes have always proved more 
difficult to operate than those collected at earlier stages of the production process. Thus an 
invoice based VAT seems to be in accordance to the general principles of the optimal 
commodity taxation (taxing the final consumption and not the intermediate goods), 
having a positive impact on the efficiency of tax system (expressed as a direct 
function of total tax revenues), (Nava, 1996). HO\\,ever, Dayis and Kay, (1997) 
measuring the impact of taxation on income distribution, showed that what matters is not 
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the progressivity of each individual tax, but the progressivity of the tax system taken as a 
whole. They suggested that the contribution of VAT to the overall progressiyity is small 
relative to that of income tax. This observation is often used to support the argument 
that a shift from direct to indirect taxes is regressive. However according to their study 
the correct inference is not that income tax is to be preferred to V AT, but that income tax 
is a more effective means of achieving progressivity than VAT (more effective in pursuing 
distributional goals). Finally they have shown that an extension of the VAT base combined 
with substantial increases in the income tax threshold and in social security benefits, 
would actually achieve the distributional goals in accordance to the optimal commodity 
taxation more effectively. 
In conclusion, the above arguments do not question the basic principles of optimal 
commodity tax theory; an invoice credit VAT still satisfies the above principles by tn:ring 
final consumption and not intermediate or investment goods. 
1.2.3 The economic effects of consumption taxes 
We can summarise the economic effects of consumption taxes in the following four broad 
categories: 
• The effects on prices and inflation 
According to the proponents of consumption taxes, the conventional doctrine is that a 
general ad volorem tax on sales, and hence the VAT, is assured to be shifted forward to the 
ultimate consumer through a rise in prices of consumption goods (Sullivan, 1966). 
Assuming full employment and the collection of the tax by the government, the procedure 
of financing government expenditures through such taxation is apparently supposed to 
operate in the following manner: under a purely competitive economic system, the tax will 
raise the marginal costs of businesses making some production unprofitable at current 
prices. To restore profits, the businesses reduce output thus freeing resources for 
government use. Given the employment of these resources by the government and, 
therefore, probably the same aggregate demand for consumer's goods despite a smaller 
output, the average price level of consumer's goods will rise by the amount of the tax. 
Under imperfect competition, similar results are achieved through direct action by taxable 
5 
persons who, with the use of average cost techniques, are expected to raise the prices by 
the amount of the tax. In the absence of full employment, the tax is expected to aggravate 
the situation by freeing private factors payments for governmental use when many factors 
are already not used (Musgrave, 1953). Although it seems reasonable to assume that a tax 
on consumption goods will be largely shifted forward to consumers through a rise in 
product prices and that a tax on investment goods will be similarly shifted forward to 
purchasers of investment goods, some economists (Zacharopoulos, 1980; James and Nobe, 
1987; Cnossen and Shoup, 1987) have contended that, when the government imposes a 
sales tax, it may actually obtain its revenues from reductions in factors incomes or 
backward shifting rather than increases in product prices. Whether a tax is imposed 
directly on factor incomes or indirectly through increases in product prices it will have 
further repercussions on factor incomes and employment. However, some temporary 
unemployment is presumably to be expected with any taxes, which reduce private 
spending or cause shifts in relative demands for various products. 
In general, to curb inflation, a tax must reduce aggregate demand to a greater extent than 
the aggregate supply of goods and services, and do so within a fairly short period of time. 
A consumption tax may be more deflationary than an income tax if it impedes 
consumption expenditures more than the income tax, and, in short run, even control 
investment spending to a greater degree because of its indirect discouragement to 
investment. On the other hand, income taxes may be more deflationary on the grounds that 
there is little difference between an income tax, even a progressive one, and a regressive 
tax in their short-run effect on consumer spending, while income taxes, especially highly 
progressive ones, may reduce investment expenditures to a much greater extent than 
consumption taxes. Taxes levied on commodities and services are not equivalent to 
inflation though, in contrast to direct income taxes, they raise prices. They resemble 
inflation only to the extent that they have secondary repercussions on factor incomes, or if 
they do not succeed in adequately reducing the quantity of products demanded relative to 
the supply. If inflationary pressures are so great that prices rise by the amount of the tax 
and the same quantities are sold as before while supply has not increased to any extent 
then the tax has failed to curb the inflation. Finally, if a tax is to be an anti-inflationary 
device, it must not seriously reduce the supply of labour (by decreasing the ability or 
willingness of workers to produce). Taxes which reduce the labour supply may be 
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inflationary because the drop in production is likely to be immediate, while the marginal 
prospenity to spend being less than one, demand will fall off less than supply. In other 
words the decline in spending will be less than the reduction in disposable incomes 
resulting from reduced labour supply to the extent that purchases are made out of past 
savings. The appraisal of alternative tax measures on the basis of this criterion is even 
more difficult than determining their effects on aggregate demand. This suggests that if 
two taxes are capable of raising the same amount of revenue, the more equitable one is 
preferable even ifless deflationary (Cnossen and Shoup, 1987). 
• The effects on allocation of resources 
A neutral tax may be defined as one which has no effect on the allocation of an economy's 
resources. A completely neutral levy has yet to be discovered, even hypothetically. One 
way in which a tax modifies the allocation of resources is through its effects on the 
incentive to work or, in other words, its influence on the taxpayer's choice between work 
and leisure. This influence, as we stated before, operates through the "income" effect on 
one hand and the "substitution" (relative price) effect on the other. The "income" effect 
increases the incentive to work by lowering the marginal utility of "leisure". The 
"substitution" or relative price effect operates through a reduction in the reward for each 
marginal unit of work. This works in the direction of reducing the incentive to work by 
lowering the marginal utility of additional income. A regressive tax, and hence a 
consumption type sales tax must by definition have a regressive income effect. The 
stimulus to work will be greater, the lower the income level. Meanwhile the substitution 
effect will depress work to a smaller degree at all income levels than in the case of a 
proportional income tax and especially a progressive income tax (Sullivan, 1966). In 
summary a regressive redistribution of the tax burden is inescapable with the consumption 
taxes. Greater regressivity, nevertheless, cannot itself provide the basis for claiming higher 
tax revenues, as the average indirect tax burden of the economy stands unaffected. Another 
mechanism should be devised to mitigate any injustices created by the consumption tax. 
Income redistribution through more progressive direct personal taxation, increased transfer 
and social insurance payments and so on, can effectively work towards restoring the 
balance (Dalamagas, 1978). 
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Finally, Bleaney, Gemmel and Kneller, (2001), examining alternative classifications and 
desegregation of taxes and expenditures, classified consumption taxes as non-distortionary 
if the utility function does not contain leisure as an argument. With leisure as an argument 
in the utility function, consumption taxes will have some impact by distorting the labour-
leisure choice. In addition since the income and substitution effects operate in opposite 
directions in the choice between labour and leisure, the impact of consumption taxation on 
labour input may in practice be small. 
• The effects on savings 
Under normal circumstances the volume of savings will depend on the size of income, the 
interest rate, the general price level, individuals' time preferences and random variables. 
The size of the interest rate determines to some extent the volume of savings to be 
attracted. The higher it is the stronger is the incentive to forgo present consumption for 
accumulation or future consumption at a given income. The economic literature suggests 
(Dalamagas, 1978; Tait, 1991) that, in theory, the savings of middle income groups will 
tend to rise upon the introduction of a sales tax. There are reasons, however for doubting 
whether this would occur in reality. There have been very few empirical studies. First of 
all it is doubtful whether the prices of the goods bought mainly by the middle-income 
earners would actually fall, as they suggested, because of the lighter tax burden or whether 
the latter would be neutralised in the form of higher prices net of tax. Secondly the price 
changes might work in the opposite direction, i.e. towards dissaving. Actually, price falls 
may become a powerful stimulus for consumers to tum their preferences to higher quality, 
higher-priced manufactured goods (consumer durables). Thirdly, second-order effects may 
interfere. For example, any deflationary effect of the price level may be outweighed by a 
strong inflationary tendency (or by money illusion), so that the savers might eventually be 
met with smaller surpluses. In addition rises in the price level, with money (nominal) 
income fixed, may tend to reduce the saving capacity of the taxpayers. This tendency may 
be counter balanced however, as inflation is reflected in interest rates and rates of return on 
investment. 
• The monetary effects of consumption taxes 
Quite aside from growth effects, a consumption tax can have destabilising short-run effects 
on aggregate demand and the monetary sector. An increase in such a tax reduces the real 
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amount of goods which a consumer can purchase and hence reduces their real 
expenditures. In this respect, a VAT or a sales tax has a similar effect on disposable 
income and hence consumption and aggregate demand, as does an income tax \"ia its effect 
on expenditures. 
There are, however, two opposing monetary effects of a consumption tax of either form. 
First, it drives a wedge between the price consumer's pay and the price producers receive 
for a consumer good. Holding producer prices constant a consumption tax, as we 
mentioned above, directly increases consumer's prices and hence reduces the purchasing 
power of the money balances that consumers hold. This can be viewed as decreasing the 
real money supplied in the economy. This tends to increase interest rates, decrease 
investment and hence aggregate demand (Holmes, Smyth and Hutton, 2000). Yet there 
also exists a tendency for the demand for transactions balances to decrease as the tax 
increases via its effect on expenditures. This tends to reduce disposable income and hence 
consumption expenditures, transactions demand and liquidity preference. This second 
monetary channel per se, leads to a lower interest rate and hence increased investment 
expenditures and aggregate demand. The question then is which monetary effect is 
dominant: the decrease in transaction demand or the decrease in the supply of real money 
balances? This is an empirical issue. However, it should be of particular concern to policy 
makers because, if an increase in a consumption tax decreases real money supply more 
than transactions demand in addition to directly reducing consumer expenditures via its 
effect on real disposable income, this will be highly contractionary either when considered 
in isolation or in conjunction with a decrease in income tax. 
1.3 The theoretical justification of the tax on value added 
There is more than one concept of value added, and the theories or, rather, hypotheses used 
to justify that the tax should be related to the type of measure employed. Hence it is logical 
to suppose that the incidence and the effects of the levy will vary with the nature of the tax 
base. The first proponents of the tax and their followers have recommended types of value 
added taxation which may be classified as "production taxes" in the sense of levies on the 
total value of a business's product with deductions limited to purchases on current 
account from outside businesses and possibly depreciation. The tax would apply to the 
final output of both producers' and consumers' goods or, in other \\ords, to items 
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purchased by investors or savers as well as ultimate consumers (Colm, 1939; Grm'es, 
1948; Studenski, 1941). On the other hand, a consumption type tax or strictly speaking "a 
sales tax" has been recommended so that the levy is imposed only on sales for ultimate 
consumption or, in other words, items purchased by ultimate consumers. 
The hypotheses used to justify the production-type measures may be classified as follows 
(Studenski, 1941; Sullivan, 1966): 
• The cost-of-service variant of the general-benefit theory 
• The social-expediency theory 
• The general-welfare theory 
In justifying consumption-type measures, emphasis has generally been placed on the 
stimulation of investment and the neutrality of the tax with respect to various methods of 
production, especially the absence of discrimination against capital expenditures, 
sometimes as compared with net profits taxation and sometimes as compared with no tax 
situation. Under the older hypotheses for taxation, the neutrality criterion represents a 
subdivision of the social expediency theory (Sullivan, 1966). 
The first of the above hypotheses maybe explained as follows: 
In rendering services of general benefit to business, the government functions in the same 
way as private producers, and should recover the cost of these services through business 
taxes. Value added by the individual firm provides an objective index of the concern's 
relative utilisation of these services. Therefore, it is fair to recoup such governmental costs 
according to the value added. 
The second hypothesis is based on the earlier proponents of the VAT who invoked 
considerations of expediency in support of their proposed measures (Studenski, 1941). 
Studenski subdivides the "social expediency theory" into: a) "fiscal" b) "political" and c) 
"economic" expediency. The "fiscal principle" emphasises the facility with which a tax 
produces revenue and its administrative convenience. The "political principle" supports 
taxes, which seem least unpopular, such as hidden taxes. The "economic principle" is 
concerned with the neutrality of a tax measure in terms of the incidence of factors of 
production or the distribution of income and wealth. 
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The third hypothesis may be summarised as follows: 
Most public expenditures represent an inseparable mixture of benefits to producers and 
consumers. However, there is a good reason to believe that the benefits may be allocated 
among individuals in proportion to their respective incomes. Hence, the cost of such 
services should be covered by a proportional tax on individual incomes. However. this 
hypothesis does not exclude recourse to indirect taxation to contribute to cost recovery for 
public services. 
Finally according to the above-mentioned theories of justification, in principle, the general 
turnover tax and the value added tax should also be imposed on services. 
It should be recalled here that even the early proponents of the tax considered clea7'~v that 
the exemption of services discriminates in favour of labour rendered in conjunction with 
such services as compared with labour rendered in the production of commodities (Due, 
1950). 
A substantial reason for the exemption of services is, according to the above mentioned 
justifications, the administrative difficulty of taxing them (identification of the tax liable 
person, the place of supply, taxation of professional services etc) and the use of the 
measure to remove the regressivity of VAT for those countries that want to maintain 
progressive tax systems. 
1.4 The general theory of VAT application and the concept of financial services 
Indirect taxes- whether imposed on particular commodities or on consumption in general-
may be implemented in various ways. An invoice based VAT -the common model used by 
the EU Member States as well-is charged on gross output. Tax levied on inputs, which are 
purchased from other registered traders, may be deducted on computing liability. V ATt 
thus provides a systematic mechanism for taxing final consumption while relieving 
transactions in intermediate goods. A comprehensive framework, which has formed 
I Historically the European VAT system was pioneered in France, which introduced a value added type of 
consumption tax on goods in 1954, levied at the production stage. In 1968, this tax was merged with the 
existing tumover tax on services and a local tax on retail sales into a single, comprehensive levy extending 
through the retail stage. In the following decade, the other original Member States of the EU adopted the 
V A T. Since the tax was made a condition for membership, the ne\\' entrants to the EU introduced it as \\ell. 
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the basis of subsequent analysis of the above issues, is that of Diamond and .l\-Iirrlees, 
(1971). An important conclusion of their analysis is that there is a strong case against 
indirect taxes on intermediate goods (other than those implied by externality or other 
market failure considerations), and that commodity taxes and especially "AT should, 
as far as possible, fall only on final consumption. In addition to being neutral with 
respect to foreign trade, the V AT does not distort domestic production and distribution. In 
particular, in analysing the effects of taxation in open economies, there is an important 
distinction between source or origin-based taxes and those which have a destination base. 
A broad-based tax may be charged by reference to the place of consumption (destination 
principle) or the location of production (the origin principle). Although it is typically the 
case that income taxes are levied on the origin principle and consumption taxes on a 
destination basis, there is nothing inherent in the structure of these taxes that requires this 
result. The practical equivalence of indirect taxes, consumption taxes and destination basis 
taxes is, however, reinforced by GATT/WTO rules, which seek to restrict the degree to 
which direct taxes may be refunded on exports. The opportunity to shift the tax system 
from an origin to a destination basis, thus stimulating exports and discouraging imports, 
has been put forward as an argument for the adoption of V AT in many of the countries, 
which have introduced this tax (Kay, 1990). 
A perceived merit of the V AT, as we mentioned above, is that the zero-rating of exports 
fulfils the requirements of the destination principle, in a simple and systematic way, while 
other indirect taxes tend to fall at least in part on exported commodities. The question of 
whether intra-community traded products should be taxed according to the origin or the 
destination principle has been much debated in the literature over the last forty years. A 
number of authors (Dosser, 1967; Shibata, 1967; Shoup, 1969; Whalley, 1979; Grossman, 
1980; Berglas, 1981; Georgakopoulos and Hitiris, 1992; Lockwood, Meza and Myles, 
1995) drawing on recent theoretical results concerning the equivalence of destination and 
origin principle have presented different findings. Although the above theoretical results 
are sufficient they do not eliminate the problem of the taxation of services (i.e. 
financial services) in intra-community trade. However, the academic literature has 
emphasised all the underlying theoretical principles in order for tax administrations to 
design a V AT structure that includes services and especially financial services. This is 
mainly driven by considerations of equity and tax neutrality (influenced by the optimal 
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taxation theory). As defined by Gillis (1987) neutrality in the value added taxation of 
financial institutions has four components: 
• Neutral treatment of financial services, relative to other goods and seryices 
• Neutrality among all types of financial institutions 
• Neutrality among businesses that specialise in financial services and other 
businesses which provide financial and other services, and 
• Neutral treatment between foreign and domestic financial institutions. 
Henderson (1988) on the other hand argues that the base for VAT should be as broad as 
possible. According to her, the general theory of VAT application is in favour of a 
broad base because that improves the neutrality of the tax. If some goods and services 
are exempt from the tax while others are taxed, the tax tends to change the relative prices 
of these two categories of goods and services. This would distort household and business 
purchasing decisions. Also, a broad-based tax tends to raise more revenues for a given tax 
rate both because it has wide statutory coverage and because it closes off opportunities for 
taxpayers to restructure transactions so as to minimise tax payments. Under these 
principles, Henderson argues that VAT should cover financial intermediaries. However 
she recognises the administrative difficulties, the conceptual confusion in the literature in 
identifying these services, and the concern that taxation would inadvertently discourage 
saving. On the other hand, Garber and Raboy (1989) argue that financial institutions serve 
as intermediaries to the actual parties of financial transaction. This intermediation service 
has definitely value, which an institution's customers are willing to pay for, either directly 
or indirectly. According to the general theory of VAT application it is this value which 
must be isolated for consumption tax purposes. 
The main conclusion of this section is that the general theory of VAT application is in 
favour of a broadly applied VAT base including financial services (researchers are 
influenced by the optimal commodity tax theory). 
1.5 The economics of applying VAT on financial services 
In general term the value-added tax is levied on the following base: 
Y=C+S, where Y is capital and non-capital income, C is current consumer expenditures on 
Goods and services, and S is savings, as in the traditional national income accounting b 
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relationship. Tax on value added as expressed in the equation may be one of two types. It 
may be the gross product type, where firms are liable to pay tax on sales, but capital 
purchases and economic depreciation are not deductible. In this sense, the gross product 
type of V AT taxes both consumption and savings, given that in capital markets 
equilibrium, investment equals savings. Alternatively, VAT as a consumption t~ pe tax, is 
applied only on consumption of goods and services, and not on investment (savings). 
To show how the above equation differs under these two types of taxation, the aboye 
equation may be restated as follows (Hoffman, 1988): 
Y=wages+returns to capital, or Y=wages+interest+dividends+net capital gains. If there 
is no growth in the economy, then national income will simply consist of payments to 
labour and capital, and capital gains will be zero. In the longer term however, assuming 
perfect competition, with free entry and exit into industries, economic profits will in theory 
be driven to zero by competitive forces and capital will earn only its "normal" return 
(Hoffman, 1988). Since the difference between a firm's sales and purchases \vill equal its 
payments to the factors of production it employs, the basic equation may also be restated to 
show value added as: VA =revenues-expenses-true economic depreciation, if savings are 
removed from the base. Summing this relationship across all transactions in the economy 
gives the total value of consumer expenditures (capital goods are exempted from the tax). 
This formula as a tax base of a consumption type V AT will capture the real transactions in 
the economy but the financial services would be excluded. To include them, the cash-flow 
base must be expanded to encompass the value added on both the financial services and on 
real transactions as follows: 
VA =revenues-non wage expenditures-capital expenditures+financial income (di\'idends, 
interest, and capital gains)-financial costs (dividends paid, interest expense, capital 
losses)-purchases offinancial assets (net of sales offinancial assets). 
Conceptually this treatment could be applied to all financial institutions in the economy. 
In theory, this treatment would be correct, since many firms, while not usually thought of 
as financial institutions, in fact create value added in the economy by producing financial 
services. The above-mentioned basic theoretical concepts were the underlying 
principles which formed the Canadian view (Canadian proposal. 1987) for taxing 
financial services under a consumption type VAT. This view appears to be also a 
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turning point for the European VAT literature (EC proposals and studies. 1996b). 
The Canadian view is that since financial services add value to the economy they 
should be taxed following the above equations, and that to do otherwise under a 
comprehensive VAT would be to deny neutral tax treatment to various types of 
services (Thompson, 1988). 
Furthermore many theoretical studies have looked at the issue of the nature of value added 
in financial services, adopting a number of approaches and viewpoints. Examples of 
studies which consider various aspects of this basic conceptual issue are: Meade, (1978); 
Barham, Poddar, and Whalley, (1987); Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley, (1987); Hoffman, 
(1988); Henderson, (1988); New Zealand, (1988); EC, (1996b); OECD, (1998). Some 
studies have been theoretical in nature, proceeding for example, by assessing how changes 
in assumptions in general equilibrium models can lead to the appearance of value added in 
financial transactions (Henderson, 1988; EC, 1996b). Other studies have been more 
descriptive and institutional in nature, concentrating on the identification of value added in 
particular transactions or by particular types of financial institutions (Canadian proposal, 
1987). However, all of these studies are designed (a) to show that financial flows do in fact 
include elements of value added and (b) to derive ways of identifying or defining this 
value added (Kimbrough, 1989). In the process, the studies invariably result in the 
identification of conceptual and measurement problems. It is of course the existence 
of such problems which is the underlying rationale for exemption for financial 
services in most currently applied VAT systems (i.e. EU VAT system). 
At the most general level, it can be argued that in markets incorporating perfect knowledge 
and no transaction costs, there would be a place for financial securities as claims on the 
cash-flows of various projects. However, there would be no value added in the creation of 
these instruments. One study which summarises this argument is New Zealand"s (Ministry 
of Finance, 1988). Under the assumption of perfect markets in such equilibrium models, 
only real activities create consumable goods and services and hence value added. Under 
such conditions, there would be no argument for general consumption taxes to apply to any 
element of financial flows, because there would be no element of value added incorporated 
in them. However, once transaction costs are included in such general equilibrium 
models, there is value added from the provision of financial services. This can be 
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described in the following fashion" ... institutions which operate in financial markets create 
additional value, because they control the costs of transacting in financial markets and also 
because they help to reduce transactions costs in other markets" (Ministry of Finance Ne\\' 
Zealand, 1988). 
In the literature, (Henderson, 1988) this function is generally referred to as financial 
intermediation and is considered to be the element in financial margins that gives rise to 
value added and which should be subject to a general consumption tax. Several studies 
discuss the nature of intermediation in more general terms: New Zealand, (1988); 
Hoffman, (1988); Henderson, (1988). They identify four main components of financial 
flows: the initial deposit, pure interest payments, the pure risk premiums and any form of 
compensation to the financial institution for the costs incurred in accepting deposits and 
making loans. It is only those components of the flows that represent intermediation 
services that should be taxable. Other parts of the flows that represent more transfers do 
not represent value added and should not be part of the tax base. 
1.6 The theory of incidence and the impact of VAT exemptions 
As we mentioned above, the economic effects of value added tax seem to be well 
understood by now in the academic literature. However, in the relevant literature the 
impact of VAT exemptions (i.e. the financial exemptions applied in EU) on incidence (i.e. 
VAT base) is not adequately investigated (Mc Lure, 1987; Gottfried and Wiegard 1991). 
In most theoretical studies VAT remaining on intermediate or investment goods is 
simply neglected, mainly because nothing has been said about the economic effects of 
this part of VAT. Bovenmberg (1987) seems to be the only theoretical study to assess the 
efficiency effects of VAT exemptions in a general equilibrium context, by relocating the 
V AT remaining on the use of intermediate products under exemption to the final demand 
categories. In all theoretical work the rationale for these exemptions is justified on the 
grounds of either of administrative expediency or equity. 
In addition, according to the theory of VAT incidence, VAT exemptions have to be taken 
into account in the procedure used to estimate the base of the tax. It is not enough to rely 
on data on final sales of exempt goods and services, as it would be for a retail sales tax. 
Additional infon11ation on the economy's productive structure is necessary to take account 
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of the use of taxed inputs by exempt sectors. As a result the procedure to estimate the base 
of VA T when there are significant exemptions can be quite complicated. A VAT without 
exemptions, with zero-rating limited to exports and purchasers of capital goods allowed a 
credit on their tax liability, is a tax on consumption, so that the base of the tax is giyen by 
the value of final sales of consumer goods and services. The theoretical base of the VAT in 
this case may be derived from the following formula (Mackenzie, 1991): 
VAT base=GDP+ Imports-Exports-Gross capital formation (l) 
Analysing now the total value of sales in an economy in both intermediate and final we get 
the following expression: 
Where C stands for the value of final sales of consumer goods and services, I for the final 
sales of capital goods, IS for intermediate sales, and the subscripts d and 111 for 
domestically produced and imported. A VAT without exemptions is levied on all sales, 
both intermediate and final. However, when they are no exemptions, the tax liability 
generated by an intermediate sale is offset by the credit received by the purchaser. When 
purchases of capital goods are treated, as they are in consumption type VAT, as 
intermediate purchases, and exports are zero-rated, the only sales that generate a net tax 
liability are sales to consumers just as in the case of broad-based retail sales tax. Using the 
above way of expressing the VAT base the formula in this case would be: 
Once some industries are exempt, however, it is no longer the case that intermediate sales 
cannot generate a net tax liability. To explore the consequences of exemptions further the 
above formula (2) can be restated as: 
n n 
VAT base=Cd+Id+X+ IIajiQj +Im+Cm, (4) 
i=1 j=! 
where Q denotes the value of gross output of industry i, which produces good j and Gji is 
the input coefficient (the amount of input necessary to produce good j). This formula is 
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derived from the identity of the sum of the intermediate sales of each industry and imports 
of intermediate goods with the value of goods used up in the production process. In this 
new formula the important impact of the exemptions lies in the factor ajiQj- Tamaoka, 
(1994) introduced a price determination model using input-output analysis in order to 
study further the impact of exemptions on the above mentioned factor. According to 
Tamaoka (1994) the following relationship holds for each industry in the economy where 
there is no VAT: 
/I 
Pi=Iajipj+v; (i,j=l, .... ,n) (5) 
j=! 
where Pi is the unit pnce of the product of the i th industry, a ji is the input 
coefficient per unit of output and Vi is the rate of value added per unit of product. In the 
case of V AT under the tax credit method, the tax liability of each industry is the tax on 
sales excluding exports minus the tax on purchases including capital goods. Then we get 
the following expression instead of the equation (5) 
(i,j=l, ... ,n) (6) 
Where r i is the tax rate for the ith industry, e i is the export per unit of output and k ji is 
the investment coefficient per unit of output. For exemption under the tax credit method, 
equation (5) still holds for a tax-exempt industry because it has no VAT liability. For a 
VAT-liable industry however, since it can obtain no credits on inputs purchased from a tax 
exempt industry, (i.e. financial services from a financial institution) the last term on the 
right hand side of equation (6) for a corresponding tax-exempt industry becomes zero 
changing the whole value of the VAT base (equation 4) through changes of the factor ajiQj 
(the basis for cascading the tax to consumers). In general the base of VAT with 
exemptions will be greater than the value added of the taxed sector, and the reduction to 
the base that results from exempting part of the economy is less than the value added of 
the exempt sector. This follows from the relationship that the value added of the exempt 
sector minus intermediate sales to the taxed sector will equal final sales of the exempt 
sector minus intermediate purchases from the taxed sector. As long as intermediate sales to 
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the taxed sector are positive, the reduction to the base entailed by exemptions will be less 
than the value added of the exempt sector. 
The argument of this section has confirmed the view that exempt products (i.e. financial 
services) remain in the base of VAT to the extent that they are sold as intermediate inputs 
(through higher prices) to the taxed sector. This proposition is sometimes used as an 
excuse to limit the base of the VAT which contradicts the basic principles of the optimal 
commodity tax theory (Mackenzie, 1991) (see also thefollowing Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 Aspects ofthe Optimal Tax Theory 
Optimal tax theory 
Taxation on Income 
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Equality 
Fairness 
Distribution goals. 
Tools: 
Consolidated corporate 
tax base 
Exemptions 
Different tax rates. 
Optimal commodity tax theory 
.. 
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Taxing the final consumption 
Efficiency, no indirect taxes on intermediate and 
investment goods. 
Broad based indirect taxes 
Invoice credit VAT. 
The theory of VAT application 
Broad based VA T. including financial 
services. 
The theory of incidence 
Exempt products are remaining in the base of 
VAT creating the "cascade effect". 
1.7 Distortions created by exempting financial institutions from VAT 
There are considerable numbers of problems and distortions that can be identified under 
the current approach to tax financial services (exemption of financial services from V AT). 
The problems can be broken into three broad categories. These are: 
• Economic effects 
• Definition of exempt financial services 
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• Taxation of imported services as inputs to financial institutionsiinternational 
competition (Hoffman, Poddar and Whalley, 1987; EC, 1996b). 
1. 7.1. Economic effects 
In general, these arise, as described in the literature, because the current exemption system 
gives rise to non-neutralities which reduce the efficiency of the economic system (EC. 
1996b; Barham, Poddar, and Whalley, 1987; Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley, 1987; 
Tamaoka, 1994). 
• The cascading of tax on financial services to consumers and the impact on efficiency of 
the VAT system. 
When financial services are provided directly to consumers, under the current tax system 
in ED, tax is not applied on the actual sale to consumers. However, there is no credit for 
any tax on inputs. The exemption thus means that financial services are taxed less heavily 
than other goods and services, because the effective tax rate 2 is determined by the value of 
inputs to financial institutions rather than the value of the final product. In this case there 
will be a tendency to over-consumption of financial services by households with attendant 
welfare losses (Hoffman, Poddar, and Whalley, 1987). 
Jack, (1996) examined the impact of V AT exemptions on the efficiency of VAT system 
and VAT base. He argued that the exemption of certain goods and services from the 
tax (VAT) base has an effect on the average statutory rate, which is difficult to 
measure without detailed information on the tax rates levied at the earlier stages of 
production, and on the share of consumption purchased from exempt businesses. In 
addition he pointed out the "input coefficient" is the important factor to determine the 
average statutory rate for the exempt sector. Therefore, the exempt goods and services 
are taxed less heavily than other goods and services because the effective tax rate as 
well as the average statutory rate is determined by the value of inputs to the exempt 
sector rather than to the value of the final products. 
2 The effective VAT rate (EVR) is defined as the V AT paid on capital expenditure as a proportion of total 
capital expenditure by the sector or more simply the (EVR) can be defined as VAT reYeI1ues VAT base. 
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According to Jack (1996) a method to measure the efficiency with \\·hich V AT laws are 
implemented is to compare the effective V AT rate, t e , with the average statutory 
rate, t s . Specifically, in his study the efficiency is defined as: e=te / t s . As we mentioned 
above in the case of exempted sectors, the value of inputs rather than the value of the final 
products determine the effective VAT rate. In this case the effective VAT rate can be 
calculated from the following formula: 
total capital expenditures 
t = ~:-:-==-=-----=---c----
e V AT base of the sector 
. t d f V AT revenues from the sector 
IllS ea 0 t = ---=-=--:-=-~----=--=------
e V AT base of the sector 
which is relevant for the taxable sectors. 
Furthermore when taxes are imposed on intermediate goods, trade distortions and 
production inefficiencies will occur. Taxes on business property and motor fuel may have 
this effect and so may exemptions within the VAT structure (as a result of the inability of 
business purchasers to reclaim VAT charged on the production of exempt goods or exempt 
financial services) (Kay, 1990). When a financial service is supplied as an intermediate 
step in the production process, that is as business inputs, the claiming of input tax credits 
earlier in the production chain is blocked by the exempt status of the financial service. 
However, the non-creditable tax of the financial institution, as we have already mentioned 
above, will be included in the selling price of non-financial goods and services (Tamaoka, 
1994) which will be subject to VAT on the full sale price. The tax in this case is cascading 
in that it applies on both inputs and the final selling price. Thus, for sales of other goods 
and services, which include financial services as inputs, there is over taxation relative to 
other goods and services. This will tend to lead to under-consumption of goods and 
services incorporating financial services. 
• Self-supply bias 
The exemption for financial services creates an incentive for financial institutions to self-
supply inputs. This provides a means by which input taxes can be avoided in the 
production of financial services. The self-supply bias is not limited to an in- house supply 
of certain inputs. It is, in fact, much broader and includes any substitution of employee 
labour (and other inputs that are exempt of the tax) for other taxable factors of production 
that are acquired from third parties. The exemption system creates a wedge benyeen the 
pre-and post-tax price of labour relative to the price of non-labour inputs. This, in tum, 
results in inefficiencies in the production and delivery of financial services (Hoffman, 
1988). 
• Government revenue implications 
By exempting financial services, government tax revenues are altered from what they 
would otherwise be. However, in a theoretical sense, it is not clear whether revenues will 
be higher or lower as this depends on the relative importance of tax cascading in respect of 
business inputs of financial institutions compared with the failure to tax household 
consumption of financial services. The exemption system results in a net increase in tax on 
financial services provided to businesses (equal to the non-creditable tax on the associated 
inputs of the financial institution) and a net decrease in tax on the services provided to 
households (equal to tax rate times that portion of the consideration for the services that 
represents value added by the financial institution). Overall impact will vary from country 
to country, depending upon the relative weight of the two factors. Even where the overall 
result is a net reduction in tax or loss in government revenues, the impact will vary 
significantly across institutions and types of services. There are several other factors, 
which could have an impact on the overall revenue loss or gain from the exemption 
system. First, to the extent that financial institutions adopt successful tax planning 
strategies in respect of minimising taxable business inputs, the extent of tax cascading will 
be limited. Second, rules such as options to allow financial services to be taxable may lead 
to self-selection effects, which reduce the extent of cascading while the level of tax on 
non-taxable consumer intermediation services is unchanged. Third, international cross-
trading may increase the level of zero-rated services as a proportion of activity in all 
countries. Finally, innovative ways may be found to provide non-financial services as 
incidental or mixed supplies with the financial services or even to substitute financial 
services for non-financial ones (EC, 1996b). 
In conclusion the academic literature is not clear whether the net effect of imposing a 
consumption tax (VAT) on financial services will be positive for government budget. 
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• Allocation of input tax credit 
Because input tax credits are not available in respect of exempt activities, any financial 
institution that carries on either taxable or zero-rated activities will need to allocate their 
sales in some fashion between those that earn input tax credits and those that do not. The 
potential methods of allocation are, in themselves, a significant source of complexity in the 
operation of the exemption system. The problem of a general nature arising from the need 
to allocate input tax credits between taxable and exempt uses will be touched upon also in 
the following chapter about the structure of VAT. Generally speaking the diversity of 
methods for allocating credits may create opportunities for choosing methods which 
allocate more activities to taxable transactions and this may lead to disputes between 
taxpayers and administrators on the appropriateness of the method used. While statutory 
rules or regulations specifying the approach to use can increase certainty, in some cases, 
they can lead to inappropriate results. 
1.7.2 Definition offinancial services 
In order for the exemption system to work, there must be a definition of what constitutes a 
financial service. In practice, there are significant number of areas where there are 
complexities and ambiguities in developing and applying such definitions. 
These main areas are (Ee, 1996b): 
• The identification of financial services 
• The financial services supplied by non-financial businesses 
• The services incidental or supplementary to financial services 
• The mixed supplies 
• The exempt versus zero-rated supplies, and 
• The sale of used assets by financial institutions. 
Taking into account the above-mentioned problems it is important to mention the existing 
definitions in the literature of financial services. Generally speaking the many services that 
financial systems provide can be grouped into five categories: they mobilise an economy's 
resources, they facilitate the transactions necessary to carry on economic exchange and 
trade, they improve risk management by pooling and diversifying the risks faced by the 
providers and the users of funds, they collect and evaluate the information needed to make 
productive investment decisions, and they monitor the behaviour of corporate managers, 
evaluating their performance and compelling them to act in the best interests of the 
firm. Financial institutions are considered to specialise in collecting funds from savers, 
evaluating potentially risky borrowers, and allocating the funds they collect to those uses 
that promise the highest rates of return (Dobson and Jacquet, 1998). A detailed definition 
can be found in the article 13(B)( d) of the Sixth Directive (EC VAT legislation) which 
specifies what is considered as financial service for VAT purposes. The EC V A T 
legislation typically sweeps in all commercial activity, defined on a broad basis, and then 
allows for certain exemptions. Under the Sixth Directive, the above mentioned 
provision/definition was made for exemption of certain transactions of financial 
nature. Only these transactions are included in the above-mentioned definition. 
However, there is not any generic definition of what constitutes a financial service. 
Furthermore the most common definition in the literature IS the following III the 
GATS/WTO/FSA Annex on financial services: 
"A financial service is any service of financial nature offered by a financial servIce 
supplier of a Member. Financial services include all insurance and insurance-related 
services, and all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance)". However, 
this definition has not been in use for other purposes than WTO's agreements on 
international trade. 
The Canadian legislation on the other hand defines a set of financial instruments and 
specifies that services related to such instruments and to money are exempt. However 
actual operation of the above rules lead to the need for more detailed interpretation. For 
example, Revenue Canada, the Canadian tax administrator, has released its interpretation 
of what constitutes financial activities. For trust companies alone, this consists of a list of 
some 240-transaction types with specification as to whether they are considered as taxable 
or exempt (Finance Canada, 1987). This is, in itself, probably indicative of the difficulties 
of drawing precise borders between financial and other activities. 
In the existing literature financial services can be categorised in a variety of ways, e.g. by 
the type of financial instruments or by the type of service provided. The actual services 
that are available in the market generally involve a mix of 1\vo or more of these functions. 
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They are rarely identified in the market place by the functions performed by the financial 
institutions (Meade, 1978). The tax treatment of financial services is also generally defined 
in the taxes statutes by reference to the nature of services actually provided in the market 
place, as opposed to the functional classification (ED study, 1996b). 
The EC study (1996b) and the Sixth VAT Directive categorise the financial services, on 
the basis of how they are packaged and presented in the market place. Five main categories 
are identified: 
• Deposits, borrowing and lending 
• Purchases, sale and issuance of financial securities 
• Insurance 
• Brokerage and other agents services 
• Advisory, management and data processing services. 
On the contrary, the WTO/GATS and the OECDICFA3 categorise the financial services by 
the underlying functions and activities performed by the financial institutions (16 and 27 
activities respectively). 
1. 7.3 International competition 
Financial services supplied by offshore financial institutions have a tax advantage over 
those supplied by domestic institutions. In the case of both households and business firms, 
the services supplied by foreign institutions are free of VAT (either because of zero-rating 
or the absence of VAT in the foreign jurisdiction), while domestic supplies include the 
VAT on the inputs of financial institutions. This creates incentives for foreign supply of 
financial services, which is obviously undesirable from the domestic perspective (Poddar 
and English, 1997). It might be noted that in the case of trading partners where both have 
V AT systems (exempting domestic financial services, zero rating financial services 
exports), there would be an equivalent tax advantage to the domestic financial institutions 
making supplies to the households and business firms in the other country. This is similar 
to the situation where export subsidies create incentives for cross trading internationally. 
1 GECD/ Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
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where foreign suppliers supply each country. This is obviously an inefficient solution from 
the perspective of both countries. 
The EU system of exemption between Member States places all the financial institutions 
on the same footing insofar as there is no rate or structural differences in the tax systems 
among Member States. It is thus more neutral between competing institutions. However, 
this is at the expense of greater cascading tax. Moreover, because of the differences in the 
input tax allocation rules, the deductible proportion of input tax is far from uniform for 
financial institutions located in different Member States (EC, 1996b). 
In conclusion after discussing the distortions created by exempting the finanCial services 
from VAT, we could argue that exemption goes against the basic principles of optimal 
commodity tax theory which advocates no indirect tax on intermediate and investment 
goods. Exemption gives rise to non-neutralities, inefficiencies, and administrative 
problems besides having revenue implications. 
1.8 The existing international evidence of the VAT treatment of financial services 
• European Union 
After three decades of experience with VAT in most EU Member States, satisfactory 
methods for full taxation of financial services have yet to be developed. Rather, practical 
problems in including banking services in the base of V AT have led all ED Member States 
to exempt rather than zero rate, the "core activities" of banks. No ED country attempts to 
apply VAT to such intermediation activities as loans, deposits or security transactions. 
While financial services are, in general, exempt in almost all countries from V AT, there 
are variations in the definition of exempt financial services. Certain services provided by 
financial institutions are explicitly excluded from the scope of the exemption in virtually 
all countries, but not all. An important common characteristic of those services of financial 
nature that are taxable is that they are typically charged on a fee-for-service basis. The list 
of taxable financial services in particular countries may also reflect particular institutional 
anangements in the countries or the structure of predecessor taxes that were replaced by 
the VAT (EC, 1996b). 
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The scope of the exemption for financial services in EU countries is set out in the Sixth 
Directive (article 13(B)(d) of the Directive 77/388/EEC). The Sixth Directive permits 
Member States to allow financial institutions an option to treat financial services as 
taxable supplies. The exercise of this option allows the financial institution to recover the 
tax on inputs. The tax charged by the financial institution on its supplies of financial 
services is recoverable by its business customers where they use the services as inputs to 
other taxable supplies. 
Insurance services are also exempted from the VAT but without any options to tax. The 
use of this option system has been limited in the EU, either because Member States do not 
allow it, or allow it only for a restricted range of financial services. Denmark, Spain, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom do not allow 
the option at all. In Belgium and France, the option is not available in respect of credit 
operations. Germany allows the greater flexibility in the use of the option but many banks 
have chosen not to take it up (EC, 1996b). 
The current EU approach is to exempt financial services supplied to other EU countries. 
For countries outside the EC, zero-rating is applied, with certain exceptions. The rationale 
for zero rating is to place domestic financial institutions on a competitive footing with 
foreign financial institutions, such as those in the United States, which may not be subject 
to any sales taxes on their inputs. However, the major difficulty that arises with respect to 
supplies of financial services to non-residents is to determine the place of supply. In the 
case of financial services, the primary criterion for defining an exported financial service is 
the residence of the person to whom the service is rendered. If the customer is established 
(resident) outside the country, the supply of the service is zero- rated, regardless of where 
the service is rendered. If the customer is a resident of the country, the supply is exempt 
(EC, 1996b). 
Finally it is worth noting here that although EU Member States do not generally attempt to 
apply V AT to financial services, many do impose other forms of indirect taxes on such 
services. In particular all EU Member States have special indirect taxes (other than V AT) 
on insurance sometimes expressed as a percentage of the premium, sometimes as a percent 
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of the value of the policy (Gillis, 1987). However, the structure of these taxes and their 
effects on the revenues and economy has not been addressed in the literature. 
• Non-EU countries 
Israel has been the only country to attempt to apply VAT to a wide variety of financial 
services. However, the VAT imposed on financial institutions in Israel was not of the tax-
credit type where tax liability is computed by subtracting taxes paid on purchases from 
taxes due on sales. Initially a 12% VAT rate applied to the sum of payrolls and profits of 
financial institutions. No offsets were allowed for ordinary V AT paid by financial 
institutions on their purchases (inputs), nor could customers of banking businesses credit 
the "special VAT" against the ordinary VAT due on their sales. But the special VAT on 
financial institutions proved unpractical (Gillis, 1987). The taxable customers could not 
credit the "special VAT" against taxes due on their sales, and financial institutions could 
not use ordinary VAT paid on their purchases as a credit against the special VAT applied 
to their supply of financial services. This addition type of VAT has been abolished in 
1981, and replaced with a separate indirect tax (15% rate), but completely different from 
VAT and is clearly non-creditable by taxable customers. According to Gillis (1987) the 
primary lesson from the Israeli experience seems to be that efforts to apply VAT with 
a different method to financial services while other sectors employ the credit type 
VAT leads to complications with the deduction of input VAT. As we said before the 
solution to the problem in Israel was to ignore the credit problem and to apply a cascade 
indirect financial tax, as many EU Member States. 
Furthermore the VAT treatment of financial Institutions in New Zealand has been a very 
interesting issue when the country introduced VAT in 1986. Although the Government's 
special advisory panel, which included experts from financial sector, proposed that V A T 
be fully applied to all financial services apart from certain insurance services (or 
alternatively to zero rate all financial services) the Government rejected the panel's 
recommendations and introduced exemption of all insurance services. The main variation 
is the treatment of property and casualty insurers, who under the N. Zealand's VAT (GST) 
are taxable on the excess of premiums over claims. Other financial transactions of a 
general insurer are excluded however, in line with the general exemption of financial 
services. In that sense therefore, no new ground was broken. Although the inclusion of 
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financial institutions under the N. Zealand's V AT is not a dead issue there appear to be no 
immediate prospect of change. 
The United States has also put forward various consumption tax proposals in recent years, 
and some consideration was soon given to applying VAT on gross interest charges of 
banks and other lending institutions. However, difficulties were noted in application, and 
none have been implemented so far (Thompson, 1988). 
Finally as we mentioned before, the Canadian proposal (Ministry of Finance, 1987) is an 
important step forward addressing directly the objective of including financial services 
within the scope of credit type VAT. In taking the financial margin as the best measure of 
the value added by financial institutions, the proposal isolates what appears to be the 
proper amount for the services provided, and yet at the same time manages to prevent 
taxation of the return on capital. In the Canadian proposal the tax base is derived from the 
overall results of financial institutions for a year. Accordingly, for many financial services 
it would be difficult to determine the exact amounts of tax applicable to specific 
transactions and to pass these amounts to taxable customers. As a consequence it would 
also be difficult to provide an appropriate credit to taxable customers of financial 
institutions. However, the problem of cascading of tax to the taxable customer has not 
been properly addressed. As the proposal states "it may be that these effects will not have a 
significant economic impact". Aside from these practical considerations, which prevented 
the system to be operational, the Canadian proposal influenced the European Commission 
and OECD in dealing with the problem. Many elements of the Canadian proposal can be 
found in the EU study on financial services (EC, 1996b) and OECD work on financial 
services (OECD, 1998) (i.e. taxing the margin with the development of the cash-flow 
method). 
1.9 The empirical work on indirect taxation of financial services 
1.9.1 Empirical evidence on the feasibility of taxation 
As we have already stated, the special characteristics of financial services make it difficult 
to apply the tax to them under the traditional credit invoice system (consumption type 
V AT). The principal alternatives that have been considered and proposed in the literature 
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(American Bar, 1977; Meade, 1978; Finance Canada, 1987; Hoffman, 1988; EC, 1996b; 
Poddar and English, 1997) are as follows: 
• The traditional credit-invoice method 
• The addition method 
• The cash-flow method 
• The cash-flow method with tax calculation account (TCA) 
• The subtraction method and, 
• The ad-hoc methods 
The credit invoice-method would involve the extension of the general system used for 
other goods and services in almost all-current VAT systems to financial services. The 
addition and subtraction methods refer to alternative methods of calculating value added 
tax, which give identical results to the credit invoice method under certain conditions. The 
former method measures value added by adding up its components, while the latter 
determines it as the difference between purchases and sales. Tax is then applied directly to 
the value-added of each business. The cash-flow method retains most of the characteristics 
of the credit- invoice system, but incorporates special features to recognise the financial 
payments, which are involved in financial transactions. The tax calculation account (TCA) 
is a tax suspense account created to obviate the payment of tax by taxpayers and of credits 
by government in the period cash-inflows and outflows of a capital nature occur. Tax that 
would otherwise be payable/creditable is instead debited/credited to the TCA account and 
carried forward to the period where the capital transaction is reversed. The TCA 
mechanism thus allows deferral of tax on cash inflows and of tax credits for cash outflows. 
However, these deferrals are subject to interest charges at the government-borrowing rate. 
Ad-hoc methods apply taxes to exempt services on a different basis, almost entirely as an 
attempt to offset revenue losses associated with exemption. They make no attempt to bring 
financial services fully into the VAT system. 
What is clear here is that a decision to apply V AT to currently exempt financial services 
cannot be taken simply on the basis of the feasibility of taxation or on the desire to reduce 
exemption to improve the neutrality of VAT. Issues such as the tax revenue implications 
of taxation in a particular tax structure (e.g. a case study of a country), the cost of 
compliance with tax requirements for business and the true potential for competitive 
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distortion in the macroeconomy must also be examined. However~ none of these 
issues are examined in any of the above-mentioned studies. 
Furthermore the financial services sector is a growth industry whose structure is changing 
through institutional consolidation, new forms of alliances and outsourcing. To 
accommodate these growth and structural changes in the financial services sector, many 
countries have taken steps to improve market access to international financial institutions 
by lowering regulatory barriers. Measures that may restrict trade and investment in the 
financial sector and which retard its innovation and adoption of the best production 
methods impose real costs on domestic economies (Sauve', 1999). Conversely. the 
efficiency of providing financial services and the institutional development of the financial 
sector were shown to be positively related to openness. As a result, global trading presents 
a number of challenges to traditional tax principles applied on financial services. In the 
literature, the globalisation of trade and the global trading of financial instruments 
are seen as the main causes for the intensified efforts to identify the best feasible 
methods of taxation of financial services (OECD, 1997a). The OECD, adopting a global 
perspective, has recently issued a report (OECD/CFA, 1998) on the study of the indirect 
tax treatment of financial services. The report is factual and provides information about the 
tax treatment of financial services in OECD member countries, methods of calculation tax 
recovery by institutions, which make both taxable and exempt supplies and a brief 
commentary on findings. The report provides some indications on differences of tax 
treatment of financial services even in ED Member States, although further research 
is necessary to establish evidence on the need for harmonisation of legislation. On the 
other hand in the report there is no firm information available to help determine 
whether any potential advantages from a change to the tax treatment would 
outweigh the costs of making such a change. It might be noted also here that the 
OECD study did not consider the taxation of insurance services and the various taxes 
that already applied on insurance services in ED indicating clearly a lack of a 
European perspective in its aims and design. 
Similarly the European Commission (DG XXI) is now in the process of studying the issue, 
trying to identify feasible methods of taxation of financial ser;ices (Ee, 1996b). As \\C 
said before, the existing option to tax financial services has been exercised, in \'arying 
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degrees, by only three Member States (Gennany, France and Belgium) and has given rise 
to some distortion of competition. In 1987 the Commission (V AT Committee) proposed 
the removal of the option to tax and to make the exemption compulsory. Parliament 
opposed this, and in a resolution in November 1990 proposed to extent the right of option 
to all taxable persons, removing Member States' discretion in the matter. As a result the 
Commission withdrew its original proposal and undertook before the end of the 
transitional period, to submit a report on the conditions of taxation or exemption of these 
transactions. In that context the EC (DG XXI) has launched a series of studies to consider 
other possible methods of taxing such services under V AT system, and finally to test one 
such alternative method in the business environment (EC, 1999a). 
The first study was a general investigation of a number of possible methods, which might 
be suitable for applying VAT to financial and insurance services. The conclusion of that 
study was that the "cash-flow" method was the most promising avenue for further detailed 
research. The two subsequent studies investigated, in considerable detail, the feasibility of 
applying the "cash-flow" method first to financial services and then to insurance services 
and supplies of gold bullion. The reports of these three studies were published by the 
Commission in 1996, the so called "Blue-Book". The Commission has now carried the 
work on the cash-flow method a stage further in order to test its practicability within 
various business environments and to gain infonnation about its potential effects on 
providers of financial and insurance services, on their customers, and, to some extent, on 
markets and revenues. The work in first stage of the pilot testing was of two types: Further 
research and development of theoretical aspects of the earlier studies and the design and 
implementation of a system of pilot testing to be carried out with two volunteer 
institutions, one large bank and one large insurance company, both in the UK. Given that 
no major conceptual problems were identified in the first stage and that the methodology 
of the pilot testing was proved effective4, it was decided to proceed with the next stage 
involving testing of the cash-flow system in a variety of different organisations and under 
the conditions existing in other Member States. Thus a total number of ten pilot tests, three 
of which involved large insurance companies, have now been carried out in six different 
Member States: Gennany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. The 
-+ XXI/99/107S-Working Paper No 284/1999 
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Commission had the final reports on the pilot testing towards the end of 1998, and is now 
in the process of evaluating the results about the feasibility of taxation of financial 
services. However, even if the testing so far has not identified any major obstacles to 
the basic concepts of the cash-flow mechanism there are a number of practical and 
other issues that have arisen and have still to be considered. One is the revenue 
implications of a possible tax reform in the field of indirect taxation of financial 
services in a particular context as we mentioned above. There is also a need to study 
the current system of taxing the financial services in each Member State, including 
the VAT treatment of financial services and analysis of the existing indirect financial 
taxes. 
1.9.2 Empirical work on modelling and measuring the economic effects of financial 
exemptions 
In tax literature there are mainly two approaches to analyse the effects of exemptions on 
VAT base and VAT revenues. The first approach, the so-called "National accounts 
approach", is based on the construction of input-output Ie co nomic tables by using aggregate 
data from National accounts, in order to identify the VAT base, the value added of the 
partiCUlar exempted sector and finally the impact of exemptions on the efficiency of the 
tax system. The second approach is based on disaggregated data from the particular 
exempted sector; it aims at developing methods for measuring the value added on 
transaction-by-transaction basis. Such method, therefore, has to be based on an economic 
theory of the particular exempted sector (e.g. theories of the banking firm), which does not 
always exist. 
Following the first approach (National accounts approach), one can examine the effects of 
V AT on prices of different industries, or measure the fiscal revenue loss when multiple 
rates and measures of exemption are used. In fact these are models of estimating value-
added taxes (V AT base) when there are a number of exempt goods and services in the 
V AT system, by adjusting the GDP for imports, exports and exempt goods or services. 
Most of these models are multisectoral, based on aggregate data. However, this method 
can only be used for forecasting as long as there is no change in V AT rates or goods and 
services affected, since it calculates the economy-wide average rate. This approach 
(National accounts approach) is well known in the V AT literature, and \vas adopted by 
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many researchers in the field of indirect taxation as well (Aguirre and Shome, 1988; 
Mackenzie, 1991; Jack, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Tesche, 1998). Generally speaking the 
advantage of this approach is that allows the calculation of an estimate of value added 
solely on the basis of aggregate volume data. However, in applying the method to financial 
sector the split of value added between depositors and deptors is ad hoc and not based on 
economic factors. 
An input-output table method (following the principles of the National accounts approach) 
was developed also by the OECD/CF A (1998) for analysing the effects of V AT 
exemptions existing in member countries. This method is based on the calculation of the 
total blocked VAT (i.e. the irrecoverable cost incurred by financial institutions) and the 
total yield from the exemption by using National Current Account outputs and National 
Capital Account inputs, and finally a sample survey to estimate the proportion of exempt 
outputs to total outputs of the sector. The calculation is split up into two sections: the first 
is the revenue collected at present by denying the recovery of input tax in respect of 
exempt supplies, and the second is the additional VAT that would be collected by taxing 
financial services at the standard rate of VAT. The first section has three main 
components: 
• Blocked V AT on current expenditure 
• Blocked VAT on capital expenditure and 
• V AT on V AT, the so-called cascade effect. 
Whilst the second has one: 
• VAT on the output (including margins on interest payments) of the financial sector 
The above-mentioned method takes into account the assumption that the effect of jointly 
removing the two exemptions (banking and insurance) is not the sum of removing them 
individually. If for example, insurance only become taxable under the V AT system, then 
there would be some revenue yield from standard rated expenditure by finance on 
insurance. If both exemptions were removed, there would be any yield from this 
expenditure. However, the method in order to be operational, requires a sample suryey of 
financial institutions to estimate the proportion of exempt outputs to total outputs or by 
using the average national recovery rates for financial institutions to establish input tax 
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relating to exempt outputs which are not always available or when they do exist the 
reliability of these figures is uncertain. This method so far has been applied in only one 
case (HM Customs and Excise, 1998). According to the findings of the study, the cost of 
financial exemptions was put for United Kingdom at £104 millions based on 1994 data. 
However, it is important to note that in the estimate of the revenue effect of abolishing the 
financial exemptions the study did not take into account the cascade indirect taxes applied 
on banking and insurance services in United Kingdom, since these taxes would have to be 
abolished and replaced by VAT. 
The alternative approach (use of disaggregated data and identification of value added on a 
transaction by transaction basis) has been developed by Genser and Winker (1997) to 
examine the issue of VAT exemption of banking services in Germany. Using this approach 
it was possible to approximate the fiscal revenue loss of VAT exemption in commercial 
banking based on bank balance sheet and interest rate data. Based on a "real resource 
model" derived from the theories of the banking firm, which regards a bank as a firm 
which maximises its profit for given output and input prices, the authors identified banks' 
outputs and, with the introduction of a benchmark rate, estimated the value added for 
particular financial services. In contrast to the National accounts approach, the value added 
in this study has been explicitly assigned to two relevant sectors i.e. the VAT registered 
firms and VAT exempt private and public households. The fiscal revenue effect has been 
then calculated on a ceteris paribus basis ignoring changes of the input-output structure 
based on the choice of the benchmark interest rate. The focus of the study has been deposit 
and loan services. It split the interest spread into taxable service components rendered to 
lenders and borrowers. A further desegregation was made in respect to taxable customers, 
which are entitled to V AT credits, and public and private households, which are not, 
entitled to any credit. Disregarding other sources of exempt margin services (e.g. foreign 
exchange), the study estimated a net revenue loss of exempting these banking services in 
Germany around 4% of the VAT revenues for the year 1994. The main limitation of this 
study is clearly the concentration on just two main categories of banking services (e.g. the 
credit card, auxiliary services or insurance have been ignored). In addition, the existing 
cascade financial taxes or the revenues from applying the option to tax under the V AT 
system by some financial institutions in Germany have been neglected. 
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Moreover, a number of econometric and mathematical (often-general equilibrium but 
based on National accounts as well) models have been used in order to estimate the 
general impact of exemptions on VAT base. For example Bogetic and Hasssan, (1993) 
used a very simple econometric model to identify the determinants of value added tax 
revenue in a cross-country analysis, relating the increases in VAT revenues wi th the 
increases in VAT rates and the coverage and the size of the VAT base. They estimated 
linear versions of the following general model using the Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) 
technique. The model was based in the following simple relation, that is: 
REV= f(RATE, BASE, RANGE), 
where REV variable is defined as VAT revenue as percentage of country's GDP; RATE is 
defined as VAT rate (in percent); BASE is defined as a VAT base variable; and RANGE is 
a measure of rate dispersion, defined as the difference between highest and lowest V AT 
rate. Based on the above model they empirically analysed, using data for the year 1988, 
determinants of VAT revenue on a sample of 20 single rate countries, a full sample of 34 
countries and a small sample of multiple rate countries. The results of the regressions 
conformed to the conventional views on the key variables influencing the V AT revenue 
performance: the rate, the base, and the rate dispersion. Similarly Jahnke (1998) in a 
macro econometric model for Germany in the tax equations linked the changes in V A T 
revenues with changes in VAT rate, private consumption, Government non-wage 
expenditure, gross investment of Government in machinery and equipment, gross 
investment of Government in construction, and the investment in residential construction. 
The estimated period extends from the first quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1993. 
The mathematical models are based on the assumption that tax bases never correspond 
exactly to macroeconomic aggregates. For this reason the models must include the 
necessary adjustments. Especially from the value added tax some types of production are 
excluded, either because they are viewed as merit goods, or because levying the tax would 
be difficult from administrative viewpoint. The simplest approach derived from these 
models is to start with adjustments to produce consumption base and to continue \\ith 
adjustments for exemptions and for reduced rates. Finally, VAT revenues are obtained by 
multiplying the adjusted base first by the VAT rate and then by an efficiency factor. 
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Unfortunately, the assumption about the efficiency factor is likely to swamp many of the 
finer adjustments and mathematical procedures needed to produce the estimate of the base 
(Kodrzycki, 1998). In addition, Gottfried and Wiegard (1991), using a mathematical 
general equilibrium model, examined the difference between exemptions and zero rating 
under a consumption type based VAT in the case study of Germany. To allow for a better 
understanding of the accruing efficiency effects, they first developed a method to convert 
the nominal VAT rates into effective tax rates on categories only of final demand (not on 
intermediate demand). Then these effective VAT rates are used to perform a gradual 
transition from exemption to zero rating. According to their study for 1984, 19.6 percent of 
total VAT revenues remain on intermediate production of the total tax-exempt sectors in 
Germany. Furthermore the V AT load remaining on investment amounts to 5 percent of 
total investment expenditures. These numbers correspond to their actual values in 1984. 
However, the model requires a sufficient number of extraneous estimates of elasticities or 
other parameter values to be borrowed from the literature. 
Finally, econometric and mathematical models have been used in a number of cases to 
analyse the general economic effects of VAT or to calculate the whole VAT base in a 
specific context with VAT exemptions. However, as we can see from Table 1.1, where we 
summarise the empirical work on the economic effects of exemptions on V AT base, none 
of them is used to measure the particular fiscal revenue loss of VAT exemptions in 
financial sector. 
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1.10 Conclusions from the literature study 
In this chapter we examined the existing literature on the taxation (i.e. VAT and indirect 
taxes) of financial services. The review of the literature brought out that there are 
extensive studies on technical, economic, and distributional dimensions of V AT. In 
addition there is a growing consensus on the best practice and desirable features required 
for a good (efficient) V AT system. Likewise, there is sufficient literature on the theoretical 
aspects of financial services taxation. Most of it identifies a number of problems that arise 
in applying the tax to financial services. While some of these problems are relatively easy 
to solve, there are others for which no workable solutions have been identified to date. 
However, very few of the above studies, none in the specific case of Greece, have 
empirically tested some basic hypotheses about key features and the performance of VAT 
as a revenue-raising instrument when exemptions (i.e. financial exemptions) are granted. 
In addition it is clear that most of the above literature lacks a European perspective which 
is more evident in the proposed methods for taxing financial services. 
Moreover, although the impact of financial exemptions on VAT base and revenues has 
been an issue of special relevance for tax authorities, it has not been thoroughly 
investigated. In general the empirical results suggest that there is still no consensus on the 
indirect taxation of financial services and the economic effects of these taxes. It is only 
through further multi-disciplinary research that one would be able to form an 
opinion about the viability and the revenue implications of applying the V AT (or 
other indirect taxes) on financial services. 
Analytically, following the above mentioned studies, in this chapter we set out the debate 
about taxing financial services, explaining the argument behind exempting from V AT the 
financial services, the theoretical reasons for treating financial services differently from 
any other sector and the practical problems in trying to tax financial services. Then \\'e 
continued by referring to the distortions created by the exempted sector, and discussed 
how in theory the incidence is affected by exemptions and how could these effects be 
modelled and measured. We also described the evidence from other countries of the effect 
of exempting financial institutions from V AT and how these effects have been measured 
in the empirical studies. 
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Moreover with the survey of the theoretical and empirical work on the issue of taxing 
financial services, we were able to identify three main areas where there is a clear need for 
a thoroughly investigation. These areas, as we also illustrate in figure 1.2. are as follows: 
• The impact of the existing V AT treatment of financial services on tax harmonisation 
in EU Member States 
• The economic effects of taxing financial services under the V AT system (effect on 
total tax revenues) and 
• The economic effects of the existing indirect taxes on financial services. 
Figure 1.2: Emerging areas (rom the literature review for further research 
The impact on revenues of taxing 
... financial services under VA T ....... 
... 
system in a particular context. 
The cascade effect. 
Indirect taxation of .... Existing indirect financial taxes and ..... 
financial services .... their impact on total tax revenues, 
expenditures and growth. 
VAT treatment of financial services 
and its impact on tax harmonisation 
---.. in EU Member States. Identification of 
.... 
distortions. 
To summarise, from the literature survey on financial services, we conclude that most of 
the existing studies are trying to solve the feasibility problem of taxing financial services 
rather than to investigate any effect on the efficiency of tax system and economy of a 
specific country. The foregoing conclusion suggests that further empirical \\'ork is 
necessary to detemline the potential advantages in changing the tax treatment of financial 
.+1 
servIces. These studies would focus on the economIC effects, the feasibility of such 
taxation in a specific context (EU VAT system) and the likely effects of tax on 
competitiveness and efficiency of financial sector. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE STRUCTURE OF VAT AND EUROPEA1Y JAT 
HARMONISATION: THE IMPACT ON FINANCIAL SERVICES TAXATION. 
2.1 Introduction 
In the literature review we discussed the theoretical and empirical work regarding the V AT 
and indirect taxation of financial services. In the following analysis we examine the 
principles of the V AT, including new approaches, in order to understand the relevant 
developments in the EU VAT system. The motivation is to explain the reasons for V AT 
harmonisation in EU VAT system, and thus to investigate the implications of V AT 
harmonisation on the taxation of financial services. 
2.2 Types of VAT 
V AT is a sales tax that is collected at each stage of the process of production and 
distribution of goods and services. The base of the tax is the value that a business adds to 
the various items that it purchases from other businesses, specifically the payments made 
by the business to the factors of production employed in turning out the product, such as 
wages, interest, rent, royalties and profits. The base of the tax in this case can be expressed 
as the difference between the sales proceeds and the cost of the materials, semi-
manufactured goods, services etc., that the business has purchased from other business and 
uses in the production and distribution process. 
There are basically three types of V AT which can be distinguished on the basis of the tax 
treatment accorded to the goods. First, assuming a closed economy for simplicity, if 
instead of seeking to tax the consumption outlay of individuals a government decides to 
tax individual income receipts, it may do so by imposing a uniform income tax which 
reaches the savings and the investments of individuals as well as their consumption. 
However, rather than assess the individual's income directly. the government may decide 
to use an indirect approach; that is, to impose a uniform sales rate which is expected to 
result in an analogous increase in the prices of goods which the individual purchases. 
thereby reducing his real income. 
Under the indirect approach, it is necessary for the sales tax to apply to sales of investment 
goods destined for final business use as well as to sales of products destined for ultimate 
consumption. In other words, the tax applies to business purchases of goods customarily 
capitalised and depreciated rather than expensed. Thus the savings of individuals are 
reached indirectly through their use by business in purchasing investment goods. The tax 
on a given asset becomes incorporated in the asset's value, and is thus included in the 
amounts that a firm charges to depreciation as the value of the asset is used up in 
producing goods. On this basis, a multi-stage VAT, being a general sales tax, can be 
implemented as follows: 
• gross product V AT levied on the value-added to both consumer and capital goods, 
without allowance for capital depreciation. In a hypothetical closed economy the 
aggregate base of the tax is equivalent to Gross National Product, 
• net income type of V AT covering the value added to both consumer and capital goods, 
after deduction of capital depreciation. The same result may also be accomplished by a 
uniform income tax, since the bases of a net product and an income tax are in fact the 
same. 
In a closed economy with two factors, the aggregate base of the income type of V AT is 
wages and profits, or consumption and net investment. The value of additions to inventory 
should also be included in the income-type base if the principles of national income 
accounting are to be observed since an increment in inventory for the economy as a whole 
represents a value added that must take into account (Shoup, 1969). However, in practice it 
may be generally assumed that excess of year-end inventory over year-beginning inventory 
may be included in next year's higher sales (Sullivan, 1966), otherwise inventory 
accounting for V AT purposes would be quite troublesome for businesses with fluctuating 
annual inventories. 
Apart from the above two types of V AT in which capital goods are taxed, there is a third 
type, namely the consumption-type V AT, levied on the value-added to consumer goods, 
and allowing deductions of all business outlays on capital investment. In a closed economy 
(with two factors) it has the same aggregate base, for anyone year, as a tax on income 
which exempts private saving, that is a general expenditure tax. Only this type of YA T 
exempts capital goods in the period of purchase instead of delaying such deduction until 
depreciation occurs period by period and thus it taxes consumption proper. The EU chose 
this type of V AT on the ground that, relative to other types, it stimulates investment and is 
more attractive from the point of view of economic growth (Neumark Report, 1963). 
On balance it appears that the consumption version has the most significant advantages. It 
provides the most neutral treatment between consumption and savings, and between the 
use of labour and capital services in product~on as the tax does not alter the relative cost, to 
any particular class of individuals, of consumption and savings, nor the relative cost to any 
producer of using labour or capital production. In contrast the net income type is biased 
against savings and capital, and the gross product type increases this bias since the input 
tax on both the purchase and the depreciation of capital goods are not deductible (Sullivan, 
1966). In addition the consumption type has administrative advantages since there is no 
need to be concerned with arbitrary depreciation allowances or to distinguish between 
capital and intermediate goods unlike under the income type. 
Finally there is actually a fourth type of V AT that exempts capital goods, namely the 
"wage" type V AT, the base of which can be obtained, in a two factor economy, by 
modification of the base of income type V AT. A deduction from this base is allowed, in an 
amount equal to the net earnings from the business's capital for that year. In a two-factor 
economy, this leaves an amount corresponding to wages paid in the tax base for any given 
year, as, in this economy, wages plus profit (including interest) equals Net National 
Income (Shoup, 1969). 
2.3 Methods of computation 
Basically, there are two main methods of computing the V AT, namely the "addition" and 
the "subtraction" method. However, the former is more appropriate to the net income type 
of V AT that includes in its base the rewards to all factors, including interest and profit. 
Profit is net after depreciation as under the income tax; inventory accounting is the same as 
under the income tax. The addition method can easily be implemented in practice on an 
annual basis as most businesses draw up their profit and loss accounts once a year, and 
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therefore only know their profit after the end of their financial year (Tait, 1972). On the 
other hand, the subtraction method is more suitable for the consumption type V AT: it 
would be quite difficult to use the addition method since depreciation and any excess 
inventory have to be added to the net profit figure. Moreover, the subtraction method can 
easily be used in practice in quarterly, or even monthly, tax periods. Furthermore, the 
subtraction method may be implemented in one or two ways. The first is the "tax credit" or 
"invoice" method, according to which the trader is required to subtract from the total tax 
shown on the invoices which he issued to his customers during the period, the total tax 
shown on the invoices he received from his suppliers during the same period, and to pay 
the difference to the tax authorities. The second method is known as the "accounts" 
method and requires the tax to be levied on the difference between business's total sales in 
a period and the value of its purchases in the same period. This method implies tax-
inclusive values, so that VAT will be levied at a tax-inclusive rate on the sales-less-
purchase's difference that is on a tax-inclusive value added by the business. These 
methods are examined below. 
2.3.1 The tax credit method 
The tax credit method is the one adopted by the EU for the implementation of a 
consumption type V AT. This method has the great advantage of self-enforcement in tax 
collection. It is to the advantage of the trader to invoice no more than the right amount of 
V AT on his sales to the taxable customer; and it is to the advantage of the taxable 
customer to receive the invoice from the trader showing no less V AT than the actually 
paid. This self-enforcement element discourages evasion through the built-in cross-
checking of the invoices issued by the traders. 
Moreover, the tax credit method emphasises the tax content of the sale and ties the 
tax to sales, thereby making it clear that the tax is an indirect tax destined to be 
passed on the customer, thus avoiding "cascade effects". On the other hand, the tax 
credit method does not make it possible to vary the overall burden of tax on a product by 
reducing or enhancing the rate of tax at some early stage in the manufacturing or 
distribution process of the product. The reason for this is that it is necessarily the rate of 
tax applying at the last stage that sets the ratio of total V AT to total value added at all 
stages. This is quite useful if, for administrative reasons, it is wished that a product be 
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lightly taxed without reducing the total tax on the total value-added. Finally, it is quite 
useful in safeguarding the revenue; for example in transactions between traders liable to 
V AT, an undercharge of tax by a supplier would be offset by a corresponding reduction in 
the amount of input tax deduction which may be claimed by the taxable customer (this is 
the so called "catching-up" effect of the tax credit method). 
One more point, which should be made in this context, is that the "tax -credit method" may 
give rise to a net tax credit in a given period. This may happen if a trader's sales are 
subject to a rate lower than the applicable to his purchases and his value added is relatively 
small. Furthermore, substantial capital purchases or exports, which under the consumption 
type of V AT are exempt, could create a large tax claim on the part of the trader, which in 
some cases may result in an excess far above the current V AT liability. 
Serious practical problems arise if we consider the concept of exemptions with the above 
analysis. In the first place, as we have already mentioned, exemption means that the 
taxable trader is not liable to VAT on the sale of any exempted good or service, nor is he 
entitled to recover the V AT invoiced to him on his purchases which are related to this 
good or service. This differs from a zero-rating provision, in the sense that although a 
trader is not liable to V AT on the zero-rated good or service, he is, however, entitled to 
recover any V AT incurred on purchases related to this sale. In the first place an exemption 
leads to over-taxation goods or services. The overtaxation refers to the non-deductible 
V AT levied on the purchases of the exempt business from other taxable business at prior 
stages. This occurs on the assumption that the exempt business does not pass the non-
deductible V AT on to his taxable customer; otherwise, the good or the service will be 
burdened even further under the double taxation effects which will take place as they pass 
through the next taxable stages ("cascade effect"). However, if the exempt stage is the last 
stage in the production and distribution process, the problems are different. The exempt 
traders are in the favourable position compared to their taxable competitors, as they will be 
able to pass any tax incurred on their purchases to their customers, thus charging a price 
attracting less tax than it would have done had they been taxable. On the other hand, the 
exemption of the stage in question results in foregone revenue equal to the tax rate times 
the value added at this stage. 
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If, on the other hand, exemption is granted for certain classes of transactions, the "partial 
exemption" problem arises in cases where a trader supplies exempt and taxable products. 
In this case, the tax credit is restricted accordingly to goods or services purchased which 
are strictly related to the taxable supplies. However, the problem arises where traders 
indiscriminately use taxable goods or services in the transaction chain of both exempt and 
taxable supplies. In these cases, the apportionment of inputs (and, therefore the tax on 
them) between those attributable to exempt supplies and those attributable to taxable 
supplies, is difficult to calculate. In practice, the so called "Pro-rata mechanism" is widely 
used in carrying out such an apportionment; the idea is to calculate the taxable proportion 
of the total value of outputs and the same proportion of the total input tax to be treated as 
attributable to taxable outputs, and therefore credited with the help of the following 
formula: 
Taxable outputs Deductible input tax 
Total outputs Total input tax 
In practice, the value of the taxable outputs is expressed as a percentage of the total 
outputs, and this percentage is applied to the total input tax. The result is the deductible 
input tax, which is to be claimed in the trader's tax return. The calculations that the partly 
exempt person undertakes under the method mentioned above at the end of each tax period 
are provisional and are subject to review and to any necessary adjustment on the basis of 
the relevant figures for the year as a whole. It should be noted that only the calculations 
involving the "Pro-rata mechanism" comes under review, and not those involving "direct 
attribution" . 
The tax credit method can satisfactorily implement the "destination principle" (taxation at 
the place of consumption). It provides precise information as to the cumulated tax paid for 
the particular good or service, and thus precisely calculates the export refund, i.e. the 
amount of V AT shown on the invoice issued to the exporter by his supplier. This holds if 
the tax credit chain is not broken by granting exemptions at earlier stages; otherwise a 
"hidden tax" is included in the export price to the extent to which the exempt trader passes 
the irrecoverable (non-deductible) tax thus giving rise to double taxation ("cascade 
effect"). As for imports, under the "tax credit method" they do not present any difficulty; 
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they are taxed at the same rates as similar domestically produced goods. Provided that the 
imported goods of the exporting country are free of any "cascade tax" no discrimination 
arises between home made and imported goods. On this basis, as the EU countries apply 
the consumption type V AT under the tax credit method, with different rates they can do 
without compensation tax upon importation, but with a careful computation of the export 
refund so long as they retain the "destination principle" (i.e. taxation at the place of 
consumption). On the other hand, the "origin principle" V AT (i.e. taxation at the place of 
"origin") does not allow the importing country to tax the value added in the exporting 
country. In the case of uniform rates and exemptions in the member countries, the tax 
credit method does not present any difficulty in implementing the "origin principle": 
exports are taxed in the exporting country, and the importer, if he is a taxable person, is 
entitled to credit the tax paid to the exporter for these products. Certain problems arise, 
however, where different rates and exemptions are allowed among member countries 
(i.e. financial exemptions). 
2.3.2 The "Accounts" method 
Unlike the "tax credit method", the "accounts method" may differentiate the overall burden 
of tax on goods or on services by varying the rate of tax applied at various stages. The 
reason for this is that the proportions of value added at the different tax stages, and not the 
rate of V AT at the final stage alone, determine the total amount of V AT imposed on a 
given good or service. 
A consequence of this method is that exemption of an intermediate stage in the 
production and distribution process (i.e. financial exemptions) does not give rise to 
overtaxation, as is the case with the tax credit method. However, revenue is always lost 
by the exemption as there is no "catching up" effect at a later taxable stage as there is with 
the "tax credit method". The amount of revenue, which is not regained at a later stage, 
equals the product of the tax rate times the value added in the exempt stage. Of course the 
application of more than one rate of V AT raises serious problems for this method 
wherever a business sells goods in two or more different tax categories. 
Regarding the EU intra-community trade, the "destination principle" can be easily 
implemented under the "accounts" method if V AT applies at a single rate and is 
49 
comprehensive, so that no problem of identifying goods belonging to yanous tax 
categories arises. However, under a multi rate V AT, the "accounts" method does not 
provide the information needed to precisely compute the export refund and the import 
compensating tax. 
In the case of the "origin principle" with a common single rate for all Member States, the 
"accounts" methods is as equally applicable as the tax credit method. With a multi-stage 
V AT applied at equal rates to all Member States, the "tax credit" method is superior to the 
"accounts" method, since the "accounts" method cannot easily differentiate between 
products in different tax categories. Generally, the "tax credit" method seems to have 
certain advantages over the "accounts" method. It allows the identification of VAT being 
levied at different rates on value added arising in the production of different commodities; 
it has built-in cross-checking; and finally, it operates as an indirect spending tax, unlike the 
"accounts method" which may seem to traders like a direct business tax since it requires 
tax-inclusive rates applied on value added. These advantages of the "tax credit" method 
over the "accounts" method, despite its disadvantage in dealing with exemptions at 
intermediate stage, were the principal reasons for its adoption as a common 
European consumption type VAT system by the EV. 
To summanse, we could mention here that the discussion so far has focused on two 
traditional categories of V AT computation: 
• the first category is a "direct method" (accounts method) which can be divided in two 
ways of calculation: 
The addition method, where V=W+I+P, with Vwe denote the value added, Wwages, and 
with I, P the interest and profits respectively; and the subtraction method, where V=R-C, 
with R we denote the value of outputs and with C the inputs used of the business. Then the 
tax liability can be calculated in the first case from the formula: 
T=t (W+I+P), with T we denote the tax liability and with t the statutory V AT rate, and for 
the second case from the formula: T=t (R-C). We would like to clarify here that this 
fonnula represents a method for computation of value added and that the difference (R-C) 
is not equal to the profit P in the addition method. 
• 
the second category is the "indirect method" of computing the V AT. The tax liability 
here is calculated indirectly. This method can be divided in two ways of calculation: 
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The indirect additive method, where the tax liability is expressed as a sum of tax liabilities 
for each component of value added, thus T=tW+tI+tP, and the indirect subtractiye 
method, where the tax liability is expressed applying the statutory V AT rate to the total 
sales and subtracting the tax made on purchases, thus T=tR-tC ("the tax credit method"). 
2.3.3 New Approaches 
One of the main appeals of the VAT has been the elegance with which it enables tax to be 
removed from commodities entering international trade. In this way V AT has done much 
to foster closer economic integration. As that integration proceeds, however, and trading 
partners seek to establish a more complete economic union with one another, so 
difficulties arise when VAT powers are allocated to the members of a federation. While 
VAT is widely considered as a good tax for countries trading with one other, it is also 
generally regarded as a bad tax to give to lower-level jurisdictions in a federation. This is 
most obviously the case in the European Union (EU), where the development of the V AT 
has been the central tax accomplishment of the Member States but has now reached an 
impasse, with those Member States unable to agree on how to design a VAT for the Single 
Market that they seek to deepen. 
• The clearing mechanism 
An alternative approach to the "tax credit" method, which the European Commission first 
proposed in the early 1990s and has recently revised (1996), is to remove the zero-rating of 
exports, so that exports would be taxed at the same rate as domestic sales, with a credit 
then available against output tax in the importing country. With this approach it is 
necessary to introduce a "clearing house" system by which revenues would effectively be 
reallocated across States/provinces so as to preserve the same allocation of revenues as 
under zero-rating. The plus-side of this method is that it fixes the break in the V AT chain. 
Goods now move between States/provinces tax-laden, and establish compliance symmetry. 
The difficulty is in finding a way of clearing mechanism that preserves proper incentives 
for tax collection. 
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An alternative approach, suggested for the EU in the Commission's most recent proposal 
(EC, 1996)5, is to reallocate revenues on the basis of aggregate consumption statistics. 
This reduces the administrative burden, but at the cost of creating a different disincenti\e 
to collection: if the net V AT that a country receives depends only on its le\el of 
consumption and the rate of tax, it has no incentive to put any effort into collection at all. 
Even if the tax it receives is based on some sharing of total revenues collected, the sharing 
with other states will be blunt collection incentives. 
• The compensating VAT (CVAI) 
Varsano (1999), Mc Lure (1999) and Bird (1999) originally propose this method. The 
essential idea is to preserve the zero-rating of inter-provincial sales in respect of national 
VATs but to superimpose on this a "compensating VAT" levied on sales between 
States/provinces (including in McLure's version, inter-province sales to households and 
non-registered traders). This means that exports to the rest of the world would be zero-
rated under both provincial and any federal V AT, and would not be subj ect to the 
compensating VAT. The innovation of the CVAT is that the compensation VAT on the 
inter-provincial exports is charged to the exporting business and recovered by the 
importing business (Keen, 2000). 
One key question is the rate at which the CVAT should be charged. With a low CVAT 
rate, there is an artificial incentive for final consumers to import; with a high CV AT rate, 
the incentive is to make false refund claims or, for final consumers, to buy within the 
province rather than to import. McLure (1999) concludes that it would be best to pitch the 
CV AT rate at broadly the average of the rates of provincial tax. A clear disadvantage 
however, beyond the administration of the tax, is that CV AT violates compliance 
symmetry, since inter-provincial trade (bearing CV AT plus any federal V AT) is treated 
differently from intra-provincial trade (bearing provincial and any federal V AT). 
• The Viable Integrated VAT (VIV AI) 
Keen and Smith (1996) propose this new scheme. This requires all States/ provinces to set 
the same tax rate on all sales to registered traders anywhere in the federation (Community). 
5 "A common system of VAT-a programme for the single Market, COM (96) 328 final 22'07/1996". 
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But the rates applied to final sales -to consumers and other non-registered traders- remain 
entirely at the discretion of the States/provinces. Actually this tax giyes revenues 
equivalent to a common withholding tax at an intermediate rate, charged and credited at 
each stage (and so raising no net revenue) combined with a final sales tax at the rate of the 
country of destination. 
The weakest point of this method is that VIV AT introduces a new kind of compliance 
asymmetry: businesses must treat their customers differently according to whether they are 
registered for V AT or not. For the European VAT system of course this not a severe 
problem. In the EU, taxpayers are already required to verify the V AT status of customers 
located in other Member States (in order to determine whether the sale can be zero-rated). 
The change here is that this principle has to be applied in the inter-provincial trade as well 
(in each Member State). 
It is especially important to note, moreover, that there is no intrinsic difference between 
VIV AT and CVAT in terms of collection incentives and clearing: both require that tax 
levied on exports from one province be credited/refunded against tax due in another. The 
distinct nature of this -separable from other parts of the VAT system- may in each case 
mean that there are in principle ways of implementing this clearing other than through 
provincial tax administrations, thereby avoiding some of the problems we mentioned 
above (Keen 2000). 
In conclusion all the above methods of VAT computations (including the new approaches) 
require a VAT system that is broadly based. In addition, despite the application of the 
Single Market in EU, there can be different ways for computing VAT The one chosen hy 
the EU (i.e. indirect tax credit method) could satisfY many aspects of the Single Market 
(i.e. destination principle) as well as of the optimal commodity tax theory. However, in the 
case of an application of the origin principle in the EU VAT system, a number of changes 
are necessary in order to preserve the level of revenues in Member States. 
2.4 The Evolution of the EU VAT harmonisation and the Single l\larket 
As we mentioned before, if "the country of destination principle" is maintained and at the 
same time tax frontiers among the Member States are abolished, a common consumption 
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type V AT applied under the "tax credit" method would be a suitable option with little 
border control; as was seen earlier, the "tax credit" method does not in effect require a 
compensatory tax upon imports unless importation is by the ultimate consumer (Shoup, 
1969). However, elimination of the tax frontiers is more consistent with the "origin 
principle" as than the "destination principle". Under the "origin principle" no exports 
refunds and compensatory tax on imports at least by non-taxable persons are necessary 
thus ensuring in inter-member trade conditions similar to those of a single market. 
On this ground the "origin principle" constitutes the ultimate goal which the EU V AT 
harmonisation programme wants to achieve. However a general sales tax like V AT 
applying to all Member States under the "origin principle" would require, unlike 
under the" destination principle", a common coverage and something like a common 
rate structure if distortion of competition were to be avoided among the Member 
States. 
Generally speaking the adoption of the "origin principle" means that Member States 
experiencing favourable trade balances with other members will gain revenue. Revenues 
are also affected by the adoption of "the origin principle" to the extent that the 
proportionate values of exports and imports, represented by tax- exempt goods or services 
or those taxed at different rates under the European Union's common rates and coverage, 
vary among Member States. If goods exempted or taxed at a reduced rate represent a 
higher proportion of exports than imports, revenue losses will be experienced. 
Definitely, the changeover from the "destination" to the "origin principle" can only be 
achieved in the longer-run after a stage-by-stage harmonisation programme, in order to 
avoid economic upheavals and abrupt changes in the sources of government revenue, and 
in the social and traditional attitudes regarding the treatment of goods and services under 
the existing systems. Article 99 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
clearly stipulates that "turnover taxes" shall be harmonised. In accordance thereto, 
the Council is to adopt, upon a proposal of the European Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
provisions on the harmonisation of the laws relating to turnover taxes in so far as this 
harmonisation is necessary for the establishing and the functioning of an Internal 
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Market. On this basis the Commission geared its policy towards a slow hannonisation 
programme which has proceeded up to now in the following way: 
When the First and the Second VAT Directives were adopted in April 1967, following the 
recommendations of the Neumark report (1963), the Community undertook a legal and 
political commitment (as part of its objective to create the most efficient possible common 
market) to establish a common VAT system under which taxation of imports and the non-
taxation of exports in the intra-Community trade would be abolished. This commitment 
underpinned the objective to design a VAT system, which was tailored to the Single 
Market and operated within the European Union in the same way as it would within a 
single country. The two basic principles of V AT had to be observed in designing such a 
system: 
• the mechanism of fractionated payments, which ensures that the tax system is to some 
extent self-policing (i.e. sales between registered traders may be carried out under 
suspension of tax, provided that the seller has checked the status of the purchaser and 
the end use of the goods and services he is supplying) and 
• a clear division of responsibilities between sellers (correct invoicing of the tax due) 
and buyers (detailed proof of the tax deducted). 
The Commission first put forward proposals for such a system in 1977 with the adoption 
of the Sixth Directive. This Directive was designed to achieve a uniform tax base in order 
to enable the EU to begin full operation of its "own resources" budget plan, and so the 
"Community levy" applied equitably to its Member States. In the first place, although the 
Directive included certain revisions, it primarily amplified and defined in greater detail the 
terms of the second Directive. On the other hand, it aimed at a uniform tax base by 
explicitly restricting the exemptions provisions to certain classes of activities and by 
providing standardised rules concerning the calculation of the deductible tax paid on 
inputs used for the production and supply of taxable goods and services. However. \vith 
respect to exempt activities, it allowed the Member States certain derogations whereas, 
with respect to the deductible tax on purchases, it gave the discretion to the Member States 
to decide what expenditure should not eligible for tax deduction. 
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Finally, the Directive was quite general and flexible with regards to the measures 
necessary to apply for the traders' bookkeeping and accounting procedures of the tax. The 
Sixth Directive constituted a positive step towards gradually narrowing the disparities in 
the V AT coverage and administration between the Member States, and in preparing the 
ground for the application of a common rate structure on a uniform base among the 
Member States. 
After the implementation of the Sixth VAT Directive the Commission put forward new 
proposals in 1987 under the work programme to establish the Single Market by January 
1993. The key elements of these proposals, which were designed to achieve a genuine 
Single Market by means of taxation in the country of origin, were: 
• a harmonised tax structure with two rates of VAT; 
• harmonisation, within a defined band, of the rates applied by Member States; and 
• a clearing mechanism for the redistribution of VAT receipts. 
By 1989, it had become clear that it would be impossible to adopt the Commission's 
proposals by 1 January 1993, and the ECOFIN Council therefore decided to adopt "a 
transitional VAT system" (see also table 2.1) which could enable controls at the 
Community's internal borders to be abolished whilst allowing tax to continue to be 
collected in the Member State of destination under certain well defined circumstances 
(transactions between taxable persons and large-scale "distance selling" to individuals). 
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The main characteristics of this scheme were as follows: 
• the terms "export" and "import" were abolished with reference to trade between 
Member States (thus achieving one of the objectives of the first Directive) and, in practice, 
replaced by an equivalent system: "intra-Community supplies of goods" (fonnerly 
"exports"); "intra-Community acquisitions of goods" (fonnerly "imports"). In order to 
compensate for the elimination of customs formalities and checks and avoid losses of tax 
revenue, a computerised system for the automatic exchange of infonnation on the value of 
Intra-Community deliveries was set up among the national authorities (V AT infonnation 
exchange system or VIES). 
• consumers could henceforth pay VAT at the point of origin on goods purchased in 
another Member State without any further fonnalities. 
• under three special schemes (distance sales, new means of transport, Intra-Community 
purchases by flat-rate farmers, exempted persons and legal entities that are not liable for 
VAT), transactions were generally subject to taxation in the country of consumption. 
At the same time however, the Council reaffirmed both legally and politically the 
commitment it had made in April 1967 to introduce a "definitive VAT system" of taxation 
where the goods and services would be taxed in the Member State of "origin" by the new 
target date of 31 December 1996. It therefore fell to the Commission, once again, to put 
forward new proposals. Before doing so, the Commission carried out a thorough 
evaluation of the operation of the "transitional V AT regime,,6 and polled the Member 
States on their views, concluding that different approach to that proposed in 1987 would 
have to be taken to achieve a VAT system tailored to the Single Market. The programme 
put forward in 1996 differed in two main respects from the 1987 proposals7. 
Firstly, the 1987 proposals were based on the "big bang" approach, i.e. an immediate 
switchover to the definitive system, whereas the 1996 programme envisaged a gradual 
changeover to the definitive system ("origin principle"). The first stage in this gradual 
approach was to modernise and more uniformly apply the existing system introducing 
changes which would shape it into a definitive system. Secondly, the 1987 proposals were 
6 Report by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the operation of the transitional 
arrangements for charging VAT on intra-Community trade (COM (94) 515 [mal -231111 1994). 
7 A common system of VAT -a programme for the Single Market (COM (96) 328 final 22/07/1996). 
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based on the principle that taxation should take at the place of supply and the clearing 
mechanism would operate on the basis of returns by taxable persons. On the contrary, the 
1996 programme put forward the idea that taxation should be based on a trader" s "tax 
domicile" so that there would be one single place of registration with a redistribution 
mechanism based on official statistics ("macroeconomic approach") to ensure that V AT 
receipts accrue to the Member State where consumption takes place. 
The choice of a "macroeconomic method" implies the availability of uniform or equivalent 
sources, methods, funds and statistical procedures. This choice is likely to bring about 
disagreements between the Member States in their individual calculations of statistical 
taxable consumption, in particular as regards the reduction in each Member State's 
assessment base via the subtraction of the underground economy. In actual fact, this has 
been the subj ect of study of many years, inter alia, in connection with drawing up of 
national accounts. The estimates put forward vary considerably, as a result, in particular, of 
the sources and methods used. It is true that the Member States already have had to 
comply, by the end of 1988, with certain exhaustiveness obligations in respect of their 
national accounts8. Nevertheless, in the current situation, it should be stressed that 
exhaustive national accounts will involve a conflict of interests for the Member States, in 
so far as they would lead to an increase in the Gross National Product at market prices 
(GNP)9. This is because any increase in the GNP requires the States to provide additional 
resources for the EU budget via the GNP resource. Under the proposed V A T system 
Member States would have an objective interest in limiting the size of the underground 
economy in their national accounts, or even underestimating taxable consumption, so as to 
maximise their share of the redistribution of overall VAT income. 
On the other hand, it is accepted that the current transitional arrangements have a number 
of shortcomings, because they are complicated, susceptible to fraud and are out of date 
(exemptions and derogations). There is a need to modernise, simplify, strengthen and more 
uniformly apply the V AT system (i.e. financial exemptions) in order to bring it up to date 
and to ensure it encourages legitimate commercial transactions within the internal market 
8 Commission's Decision 971l9/EU, 311111997, OJ L252. 
9 Special report No 9/98, concerning the protection of the financial interests of the El" in the field of V A T on 
intra-community trade together with the commission's replies, OJ C356, 20/1111998. 
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without providing greater scope for fraud and less efficiency of the tax systems 10. In its 
report on the operation of the transitional VAT regime 1 1 the Commission clearly 
underscored the constraints and limitations of the present system, most of which do not -or 
do not only - result from the rules set in place for governing intra-community trade during 
the transitional period, but are intimately linked to the pre-existing tax rules and to the 
insufficient harmonisation of Member States' legislation. The simplification procedures, 
which were adopted in an attempt to remedy the most flagrant difficulties encountered in 
the operation of the common V AT system, provided only partial solutions that remain 
unsatisfactory. It is clear, however, that this approach has reached its limits, since it's 
not possible to continue seeking simplifications without tackling the root causes of 
existing problems. In fact businesses and consumers still do not enjoy all the benefits 
expected from the Single Market in that the existing arrangements in no way ensure 
uniform treatment of all transactions carried out in the Community, thereby giving 
rise to costs that are incompatible with a genuine Single Market. However, the 
Commission has drawn up an action programme to implement a new V AT strategy based 
on four objectives: simplification and modernisation of current rules, more uniform 
application of current rules and a new approach to administrative co-operation. These 
procedures are expected to start and probably finish in three "Phases" during the year's 
2000/2001 (as stated in Commission's relevant communication paper). 12 During the Phase 
one, the European Council will adopt the following proposals: 
• changes in the status of the VAT Committee (COM (1997) 325), 
• improving mutual assistance on recovery (COM(1988)364), 
• proposal on the right to deduction and the Eighth Directive (COM(1988)377), 
and 
• proposal on the person liable for VAT (COM (1988) 377). 
In Phase two, the Commission will table proposals for Directives in the following areas: 
• e-commerce and electronic invoicing, 
10 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament-A strategy to improve 
the operation of the VAT system within the context of the Internal Market (COM (2000) 348 final, 
7/06/2000). 
II Report from the Commission to the council and the European Parliament on the operation of the 
transitional aITangements for charging VAT in intra-community trade (COM (94) 515 final 23.11.1994). 
12 "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. A strategy to improve 
the operation of the V A T system within the context of the internal market" (COM (2000) :'''+8 final 
07/06/2000). 
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• 
• 
reVISIOn of rules, on administrative co-operation and mutual assistance, and 
a minimum standard rate of V AT . 
In Phase three, the future priorities will largely depend on the progress made by the 
Council in adopting the proposals mentioned above. 
Furthermore, in the above mentioned communication paper (COM (2000) 348 final 
7/06/2000-Annex), the Commission recognises the treatment of financial services as 
"a key potential future priority" mentioning that "the financial services sector has 
increased both in size and complexity and its structures and operating methods have 
changed creating growing problems for current VAT rules", and concluding that 
"other measures are required to bring the VAT system into line with the 
developments in this sector, which include greater opportunities for gross-border 
shopping" . 
Finally, the Lisbon European Council's deadline of 2005 to establish an integrated 
European Market in financial services is central to the Community's employment and 
growth agenda (EC, 2001). Clearly this target for a Single Market for financial services in 
EU, cannot be developed without solving the above-mentioned problems in order to 
proceed in further harmonisation of the indirect taxation of financial services throughout 
the EU Member States (EU, 1997; London Economics, 2002). 
In conclusion, in this section we discussed all efforts made by the Commission in order to 
harmonise the VAT in the EU Member States. Despite the general problems of VAT 
application which still exist in EU, the Commission has clearly recognised that the 
taxation of financial services is a problematic area, though very important in order to 
progress in harmonising VAT and to achieve the target for a Single Market for financial 
servlces. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have analysed the potential and the structure of VAT in EU, in order to 
gain an understanding of the latest developments in the European V AT harmonisation 
process. We have seen that the logic of the invoice-credit V AT has been the choice of the 
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European Commission. In addition this method may be more powerful, than has yet been 
fully understood, in taxing the financial services under the V AT system. Moreover. in 
terms of the potential applicability of the V AT to lower levels of government, new 
conceptual advances suggest that the prospects for implementing the V AT as a 
State/provincial tax within a federation are brighter than previously thought. The ideas of 
VIVAT and CVAT both provide ways of implementing the "destination principle" without 
breaking the VAT chain on inter-state exports or inducing game-playing. However in the 
absence of an over-arching federal administration (or the willingness to create one), which 
is the case in the ED, however, both schemes run into difficulty in securing appropriate 
clearing, ensuring that revenue collected on exports from one State/province is available to 
finance credits/refunds claimed in another. 
Regarding the European V AT system, with few exceptions and without overlooking the 
essential contribution made by the Single Market in promoting growth and employment, 
little progress has been made in the process of harmonising the ED VAT system. Since the 
introduction of the Commission's initial Proposals on the Internal Market in 1987, all 
efforts have been concentrated on the realisation, at all costs, of the current hybrid of 
Single Internal Market, by beginning of 1993. Because Member States had neither the 
willingness to face the problems posed by the necessity to harmonise rates and relinquish 
derogation's and exemptions (i.e. financial exemptions), nor were they ready to accept any 
compensation mechanism for VAT revenues, the radically different "origin" based VAT 
system, envisaged in the Cockfield, (1987) package, was not adopted. Instead, over the 
years up to 1993, the focus moved away from this approach towards a compromise based 
on what was achievable at that time. 
The argument of this chapter has confirmed the view that the procedures towards 
the VAT harmonisation in EU have enabled the implementation of the "Single 
Market". However, the existing VAT system does not ensure uniform treatment to all 
transactions (i.e. financial transactions) carried out in European Union. These 
shortcomings have already been identified by the Commission. Therefore, there is 
clearly a need to adjust the EU VAT system to meet changing economic conditions. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE VAT SYSTEM IN THE GREEK TAX STRUCTURE. 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we discussed the developments in ED VAT system and their 
implications for financial services taxation. In this chapter we discuss briefly the main 
features of the Greek tax system with emphasis on the structure of the Greek indirect 
system (V AT). The discussion is considered necessary as a basis for deepening, at a later 
stage, our analysis of the taxation of financial services in the specific context of Greece. 
However, in order to facilitate our comparisons with Spain and Portugal, we are looking at 
the various categories of taxes applied in these countries as well. Our focus in this chapter 
will be on the functional structure of taxation in Greece, (taxes applied, relation between 
direct and indirect taxation, evolution and recent developments) under the period 1965-
1998 and on the general review of the Greek V AT system as it has been applied in Greece 
since 1987 (the year of introduction of VAT). 
3.2 The Direct taxes applied in Greece 
3.2.1 Income taxes on Corporations 
• Rates and basis of assessment 
Greek companies are liable for corporate income tax on income from all sources. The tax 
is levied on net taxable profit at a flat rate of 40% for limited liability partnerships and 
corporations with registered shares. Banks and corporations with non-registered shares and 
branches are taxed at 40%. There are no state or provincial (Local) income taxes in 
Greece. Capital gains are treated as income from commercial activity and taxed at source 
at a rate of 30%, 20%, or 25%. Any gain resulting from the sale of fixed assets, including 
immovable property, belonging to an enterprise is treated as income from commercial 
activity and taxed under the income tax laws. The gain from the sale of plant and 
machinery may avoid taxation if used as additional depreciation of existing plant and 
machinery or of plant and machinery to be acquired in the following two years. In the case 
of immovable property, the taxable gain is determined on the basis of the "objectiye" 
valuation coefficients used by the tax authorities. Foreign business organisations trading in 
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Greece are subject to Greek corporate tax (40%) on their total net income derived from 
Greek sources and/or from their permanent establishments in Greece. Relief from double 
taxation is governed by tax treaties that Greece has concluded with other countries. Tax 
credit is generally allowed for foreign-source income. However, the credit cannot exceed 
the Greek tax attributable to the foreign-source income. Corporations are required to pay 
income tax on their preceding year's profit in five equal instalments, with the first one 
payable by the fifteenth day of the fifth month after the year-end. In addition, 50% is 
payable in advance in five equal instalments on the account of the current year. For banks 
established in Greece, the rate of advance tax is 60%, instead of 50%. If the total amount 
of the tax due is paid within the period of the first instalment due, there is a discount of 
5%. Limited liability companies, joint ventures, and partnerships are also subject to l.2% 
stamp duty on the profits of the partnerships. 
• Exemptions 
There are the following exemptions: The Greek State, including decentralised Public 
services operating as special funds, and urban and rural municipalities, in respect of 
income of all kinds; Profits from the operation of ships under the Greek flag by Greek 
companies, co-operatives or unions, where such profits are subject to the specific taxation 
on ship owners' profits; Income from immovable property belonging to recognised 
religious group's etc; Profits made in Greece by foreign businesses from the operation of 
ships, under foreign flags and aircraft. 
3.2.2 Income taxes on individuals (Personal Income Tax-PIT) 
• Rates and basis of assessment 
Both employees and self-employed pay the PIT that applies a progressive schedule to all 
earned income, net of social security contributions and of deductible expenses. The 
schedule comprises six income brackets with rates ranging from 0 to 45 per cent. The tax 
is calculated using these rates, on an individual's total income, which is the aggregate of 
net income from all sources, classified as follows: 
a) Income from leasing or use of buildings and land; 
b) Income from securities, interest. dividends, and directors' fees (as distinct from 
directors' salaries); 
c) Profits of industrial and commercial enterprises; 
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d) Income from agricultural enterprises; 
e) Income from salaries, wages, pensions, and other forms of remuneration; 
f) Income from professional fees and all other sources that cannot be classified in 
any of the above categories. 
Different rules apply, and different deductions are made in the computation of net income 
of each category. There is also a tax at 3%, which is computed on the gross income from 
real estate. This tax increases to 6% if the real estate is used for residential purposes and 
exceeds 300 square meters in size. This tax cannot exceed the primary tax due on such 
mcome. 
• Special features 
Every individual, irrespective of nationality, domicile, or country of residence, is subject to 
income tax in Greece on income arising in Greece. In addition, every individual domiciled 
in Greece is subj ect to income tax on income arising abroad. A wife's income is assessed 
separately, although married couples are required to file joint returns. Partnerships and 
limited liability companies are subject to a flat 35% tax rate. However, up to 50% of a 
partnership's profits are treated as "deemed" salary for up to three of the partners, in which 
case the tax rates applicable to individuals will apply. 
Interest earned from funds deposited with banks operating in Greece generally is subject to 
15% withholding tax. A new withholding tax of 7.5% was introduced for interest income 
derived from all government securities issued after January 1, 1997. The tax applies at 
source, irrespective of the country of residence, nationality, or citizenship of the 
beneficiary. Nevertheless, for tax treaty residents entitled to a lower withholding tax or to a 
tax exemption on interest income, a new tax refund procedure for that purpose has been 
established. Both the 15% withholding tax on resident bank deposits in Drachmas/euro or 
in foreign currency and the new 7.5% tax on government securities are final taxes in the 
case of individuals. 
Individuals may be taxed according to deemed or imputed income in cases where this 
income is higher than the actual income declared and the taxpayer cannot substantiate the 
difference. Imputed or deemed income is determined on the basis of living expenses and 
the acquisition of assets. Living expenses are again determined on the basis of "objectiye" 
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criteria. Living expenses or the acquisition of assets that cannot be covered by declared 
income of the current or prior years may be justified by loans contracted, the sale of 
property, or the importation of foreign exchange by persons who can justify the acquisition 
of such foreign exchange abroad. Finally personal income tax is always based on the 
calendar year. 
• Exemptions 
Exemption exists if no liability for tax arises from the application of the taxation scale. 
The tax due is reduced in respect of the dependent children. Relief from double taxation is 
granted either in accordance with tax treaties or on the basis of domestic credit rules. This 
credit may not exceed the amount of Greek tax that would have been payable had the 
income been earned in Greece. 
3.2.3 Income taxes on non-residents 
Non-resident individuals are, in general terms, taxed on their total Greek source income, 
including income obtained from a permanent establishment in Greece. A non-resident is 
any person whose domicile or principal residence is not located in Greece. Non-residents 
are not entitled to tax deductions. Some of the double taxation agreements entered into by 
Greece provide that income from employment earned by foreigners resident in Greece for 
a period of less than six months, subject to certain conditions, is exempt from tax. 
Business organisations that are considered as having a permanent establishment in Greece 
are liable to tax on their income from Greek sources only. Income of non-residents is taxed 
at rates similar to those for residents (5%-45%). Royalties paid to foreign enterprises and 
organisations that do not have permanent establishments in Greece are generally subj ect to 
a 20% withholding tax. This tax is withheld at the earlier of when the royalties are paid or 
credited. Tax treaties may provide for tax withholding at a lower or zero rate. 
Agreements for the avoidance of double taxation exist between Greece and the following 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, India, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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3.2.4 Other significant direct taxesJ3 
• Tax on savings/capitaZ 
The taxation of income from savings is uneven, with different forms of capital income 
taxed at substantially different rates. With the exception of rents from land and buildings 
and of income from private pension funds, which are subject to the PIT, income from 
savings is taxed under a separate flat-rate regime at rates ranging between 0 and 15 percent 
depending on the manner in which the income is invested and distributed. Such gaps tend 
to affect the allocation of savings and firms financing decisions (OECD, 2001). Capital 
contributed to an enterprise of whatever legal form and for whatever purpose is subject to 
tax at 10/0. Capital remittances by foreign legal entities from countries other than EU 
Member States to their Greek branches also are subject to this tax. 
Effective June 30, 1992, dividends are distributed out of net after-tax profits and are not 
subject to any further tax. An amount equal to 5% of the year's after-tax profit must be 
transferred annually to a statutory reserve until the reserve is equal to one-third of the share 
capital. Of the remaining profits, a dividend of at least 6% of the paid-up capital or 35% of 
the net profit reduced by the amount transferred to the statutory reserve, whichever is 
greater, must be paid. 
• Inheritance tax 
Inheritance tax is imposed on all property, movable or immovable, that passes on death if 
the property is situated in Greece. In addition, movable property situated abroad may be 
subject to inheritance tax if the deceased was a Greek citizen or a person domiciled in 
Greece. Gift taxes, which are imposed at the same rates as inheritance taxes, apply to all 
property, movable or immovable, that is donated if the property is situated in Greece. In 
addition, movable property situated abroad is subject to gift tax if the donor is a Greek 
citizen or the donee is a person domiciled in Greece. 
13 It is worth noting here that apart from direct taxes to encourage the decentralisation of industry away from 
the Capital area, various regional tax incentives (related to direct taxes) have been introduced mainly through 
Law 189211990. The incentives provided by this law apply to "productive investments," as defined, and 
consist primarily of outright grants, deductions from taxable profits, different tax rates, interest subsidies. and 
additional depreciation allowances. For the purposes of the above-mentioned law, the country has been 
divided into four areas: A, B, C, and D. Area A is the most developed and area D the least developed. 
Progressively higher incentives (regarding personal income tax and company tax) are provided for less 
developed areas. 
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• Payroll Tax and Social Security Contributions 
This is a tax on wages, salaries and in general, on any remuneration of labour employed by 
industrial and handicraft enterprises, which are responsible for its payment to authorities. 
There are dissenting views on the distributional effects of the tax but in so far as the firm 
concerned shifts it on the prices, the tax increases the price of domestically produced 
goods relative to the prices of imports and also weakens export competitiveness I 4. Small 
firms and firms located in provinces are exempted from the tax, and the basic rate of the 
tax is reduced according to the amount of the firms annual labour costs or the status of the 
firm. 
Social security coverage is compulsory for all employees. Foreign citizens may claim 
exemptions in certain cases and for limited periods of time. Social security contributions 
are calculated on monthly salaries at the following rates: 
a) Employer 15.90% 
b) Employee 27.96% 
Social security contributions apply to the 14 salaries defined by law and the two extra 
salaries, corresponding to Christmas, Easter, and vacation bonuses, which are obligatory 
under Greek labour law. Stamp duty of 1.2% is levied on gross salaries and wages. The 
employer and the employee share the stamp duty equally. 
• Tax on Property 
Effective January 1, 1997, "large" immovable property located in Greece has become 
subject to an annual capital tax, irrespective of citizenship, nationality, place of residence, 
or registered office of the owner. The tax rate is 0.7% for legal entities, and ranges from 
0.3% to 0.8% for individuals, based on a progressive tax scale. For spouses, the tax is 
computed separately, although a joint tax return is required. A variety of exemptions exist, 
particularly for legal entities (e.g., for self-used buildings of commercial or industrial 
enterprises). The usual tax rate for property transferred is 9% on the first Drs 4 million and 
11 % on the excess. This is increased by 2% in urban areas to cover the cost of fire 
protection. In addition, there is a surtax of 3% on the assessed tax. Lower taxes may be 
levied in certain cases; e.g., on the merger of companies. The tax is computed according to 
the amount mentioned in the contract or resulting from the objective value system, 
14 Greek Ministry of Finance and Greek Centre for Planning and Economic Research "A survey of the 
compliance cost in the Greek Tax System" (1998). 
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whichever of the two amounts is higher. If no obj ective value exists, the tax authorities 
determine the value. 
• Shipping Tax 
Profits from shipping are subject to a shipping tax in lieu of income tax. The tax applies 
only to ships operating under the Greek flag. These are classified into two categories: 
Category I includes freighters, tankers, and refrigerated ships of gross tonnage of 3,000 
koros (8,460 tons) or more, and passenger vessels plying routes from Greece to foreign 
ports or between foreign ports, with the rest belonging to category II. 
3.3 Indirect Taxes applied in Greece 
3.3.1 Value-added Tax (VAT) 
• General background 
VAT was introduced in Greece with effect from 1 January 1987 (Law 1642/86), adopting 
the sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EEC) as the agreement for the Greek accession to the 
EEC, and replaced a number of indirect taxes the most important of which were the 
turnover tax and stamp tax. The older system of indirect taxation was very complicated, as 
the nominal tax rates varied widely among different sorts of transactions and were subject 
to numerous exemptions, rate reductions, and cumulative effects. Accordingly, it was 
difficult to estimate the actual burden levied on final products. This led to a very 
complicated tax structure with high administrative costs, and it enforced vertical 
integration of economic activity, which involved many inefficiencies. Moreover, the 
system was very protective. The replacement of the old taxes by VAT, a neutral tax, was 
expected to have a strong impact on the economy. In addition this tax reform took place 
during a period of strong inflationary pressure. All previous ED members had made their 
changes twenty years earlier, before the inflationary pressure had accelerated. The tax 
reform proceeded quite smoothly. The impact of the new tax on the overall level of 
economic activity was rather mild and beneficial. More specifically, the impact on prices 
was very low (2%) owing to a price-freezing policy implemented when VAT was 
introduced. VAT resulted in a better redistribution of tax burdens, since this tax is 
less regressive than the ones that preceded it. Thus, it improved the tax structure's 
flexibility and stabilising effects. Finally, VAT did not have a considerable impact on 
trade (imports and exports) (Agapitos, 1999). 
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There is no monetary limit below which V AT is not chargeable. Any person supplying 
goods or services in the course of business, whether on a regular or occasional basis is 
taxable. VAT is a tax on goods or services supplied in the course of independently 
carrying on a business or other economic activity in Greece. Supplies that do not take place 
in Greece are referred to as being "outside the scope" of the tax. VAT is also due on goods 
imported into Greece from a country that is outside the EU and on goods that haye been 
"acquired" (i.e., imported) from other EU Member States under the EU Single Market 
procedures. 
The principal mechanism for collecting the tax requires the supplier (called a taxable 
person) to charge V AT on the goods or services supplied, to take credit for V AT paid on 
business expenditure, and to pay the net tax over to the authorities (i.e. indirect tax-credit 
method). However, for some transactions, e.g., the intra-Community supply of goods, the 
recipient of the supply of goods is required to account for the VAT due, rather than the 
supplier. Special rules allow the recovery of V AT incurred by foreign enterprises in 
Greece if the VAT is referable to the making of supplies outside Greece. The Greek State, 
municipalities, communities and other organisations governed by public law are not 
considered taxable persons in respect of activities in which they engage in pursuance of 
their objectives, even where they collect dues, fees or contributions. These bodies, 
however, are considered as taxable persons when they engage in such activities as 
telecommunications, supply of gas, electricity and thermic energy, transport of goods, port 
and airport services, passenger transport, running of trade fairs and exhibitions, etc. 
Entrepreneurs with no establishment in Greece but delivering goods in Greece or 
supplying services, which are taxable in Greece, are subject to VAT. A foreign 
entrepreneur is regarded as delivering goods in Greece when he acts as the importer of the 
goods. Generally, a non-resident entrepreneur is considered as having an establishment for 
V AT purposes if he keeps a regular place of activity such as an office, shop, factory or a 
fixed domicile from the activity is exercised. Foreign entrepreneurs making transactions in 
Greece are required to appoint a VAT representative who will be responsible for fulfilling 
the administrative obligations and for payment of the tax due. 
• Taxable transactions and place of taxation 
In general subject to tax are the following transactions: 
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a) Supply of goods. The term includes the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible 
movable goods as well as immovable properties 
b) Supply of services. This is defined as any transaction which does not constitute a 
supply of goods. This wide definition allows a large number of transactions to be 
classified as "services" 
c) Self-supplies of goods and services (private use of goods or services) 
d) Intra-Community acquisitions. The threshold in national currency for intra-Community 
acquisitions is 2500000 Drs (10000 euro)15, and for intra-Community distance selling 
8200000 Drs (35000 euro)16. 
e) Intra-Community acquisitions of new means of transport 
f) Intra-Community acquisitions of goods subj ect to excise duties 
g) Imports of goods 
The place of supply of goods is deemed to be in Greece if at the time the tax becomes 
chargeable the goods are within the Greek territory. The place of supply of services is 
considered to be Greece if, at the time the tax becomes chargeable, Greece is the country 
where the supplier has established his business, or has a fixed establishment from which 
the service is supplied or, in the absence of such a place of business or fixed establishment, 
he has a permanent address or habitual residence. When a foreign entrepreneur provides 
the following services to a Greek entrepreneur, he will not have to account for Greek V AT 
since the tax will be due by the Greek recipient. This special rule referred to as the "reverse 
charge mechanism" applies to the importation of: 
a) transfers and assignments of copyrights, patents, licences, trademarks and similar 
rights 
b) advertising services 
c) services of consultants, engineers, consultancy bureaux, lawyers, accountants and other 
similar services, data processing and provision of information (but excluding any 
services relating to land) 
d) banking, financial and insurance services (including reinsurance, but not including the 
provision of safe deposit facilities) 
e) the supply of staff 
15 Article 28a-(l) (a) of Directive 911680/EEC. 
16 Article 28b-(B) (2) of Directive 911680/EEC. 
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f) the letting or hire of goods other than means of transport 
g) the services rendered by one person to another in procuring for the other any of the 
services mentioned in the preceding paragraphs 
In all above cases, the liability for the tax is shifted to the recipient of the services. 
• The basis for taxation 
The taxable amount in respect of supplies of goods and services is the consideration which 
has been or is to be obtained by the supplier of goods and services. On that basis, 
incidental expenses, such as commissions, packing, insurance, transport and Customs 
duties are part of the taxable basis. VAT due on the importation of goods is assessed on 
the value paid by the importer to the supplier. The taxable amount also includes all taxes, 
dues; levies and contributions paid to the State by other third parties, and also commission, 
transport and insurance costs, with the exception of VAT. VAT becomes due when the 
goods have been supplied and the services performed. 
• VAT rates 
The current V AT rates are: 
a) 0 % (Zero rate), for exemptions with credit for input tax 
b) 4% (reduced rate), applicable to books and magazines, printed materials III 
general and tickets for performances 
c) 8% (reduced rate), applicable to products regarded as basic necessities and 
d) 18% (standard rate), applicable when the goods or services are not subject to 
any other specific rate 
• Exemptions 
The following are examples of exemptions with credit: 
a) export of goods from Greece provided that the tax authorities are satisfied that 
the goods have in fact been exported 
b) insurance and reinsurance services rendered to non-EU residents including 
related servIces performed by insurance brokers and insurance agents 
c) supply and importation of goods and services under diplomatic and consular 
arrangements 
d) supply and importation of vessels and aircrafts intended for commercial use. 
A number of exemptions are granted from V AT (exemptions without credit for input tax) 
including: 
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a) servIces supplied by lawyers, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, nurses and 
physiotherapists 
b) the supply of educational servIces 
c) the income (rent) from buildings, excluding the exploitation of hotels, furnished 
rooms, parking places 
d) hospital and medical care 
e) banking, insurance and reinsurance servIces provided in the territory of Greece 
or to a recipient established in other ED Member State 
f) delivery of gold to the Bank of Greece. 
There is no right to recover V AT on the purchases of the above exempted transactions. 
Transactions are either subj ect to V AT or exempt. It is not possible to opt to pay V AT 
when an exemption normally applies. 
• Tax credit for input tax 
A taxable person is in principle, entitled to recover VAT paid on goods and services and 
on importation of goods acquired in furtherance of business. However, no credit is granted 
for input tax on: 
a) purchase or import of tobacco products 
b) purchase or import of alcoholic beverages to the extent that these have been utilised in 
non-taxable transactions 
c) entertainment and hospitality expenses 
d) accommodation, food, beverage, transport and entertainment expenses or personnel or 
company representative 
e) purchase or import of passenger cars for private use, vessels and aeroplanes for private 
use or sports, as well as the related fuel, repair, maintenance, rental and circulation 
expenses generally. 
Taxable persons making both taxable and exempt supplies are entitled to recover input tax 
related only to their taxable supplies. When goods and services are used for both taxable 
and non-taxable activities, the creditable input tax is calculated based on the ratio between 
taxable supplies and total supplies (pro-rata mechanism). 
• Special VAT regimes 
In Greece special arrangements are applied for "special V AT regimes": 
a) The special arrangements for farmers provide for the return of tax charged on their 
purchases of goods and services. The V AT rate applied to sales of goods by fam1ers 
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under this special regime in Greece is zero. The goods concerned are fishery, forestry, 
crop and livestock products. 
b) The special regime for small businesses provides special arrangements for the 
administration of the tax. 
c) Special rules apply to travel agents who, for the purpose of providing travel facilities to 
their customers, use the supply of goods and services of other taxable persons. All 
transactions performed by a travel agent in respect of a journey are treated as a single 
service by the travel agent to the traveller. 
d) Finally a special scheme is applicable to second-hand goods, works of art, collector's 
items, antiques including the sales of these goods by public auctions, and to 
transactions concerning gold acquired for investment purposes 17. 
3.3.2 Other indirect taxes 
• Turnover Taxi8 
This tax is a single-stage tax levied only on the insurance industry. The basis for taxation 
is the insurance company's turnover and the tax must be paid within 90 days of the quarter 
end. The rates applied are 4% for life insurance (and reinsurance) and 10% for householder 
(all risks) and other classes. The tax is payable on insurance premiums and all charges 
accruing from insurance contracts without any reduction of discounts allowed to clients 
and likewise without any reduction of brokerage fees and commission paid to third parties. 
The tax is payable to the State by insurance companies on a quarterly basis. 
y Exemptions 
The contracts over ten years are exempt as well as the marine aviation transport and the 
State export. Reinsurance premiums collected by insurance and reinsurance companies are 
also exempt. 
17 Council Directive 98/80/EC, 12 October 1998, supplementing the common system of value added tax and 
amending Directive 77/388/EEC-special scheme for investment gold. 
18 The turnover tax was a broad based tax levied on both domestic production and imports, characterised by a 
multitude of tax rates and exemptions which were the same for domestically produced and imported goods, 
and which has been abolished with the introduction of V AT, as a part of Greece's accession to the EEe. with 
the exemption of insurance industry. 
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• Stamp Duties 
These include a wide group of levies imposed at different rates on various transactions. 
Most of these duties constitute indirect taxes and are either proportional to the yalue of 
transaction or fixed (e.g. 3% levied on the value of insurance contracts) irrespectiYe of the 
value of the transaction any document may represent. The rates vary from 0.5 % (draft and 
promissory notes) to 3% (insurance services). The stamp duties are a significant category 
of indirect taxes. They also constitute the most complicated tax category in the sense that 
they encompass a plethora of levies, either proportional or fixed with cumulative effects. 
, Basis of assessment 
a) The total fee received for the provision of a service 
b) The total rent received for the letting of buildings and land 
c) The amount of the loan for which a contract is being concluded 
d) The full sale price of a sale of movable goods by a natural person 
e) The amount of the insurance premium or the insurance pay-out 
f) The nominal value of bills of exchange and promissory notes 
g) In the case of a contract between natural persons, the value of the contract 
, Exemptions 
a) Personal exemptions: In these cases, it is one of the contracting parties that is exempt 
and not the contract itself. 
b) Exempt parties: include the State and foreign embassies. 
c) Real exemptions: In these cases, the contract or document itself is exempt from stamp 
duty 
d) Formal exemptions: Granted on contracts that have been ratified in law. These may be 
personal or real 
• Special Tax on Banks' Transactions (EFTE) 
This is a sales tax introduced first in 1987 replacing the formerly applied turnover tax on 
financial (bank) institutions, following the reform of the indirect taxation in Greece 
(introduction of VAT). This tax is calculated using a specific rate (3%) each time a bank 
transaction takes place without deduction for tax paid on inputs (multi-stage cumulatiye 
tax). The tax is payable on all form of gross bank revenues, derived from interest. 
commission and brokerages fees, etc., by Greek banks, the bank of Greece, foreign banks 
registered in Greece. The tax is payable to the State on the basis of monthly statements. 
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}- Exemptions 
a) Loan and credit contracts granted by banks to the State municipalities and legal 
persons governed by public law when, subject to the existing provisions, these parties 
enjoy exemption from stamp duties and likewise. 
b) The commission charged by and the interest accruing to banks in respect of loans and 
credit arrangements granted to the parties. 
c) Bank revenues that are exempt from stamp duties or turnover tax by virtue of specific 
legal provisions. 
d) Bank revenues accruing from the sale or letting of real estate. 
e) Bank revenues that are subject to VAT. 
±) Loan and credit contracts to finance export operations. 
g) Credit contracts with a bank to the extent either not taken up or covered by another 
bank. 
• Excise taxe/9 
Besides the above broad-based (i.e. VAT) indirect taxes there also exists a number of taxes 
levied on all traditionally excised products, thus alcoholic beverages, tobacco and tobacco 
products, and mineral oils. In Greece before the introduction of V AT the use of excise 
(and the turnover tax) was the recognised mean of taxing consumption. Nowadays, the 
alternative philosophy, beyond the additional revenues which these taxes contribute, is of 
course to use excise taxes to influence consumer behaviour. These taxes are generally 
calculated using a combination of ad-valorem and specific rates of duty giving to the 
Greek tax administration a greater degree of flexibility to meet variable policy demands. 
The most important, from a revenue point of view, are the excise taxes on mineral oils, 
followed by those on tabacco products. 
Finally a number of additional indirect taxes are applied in Greece, such as import duties 
(within the framework of the European Customs code/TARle, TARIFF), Road Tax. Fire 
Brigade Tax and taxes collected by the State on behalf of third part agencies (low-yield 
19 An important step towards the harmonisation of excise taxes in European Union was the adoption of the 
Council Directive 92112/EEC of 25 February 1992 "on the general arrangements for products subject to 
excise duty and on the holding movement and monitoring of such products". With these arrangements only 
five of the existing excise taxes remained in Member States, thus the tax on mineral oil, the tax on 
manufactured tobacco, the tax on spirits, the tax on beer, and the tax on wines. 
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taxes )20. Here we would like to add that although the Greek Tax system appears to be 
based on various categories of taxes, as we can see from the following table 3.1 there are 
many similarities with the Spanish and Portuguese tax system regarding the taxes applied. 
This is one of the reasons these countries have been chosen for a comparative 
evaluation in the application of particular taxes (i.e. consumption and indirect 
financial taxes) in our empirical analysis. 
20 The European Court of Justice has put in question th~ wides~r~ad practice of such levies in Greece. raised 
in favour of several professional funds. The court in It'S deCIsIon of 19.03.02 stated that such leVIes are 
ille al because they are not in line with article 10 of the Directive 69~335, whIch st~tes that apart from the 
ca 7tal duty the Member States shall not charge with regard to compames ~rms aSSOCIatIOns or legal ~ersons 
o:erating for profit, any tax whatsoever. The Court with this decision consIdered these taxes as mdIrect taxes 
on raising capital. 
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Table 3.1 : Taxes applied in Greece, Spain, Portugal 
Member Direct taxes Indirect taxes 
State 
Personal Income tax VAT 
Corporate Income tax Excise taxes 
Tax on inheritance Customs duties 
Tax on gifts Motor vehicle Tax 
Income tax levy on behalf of Agricultural Special tax on television advertisements 
Insurance organization (OGA) Levy in favor of ELGA 
Greece Real estate transfer tax Central Bank levy 
Tax on movement of capital Special tax on bank transactions 
Duty on the purchase of temporary Turnover tax (insurance) 
residence in short-stay accommodation Stamp duties 
Tax on major real estate Levy on behalf of the Merchant Marine 
Taxes on payroll and workforce Pension Fund 
Recurrent tax on net wealth Levy on private and Public good vehicle 
Taxes on financial and capital Dodecanese municipal tax 
transactions Charge on heavy plant and machinery 
Social security contributions Fee for operation of recreational technical 
games 
Taxes and levies on behalf of third parties 
Personal Income tax VAT 
Tax on the income of non-residents Excise taxes 
Corporation tax Custom duties 
Wealth tax Duty on intermediate products 
Succession and gift duty Tax on insurance premiums 
Tax on construction, installation and Excise duty on certain means of transport 
works Tax on electricity 
Spain Tax on capital transfer and documented Tax on the increase in the value of urban land 
legal acts Tax on economic activities 
Local taxes Tax on mechanically powered vehicles 
Tax on capital gains Taxes on financial transactions (turnover tax) 
Taxes on payroll and workforce Taxes on motor vehicles 
Gift taxes 
Taxes on financial and capital 
transactions 
Social security contributions 
Tax on Personal Income VAT 
Tax on corporate Income Excise taxes 
Municipal Tax Custom duties 
Capital gains surcharge Special levies 
Inheritance and gift tax Tax on the use, carrying and possession of 
Real estate transfer tax weapons 
Social security contributions Motor vehicle Tax 
Portugal Taxes on wages and payroll Gaming tax 
Taxes on property Entertainment tax 
Tax on capital transactions Tax on insurance premiums 
Social security contributions Stamp duties 
Tax on banking operations 
Tax on credit 
Local taxes 
Data: DECD "Revenue Statistics", edition 2000,' European Commission, "hm:l1t01y oftaxes", edition, 2000 
-EC 2000a. 
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To summarise, this section has shown that quite different categories of taxes (both direct 
and indirect taxes) are applied in Greece. In addition similar categories of taxes are 
applied in Spain and Portugal. However, zn the case of Greece many of the abo\'e 
categories, especially indirect taxes, appear to have a complicate structure when applied. 
3.4 The functional structure of taxation in Greece (1965-1998) 
During the period 1965-1998 21 the level of aggregate taxation (total tax revenues) in 
Greece was 25.7% (mean) of GDP, a percentage quite low by international standards. This 
percentage is around 10 percentage points below the European Union average (36.6%), 
thus one of the lowest in ED, and 7.2 percentage points below the OECD average 
(32,89%) (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3 1. Tax Revel/lies as a percelll age of CDP 
/ Creece 
I EU 
10 L-__ +-__ +-__ ~ __ ~ __ ~ __ -+ __ ~ GEeD 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Year 1965-1998 
Data: GEeD "Revenue statistics", 2000, edition 
The situation has improved (from Tax administrations point of view) in the 1990's. As an 
indication we could mention here that in 1997 the above percentages were 7.7 points 
below the ED average and 3.4 points below the OECD average. During this period (1965-
1998) for which data are available it appears that indirect taxes are the most important 
category of taxes, constituting 47% of total taxation (14.8% of GDP) . In European Union 
no other State depends to the same extent on indirect taxation to finance its expenditures 
(Table 3.2; Figure 3.2-3.11). 
21T he estimations are based on data taken from OEeD "Revenue Statistics", edition Year 2000. 
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Table 3.2 Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect 
taxes) as a percentage of GDP. 
Year GR EU 
1980 10.4 12.9 
1985 12.5 13.4 
1989 12.2 13.4 
1990 13.9 13.4 
1991 14.6 13.4 
1992 15.3 13 .3 
1993 14.7 13.4 
1994 14.3 13.6 
1995 13.6 12 .7 
1996 14 12.9 
1997 14.2 13.2 
1998 14.3 13.7 
1999 14.6 14 
2000 14.8 13.9 
2001 14.8 13.9 
Source: European Commiss ion (Directorate Genera! Economic and Financial affairs) }} 
Figure 3.2-3.11: Plot of direct and indirect tax revenues in Greece, EU and OEeD. 
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VAT accounts for around 46% (23,8% of total tax revenues) and excise duties 13.5% of 
the total indirect taxes over the period 1987-1998 (Table 3,2; Figure 3.12-3 .15). Unlike 
many other countries, Greece raises a substantial part of its revenues in the form of indirect 
taxes other than V AT and excise duties (for example taxes on bank transactions, taxes on 
cap ital goods transactions represented 40,6% of total indirect taxation (6% of GDP) 
(Figure 3,16-3.17). 
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Table 3.3 VAT Revenues as percentage ofGDP and 
Total Tax Revenues 
VATas % VAT as % 
Year ofGDP of Total Tax 
Revenues 
1987 6.5 21.1 
1988 6.5 23.2 
1989 6.5 23 .9 
1990 7.3 24.5 
1991 7.4 24.7 
1992 7.6 24.6 
1993 7.3 23.2 
1994 7.2 22.7 
1995 7.2 22.4 
1996 7.2 23 .7 
1997 7.5 22.1 
1998 7.6 30.7 
Source: DECD (Revenue Sta tistics, 2000 edition) . 
Figure 3.12-3.15: Plot of VAT revenues and Excise duties as percentage oftotal tax revenues in Greece, 
EU and OEeD. 
Figure 3.12: VAras a percel/ rage oj roral rarariol/ . 
Figure 3.14: £rcise duties as percelltage of totnitmfltioll. 
YeoI' 1965 1998 
Data:DECD Revenue statistics , 2000 edition 
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The Direct tax/GDP ratio in 1997 (7.7%) was around 5 percentage points below the Union 
average; it is the lowest in the Union. The most important Direct taxes are taxes on 
personal income raising around 66% of total direct taxes (1.7% of GDP in 1965, 7.7% in 
1997). Central government receives by far the largest share of tax revenues in Greece. 
According to the estimates (Data: OECD Revenue Statistics) Central Government received 
during the period 1965-1998 almost 70% of total taxation, social security funds around 
30% and local Government only 1 %. 
3.5 The evolution of the functional structure of taxation in 1990's 
The overall tax level increased from 29.7% ofGDP to 33.8% over the period 1990-1997, 
with no more major peaks but a relatively steady growth rate of around half of percentage 
point per year. The share of taxes on consumption in GDP was quite stable during this 
period (from 9.8% in 1990 to 9.5% in 1997) which was in general around two percentage 
points above the EU average (Data: OECD "Revenue statistics" , 2000). Because of the 
comparatively low overall level of taxation however, this GDP share corresponded to a 
share in total taxation that was above the European Union average (26.5 % in 1990, 23.3% 
in 1997) and the highest in EU. Taxation of consumption accounted for 17 .2% of total 
taxation in 1985. It peaked in 1987-1988 due to the major increases in Revenues from 
V AT and general turnover taxes . Hereafter, the share stabilised to a level of around 24% of 
total taxation. 
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T . 23 axatlOn on labour-employed was among the lowest in EU and OEeD, even after the 
inclusion of social security contributions in the accounts from 1989 and onwards (Figure 
3.18-3.19). Taxes on labour accounted for slightly less than 4% of GDP during the peri od 
1985-1989. This share increased to 12% in 1989 stabilised at that level, until it increased 
again to 13.6% in 1993. The share on taxes on labour in total taxation was around 42% in 
the period 1989-1991 , decreased in 1992 and increased again in 1993 to around 44% 
approaching the European Union average but still below it. 
Figure 3.18-3.19: Plot oftaxes 011 labour ill Greece, EU al1d OEeD. 
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Finally in 1990' s in a number of countries attention is given to the possibilities of using 
tax instruments in environmental policy formulation. 24 Environmental taxation in Greece 
consists mainly of the motor vehicle duty and the car registration fee . Environmental taxes 
raised around 0.5% ofGDP in 1988-1990 increased slightly in 199 1 to decrease thereafter 
and stabilise at 0.4% (0,7% the EU average) after 1995 . 
The taxation of energ/5 in Greece in 1990' s consisted of a tax on petroleum, petroleum 
products, lubricants and gas (excise taxes). Its trend over time could suggest some strong 
fluctuations, but in general the share of GDP seems to be slightly below the European 
Union average (4,6% comparing to 5.1 % in EU). 
23 StlUctures of the taxa tion sys tems in the Emopean Union 1970-1 996 Emostat and DG XXI (E , 199 ) and 
OECD Revenue Statistics, 2000 . 
24 OECD, ConsWllptiol1 Tax Trends, 1999 edition. 
25 Stmctmes of the taxation systems in the Emopean Union 1970-1 996 Em ostat and DG XXI (Ee, 199 ). 
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3.6 Recent Fiscal Developments 
Generally speaking Greece has made a significant progress in correcting fiscal imbalances 
in recent years. Having peaked at 13.8% of GDP in 1993, the general government deficit 
fell to 3.1 % in 1998. The debt ratio peaked at 111.3% of GDP in 1996 and decreased by 
almost 6 percentage points in the two subsequent years to 105,4% of GDP in 199826 . 
Despite a temporary deceleration in real output growth, the general government deficit was 
reduced to 1.6% of GDP in 1999 while the debt ratio continued to decline for a third 
consecutive year. The improvement in the budgetary position in 1999 was mostly the result 
of budget revenues while the decline in debt servicing costs was partly offset by general 
government investment. The primary surplus reached 5.8% of GDP, the highest level ever 
achieved in the consolidation phase. Indirect taxes and taxes on capital transactions 
were the main contributors, reflecting further progress achieved in combating tax 
evasion and strong activity in the Athens Stock Exchange. Furthermore, social 
contributions increased significantly, implying the effectiveness of the 1998/99 first phase 
reform of the social security system. On the basis of these achievements, the Council 
abrogated its decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in Greece in November 1999 
and accepted Greece in the final stage of the Monetary Union (June 2000). 
The 1999 update of the Greek convergence programme restates the economic strategy with 
a view to the smooth entry of Greece into the Euro-zone. The programme projects the 
government balance to tum into a surplus of 0.2% of GDP in 2002, while the level of the 
government debt should fall to below 100% of GDP in 2001. This points to the need to 
tackle structural challenges if the debt ratio is to decline at a faster pace. On the revenue 
side, a reform of the tax system is on the agenda. The government-approved tax breaks 
totalling 165 billion drachmas for 2001 and 200 billion drachmas for 2002. As a result the 
ceiling for tax-exempted annual income in direct taxation rises to 2.4 million drachmas. 
The top income tax rate will be reduced from 45% to 42.5% for 2001 and 40% for 2002. 
Further this reform provides for the abolition of a multitude of low-yield taxes collected by 
the State on behalf of third party public agencies as well as the Special Banking 
Transactions Tax (EFTE), considered as significant burden on the cost of bank loans27. 
26 Public Finances in EMU-2000 (EU, ECFIN/339/00-24.S.2000) 
27 Greek Ministry of Finance, 2001 Budget. 
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3.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we examined the various defined (Direct and Indirect) taxes applied in 
Greece. The categories of taxes applied in Greece are in general similar to those applied in 
Spain and Portugal. However, it appears that their complex structure make the Greek tax 
system inefficient (i.e. Revenues raised/ Overall Tax burden) in comparison to other EU 
and OECD systems. Over the years, numerous tax changes have been implemented in a 
piecemeal fashion, leading to a complex and non-transparent tax system. As a result the 
tax system has performed poorly. However the introduction of VAT brought a major 
improvement to the tax system and successful steps in recent years to raise tax compliance 
have been reflected in strong revenue growth (OECD, 2001). On the other hand, the 
indirect taxes, which are many in numbers and are levied at numerous rates on variously 
"defined" bases (in some cases not in line with the EU legislation), dominate the overall 
tax system in Greece. However, we found that there are many similarities with Spain and 
Portugal regarding the categories of taxes applied. In addition as we have seen in EU no 
other State depends on the same extent as Greece on indirect taxation to finance its 
expenses. Unlike other EU countries, V AT in Greece has not the same dominant position 
in indirect taxation. In Greece are still in force multi-stage cumulative taxes (also known 
as "cascade" taxes) where tax is levied each time a transaction takes place without 
deduction for the tax paid on inputs (i.e. the special tax on banks' transactions, turnover 
tax on insurance companies). These taxes contribute to revenues (high-yield taxes) but at 
, 
the same time they are inefficient from economic and administrative point of view. In 
general, the way of calculating the tax due (without deductions) gives rise to cumulative 
effects resulting in a spillover of these taxes into industrial costs and hence into exports 
and capital formation. 
VAT in Greece has been applied within the framework of the sixth VAT Directive, 
following Greece's entry to EEC, concerning the taxable transactions, the exemptions 
provided or the calculation of the tax due (the tax-credit method of computation has been 
applied). However, the different structure of the Greek economy appears to be a strong 
factor explaining the multi-rate system and the different "special VAT regimes" applied. 
The large number of small businesses especially at the retail stage creates certain problems 
in the application of VAT which requires detailed record keeping and accounting 
procedures. This is the main reason for the existence of the special regime for small 
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businesses. Also the dominant role of the agricultural and touristic sectors in the Greek 
economy explains the different arrangements applied for farmers and travel agents. 
Finally despite the above-mentioned problems in the tax structure of the tax system, 
Greece has made a significant progress in correcting fiscal imbalances in recent years. 
However, the strategy for a smooth entry to Euro-zone and the consequences of the 
Economic and Monetary Union for the co-ordination of Tax Systems in EU indicates the 
need for further structural changes and reforms in the Greek tax system. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS. 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we reviewed the theoretical and empirical research on the issues 
we examined concerning the V AT and the taxation of financial services. We found that 
that there are certain gaps in the literature which we shall attempt to fill. The paucity of 
empirical results may be attributed to the lack of attention paid by researchers to indirect 
taxation in a particular national context. A country case study represents an ideal means of 
bridging this knowledge gap, as it allows all the characteristics that are unique to each 
country to be taken into account. This chapter presents the methodological consideration to 
be taken into account when studying the indirect taxation of financial services. 
Methodology for a study specifies what information is to be gathered, from where and 
what methods of data collection and analysis are to be employed. Subsequently, the 
selection and development of the research instruments will be considered and the methods 
of analysis and approaches employed by this study will be discussed. 
4.2 Research focus and research questions 
Before discussing the methodologies adopted in our research we would like to recall the 
objectives of our research. The basic aim, subsequent to a better understanding of the 
current system of taxing financial services, is to design new VAT structures including the 
financial services within the framework and in the light of the EU Member States 
experience. In particular our research methodology will serve to achieve the three main 
objectives/aims of this study, which are: 
1. to identify the distortions arising from the existing system of financial exemptions in 
Greece and EU (through study of the Greek and EU VAT legislation) [aim 1] 
2. to estimate the economic effects of taxing financial services under the Greek V AT 
system, including the estimation of the fiscal revenue loss of the current applied 
financial exemptions in Greece [aim 2] 
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3. to investigate the economic effects on total tax revenues, expenditures and growth of 
the existing indirect financial taxes [aim 3]. 
Our research will focus on the case of Greece (special reference) but \ve will compare and 
evaluate our results with those derived for selected ED countries (Spain and Portugal). The 
special features of its indirect taxation of financial services motivate the choice of Greece. 
Specifically, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Greece continues to apply cascade 
indirect taxes on banking services and a turnover tax on insurance services. In addition the 
whole tax system in Greece is dominated by indirect taxes other than V A T. During the 
period 1965-1998, for which data are available, indirect taxes are the most important 
category constituting for the whole period 47% of total taxation (14.8% of GDP). No other 
ED State depends to the same extent on indirect taxation to finance its expenses. Moreover 
the tax system in Greece seems to be rather complicated and inefficient. The level of 
aggregate taxation in Greece for the period 1965-1998 was 25.7% ofGDP, quite below the 
international (OECD) and European (ED) standards. It is also recognised that any future 
tax reform of the Greek tax system should cover a broad range of measures that aim, 
among others, to broaden the tax base (i.e. abolishing of exemptions) (OEeD, 2001). 
Furthermore, despite the overwhelming importance of indirect taxes (including the indirect 
financial taxes) in total Greek revenue, there are very few systematic up-to-date studies 
available. These studies are either outdated (Karageorgas, 1973; Provopulos, 1979) or 
fragmentary (Georgakopoulos, 1989; Andrikopoulos, Brox and Georgakopoulos, 1992; 
Alogoskoufis, Misoulis and Karavitis, 1996). Finally, none of the aforesaid studies is 
investigating two important categories of indirect taxes; taxes that fall only on final 
consumption through the deduction of input tax (i.e. consumption taxes) and taxes that 
may fall on intermediate and investment goods (indirect financial taxes). 
As we have already mentioned in our literature survey, the umque characteristics of 
financial services make it difficult to apply the V AT to them under the credit invoice 
(Consumption type) system. We discussed several problems arising from the taxation of 
financial services (the feasibility of taxation, the cascade problem, the efficiency of 
financial sector, the indirect financial taxes etc.) identifying several gaps especially on the 
economic effects of tax (VAT and indirect financial taxes). We show that in most 
theoretical and empirical studies V A T remaining on intermediate goods (especially in 
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financial sectors) is simply neglected and nothing has been said about the economic effects 
of this part of VAT. On the aforesaid basis and taking into account the fact that the overall 
tax system of financial services in Greece is biased towards indirect taxation (as we show 
in our previous chapter about the V AT system in the Greek tax structure, the current 
system of taxing financial services is dominated by the application of indirect cascade 
financial taxes) we form the general hypothesis that a V AT substitution in the sense of 
replacing the existing taxes on financial institutions would be feasible and economically 
effective for the Greek economy and financial sector as well. 
The underlying empirically testable hypotheses are: (a) financial servIces are a key 
determinant of VAT base, thus a wider VAT base including financial services gives higher 
revenues or larger VAT revenue-to-GDP-ratio; theoretical contributions: Tait, (1988, 
1990); Gillis, (1987); Bogetic and Hassan, (1993) (b) the inclusion of financial services in 
VAT base gives less embeddedlblocked VAT on investment and capital goods (Tamaoka, 
1994) and (c) the "cascade" indirect financial taxes have economic implications through 
the taxation of the intermediate and investment goods; Optimal commodity tax theory: 
Bovenmberg, (1987); Gottfried and Wiegard, (1991) etc. 
The information/data derived will be used to answer the following research questions, 
linked to our main research aims and hypotheses: 
• what are the main differences among the Greek and other EU systems of taxing 
financial services? (Rl) 
• what is the potential for competitive distortions for the Greek financial institutions of 
the current system of taxing financial services? (R2) 
• are financial services significant for the VAT base? (Yield from Taxation, estimation 
of the impact on VAT revenues, assessing the economic effects and efficiency) (R3) 
• what empirical relationship exists, first on VAT revenues/GDP, VAT base and V AT 
rates and second on consumption, indirect financial taxes and national income? (R4) 
• how changes in consumption taxes (i.e. taxes that only fall on final consumption) and 
"cascade" indirect financial taxes (i.e. taxes that might fall on intermediate and 
investment goods) affect the whole fiscal structure? (effects of consumption and 
indirect financial taxes on total tax rate and expenditures) (RS) and 
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• lastly, what is the impact of the existing consumption and indirect financial taxes on 
growth ? (R 6) 
As we can see from figure 4.1, research questions Rl, R2 are linked to the first aim: 
research questions R3 and R4 are linked to the second aim; and research questions R5, R6 
are linked to the third aim. 
Figure 4.1: Research aims and (luestions. 
I aim 1 H : :: 
I aim 2 H : R3 R4 
I aim 3 H : :: 
4.3 Methodology and Research Design 
Our study is in fact an analytical and applied economic policy research. Thus, the research 
is essentially desk-based and quantitative. Secondary data and information are employed in 
studying in depth the relevant legislation applied in ED Member States to establish a full 
comparative evaluation of the current indirect tax systems applied to tax financial services 
in Greece and other ED Member States by: 
• identifying the main differences between the Greek system and other National 
systems 
• identifying the major distortions within and across those systems (Research questions Rl 
andR2). 
At this point we chose to include in our analysis all the ED Member States because in our 
opinion this will give us a complete overview of the tax treatment of financial services in 
Greece and ED facilitating our comparisons. In addition the availability of data for all EU 
Member States and the harmonisation of VAT system in ED will facilitate our efforts to 
identify important differences in the tax treatment of financial services. The main areas for 
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study here are the scope and liability of taxation on financial services, the recoyery of input 
V AT incurred by financial institutions, and the taxation of insurance services. This study 
will provide us with more information needed for the generalisability criteria of our 
research (external validity). With this qualitative analysis, the basic structural elements of 
the V AT treatment of financial services are identified and for each Member State the 
approach adopted by that Member State to tax financial services is briefly explained. It is 
therefore possible to classify the different approaches for each structural element 
(categories of financial services) and identify groups of Member States who use a similar 
approach i.e. to apply the same or similar VAT treatment for particular elements 
(categories of financial services). Groups or individual Member States who apply different 
treatment outside the "average" can also be identified. This qualitative analysis does not 
attempt to identify which approach to a specific category of financial service is the "best". 
Each Member State has established its rules with the aims of constituting a coherent tax 
system to meet its particular need to tax financial services. 
Then the research will continue by quantifying the revenues that could be raised in Greece 
from the exempted financial services and by estimating the revenue yield if such services 
were taxable. This quantitative analysis allows us to measure the effect of the particular 
tax measure. Our aim in this part of our research is to estimate the fiscal revenue loss of 
VAT exemptions in financial sectors in Greece (including insurance services) over the 
period 1987-1998 (Greece introduced VAT in 1987) (Research questionR3). 
At this stage an input-output table method based on National Current Account Inputs and 
National Capital Account Inputs will be used for the first time in Greece. This will help us 
to identify the value added by the financial sector, and after the calculation of the weighted 
average VAT rate (A WVR) to estimate the yield from exemption/taxation. This approach 
(National accounts approach) is well known in the VAT literature and was adopted, as we 
have seen in our literature review, by other researchers in the field of indirect taxation as 
well (i.e. Aguirre and Shome, 1981; Mackenzie, 1991; Jack, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; 
Tesche, 1998). The starting point for the calculations in this method is the most recent 
annual measure of nominal gross domestic product (GDP), where the study is measuring 
the whole VAT base, or the output of the sector (estimated from National accounts). \\"here 
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the study is measunng the VAT base for the sector. Then three mam categories of 
adjustments are made as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
adjustments to produce the Consumption V AT base for the economy or for the sector 
adjustments for exemptions 
adjustments for the reduced V AT rates 
The first set of adjustments is definitional. These are adjustments to produce the 
consumption VAT base (for example imports must be added to and exports subtracted 
from GDP, or the gross fixed investment must be subtracted from sector's output etc.). The 
second set of adjustments concerns exemptions. The VAT may exclude consumer 
purchases from exempt industries (education, professional services, health care etc.). The 
VAT may also exclude consumer purchases from business below the VAT threshold, such 
as small farms and self-employed providers of services. Finally the third set of adjustments 
account for reduced rates of tax on some goods and services consumed domestically. In 
general, although input-output tables are unlikely to be up-to-date, they can provide a 
guide to the purchases of inputs by exempt industries (i.e. financial institutions) relative to 
the importance of final sales of these items to consumers. The National accounts data refer 
to the final expenditure of the economy; they are therefore the appropriate ones since V AT 
is closely related to the taxation of final expenditure on goods and services. Furthermore, 
although this method does not capture general equilibrium effects, it allows analysis of the 
effects of the financial sector's taxation in a simple spreadsheet model. However, this 
method can only be used for forecasting as long as there is no change in tax rates or goods 
(services) affected since it calculates the economy wide average VAT rate. In addition, in 
applying the method to financial sector the split of value added between depositors and 
deptors is ad hoc and not based on economic factors. 
An alternative approach is the one developed by Genser and Winker (1997) to examine the 
issue of VAT exemption of banking services in Germany. This approach is based on the 
use of disaggregated data and identification of value added on a transaction by transaction 
basis. In their study they estimated the size of the fiscal revenue loss due to the current 
V AT exemption of commercial banking in Germany. They used a balance sheet approach 
for the calculation of value-added in margin services based on the introduction of a 
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benchmark interest rate which economically reflects the marginal cost of financial funds 
and allows for assigning bank services to debtors and depositors. Using this approach it 
was possible to approximate the fiscal revenue loss due to V AT exemption based on 
aggregate bank balance sheet and interest rate data. As we mentioned in the literature 
study, the numerical results indicated a net revenue loss of exempting bank services in 
Germany around 40/0 of the VAT revenues for the year 1994. Although this method is 
expressed in detail and seems rather sophisticated allowing a series of sensitivity analyses 
with regard to changes of the underlying assumptions, unfortunately is not well suited, in 
our opinion, for our purpose. This method clearly considers only deposit and loan services 
and disregards other banking activities. In addition it does not calculate the overall VAT 
base for the financial sector including insurance services. Furthermore the above 
mentioned method is based on desegregated bank data and on the introduction of a 
benchmark interest rate in order to improve the estimates for the fiscal effects and to study 
the issue of implementing a regular VAT on banking services in more detail, which 
unfortunately are not available from the official published bank statistics in Greece. 
In addition to test the significance of the financial exemptions in Greece and to investigate 
what empirical relationship is emerging from the existing time-series data on V AT 
revenues, VAT base, and VAT rates we will use an econometric model (using regression 
techniques) relating the above variables. This model will help us also to make 
comparisons, at a later stage, with Spain and Portugal. Our aim here is to investigate the 
strength of the relationship between the VAT base (i.e. exemptions) and VAT revenues' 
performance (VAT revenues/GDP) in each country (Research question R4). 
Moreover in our research we will try to gain a better understanding of the existing indirect 
financial taxes in Greece by estimating the elasticities of these taxes on National Income 
and comparing the results with those for VAT, consumption taxes and total tax revenues. 
In tax literature the income elasticities of taxes are frequently used as an indicator of short-
run variability and long run growth (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996). Our aim in this part of 
our research is to examine the variability of different taxes (indirect financial taxes, VAT, 
Consumption taxes) in relation to changes of Net National Income. The estimation will 
cover the period 1965-1998 (for financial and Consumption taxes) and 1987-1998 (for 
V AT). For the estimations we will use regression techniques and a simple log-linear model 
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relating the different tax revenues to Net National Income. At a later stage following the 
same methodology we compare the above mentioned results with those derived for Spain 
and Portugal. These two countries were selected for a comparative evaluation due to the 
similarities in indirect tax system which makes the comparisons feasible. Both countries 
introduced VAT during the same period as Greece (1986) and apply indirect financial 
taxes in a uniform way. Here we enrich our results by estimating the average effecti\"e tax 
rates on consumption as well. This numerical analysis relates realised tax revenues (e.g. 
from consumption and indirect financial taxes) directly to the relevant macroeconomic 
variables in National Accounts. Following Mendoza, (1994) and OEeD, (2000a) \ve 
calculated the average effective rate on consumption (te) for Greece, Spain and Portugal 
over the period 1965-1998 based on the following formula: 
General Consumption taxes + Excises 
t =--------------~------------------
C Private Consumption + Public Consumption 
In our calculations using the above formula we consider some methodological issues 
concerning the inclusion of indirect taxes on investment on the numerator (a detailed 
explanation of this analysis is following in the relevant chapter including the estimations). 
Here we calculate also the average effective rate on consumption attributed to the existing 
indirect financial taxes in three countries. (Research question R4). 
The next step is to examine the effects of consumption and indirect financial taxes on 
fiscal structure (i.e. revenues and expenditures) in Greece, Spain and Portugal using annual 
data over the period 1965-1999. This shall be done by using cointegration techniques and 
testing the model for parameter instability in the cointegration relationship between the 
variables, due to structural breaks around times of unusual events. Our concern here is the 
time series analysis of the variables of interest (i.e. total tax rate/expenditures, 
consumption and financial taxes). Here we wish to examine the long run relationship 
between the variables and how they interact in a system. Therefore we need to utilise a 
methodology which accounts for these dynamics and provides results concerning the long 
run. We feel that the most appropriate methodology is to test, as we mentioned abo\'(~, for 
cointegration between the variables. The notion of cointegration refers to the case \\'here 
two or more variables move together over time and the difference between them is stable 
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over time. This methodology will give us an insight into the relationship of each of the 
variables with other and how they behave as a system. In the present analysis this 
methodology is particular relevant because we wish to establish not only how these 
variables relate, but also which of the variables are endogenous. In this present analysis we 
will use the Johansen (1988) and Johansen, Juselius (1992) co integration methodology 
which involves several steps. The Johansen methodology is rather complicated and by nO\y 
well has known in the academic literature (a brief overview of it will follow in the 
empirical chapter) (Research question R5). 
The final step will be to consider the time series properties of growth and indirect financial 
taxes in Greece, Spain and Portugal. Our aim at this part of the present analysis will be to 
test whether changes in indirect financial taxes permanently affect growth and its 
components (e.g. investment and labour force) (short-run and long run effects of financial 
taxes on growth). Endogeneity of the relevant variables here is an important issue because 
we expect the tax system and the relevant revenues to cause economic growth and vice-
versa. At this stage we will use the same methodology (co integration) as mentioned above 
using data over the 1965-1999 period. This will help us to understand the possible effects 
of a tax reform in the tax treatment of financial services in three countries, and to develop 
policies on the indirect taxation of financial services in the context of a comprehensive 
reform of the tax system in Greece (Research question R6). 
4.4 Data collection 
Since we carry out a macroeconomic quantitative research we are mainly concerned with 
the collection and analysis of secondary data in numeric form. In addition we will also use 
secondary data in other forms such as books, journals, published and unpublished papers, 
reports, minutes of meetings, computer-based material and other governmental documents 
(e.g. legislation). In broad terms we use sources and statistics from government private 
organisations, international institutions and "documentary and text analysis" for the non-
numeric type of secondary data. But this documentary analysis will be in the form of 
literature review ("content analysis") rather than a specific analysis method. 
The data needed for the legislative study has been collated from the follo\ying sources: 
• Greek V A T legislation (Law Nr. 1642/86) 
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• EU VAT legislation (Sixth V AT Directive, 77/388/EEC) 
• EU law data base (EUR-LEX, code 09.30.10 VAT) 
• European Court of Justice's relevant decisions 
• EU V AT Committee 
• OECD (Consumption Tax Group) 
• London Underwriting Centre (LIRMA) for the taxation of insurance services. 
The main data source for the estimation of the impact (economic effect) of taxing financial 
services on V AT revenues and GDP, is the National Accounts Input-Output Tables 
(Greece's National Statistic Service) over the period 1987-1998 (time-series/annual data). 
We would like to mention here that in Greece the National Accounts shows VAT 
exclusive figures in input-output tables and holds the corresponding V AT information 
behind each figure (capital purchases from the financial sector, Intermediate consumption 
etc.). Furthermore, the additional data needed for the estimation of VAT indicators such as 
the average weighted VAT rate (A WVR) and the recovery rates in Greece will be taken 
from the Greek Fiscal Authorities (Greek Ministry of Finance and National Statistical 
Service). These data are necessary for the estimation of the revenues collected by denying 
the recovery of input tax in respect of currently exempt financial services and instruments 
and finally for the estimation of the revenues taxing these services would collect that. 
Finally, in our econometric analysis, we will use time-series data from OECD ("Revenue 
statistics", 2000 edition in disc format) concerning VAT revenues, consumption taxes, 
total tax revenues, indirect financial taxes and GDP for Greece, Spain and Portugal over 
the period 1965-1998. Lastly from IMF ("International Financial statistics, Yearbook" 
2001 edition) we use time series data, over the same period of estimation, on total 
consumption, expenditures, Net National Income, and gross fixed capital formation. Data 
on active labour force are taken from International Labour Organisation (ILO/Laborsta 
database). The variables are in billion of National currencies and are expressed in real 
prices (at 1995 prices). The variable representing the labour force is expressed in 
thousands of employees. 
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4.5 Data analysis 
First in our legislative study to facilitate our analysis and comparisons we will look at 
twenty main categories of financial services (banking and insurance) and two categories of 
activities auxiliary to financial intermediation (professional and advisory services). It 
means that the VAT assessments (i.e. status of taxation for each category of financial 
service) will be given under the Greek V AT legislation and under the other Member 
States' legislation as well. In the light of the definitions provided by the Sixth VAT 
Directive (77/388/EEC) and GATS/WTOIFSA Annex on financial services, the above 
mentioned list is not exhaustive. However, in our opinion it covers the majority of the 
different financial services provided by the financial institutions. The information or data 
collected from the legislative study will be analysed manually in order to serve the 
research aims (identification of differences and similarities in legislation between Greece 
and EU Member States, identification of distortions etc.). 
Our data analysis needed to construct the input-output tables will start with production 
data from the National accounts which we will modify as necessary to get the VAT base 
and V AT revenues with the application of the average weighted V AT rate (A WVR) , in the 
hypothetical case of taxing the financial services under the VAT system in Greece. A 
detailed analysis of this methodology will follow in the chapter on the impact of taxing 
financial services on VAT revenues. This analysis will be performed in a simple spread 
sheet framework. 
Finally in our econometric analysis we will estimate linear versions, using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) techniques relating the relevant variables of interest (time series data, 
estimation period 1987-1998 and 1965-1998) to estimate the elasticities of different taxes 
on Net National Income, in order to examine the variability of each tax (V AT, indirect 
financial taxes etc.). Then we shall continue searching for long run relationships and 
comparisons with other countries (Spain and Portugal) by using, as we explained before, 
multivariate techniques for the period 1965-1998 ( cointegration, Johansen procedures). 
trying to identify differences in consumption tax systems (i.e. differences bet\\cen 
consumption taxes, thus taxes that fall only on final consumption, and indirect financial 
taxes, thus taxes that may fall on intermediate and investment goods). Finally, using the 
same methodology, we will examine the relation of growth and indirect financial taxes by 
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testing for causality (i.e. possible direction of causality) and by examining the long run 
effects of the existing indirect financial taxes on the growth variable and its components. 
For the above-mentioned econometric analysis the Microfit 4.0 software will be used. 
Finally the following Figure 4.2 describes the research process developed in this thesis and 
table 4.1 details the customised research design for meeting the objectives of this study. 
Figure 4.2: Overview of Research process 
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4.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provided a depiction of the research design and processes used to analyse, and 
interpret the data that were collected. The research process phases in this thesis beginning 
with problem formulation, theoretical underpinnings, research methodology, data 
collection and analysis were detailed. The research methodology employed in this study 
appeared appropriate because it helped to state and to answer the research questions. 
In our opinion in order to deal with the problem of methodology in our study we have to 
look at it in the context of the European integration in the field of indirect taxation. If this 
is the case the need for an open methodology, which can readily absorb new factors and 
elements and maintains an interdisciplinary outlook appears to be relevant to the research 
aims. For this, an in depth study of the relevant legislation applied in the 15 EU Member 
States seems appropriate. In addition, because of the nature of our research which is in fact 
secondary analytical and applied economic policy research, more contextual and 
diagnostic, our first concern will be the time-series analysis of the variables of interest. 
Consequently the application mainly of econometric methods in parallel with an input-
output method (National account approach) seems to us straightforward. Finally, the 
comparisons of the results for Greece with those derived for other selected EU Member 
States (Spain and Portugal) will reinforce our conclusions and the validity of the study on 
the tax treatment of financial services, in order to develop policies on the indirect taxation 
of financial services. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL SERTICES CSDER 
INDIRECT TAXATION IN GREECE AND IN THE OTHER EU AfEjlfBER STATES. 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we evaluate the current indirect tax system used to tax a wide range of 
financial services in Greece, and compare it with those used in other Member States 
(including Spain and Portugal) by: 
• identifying the main differences between the Greek and other EU systems [Research 
question Rl, Table 4.1 p.l OOJ, and 
• identifying the major distortions within and across those systems [Research question 
R2, Table 4.1 p.l OOJ. 
This will enable us to identify the V AT status of financial services, which Greece and 
other Member States provide. Every effort has been made to make this chapter as up to 
date as possible (2000). 
The indirect taxation of financial services is a complex and technically difficult subject, 
both in tenns of the products themselves and the context in which wholly financial 
transactions are undertaken. Historically, many financial services have been exempted 
from consumption taxes. As we discussed in literature review, the reasons for this are both 
theoretical and pragmatic. Whilst on a practical level it has often proved difficult, it is not 
impossible to establish the tax base for certain intennediation services. A study of this 
subject is in our opinion likely to meet with difficulties in obtaining consistent and reliable 
infonnation for all EU Member States. For this reason, we focus our study on the scope 
and liability of taxation in the area of financial services where comparable and reliable 
data are available from the National and the EU legislation. In this chapter we go some 
way forward by identifying the main differences between Greece' s system and other EU 
Member States' systems in those areas which were selected for research. These areas are 
the scope and liability of taxation on financial services and instruments (what is subject to 
V AT and what is exempted), the recovery of input V AT incurred by financial institutions 
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and finally the taxation of insurance services which is an issue which has been neglected 
so far from all the latest studies as we mentioned in our literature review. 
5.2 Data and methodology 
The Data contained in this chapter has been collated from the following sources: 
• The Greek V AT law Nr. 1642/86, "On implementing Value added tax (V AT) and other 
provisions" and Law Nr 2859/2000(the new complete consolidated version of the V AT 
legislation-VAT code) 
• The Sixth VAT Directive 77/388/EC, of 17 May 1977, "On the harmonisation of the 
laws of the Member States relations to turnover taxes-common system of value added 
tax: uniform basis of assessment", Official journal L 145, 13/06/1977 
• The EU law data base EUR-LEX, under "community legislation in force" code-09 
taxation, code 09.30 indirect taxation, code 09.30.10 VAT 
• European Commission, "Inventory of taxes", 2000 
• The European Court of Justice relevant decisions (ECJ) 
• The European Commission's "VAT committee" (National legislation and changes, 
Inventory of taxes) 
• The OECD's "Consumption tax group", mainly information about the recoverable 
VAT on inputs by financial institutions and tax treatment of different financial services 
• The London Underwriting Centre (LIRMA, data on indirect tax treatment, other than 
VAT, of insurance services). 
To identify the differences in tax treatment of financial services we will start to study the 
Greek VAT law by identifying the relevant provisions. Having examined in this way the 
current system of taxing financial services in Greece, we shall continue with the EU 
legislation (sixth V AT directive) and finally we will compare, where appropriate. the V A T 
treatment of financial services in Greece with other systems applied in EU Member States. 
To facilitate our comparisons we looked at twenty main categories of financial services 
(banking and insurance) and two categories of activities auxiliary to financial 
intermediation (professional and advisory services). It means that the V A T assessments 
(i.e. status of taxation for each financial service) are given under the Greek \' AT 
legislation and under the other Member States' legislation as well. We \\ould like to 
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mention here that we have chosen the above-mentioned definitions and categories of 
financial services because all the businesses covered by this chapter provide, or are in one 
way or another involved in finance and insurance. Most of what they do is directly related 
to money and insurance contracts. At its simplest, this will mean dealings in money or its 
equivalent (including foreign exchange) and the provision of credit i.e. lending. It also 
extends to providing current account facilities, letters of credit and other more specialist 
types of finance and insurance, including hire-purchase or instalment credit finance, debt 
factoring, loss adjustment services etc. More permanent or long-term finance may im"olve 
securities, such as shares or loan stock, derivatives etc. However, by no means all-financial 
services have this direct link with money. There is also a wide range of associated services 
and facilities to which the monetary link is peripheral, i.e. investment or other financial 
advise, professional services, underwriting of the issue of securities etc. 
In addition, in our comparisons the following definitions have been used: 
• Ex, exempt from the tax with no right to deduct the input tax. This income is included 
in the calculation to establish the recovery of V AT on general expenditure (pro-rata 
mechanism) 
• SIR, standard rated, i.e. subject to Greek VAT at 18% 
• O/S, outside the scope of VAT, without credit for related input tax. This income is not 
included in the calculation to establish the recovery of V AT on general expenditure 
• ExIR, exempt from VAT but with credit for related input tax. Here we include the 
zero-rated financial services as well (technically taxable but at 0% with a right for 
deduction of the input tax). 
Finally by using data from the London Underwriting Centre (sourced in part from the 
Comite Europeen des Assurances, and up dated year 2000) and from the European 
Commission, fuventory of Taxes, 2000), we have examined the indirect taxation on 
insurance services (contracts) in Greece and other ED Member States, filling in our 
opinion an important gap in the existing literature. Although there is literature on the 
appropriate treatment of insurance services under corporate and personal taxes (see for 
example Aaron, 1983), little attention has been given to the question of its treatment under 
indirect taxes. 
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5.3 The current applied VAT legislation on financial services in Greece 
5.3.1 The financial exemptions in Greece 
According to the Greek VAT Law (Nr.1642/86, article 1828 (1), k, ka, kb, kc, kd, ke, kf) 
the following financial transactions are exempted from V AT: 
• 
• 
• 
insurance and reinsurance transactions including related servIces performed b\' 
insurance brokers and insurance agents (k) 
transactions, including negotiation, concerning currency, bank notes and coins used as 
legal tender with the exception of coins and bank notes for collectors (ka) 
transactions, including negotiations, except safekeeping and management in shares of 
S.A companies, interests of companies, bonds and other securities, excluding 
documents establishing title to goods (kb) 
• management of the joint funds provided for the provisions of the Law 60811970 (Gov. 
Gaz. 170) (kc) 
• the granting and the negotiation and the management of credit by the person granting 
it (kd) 
• dealing in bonds, personal or financial guarantees and other securities negotiation and 
dealing in these transactions and the management of credit guarantees by the person 
granting the credit (ke) 
• transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, 
transfers of deposits and remittances, debts, securities for credit, cheques and other 
negotiable instruments but excluding the collection of third party debts. Also the 
transactions concerning factoring agencies involved in this sector (kf). 
5.3.2 The rightfor deductions, article 2329 of the Greek VAT Law (Nr. 164]186) 
The taxable person is entitled to deduct from the tax which corresponds to the transactions 
carried out by him in supplying goods and services and intra-community acquisitions of 
goods, the tax charged on the supply of goods and services made to him and on 
importation of goods effected by him, as well as the tax due in respect of intra-community 
acquisitions of goods, effected by him. In the case of supplying investment goods, the right 
to deduct the tax is exercised definitively at the time when the goods are first used. This 
deduction is granted in so far as the goods and services are utilised in carrying out 
28 Art.22 UI, k, ka, kb, kc, kd, ke) in the new version of the VAT legislationJVAT code, Law:\r 28)C) 2000, 
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transactions subject to the tax. The right to deduct the tax is also granted to the taxable 
person in so far as the goods and services are used for the transactions exempted under 
article 18 (1), (k, ka, kb, kd, ke and kf) namely banking services, when the customer is 
established outside the European Union or when these transactions are directly linked \\ith 
goods being exported to a country outside the European Union article 2330 (2)(d) of the 
VAT Law, Nr 1642/86. 
5.3.3 The place a/supply (taxation) a/financial services 
The place of supply of services according to the article 1231 (1) of the Greek VAT Law is 
considered to be in Greece where at the time when the chargeable events occurs, the 
supplier has established his business or has a fixed establishment from which the service is 
supplied or, in the absence of such a place of business or fixed establishment, the place 
where he has the permanent address or usually resides. Exceptionally, the place of supply 
for banking, insurance, including reinsurance, and other financial transactions, with the 
exception of the hire of safes, is considered to be within the country, when supplied by 
persons identified in another Member State to taxable persons, established their business 
within the country. The same rule is applied where the above services are provided by 
persons established outside the community, to any customer identified for V AT purposes 
within the country (taxation within the country/Greece). 
By way of derogation from the above mentioned, the place of the supply of services is 
considered to be outside the economy of the country, when the supplier, identified within 
the country supplies financial services (as mentioned in the above paragraph) rendered to a 
customer identified in another Member State or the Community Institutions or to e\'ery 
customer established outside the European Union. 
5.4 The sixth council VAT directive-77/388/EEC 
5.4.1 Article 13 B (d) 1-6 
Generally speaking, the 6th V AT Directive does not identify value added to be the taxable 
event. Apart from importation, the taxable events are the supply of goods, the intra-
29 ali. 30 of the VAT code, Law Nr 2859/2000. 
30 art.30(2)( d) of the VAT code, Law Nr 2859/2000. 
31 art.l4( 1) of the VAT code, Law Nr 285912000. 
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community acquisitions and the supply of services rendered for consideration. According 
to the 6th V AT Directive (article 6) any transaction not subject to the legal definition of a 
supply of good constitutes a supply of service (taxable event). This is a broad definition 
that ignores economic axioms. Regardless of whether there is a value added, financial 
activities constitute a service from a sixth Directive legal perspective. 
Analytically the above mentioned relevant article [13B( d) 1-6] states that the Member 
States shall exempt from VAT the following transactions under conditions which they 
shall lay down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of 
the exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse: 
• the granting and the negotiation of credit and the management of credit by the person 
granting it 
• the negotiation of or any dealings in credit guarantees or any other security for money 
and the management of credit guarantees by the person who is granting the credit 
• transactions, including negotiation, concerning deposit and current accounts, payments, 
transfers, debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments, but excluding debt 
collection and factoring 
• transactions, including negotiation, concerning currency, bank notes and coins used as 
a legal tender, with the exception of "collectors' items". The" collectors' items" in this 
case are gold, silver or other metal coins or bank notes which are not normally used as 
legal tender or coins of numismatic interest 
• transactions, including negotiation, excluding management and safekeeping, in shares, 
interests in companies or associations, debentures and other securities, excluding: 
-documents establishing title to goods, 
-the rights or securities referred to in article 5(3) of the same Directive, thus rights in 
rem giving the holder thereof a right of user over immovable property and shares or 
interests equivalent to shares giving the holder de jure or de facto rights of ownership 
or possession over immovable property. 
• management of special investment funds as defined by Member States. 
108 
5.4.2 Article 13 B (a) 
This article includes separately the legislation for the exemptions of insurance services. It 
states that Member States shall exempt the following under conditions which they shall lay 
down for the purpose of ensuring the correct and straightforward application of the 
exemptions and of preventing any possible evasion, avoidance or abuse: 
• insurance and reinsurance transactions, including related services performed bv 
insurance brokers and insurance agents. 
5.4.3 Article 13 C. Option to tax 
This article gives a right for option to the Member States to tax financial services under the 
V AT system. Actually it states that the Member States may allow taxpayers a right of 
option for taxation in cases of the transactions covered in article 13 B (d), mentioned 
above. These transactions as we can see are banking services. It does not cover the 
insurance and the reinsurance services. 
5.4.4 The place a/supply (taxation) a/financial services. Article 9(2)(e) 
Generally, according to article 9 the place where a service is supplied and taxed is 
considered to be the place where the supplier has established his business or has a fixed 
establishment from which the service is supplied or, in the absence of such a place a 
business or fixed establishment, the place where he has his permanent address or usually 
resides. However, the place where banking, financial and insurance transactions including 
reinsurance, with the exception of the hire of safes, are supplied when performed for 
customers established outside the European Union but not in the same country as the 
supplier, is considered to be the place where the customer has established his business or 
has a fixed establishment to which the service is supplied or, in the absence of such a 
place, the place where he has his permanent address or usually resides. 
5.4.5 Origin and scope a/the right to deduct. Article 17(1) (3) (c), and 19 
Generally, the right to deduct arises at the time when the deductible tax becomes taxable. 
In so far as the goods and services are used for the purposes of his taxable transactions, the 
taxable person is entitled to deduct from the tax which is liable to pay (V AT paid \\'ithin 
the territory of the country in respect of goods and services supplied or to be supplied to 
him by another taxable person, VAT paid in respect of imported goods etc.). \Iembcr 
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States can also grant to every taxable person the right to the deduction or refund of VA T in 
so far as the goods and services are used for any transactions which are exempt according 
to Article 13 (B) (d) (1) to (5) when the customer is established outside the European 
Union or when those transactions are directly linked with goods to be exported to a 
country outside the European Union. These transactions include all the banking 
services but exclude the management of special investment funds as defined by the 
Member States. 
In addition as regards goods and services which are used by a taxable person (i.e. financial 
institutions) both for transactions which V AT is deductible and for transactions in respect 
for which VAT is not deductible, only such proportion of the VAT can be deductible as is 
attributable to the former transactions. This deductible proportion is made up of a fraction 
having: 
• as numerator the total amount, exclusive of VAT, of turnover per year attributable to 
transactions in respect of which V AT is deductible 
• as denominator, the total amount, exclusive of VAT, of turnover per year attributable 
to transactions included in the numerator and to transactions in respect of which V AT 
is not deductible (known as pro-rata mechanism). 
The proportion is determined on an annual basis, fixed as a percentage and rounded up to a 
figure not exceeding the next unit. By way of derogation from the above mentioned 
arrangements from the calculation of the deductible proportion are excluded, amounts of 
turnover attributable to the supplies of capital goods used by the taxable person for the 
purposes of his business. Finally amounts of turnover attributable to banking transactions 
[article 13 (B) (d)] in so far these are incidental transactions, and to incidental real estate 
and/or other financial transactions are also excluded. 
5.5 Indirect tax treatment of financial services in Greece and other Member States 
Table 5.1 shows the different taxes applied on financial services in the EU Member States. 
It gives a general overview of the indirect taxes (other than VAT) and direct taxes applied. 
At this stage we prefer to include direct taxes as well, taking into account that the majority 
of these taxes although in many countries are classified under the code 4400 in the OEeD 
classification of taxes, thus as direct taxes and presented as such in budget reports in 
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Member States, many include some elements of indirect taxes as well. As we can see from 
Table 5.1 it is common to apply direct taxes (with some elements of indirect taxes) on 
banking services than to apply only indirect taxes. This is an indication of the difficulties 
the tax administrations face in applying indirect taxes on banking services. In addition the 
application of indirect taxes on insurance services seems to be a common tax policy in EU 
Member States. Actually seven Member States do not apply any indirect tax on banking 
services although eight do apply "pure indirect taxes". In addition all Member States apply 
indirect taxes on insurance services, which appears as heavily taxed in EU. Direct taxes 
(with elements of indirect taxes) are applied in almost all Member States. Only Spain does 
not apply any form of direct tax on financial services. In addition, among the EU Member 
States, Belgium applies the larger number of direct taxes on financial services. From the 
first overview of the system applied to tax financial services in EU (Table 5.1) we could 
conclude that we are far away from the target of achieving tax harmonisation in the tax 
treatment of financial services. 
Table 5.1: Comparison of taxes applied on financial services in EU Member States ~ 
---
Indirect taxes 
Member State Direct taxes 
banking insurance 
-- -----
Tax on interest yields: Tax on insurance Capital transfer tax , I 
bank and bond interest contracts Tax on capital transactions: stock I 
, 
Austria exchange turnover tax 
-----
! Annual tax on insurance Registration duty 
contracts Annual tax on collective 
investment organizations, credit 
institutions and insurance 
compames. 
Belgium - Special tax on the retained profits 
of certain credit institutions. 
Tax on capital transactions 
Tax on long tenn savings 
Tax on stock market operations 
and carry over transactions 
Tax on bearer's bonds 
Tax on shares quoted in stock 
market 
Duty on insurance 'Stamp duty on financial sen' ices 
contracts Taxation of profits and losses on 
Denmark claims and debts, and fmancial 
-
instruments 
Leyy on banks and sayings banks 
I 
Duty on share capital creation 
Duty on transfer of shares 
-----
-- -- - --
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Tax on insurance Credit tax 
Finland 
- contracts Transfer tax on capital transaction 
Exceptional tax on all Tax on insurance Stamp duty on capital transactions 
bank and fmancial contracts Tax on stock market operations 
France institutions Registration fee on Additional tax on registration 
Tax on credit insurance contracts 
Insurance tax Capital transfer tax 
Fire insurance tax Bill of exchange tax ! 
Germany I 
Gross-sales tax Turnover tax Tax on capital and financial 
Stamp duty on loans and Stamp duty transactions 
Greece credits Tax on capital changes 
Bank levy Gross-sales tax Stamp duty 
(levy of assessable Stamp duty on certain statements 
gross) of interest 
Ireland Security duty Stamp duty on credit, charge, and 
Duty on policy of life cash cards 
msurance 
Stamp duty on fmancial Insurance tax Registration duty 
services Stamp duty on fmancial 
Italy Stock exchange turnover transactions 
tax Tax on net company assets 
Tax on bank notes Tax on insurance Registration duty 
Luxembourg contracts Stamp duty on banking operations 
Tax on insurance Stamp duty on fmancial 
Netherlands - contracts transactions 
Tax on dividends 
Registration duty 
Stamp duty on banking Insurance premium tax Tax on capital transactions 
Portugal operations 
Tax on credit 
Turnover tax Tax on insurance 
Tax on economic contracts I 
Spain activities -
Insurance premium tax Taxes on financial and capital 
Sweden transactions 
-
Tax on securities 
Insurance premium tax Stamp duty on financial and 
UK capital transactions 
-
Data: DECD Revenue Statistics. edition 2000. and European Commission. Inventory oftaxes-Ec' 2000a. 
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Looking at the VAT treatment of financial servIces in ED in general it appears that 
Member States control providers of financial services by regulation and only for these 
purpose financial services are defined in the existing legislation. Howe\'er, as we 
mentioned in our literature review, there is no generic definition of financial services for 
indirect tax purposes. The ED's and the State's indirect tax legislation defines those 
financial services, which are exempted from VAT. Certain other financial services are 
considered to be outside the scope of the tax and the remaining financial services are taxed 
under the VAT system. Table 5.2 gives a detailed description of financial services 
(categories) considered in this study in the analysis of VAT treatment. This is by no means 
an exhaustive list, but these services are recognised (through the core legislation we 
mentioned above) as being quite clear financial in nature in Greece and other Member 
States. We would like to notice that we do not include in our list the transactions in gold 
given the harmonisation achieved in ED by the applied special tax scheme on investment 
gold (Directive 98/80/EC of 12 October 1998). 
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Table 5.2 provides an indication of the indirect tax treatment of fina . I . nCla SerYICeS across 
Member States. It seems that generally, there is a basic level of consistency in the 
treatment of such services across ED Member States. Howeyer, some significant 
differences can be identified (including in Greece). 
Generally speaking, monetary financial services are almost exclusively exempt from \'AT. 
Few are taxed at standard rate. This, as seen in the chapter about the structure of VAT, 
implies loss or restriction in input tax deduction. In some countries, howeyer, a number of 
such financial services are outside the scope of V AT, and depending on the method 
applied for the calculation of input tax (pro-rata mechanism) this may mean input tax is 
not inevitably an expense. This applies particularly to certain international, as opposed to 
purely domestic, financial transactions because in many cases some ED States provide the 
right for deduction of the input tax when these services are supplied to third countries 
(outside the EU). Non-monetary services are still, in so.me cases exempt. However, most 
are taxed at the standard rate. This is applied, in particular areas such as leasing and 
factoring, but is also extended to many services of professional or broadly administrative 
nature. Again, depending on what is involved, a number of financial services are outside 
the scope of the tax and zero-rating is still available in some situations. In short, from a 
first look at the relevant table 5.2, it appears that recovering input tax, rather than 
accounting for output VAT, is the main concern from an economic point of view. 
How much is recovered depends, however, on the individual business and, in many cases, 
the extent to which it is internationally based rather than domestic. Sometimes equally 
important can be the extent to which individual accounting systems can accommodate 
some of the more sophisticated approaches in the partial exemption mechanisms. 
Finally, the typically exempted financial services directly involve a financial transaction or 
negotiation of a transaction, in money or a security for money (including shares and 
debentures). They may also involve intermediation. The consideration is interest based or 
indexes based. Categories which are typically exempt are: loans/credit, dealing in money, 
shares, securities, derivatives. The typically taxable financial services are related to, but 
not directly involve, the negotiations of performance of financial transactions. These 
services may also involve support or administrative sen'ices and general ad\'isory sen·ices. 
The consideration is fee or commission based. Categories, which are tyllically taxable. are: 
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safekeeping, debt collection, portfolio and fund management, management of credit by 
third parties, advisory or introductory services and accountant services. 
5.6 Differences in the VAT treatment of financial services in Greece and other El' 
Member States 
5.6.1 The main differences in Greece 
Our earlier discussions of the relevant provisions in Greek and EU legislation, show that 
Greece has adopted and translated in the National legislation (Law Nr 1642/86 and Law Nr 
2859/2000/VAT code), the EU legislation regarding the VAT treatment of financial 
services with the exception of the provisions included in article 13( c) of the sixth V AT 
Directive (77/388/EEC), thus not giving to financial institutions the right of option for 
taxation. However, Greece, has adopted article 17(3)(c) (see table 5.3) of the sixth 
VAT Directive (77/388/EEC) granting the financial institutions with the right for the 
deduction or refund of input tax in so far as the customer is established outside the 
EU or when those financial transactions are directly linked with goods to be exported 
outside the EU. We will investigate the importance of this amount for the "cascade effect" 
in the following chapter (see chapter 6) where we will study the impact on revenues of 
taxing financial services under the VAT system in Greece. 
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Beyond the above mentioned general remarks, the main and most important differences 
which we can identify from table 5.1-5.2 for Greece in VAT treatment of financial 
services, in comparison to other EU Member States, are the following: 
• Dealing in money: Greece treats supplies of collectors' items as taxable 
• Credit and auxiliary services: There is an exemption applied with credit for the input 
tax for financial services in relation to exports of goods outside the EU 
• Provision of loans: Greece treats the management of loans by persons other than the 
person granting the loans as taxable 
• Credit card services: Greece exempts with no right for deduction of the input tax the 
services provided by the organisation which issues the credit card to the customer but 
applies the V A T at the standard rate to the use of organisations' networks for the 
payment of the bills, by the credit card owner 
• Leasing: The whole charge is treated in Greece as taxable at the standard rate 
• Factoring: Debt factoring is treated in Greece as taxable at the standard rate 
• Provision of non-life insurancelre-insurance: The provision by a non-authorised 
insurer of insurance cover relating to a specific risk (i.e. theft, loss, damage, illness 
etc.) in return for a periodic premium, including the services of non-authorised brokers 
or agents, is treated in Greece as taxable at the standard V AT rate 
• Settlement of insurance claims: All services provided from non-authorised msurer 
broker or agent are treated in Greece as taxable at the standard VAT rate 
• Fund management: Greece treats the management of mutual funds as exempt with no 
right to deduct the input tax. Any other fund management services are treated as 
taxable at the standard VAT rate 
• Professional services: Greece treats lawyers' services as exempt from VAT. On the 
contrary accountants' services are taxable at the standard V AT rate. 
5.6.2 Differences and potential distortions between the EU Member States 
As we mentioned above, from the information arising from table 5.2, it appears that there 
is a basic level of consistency in the treatment of financial services across EU Member 
States. However, there are number of cases where we can identify main differences 
between Member States and consider the potential distortions of competition arising as a 
result of them. The types of distortions arising can be broadly categorised as follows: 
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• 
• 
• 
distortions leading to competitive advantage/disadvantage between suppliers of 
financial services in the same Member State 
distortions leading to competitive advantage/disadvantage between suppliers of 
financial services in different Member States 
distortions caused by the variation in the level of "cascade effect" passed through to 
taxable business 
With no doubt, a key step in determining the economic and competitive effect of these 
distortions would be to quantify the level of the "cascading tax" arising from the 
exemptions of most financial services and instruments. This will be examined in the case 
of Greece in the following chapter on the impact of taxing the financial services under the 
Greek VAT system. 
Based on the information provided in table 5.2, categories of financial services where there 
are significant differences between the EU Member States are the following: 
• Dealing in foreign exchange: Actually the differences in treatment of foreign exchange 
exist where no fee or commission is paid (the profit being made on the margin). Thus 
this category is treated as taxable for VAT purposes or outside the scope of the tax. 
Where both the buyer and the seller are within the same Member State, the differences 
in treatment are unlikely to give rise to any significant indirect tax consequences. 
However, where transactions are made between different EU Member States, or 
between EU and non-EU Member States, the difference in treatment will cause a 
disparity in the seller's ability to recover V AT on inputs. This current difference in 
treatment will lead to an increase in the cost base of institutions located in the Member 
States where foreign exchange dealing is treated as outside the scope of the VAT. This 
treatment may affect their competitiveness and profitability against those institutions 
located in more favourable locations. 
• Financial leasing: Many Member States treat the whole of any leasing charge as 
taxable, whereas others treat the finance (or interest) element as exempt. This could 
affect the V AT revenues since those Member States applying V AT to the whole charge 
allow V AT, through deductions, to flow and to be paid by the final consumer, whereas 
those countries which exempt part of the charge create "hidden tax" through the 
"cascade effect". In addition these differences could potentially lead to distortions 
121 
within Member States. For example, in Member States where financial leasing is 
taxable, certain consumers who are not able to recover input V AT may restructure 
agreements to purchase assets under one contract and take a loan or credit under a 
separate agreement thus avoiding to pay V AT on the interest payable. 
• Fund management: Some Member States treat fund management as exempt \\"hereas 
others treat it is as a taxable. For businesses this mean that they can set up investment 
funds in jurisdictions which exempt fund management services and buy the relevant 
services from a jurisdiction which taxes them. This may allow the services to be 
purchased without "hidden tax" and without application of VAT on the import 
services. On the other hand non-taxable persons could, in theory, seek to purchase fund 
management services from a jurisdiction which exempts such services and so incur 
only the "hidden tax" element which is considerably lower than V AT on the whole of 
the fee. 
• Factoring: There are many apparent differences in the VAT treatment of these services 
between Member States. However, the indications are that the differences are actually 
a matter of variation in the interpretation of the nature of the services in the legislation. 
It general, it appears that if a debt is sold and the risk passes to the purchaser, the sale 
is an exempt supply for VAT purposes. Fees for administration and tracing bad debtors 
are generally taxable. This different treatment is likely to give rise to significant 
indirect tax consequences (same as those mentioned in the treatment of financial 
leasing above). 
• Option to tax: Beyond the above mentioned differences the application of article 13(C) 
of the sixth VAT Directive (77/388/EEC) in some Member States (Germany, France, 
Belgium), giving to businesses the right to opt, could lead to distortions within these 
Member States (for example between businesses which opted for taxation and between 
businesses which did not) and between Member States. We would like to clarify here 
that table 5.2 is not relevant where an option for tax is granted (in which case the 
relevant financial services are taxed with a right to deduct the input tax). In 
Germany this option is applicable for financial transactions relating to payment and 
cashing, currency and security transactions, credit and bullion; in France for payment 
and cashing, commercial paper, credit and guarantees, fees on futures and factoring; 
and in Belgium only for payment and cashing financial transactions (not for credit 
operations). 
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• International financial services: All EU Member States appear to apply a mixed 
destination/origin principle. The destination principle applies to non-EU customers and 
V AT registered businesses within the EU (application of the above-mentioned article 
9(2)(e) of the Sixth VAT Directive-77/388/EEC). The origin principle applies if the 
customer is an EU resident but is not a registered V AT trader. When the financial 
services are supplied outside the EU the place of supply is where the transaction occurs 
and the destination principle applies for the supplies of the services. Significant relief 
in the form of the input VAT recovery (for exempt financial services) is allowed in the 
context of international transactions (outside the EU) by virtually all countries (with 
the exemption of Italy). Despite the uniformity in the place of supply rules of 
international financial services the differences in the scope of tax itself within the EU 
Member States and between EU Member States and third countries could lead to 
potential distortions such as double or no taxation, competitive disadvantages, 
increased compliance cost etc. 
Finally we would like to mention here that there are other additional differences in national 
legislation in EU Member States, not directly related to financial services, but which could 
lead to potential distortions when applied to financial institutions. These differences arise 
from the different legislation applied in the V AT treatment of some cases such as the 
special regulations applied on "VAT groups32", the different treatment of capital goods, the 
restrictions applied to exempt bodies and the different methods of input tax recovery. 
5.6.3 Differences in taxing financial services under the VAT system in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal 
As we can see from table 5.2 there appears to be a similarity in the type of financial 
services which are treated as taxable and those which are treated as exempt in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal. Although a form of indirect tax has been applied to the main banking 
services (see Table 5.1) other exceptions related to specific financial services ha\'c been 
identified for the above countries. Table 5.4 shows that there are a variety of treatments 
under the V AT system for eight main categories of financial services in three countries. 
32 According to the article 4(4) of the 6th V AT Directive each Member State may treat as a single taxable 
person, persons established in the territory of the country who, while legally independent, are closely bound 
to one another by financial, economic and organisational links. 
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Table 5.4: Differences in taxing financial services under the VA T system I 
in Greece, Spain and Portugal (Extract from table 5.2). 
Cate~ories of financial Tax treatment under the VA T system 
services 
Greece Spain Portugal 
Credit card services Ex, SIR Ex Ex 
Dealing in financial instruments Ex Ex, SIR Ex, SIR 
and shares 
Share dividends Ex Ex OS 
Leasing Ex, SIR Ex, SIR SIR 
Factoring SIR Ex, SIR Ex 
Fund management Ex, SIR Ex, SIR Ex 
Settlement of insurance claims Ex OS OS 
Professional services Ex, SIR SIR SIR 
Data: OECD, Consumption Tax Group and European Commission, VAT Committee (Nationa//egis/ation). 
Ex: exempt from the tax with no right to deduct the input tax 
SIR: taxable at standard rate 
OIS: outside of scope of VA T, without credit for related input tax 
ExlR: exempt from VAT or zero-rated but with credit for related input tax 
Analytically the above-mentioned differences for Spain and Portugal (in relation to 
Greece) are as follows: 
• Spain 
, Credit card services: Even the activities of intermediaries and the operation of a 
network for the supply of these services are exempt. 
)r Dealing in financial instruments and shares: The issue, services and operations linked 
with values which represent goods and commodities or which are considered as 
property rights regarding real estate are standard rated (taxable). Commodities futures 
are standard rated unless traded on the official market in which case they are exempt. 
Options in respect of interest rates, exchange rates, securities, stock indices and other 
financial instruments are exempt. All other options are standard rated. 
)r Leasing: The charge for credit if it is separately disclosed is exempt. 
)r Factoring: If factoring services do not include any advance, payments are standard 
rated. 
~ Fund management: Only the management of specific investment funds is exempt. All 
the other types of fund management are standard rated. 
• Portugal 
)r Dealing in financial instruments and shares: Opening the stock deposit of securities, 
the stock deposit and drawing of securities, the transfer of securities among credit 
institutions, the payment of interest, registration and cancellation of securities, dealing 
in instruments which confer certain rights of land, are standard rated. In addition 
commodity future contracts, and option in goods/commodities are standard rated. 
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r Share Dividends and Insurance claims: They are considered to be out of scope of 
taxation (i.e. they are not included in the calculation of the Pro-rata fraction in order to 
establish the recovery of V AT on general expenditure). 
r Fund management: Only guarantees and related services including management 
services, which are not supplied by the original guarantor, are standard rated. 
A general conclusion is that although there are few differences among the three countries 
in VAT treatment of financial services, competitive distortions may arise from the 
differences in V AT treatment where the financial service in question is of a type which can 
easily be supplied cross-border. In particular, these competitive distortions may arise in 
Fund management, Professional services (different VAT treatment of lawyers and 
accountants) and in transactions based on different financial instruments. 
5.7 Implications of ECJ Decisions 
F or a proper assessment of the current legislation on the V AT treatment of financial 
services in the ED Member States it is important to look into the guidance given and 
limitations indicated by relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (EeJ) as 
well. Unfortunately in this field the ECJ has not developed a large body of case law. 
However, the importance and the impact of some cases should not be neglected. By far the 
most important was the ECJ's conclusions in Sparkassernes Datacenter v Skatteministeriet 
(case C2/95). The issue in the above mentioned case concerns the scope of the exemption 
for financial services in article 13 B (d) 3-5 of the EU sixth VAT Directive and in 
particular its application to services sub-contracted by a financial institution to a third 
party. The ECJ concluded on the application of financial exemptions of the above 
mentioned article that it is not only the nature of the service which is decisive for the 
exemption but also the capacity in which a person makes the supply of financial services. 
For example, whether he is a sub-contractor or not is very important for the exemption of 
the services provided. This will be a major source for change in the way outsourced 
financial services are treated for VAT purposes throughout the European Union. 
Everything else being equal, this is a bound to lead banks and other financial institutions 
preferring the in-house option in order to avoid sticking V AT on outsourced sef\'ices such 
as cheque clearing, payment card processing etc., even where because of economies of 
scale this is from an economic point of view a better option. The practice hitherto in 
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Greece and the other EU Member States has been to judge such contracted services 
on their merits for VAT purposes. If they are purely of administration and data 
processing, they have been treated as taxable, but if the activity has involved settlement 
and payments transactions between the financial institution and other financial institutions 
and the financial institution and its customers, the services has been generally accepted as 
exempt. In the final analysis, the narrowing of the scope of exemption provided by 
the article 13 B (d) 3-5 of the Sixth VAT Directive could cause problems of the 
interpretation of the Decision by EU Member States and could well, in our opinion, 
increase the attractiveness of the proposals currently under consideration for the 
taxation of financial services. 
Furthermore it is worth noting here two other important decisions taken by the ECJ, 
namely the cases C-281/91 and C-306/94. The first concerns the application of article 19.2 
of the Sixth VAT Directive on the deduction of input tax. According to this decision 
financial receipts are not included in the denominator of the pro-rata fraction if they 
consist auxiliary services. However, these receipts are included (taxed under the V AT 
system) if they consist the main activity of business. The second case is less important but 
it can playa role in determining whether the interest charged on credit sales are taxable or 
not under the VAT system (scope of the exemption for financial services in article 13 B (d) 
of the Sixth VAT Directive). Finally the ECJ in the cases C 70/83 and C 255/81 gave legal 
guidance for the exemptions provided in article 13(B) (d) (1) (i.e. guidance on the entry 
into force for the exemptions of negotiations of credit in Member States). 
5.8 Indirect taxation on insurance services in Greece and other EU Member States 
Generally insurance represents an arrangement in which one party (the insurer) assumes 
the risk for certain types of liabilities in return for premiums or other financial payments 
from a person being insured (the policyholder). What is or not insurance is clearly 
important. In the absence of any statutory definition, either in the Sixth V AT Directive 
(77/388/EEC) or in National legislation the matter falls to be construed according to the 
principles of the general law. We can identify three elements, which can define the 
insurance services: 
• the contract must provide that the assured will become entitled to something on the 
occurrence of some event 
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• the event must be one which involves some element of uncertainty 
• the assured must have an insurable interest in the subject matter of the contract. 
In terms of the general law of contract these usually mean that there must be an offer and 
acceptance between the two parties, an intention to enter into a legal relationship, and a 
consideration (some kind of payment). There are a wide variety of arrangements, which 
involve, in effect, insurance services in EU. Therefore, the discussion of the indirect 
taxation on insurance contracts in EU covers not only general insurance and life and health 
insurance but also such arrangements as guarantees, reinsurance, certain types of hedges 
and any other mechanisms with the same attributes. As we have seen in table 5.2, by far 
the majority of supplies by businesses in insurance sector do not attract VAT. Insurance 
is, with rare exceptions, exempt. Understandably, therefore, in an industry where recovery 
rates tend to be low, the emphasis is often on input VAT and on other taxes applied, which 
can create "cascade effect" in other sectors as well. As we can see from table 5.5, which 
gives an insight into the application of indirect taxes on insurance services (contracts) in 
EU, in the majority of the EU Member States the insurance premium tax (IPT) is applied 
(including Spain and Portugal). The rate appears to vary from 2% in Ireland to 22% on 
some types of insurance in Finland. The scope of the tax varies considerably and there are 
many differences in tax accounting and assessment. However, it seems that there is some 
consistency in tax base and in liability of taxation. 
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0 
The tax base appears to be the premium and the person liable to taxation, in most cases, is 
the insurer. Only two countries apply other taxes than insurance premium tax (IPT). 
France apply a general consumption tax (but similar to IPT), and Greece a turnover 
tax with a stamp duty tax of 2.4%. The turnover tax in Greece is a single stage tax where 
the deduction of the tax on inputs is restricted (with cumulative effect). By far the majority 
of insurance services concerning life and health insurance are exempt, or are taxed less 
heavily, in comparison to other categories (reduced rates). In addition there is an obvious 
tendency to tax more the property, the householder and vehicles with cumulative effects 
(restricted deductions). 
5.9 The recoverable VAT by financial institutions 
The fact that financial services are usually exempt from V AT means that financial 
institutions face some restriction in the amount of input tax they can recover. However, as 
we have seen from the legislation applied in ED Member States, to the extent that financial 
services are supplied to customers outside the ED, specific relief is provided. In most 
cases, the amount of tax recovered will be low (generally under ten per cent and often 
much less) due to the high incidence of exempt supplies for which the right of input V AT 
deduction is not available. How much is recovered depends, however, on the mix of 
particular company's business and what is the method for "partial exemption" applied. 
Mainly we could identify three important approaches33 in partial exemptions' rules applied 
by the ED Member States. These are: 
• The standard approach: Currently the standard method looks first at direct attribution 
for input tax incurred exclusively in making taxable or exempt financial services. This 
is either recovered or disallowed in full. Thereafter, the residual input V AT is 
recovered on a pro-rata basis according to the values of outputs or supplies of financial 
value of taxable supplies 
services made i.e. * input VAT. Taxable supplies for this 
value of total supplies 
purpose, for the most part, represent financial servIces, which are currently either 
exempt or outside the scope, but in either case with the right to recover underlying 
input VAT. In other words, they are financial services charged to customers established 
outside the ED or in connection with the export of goods. 
33 Aliicle 18-19 of the Sixth VAT Directive. 
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• The cost allocationlsectorisation method: This is a more complicated, but often mor~ 
accurate, cost/income centre approach. Under this arrangement expenditure and related 
V AT is first allocated specifically where possible to particular cost or income centres. 
Where this is not possible the allocation is done indirectly on an appropriate basis. 
V AT allocated to cost centres is then re-allocated to the appropriate income centres, 
again on a reasonable basis according to use of contribution (i.e. according to the 
relative value of business, number of staff employed in each section etc.) and 
• The simple apportionment: Where costs cannot be allocated specifically or a detailed 
costlincome approach is impractical, the apportionment of input VAT between 
different categories of income might be made on a basis of a fixed percentage laid 
down by the tax authorities of Member States. 
Table 5.6 (from the existing data) shows that there are significant differences between 
Member States in respect of the basis on which input VAT recovery can be made. In some 
Member States recovery rates are significantly higher than those achieved by other 
Member States. This may be because of the taxable activities undertaken by the 
institutions (for example financial leasing) to which most of the input tax can be directly 
attributed. This suggests that it may not be only the basis used to calculate the 
recovery of VAT (methods for partial exemption mentioned above) which influences 
the level of recovery achieved. The differences may also reflect the fact that different 
types of business and mixes of activity undertaken by financial institutions depend, 
in part, on the markets in which they compete (international business orientation) 
and the Member State in which they are established. In our opinion it is unlikely that 
the differences in input VAT recovery would form a consideration for a financial 
institution when deciding where to locate its operations. Other fiscal and Market factors 
are likely to be far more significant. However, differences in this area may affect the 
profitability of the financial institution in a number of ways i.e. the actual amount of V AT 
on expenditures which may be recovered, the administrative cost of applying a complex 
recovery formula, the cash-flow cost depending on frequency and timing of repayments of 
VAT etc. 
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Table 5.6. Percentage of the deducted input VAT by financial 
institutions 
M. State Banks Insurance 
Austria N/A* N/A 
Belgium 5-65% 0% 
Denmark 2% 2% 
Finland <5% <5% 
France 3-25% 5% 
Germany 10-20% N/A 
Greece 1-2% 1-2% 
Ireland 77-85% 76-86% 
Italy 0-2% 0-2% 
Luxembourg 8-70% 0% 
Netherlands 5-30% 0-5% 
Portugal 3-10% 1% 
Spain N/A N/A 
Sweden 5-21% 0% 
UK 8-60% 2-50% 
Data and estimations: GECD. Consumption Tax Group (1998) 
'Data not available 
From the existing data in table 5.6 (year 1998) it is not possible to evaluate the 
significance and the impact on tax yield of the differences in the levels of recovery in input 
tax of financial institutions. A simple conclusion could be that those Member States which 
indicate high levels of recovery by financial institutions are likely to be suffering a reduced 
yield from VAT measured against those Member States demonstrating low levels of 
recovery. This will be studied further in the case of Greece in the following chapter where 
we shall estimate the value of VAT incurred by financial institutions. Finally, in the 
specific case of Greece and Portugal the available data suggest some similarities in the 
level of deducted input tax (data were not available for Spain). Both countries appear with 
almost the same percentage of deducted input tax in insurance sector (1-2% for Greece, 
1 % for Portugal). However, Portugal appears with higher level of deducted input tax in 
banking sector (3-10% for Portugal, 1-2% for Greece) which can be best explained by the 
identified differences in VAT liability of the different categories of financial sen' ices, as 
we mentioned above. 
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5.10 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have examined the legislation regarding the current indirect tax system 
used to tax financial services under the VAT system in Greece and the other ED Member 
States. We went some way forward by identifying the main differences between the ED 
Member States in the scope of taxation of financial services. 
Generally it appears that there is some degree of consistency regarding those financial 
services, which are exempt from V AT. In addition we have found that some of the existing 
differences in the V AT treatment of certain categories of financial services could 
potentially lead to distortions of competition within ED Member States (e.g. example 
financial leasing). Differences may also lead to distortions between EU Member States 
(e.g. example fund management). Of course this distortive impact of differences in the 
taxation of financial services should be considered in the context of the wider range of 
other potentially distortive influences including special arrangements in V AT system, 
regulatory constraints, market development, country location etc. 
In addition we have reached the conclusion that Greece adopted in the National legislation 
the EU legislation regarding the V AT treatment of financial services. However, we were 
able to identify a number of important differences between Greece and other ED Member 
States. These differences which could easily lead to potential distortions are mainly in 
the scope/liability of taxation in financial transactions such as dealing in money, 
documentary credits, provision of loans, credit card services, financial leasing, 
factoring, fund management etc. At this stage the same results could arise from the 
comparative evaluation in VAT treatment of financial services among Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. In the next step we have identified important differences between all the ED 
Member States. These differences are arising mainly from the different treatment of 
financial transactions such as dealing in foreign exchange, financial leasing, factoring, the 
right to option for taxation and the different treatment of international financial services. 
Likewise, the evaluation of the indirect taxation (other than V AT) on insurance sen'ices 
(Contracts) in EU Member States has shown that there is some degree of consistency in 
indirect taxes applied (the application of insurance premium tax), with the exception of 
Greece where a turnover tax and stamp duty on insurance services (contracts) are applied 
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and France where a general consumption tax is applied. In particular, all .vlember States 
have special taxes on insurance, sometimes expressed as a percentage of the premium, 
sometimes as a percent of the value of the policy. However the differences in the scope 
of taxation between the EU Member States gave us a useful insight that we are far 
away from a common tax system on insurance services. 
Furthermore, a key step in determining the economic and competitive effect of the above 
mentioned distortions in tax treatment of financial services would be to quantify the level 
of the" cascading tax" arising from the existence of so many exemptions in V A T treatment 
of financial services and the different partial exemptions rules applied (value of V AT 
incurred by financial institutions). 
To summarise, the analysis in this part of the study has clearly shown that many of the 
obstacles concerning the taxation of financial services depend on the differing 
implementation by Member States of the Sixth VAT Directive. Such differences are of 
course to some extent intrinsic to the legal instrument of a "Directive" but the analysis has 
revealed a number of issues that merit further consideration. Generally, while a limited 
degree of divergence of implementation and interpretation of the Directive by Member 
States in drafting their national laws is inevitable, significant differences in the conditions 
under which the benefits of the Directive are applicable give rise to problems. Moreover, 
the substantially different implementation of the ED law in the Member States increases 
further the compliance cost resulting from the existence of 15 tax systems within the 
Single Market. A more uniform application of (existing and future) EU tax law 
(concerning financial services as well) could be an important step in order to reduce the 
differences and compliance costs and to make sure that, where EU tax law is relevant, 
comparable situations are treated in a comparable manner. At the same time, the need for 
litigation would be reduced. One way of achieving these objectives and to tackle the 
various problems relating to the divergence of the application of EU tax law across 
Member States would be the introduction of some kind of collective monitoring of the 
implementation of the relevant Directives. This would involve the creation of a mechanism 
for the exchange of best practice and/or some of peer review. After discussion with 
Member States, the commission could issue guidance on the interpretation of the relevant 
provisions especially of the Sixth VAT Directive. In this context, it is important to note 
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that the differences in the implementation of the Directives are often related to different 
legal traditions and concepts. In the provisions of the Sixth V AT Directive regulating the 
exemptions of financial services, many cross-border difficulties boil down to a va!) ing 
understanding of the definition of financial services. In the long run, the elaboration of 
binding guidelines on what constitutes a financial service could help to find solutions to 
obstacles that respect the justified interests of tax administrations in all Member States. 
Finally given the importance of the underlying problems in the field of indirect taxation of 
financial services "collective monitoring" appears to be a particularly appropriate means to 
deal with these sorts of tax obstacles in the Single Market. It is worth noting that the 6th 
V AT Directive explicitly provides for a V AT committee34 as an interpreting body of the 
relevant provisions. This committee could playa key role in finding solutions to obstacles 
for tax harmonisation in the tax treatment of financial services. Obviously any possible 
solution to the existing tax differences in the tax treatment of financial services must take 
into account the existing judgements of the European Court of Justice (EeJ) considering to 
what extent the European Court of Justice jurisprudence calls for further co-ordination 
between Member States in this field. Unfortunately, while the EeJ has unquestionably 
made a significant contribution to the removal of tax obstacles in indirect taxation (V AT 
harmonisation, abolition of fiscal frontiers etc.), it is unlikely that the interpretation of the 
few EeJ decisions on financial services could be sufficient to address all tax obstacles (in 
taxation of financial services) to cross-border activity. In consequence, the EeJ, in our 
opinion, is necessary to develop a larger body of case law in the field of indirect taxation 
of financial services and on the compatibility of the national tax rules with the relevant 
th ., provisions of the 6 VAT DIrectIve. 
3~ Title XVII, Art 29 of the 6th VAT Directive. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXATION: THE LUPACT OS 
REVENUES OF TAXING FINANCIAL SERVICES UNDER THE VAT SYSTEJI IX 
GREECE. 
6.1 Introduction 
As we discussed in the literature study and demonstrated by the comparatiYe study of 
legislation in EU Member States in previous chapter, most financial services are exempt 
from value added tax (VAT). This means that although these sectors pay very little in the 
form of output VAT, they are unable to reclaim most of the V AT they pay on their inputs. 
This exemption gives rises to non-neutralities relative to the taxation of other goods and 
services, which reduces the efficiency of the tax system. The exemption means that 
financial services are taxed less heavily than other goods and services because the value of 
inputs to the financial institutions rather than the value of the final products determine the 
effective tax rate. This chapter analyses the revenue effect of removing this exemption. We 
use an input-output method to estimate the effect on revenues of taxing financial services 
under the VAT system in Greece. The method is applicable to other (EU) VAT systems as 
well. Our aim is to compare the present VAT exemption of financial services with a 
hypothetical benchmark case of taxing them, and to derive first quantitative 
estimates for the fiscal revenue loss. 
We will seek here to answer our research question about the impact of financial 
exemptions on VAT base. Thus, does a wider VAT base including financial services giYC 
higher VAT revenues? [Research question R3 raj, Table 4.1 p.100] (Recent general 
theoretical contributions: Tait, (1988); Gillis, (1987); Bogetic, (1994), where a positive 
impact of the abolition of VAT exemptions on V AT base and revenues has been pointed 
out). In addition our second subsequent research question, which we shall ans\yer, is: Does 
the inclusion of financial services in the V AT base giye less embedded blocked VAT on 
financial institutions inputs? [Research question R3 rb), Table 4.1 p.l00]. 
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6.2 The taxation of financial services under consumption type YA T. The specific 
problems in Greece 
To understand the background and the problems of including financial seryices in VAT 
base we think that is necessary to recall from the literature review the main points and 
theoretical aspects which will help us to understand the steps we take in our empirical 
analysis which follows. Briefly, the unique characteristics of financial seryices make the 
application of VAT difficult under the traditional credit-invoice (consumption type) 
system. As we have seen, the difficulties in taxing financial services are discussed in a 
number of studies, such as: Barham, Poddar and Whalley, (1987); Hoffman, Poddar and 
Whalley, (1987); Thompson, (1988); Hoffman, (1988); Henderson, (1988); Garber and 
Raboy, (1989); Aujean and Poddar, (1997); Poddar and English, (1997). According to 
these studies, the problem of identifying or defining the elements of value-added on 
financial flows is the underlying rationale for exemptions in most V AT systems. Most EU 
Member States treat the vast majority of financial services provided within their economy 
by these institutions as exempt (article 13Bd of the EC sixth directive), with no right to 
recover the VAT on inputs. On the other hand, financial services supplied by financial 
institutions are generally treated as zero-rated supplies (or supplies deemed to be outside 
the country with full VAT recovery for inputs) when they are exported (see also table 5.2 
p. 114). 
Moreover it has been shown that an exemption on an intermediate stage of production 
could lead to the cascading of tax ("cascade effect") (Weidenbaum, Raboy, and Christian, 
1989; Tamaoka, 1994). No credit is given for taxes paid on inputs before the exempt stage, 
neither under an invoice and credit VAT, nor in a sophisticated subtraction VAT. When 
the exempt firm sells products to a company further along the production chain, the 
purchasing company pays tax on its own value-added. However, since there is no credit for 
inputs from the exempt stage that include previously paid tax, value-added from pre\'ious 
stages is taxed again. Thus, due to this cascading effect, the overall tax burden is higher 
than if there had been no exemption. Many financial services are provided as intermediate 
inputs to other businesses. This is particularly true of banking and insurance. In addition, 
as most exported services are effectively zero-rated of the originating country. the 
exclusion of imported services from the tax base can produce competitive inequities and 
economic distortions in the destination country. Similarly double taxation and economic 
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distortions may arise where imported services that are exempt or standard rated at the 
originating country are fully taxed by the destination country (EC, 1996b). Given the size 
of financial services sector it is unlikely that any tax structure would exempt this sector 
from without imposing separate (gross receipt) taxes. However. as we concluded in our 
literature review, there is no firm information and empirical evidence ayailable to 
determine whether any potential advantage from a change to the tax treatment of financial 
services would outweigh the costs of making such a change. 
Beyond the aforesaid problems, in Greece the current system of imposing a special 
transactions (gross-sales) and turnover tax and stamp duty on banking institutions and 
insurance companies respectively is inefficient on economic and administratiye counts. In 
general terms, the existing system does not exempt the acquisition of capital goods and so 
discriminates against capital formation. It also gives rise to cumulative effects resulting in 
a spillover of these taxes into industrial costs and hence into exports and capital formation; 
and weakens export competitiveness in so far as the amount of taxes incorporated in 
exports is not fully rebated. Moreover the administration of these taxes is troublesome for 
the Greek Tax Authorities (Greek Ministry of Finance, 1998). 
Although the issues mentioned above are not new, they have gained significance due to a 
number of developments that occurred in the Greek financial sector in recent years. After 
the threshold of "1992" and the Single Market, attention is turning to the Monetary Union 
and to the participation in the final stage of EMU (June 2000). In Greece the financial 
sector is a growth industry whose structure will be affected through the Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the Single Currency. Financial institutions will bear a big part of the cost of 
the Single Currency. It has been estimated that this cost will be approximately 3.37 % of 
the total administrative expenditures for the banking sector (24.85 billion drachmas in 
1996 prices; Hellenic Banks Association, 1998). Like in most monetary unions, but 
distinct from sovereign federations in which currencies and nations coincide, the E\ IU has 
no central fiscal authority. Although monetary and exchange rates policies are fully 
centralised, fiscal policy remains largely a national responsibility, in line with the 
subsidiarity principle. Fiscal and tax policies are co-ordinated through the multi lateral 
surveillance and excessive deficit procedures of the Maastricht Treaty, as clarified in the 
Stability and Growth pact. Under the common currency, tax competition is likely to 
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increase for at least two reasons. First, tax-l'nclusl've . pnces would become more 
transparent. Second with the loss of the monetary and exchange rate instruments, the role 
of tax policy in attracting business and enhancing competitiveness \\"ould become 
prominent (Cangiano and Mottu, 1998). If this is the case, a fiscal refonn in the taxation of 
financial services will be crucial for Greece and especially for the competitiveness of 
financial sectors which will be one of the key factors for the smooth adoption of euro (as 
from January of 2002). For such a change it is important (among the other issues 
mentioned above) to estimate the potential impact on revenues arising from the 
implementation of VAT on financial services which we examine in this chapter. 
6.3 Data and methodology 
As we discussed in the chapter on methodology, to estimate the fiscal revenue loss of V A T 
exemptions in financial sectors in Greece we follow the "National Accounts" approach. 
This method is well known in the VAT literature and was adopted by many researchers in 
the field of indirect taxation as well (i.e Aguirres and Shome, 1988; Mackenzie, 1991; 
Jack, 1996; Kodrzycki, 1998; Tesche, 1998). This method is based on the construction of 
input-output tables (economic tables) derived from the National Accounts. The best known 
example of the above studies using the "National Accounts approach" in V AT literature is 
the approach developed by Aguirres and Shome (op.cit) in order to estimate the V AT base 
for Mexico of the years 1980 and 1983 (two years whose individual VAT structures were 
considerably different). To address the problem of the estimation of the V AT base for the 
relevant years, they started with production data modifying them by adjusting for exports, 
imports, capital transactions, changes in stocks, exemptions, and all intennediate uses 
(with the help of an input-output table) in order to arrive at taxable consumption. 
Furthermore, the same approach has been used by the EU Member States as a common 
method for the purposes of calculating the value added for the agricultural sector for EU 
budget purposes. These detailed procedures are included in Annex C of the Sixth VAT 
Directive (77/388/EEC). The agricultural sector like the financial is exempted from \" AT 
in EU. According to the above method, to calculate the VAT base for the agricultural 
sector the Member States have to identify from the National Accounts the total final 
production of the agricultural sector, the total value of inputs and the gross fixed-asset 
fonnation. The V AT base in the case of the agricultural sector is equal to the difference 
between the value of the total final production, exclusive of value added tax, and the total 
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value of inputs together with gross fixed-asset fonnation In our case . 
. \\ e use aggregate 
data to work on the financial sector (banking and insurance) fiollo' th I 
' wmg e genera 
principles of the above-mentioned method for the estimation of the financial sector' s \'.~ T 
base. With the help of input-output ( economic) tables constructed for each year, for the 
period 1989-1998, we identify the V AT base for the exempted financial sectors and finally 
the yield from taxing the financial services under the V AT system. The calculations are 
based on the following fonnula: 
B=Q-IC-I, 
Where with B we denote the VAT base of the financial sector (banking and insurance), 
with Q the total final production of the financial sector (output), IC denoting all the 
intermediate transactions (inputs) and I the investment of the financial sector. In addition, 
following the OECD (see OECD/CFA, 1998) work on the cost of VAT exemptions on 
revenues, an additional modification has to be done at the final stage on the V AT base, to 
remove the "cost of the exemptions", thus removing the amounts which are not deducted 
by the exempted sector (general principle of the credit-invoice VAT system). In this case 
the above formula can be expressed as follows: 
B=Q-IC-Cd-I. 
With Cd we denote the non-deductible consumption (inputs) of the financial sector, which 
have to be removed from the VAT base or from the yield of taxing the financial services. 
These methods were modified as necessary to reflect the specificity of the sector's 
structure and the Greek VAT legislation and system (specific reference to Greece). 
Most of the data (annual time series) used in the calculations come from the input -output 
balances (economic tables) issued by National Accounts of the National Statistical Service 
of Greece for the years 1988-1997 (1998 edition). From the Greek Ministry of 
Finance/General Accounting Office we obtain data on existing taxes on financial services 
in Greece (gross-sales tax on banking services and turnover and stamp tax on insurance 
companies). These data are included separately in the annual budget reports over the 
estimated period. This information about these specific taxes is necessary for the 
calculation of the net effect on tax revenues. We also use data from OEeD (GDP, Total 
tax revenues and VAT revenues), "Revenue Statistics", 2000 disc fonnat edition. The 
variables are expressed in billions of national currency (Drachmas) at market prices. 
1..+1 
Analytically our aim in estimating the fiscal revenue loss of V A T exemptions in the 
financial sector, is to start with production data of the Greek financial sector and to modify 
them by adjusting for capital transactions, changes in stocks, exemptions and all 
intermediate uses, with the help of economic/input-output tables for the sector. derived 
from the National Accounts for the period 1989-1998. This period has been chosen 
because of the availability of data (revised according to the European System of Accounts, 
ESA)35, the introduction of V AT (1987) and the application of the Single Market (1993) 
with the new "transitional VAT regime". 
Our methodology can best be described through an explanation of the steps we take to 
reach the final results in the relevant tables. First, in our analysis we identify the yield from 
taxing the financial services under the V AT system by: 
a) Identification of sector's outputs 
b) Identification of the purchases to be credited by the sector 
c) Estimation of the intermediate VAT base for the sector 
d) Estimation of the consumption of fixed capital (to be credited by the sector) necessary 
for the calculation of the effective V AT rate (te) of the sector as well 
e) Identification of the value-added (VAT base) of the sector 
f) Estimation of the average statutory (weighted) rate for the Greek VAT system (AWVR) 
g) Finally by applying the (A WVR) on financial sector's VAT base we get the yield from 
taxing the financial services under the V AT system. 
Actually the potential VAT revenues can be derived as follows: 
Output (a)-Creditable purchases (b) = Intermediate VAT base (c), Intermediate VAT base 
(c)-Consumption offixed capital (d) = VAT base for the financial sector (e), T~4T base for 
financial sector (e) * (AWVR) = VAT revenues from taxingfinaneial services. 
The estimation of the average statutory (weighted) rate for the Greek V AT system is in our 
case necessary, because of the additional adjustments which have to be done on the VAT 
base, in order to remove upward biases (because of the dispersion of V AT rates in 
financial sector's inputs and outputs) that would have resulted from simply applying the 
statutory rate. In addition, since the National Accounts do not contain information on the 
35 The ESA replaced the traditional system, which followed the principles of the standardised system of the 
OEeD National Accounts of the Year 1958. The works on the revision of the Greek ~JtlOnal :\ccounts 
started in the middle of 1990 and is still in progress for the period 1995-2000. 
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breakdown in rates for intennediate consumption and on inputs (exempt shares) for each 
sector of the economy, we use the weighted average statutory rate (A \\'VR) of the Greek 
V AT system derived from the whole, legally defined VAT base. In this case the 
breakdown of the V AT base (including V AT) is made according to the different applied 
V AT rates36 and on the basis of the dispersion of the intermediate consumption for 
respective parts of the base. This rate also includes adjustments for the special scheme for 
farmers in Greece (special rates for V AT refund), the intermediate consumption of the 
exempt sectors, which we do not estimate in our first steps, the intermediate consumption 
of private cars, transactions in gold for non-industrial use etc. These of course will affect 
the V AT base of financial sector in the case of rendering such goods or seryices as inputs 
of financial sectors production and transaction chain. The data for the estimation of the 
Average weighted (statutory) rate for each year are included in the "Own Resources 
Statement37 " Part 2, of the Greek Ministry of Finance and the National Statistical Service. 
Next in order to get a clear view of the "cost" of financial exemptions in Greece we 
identify the inputs of financial sector which will be creditable when financial services will 
be taxed and which now are not creditable (yield from current exemptions). The "cost" in 
this context is defined as the difference between the V AT yield from the financial services 
sector at present (as a result of the exemptions for financial services) compared with the 
result that would be achieved, if financial services were subject to V AT. For the 
estimations we use data from the "Own Resources Statement" for the year 1995-1998, Part 
2 Annex VIII, Greek Ministry of Finance and National Statistical Service, where there is 
special infonnation on the exempt share of intermediate consumption and investment of 
financial sector (banking and insurance). 
Finally we estimate the efficiency of V AT collection of the exempted sectors (finance and 
insurance) to gain a better understanding of the V AT revenues (in relation to financial 
sector's inputs) presently accruing to the tax administration from the financial sector. The 
general approach to measure the efficiency of V AT collection is to compare the effecti\c 
V AT rate (t
c
) to the average statutory rate (t5)' This methodology necessitates a measure of 
36 Applying the rates which were in force for each year of calculation. .. b 'h 
' b . d E ComnuSSlOn v I.'Jl 
37 This is an official statement based on National Accounts su nutte to uropean • 
Member State every two-year for EU budget purposes. 
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' .. 
revenue collections, an estimation of the consumption base on which the VAT is 
effectively levied and finally the calculation of the effective VAT rate. In this case the 
efficiency of VAT collection (e) is defined as te / ts (see Jack, 1996). In our case the 
exemption of financial sector means that the effective V AT rate is detennined by the value 
of inputs to financial institutions rather than the value of the final products. The effective 
VAT rate can be calculated as follows: 
total capital expenditures 
t = ----------
e VAT base of the sector . 
Jack (1996) assumes that the statutory tax rate on exempt goods is zero; despite the fact 
that inputs in the production of such goods may be taxed. But this is hardly the case for 
Greece or most of the other EU Member-countries where a number of these services 
provided by the financial institutions, as we have seen in the chapter on the comparative 
tax (legislative) treatment of financial services, are taxed (leasing, factoring, credit card 
and advisory services etc.) or are provided to third countries (outside the EU Member 
States) giving right for deductions (zero-rated). 
6.4 Empirical findings 
The data over the estimated period (1989-1998) indicate that Greece could benefit from a 
switch from the current system of exemptions to tax financial services under V A T system. 
Table 6.1 shows the VAT base and the yield of financial services in the hypothetical case 
of taxing them, under the VAT system in Greece (the detailed calculations of economic 
tables and VAT base for each year are displayed in Appendix 1). 
1.+.+ 
Table 6.1: VAT base and yield from taxing financial services under the VAT system in 
Greece (in billions of Drachmas. 
Total VAT base for AWVR (Average Yield from taxation Year financial institutions weighted VAT rate in %) 
(banking and insurance) 
1989 338.966 12.23 41.47 1990 455.792 13.4 61.1 1991 585.257 14.05 82.25 1992 745.236 13.91 103.68 1993 614.852 13.48 82.89 
1994 788.746 13.52 ___ J 106.68 
1995 939.041 14.5 136.16 
1996 1037.296 13.29 137.939 
1997 1121.22 13.32 149.404 
1998 1231.663 13.51 166.498 
Data: National Statistical Service. 
In addition Table 6.2 includes the financial sector's V A T revenues as a percentage of 
GDP, Total tax revenues, and V AT revenues respectively, in billion of Drachmas at 
market prices. These amounts for the estimated period are 0.45 % (mean) as a percentage 
of GDP, 1.53 % (mean) as a percentage of total revenues and 6.31 % (mean) as a 
percentage of VAT revenues. 
Table 6.2: VAT revenues from financial services as a percentage of GDP, Total tax revenues and J AT 
revenues (amounts are expressed in billions of Drachmas at market prices). 
Year GDP Total tax VAT VAT revenues from as % ofGDP as % of Total as%ofJAT 
revenues revenues financial services tax revenues 
revenues 
1989 10895.2 2949.8 714.2 41.47 0.38 1.4 5.8 
1990 13143.1 3909 961.2 61.1 0.46 1.56 6.35 
1991 16230.5 4846.9 1207.5 82.25 0.5 1.69 6.81 
1992 18766.1 5787.4 1444.9 103.68 0.55 1.79 7.17 
1993 21135.7 6627.8 1553.7 82.89 0.39 1.25 5.33 
1994 23983.6 7591.1 1735.5 106.68 0.44 1.4 6.14 
1995 26883.5 8622.4 1939.5 136.16 0.5 1.57 7.02 
1996 29697.7 9517.2 2160.5 137.93 0.46 1.44 6.38 
1997 32752.2 11053.6 2460.8 149.4 0.45 1.35 6.07 
1998 35601.6 8807.2 2719.2 166.49 0.46 1.9 6.12 
Data: National Statistical Service. 
The V A T revenues derived from financial service taxation under the V AT system appear 
to be positive for the estimated period. On the other hand, mainly because of the changes 
in the V AT law in 1993 due to the implementation of the Single Market and the 
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"transitional V AT regime" in EU, we can see a decrease in the revenues from financial 
services in 1993. This can be explained by the general decrease in tax revenues and VAT 
base in 1993 due to the abolition of the fiscal frontiers (Single Market in EC \lember 
States) and the new way of calculating and accounting for VAT. In any case it seems that 
the revenues resume their upward trend from the following years, 1994 and 1995. In the 
calculation of the net effect of taxing financial services under the VAT system in Greece. 
we had to take into account the revenues presently accruing to the Tax Administration 
from the existing taxes on banking and insurance services. These revenues would have to 
be foregone since these taxes would have to be abolished and replaced by V AT. For 
Greece these amounts are not negligible. In table 6.3 we present the revenues accruing to 
the Tax administration from the existing taxes on financial services in Greece (gross-sales 
tax on banking transactions and the turnover tax and stamp duties on insurance 
companies). The data on the different taxes on financial services in Greece are taken from 
the annual budget report for the respective years of the Greek Ministry of Finance (General 
Accounting Office, Year 1989-1998). 
Table 6.3: Net revenue effects (billions ofGRD at market prices). 
Year VAT revenues Revenues from Net effect on i 
from existing taxes total revenues I lin. services on lin. services 
~ 
1989 41.47 81.7 -40 
--I 1990 61.1 62.3 -1.2 
1991 82.25 76.9 5.35 
1992 103.68 87.95 15.73 
1993 82.89 109 -26.11 
1994 106.68 121 -14.32 
1995 136.16 99.9 36.26 
1996 137.93 84.2 53.73 
1997 149.4 106.2 43.2 
1998 166.49 98 68.49 
Data: Greek Ministry ofFinanceiGeneral Accounting Office: Budget Statement 0989-1998) 
As it appears from the above table the net effect on total tax revenues is negative in the 
years of VAT introduction and the application of the Single Market. This can be explained 
by the low V AT revenues (and V AT base) for these periods. On the contrary, positi\'e for 
the other years giving a net effect of 36.26 billion of GRD for (1995) to 68.5 billion the 
total revenue effect is GRD for (1998). These amounts are not negligible, especially, if \\c 
take into account the way of application of the existing taxes on financial sen'ices (no 
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deduction for the tax on inputs). In addition table 6.4 and Box 6.1 include the procedure 
and the results of the calculations of the right of deduction of the financial institutions 
("Yield from current exemptions"). These estimations indicate that there is no potential 
threat from removing the exemptions of financial services and providing the right for 
deduction for the V AT chargeable on inputs of financial institutions. The V AT chargeable 
on inputs as a percentage of VAT revenues is 0.86% for the year 1995. This percentage is 
expected to be relatively "stable" over the years depending on the right for deduction of 
financial sectors (defined in this case as a proportion of the total taxable outputs to total 
outputs or equally as a proportion of the deductible input tax to total input tax, "pro-rata 
mechanism,,38). Indeed when we estimate the above mentioned amounts for the period 
1996-1998 (for which definitive data exists) these amounts are around 0.8 % (mean) of 
V AT revenues (Table 6.4). In the case of changing the system and removing the 
exemptions these amounts shall be deducted by the financial institutions. Therefore to get 
the final result of the fiscal revenue loss of V AT exemptions on financial services we do 
an additional modification reducing the amount of V AT revenues of financial services 
with the above percentage (0.8 %) which still gives a final 5.51 % (mean) revenues from 
financial services as a percentage of total VAT revenues. 
38 When exemption is granted for certain classes of transactions, the partial exemption problem arises in 
cases where a financial institute supplies exempt and taxable products. In this case, the tax credit is restricted 
accordingly to goods or services purchased which are strictly related to the taxable supplies. However. the 
problem arises where financial institutions indiscriminately use taxable goods or services in the transaction 
chain of both exempt and taxable supplies. In these cases, the apportionment of inputs (and, therefore the tax 
on them) between those attributable to exempt supplies and those attributable to taxable supplies, is difficult 
to calculate. In practice the "pro-rata" mechanism is widely used in carrying out such an app0l1ionment; the 
idea is to calculate the proportion of the deductible tax based on a fraction having as numerator the amount 
of the annual turnover, less the value added tax, attributable to the deductible transactions and as 
denominator the sum of transactions included in the numerator and the tax non-deductible transactions 
(exempted and non-taxable outputs). 
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The amounts included in the above table 6.4 are found in the Own Resources Statement 
for 1995-1998, Part 2, Annex Vill, Greek Ministry of Finance. Amounts are in billions of 
national currency at market prices. Box 6.1 gives the detailed calculations for the year 
1995, as an example of calculations and the breakdown of the inputs in different V AT 
rates. 
Box 6.1: Calculation and breakdown ofinputs. Year 1995. 
Intermediate consumption of the exempted sectors, Banking and insurance: 68.57 (illc!. VA T). Investmenr 
(inc!. VAT), Banking and insurance: 48.92 (inc!. VAT). The intermediate consumption is taxed at both 
reduced and standard rate whereas the investment is only taxed at the standard rate. Since the National 
Accounts (Own Resources Statement) do not cOlltain information on the breakdown ill rates for the 
intermediate consumption for each sector. an artificial breakdowll in rates is made on the basis of the 
dispersion of the total intermediate consumption for all sectors on the different VAT rates. The breakdown 
by VAT rate and percentage of intermediate consumption of the exempt sectors is as follows: 
Total intermediate consumption of all sectors: 531.87 (exc!. VAT) of which 22.28 (=4.19%) is taxed at 4%, 
83.22 (=15.65%) is taxed at 8%, and 426.36 (=80.16%) is taxed at 18%. This proportion is used on the 
intermediate consumption for the two sectors. 
Amount at reduced rate: 
incl.VAT. Bankinglinsurance, 
Intennediate consumption (4%): 2.87 (68.57*4.19%=2.87) 
Intennediate consumption (8%): 10.73 (68.57*15.65%=10.73) 
excl. VAT. Banking/Insurance 
Intennediate consumption (4%): 2.87/1.04= 2.76 
(8%): 10.73/1.08=9.93 
Total : 12.7 
Amount at the standard rate: 
Incl. VAT. Banking/insurance, 
Intennediate consumption (18%): 54.97 (68.57*80.16%=54.97) 
Investment 48.92 
Total 103.89 
Total (excl. VAT) 103.89/1.18=88.05 
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Table 6.5 also shows estimates of the efficiency of VAT collection of the exempted 
financial sectors in Greece over the period 1989-1998, comparing the effective VAT rate 
(teJ to the average statutory rate (ts). It is worth-noting here that in Greece a number of 
financial services are subject to VAT (i.e. leasing, factoring, credit card and advisory 
services etc.) or are zero-rated, thus giving right for deductions, when they are supplied to 
third countries (outside the EU Member States). It is also meaningful to measure this 
efficiency. The data used for the calculation of the effective V AT rate for the financial 
sectors are derived from the input -output (economic) tables for the total financial sector, 
namely the consumption of fixed capital and the VAT base (input-output tables, Appendix 
1). 
Table 6.5. Efficiency of V AT collection of the exempted financial sectors. 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
te 3.41 3.39 3.58 3.7 4.03 4.31 3.94 4.24 4.33 4.32 
ts 12.24 13.41 14.05 13.91 13.48 13.52 14.5 13.29 13.32 13.51 
e 27.85 25.27 25.48 26.59 29.89 31.87 27.17 31.9 32.5 31.97 
Estimated average efficiency, 1989-1998: 29.04 % 
The estimated efficiency of VAT collection (e) of the exempted sectors (29.04 %-mean) is 
very low. This can best be explained by the low percentage of deductions for the financial 
sector in Greece (1_2%)39 and the high amounts of financial sectors inputs (0.8% as a 
percentage of VAT revenues, table 6.4). This low efficiency of VAT collection of the 
exempted sectors can reduce the whole efficiency of the VAT system, depending on the 
importance of the financial sector for the VAT base, and give rise for non-neutralities 
relative to other taxed goods and services. 
Finally in Appendix 1, table a}-a}O we show the procedures for the estimation of financial 
sector's V AT base, presented as input -output (economic) tables for the period 1989-1998 
and the yield from taxing the financial services under the V AT system at current prices. 
Appendix 1, table b rb}o contains the detailed calculations of the Average Weighted VAT 
Rate (AWVR) of the Greek VAT system for each year. 
39 Hellenic Banks Association and Greek Ministry of Finance (1998): working document :\0 999 21 S 1998 
and OECD/CF A, 1998. 
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6.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has outlined some of the problems of taxing financial services in Greece. The 
main issue considered is the estimation of the economic effect of taxing financial sen'ices 
under the Greek V AT system on V AT and total tax revenues. According to the general 
principles of V AT, there is no firm information when the tax authorities impose the tax, 
that this will result in a positive effect on V AT revenues depending on the dispersion of 
the rates and the deductible amounts of tax on financial institutions' inputs. 
In our analysis we estimated the economic effect based on the financial sector's V A T base , 
which will arise in the hypothetical case of taxing financial services under the V AT 
system. The mechanisms discussed in this chapter were developed in previous research 
projects. However, we developed some modifications with special reference to Greek 
V AT system, for first time in Greece, which in our opinion can easily be implemented for 
other EU countries as well. We obtained an estimate of average 5.51 % of VAT revenue 
over the period 1989-1998 for the fiscal revenue loss of exempting financial sectors from 
V AT in Greece. These results do not differ much from the results obtained by Genser and 
Winker (1997) for Germany. The small difference between the results can be explained by 
the inclusion in our estimation of the insurance services and the absence of the option to 
apply VAT on financial services in Greece. It should be noted here that this fiscal revenue 
effect has been calculated on a ceteris-paribus basis i.e. ignoring changes of the input-
output structure, which are likely to be induced by a change in V AT rates. It is howe\'er 
beyond the scope of this thesis to provide numerical estimates of the price elasticities of 
banking services or to embed the analysis in a general equilibrium framework. 
Finally the empirical evidence provides support to the view that the taxation of financial 
services under V AT system in Greece is a policy measure able to increase the V AT and the 
total tax revenues, despite the high amounts of inputs of financial sectors and the right for 
deduction which will be given to them under VAT system (for example we got 68,5 billion 
GDR of net revenue effect for year 1998). On other hand, the "cascade effect" will be 
reduced primarily because the firms using financial services, as inputs will now be able to 
claim the VAT they pay on these inputs. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE VARIABILITY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF ~4T 
AND INDIRECT FINANCIAL TAXES IN GREECE. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AXD 
COMPARISONS WITH SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 
7.1 Introduction 
The introduction and harmonisation of VAT in the EU enabled the adjustment of indirect 
taxes as well. These adjustments resulted in a change in tax structures in Member States 
(e.g. relation between direct and indirect taxes). Such adjustments have been documented 
in the literature (Tait, 1991a,b; Ee, 1996a). However, the revenue productiveness and the 
elasticity of VAT, or the elasticity of consumption taxes, has not been estimated. Our 
focus in this chapter will be to examine empirically, with special reference to Greece, the 
above-mentioned parameters and to compare with those that will be derived for Spain and 
Portugal [Research question R4, Table 4.1 p.1 00]. In addition the estimation of the 
revenue productiveness and elasticity of the indirect financial taxes (including the 
estimation of average effective tax rates) will provide us with empirical evidence about the 
structure of the cascade indirect financial taxes and their potential as a revenue-raising 
instrument. This empirical evidence will help us to reach some conclusions about the V AT 
system in the three countries and to deepen our analysis and knowledge of the existing 
system of taxing financial services. 
Finally, in this part of the present thesis we also examine some basic hypotheses about the 
key features of V AT and the revenues' performance in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The 
objective is to answer our research question on the empirical relationship emerging from 
the existing data on VAT revenues, VAT base and VAT rates for the period 1986-1998, 
gaining a better understanding on the impact of exemptions (i.e. financial exemptions) on 
VAT base and VAT revenues' performance [Research question R4, Table 4.1 p.lOO]. 
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7.2 Methodology and data 
7.2.1 Methodology for the estimation of elasticities 
The elasticity of a tax on income is derived from the following fonnula [James and \:obes. 
(1997)] : 
where T is the revenue from taxation (expressed in a simple linear regression model as 
T=a+bYas mentioned above), Y the National Income and b the marginal producti\'eness 
of taxation. Alternatively if we express the above-mentioned model in logarithmic fonn 
then we get: 
lnT= a + b*lnY+u, (1) 
where In is the natural log to the base e=2. 718. In common logarithm, thus log to the base 
10 (which we use in practice), the model can also expressed as: 10gT=a +b*logY +u (in 
this case lneX=2.302610g](0:). One of the features of this log-linear model is that the slope 
coefficient b measures the elasticity of tax revenues on National Income (Gujarati, 1995). 
However, the elasticity obtained from the log-linear model does not coincide with the 
elasticity obtained by using the above fonnula. This elasticity is often an estimate of the 
average elasticity of the variables and is computed at the mean, or the average values of 
the variables. In addition, using the actual tax revenues in the equation (1) eliminates any 
problems with measuring tax rates and their changes and because the data are aggregated 
across countries it eliminates any problems of country business cycles differing from the 
national cycle. Following Groves and Kahn, (1952), and Sobel and Holcombe, (1996). 
the income elasticity b serves as a proxy for both the long run growth and the short 
run variability of taxes with respect to the national income. 
The above model has been widely used to estimate the income elasticity of tax revenues of 
different taxes. In this case the coefficient b represents the income elasticity of revenues of 
this particular tax. As Sobel and Holcombe, (1996) argue, depending on the econometric 
properties of the variables in equation (1), the estimates of a and b may be subject to 
different problems. The important characteristic of the variables is whether they arc 
stationary (a stationary variable is one that tends to return to some mean \'alue through 
time) or not. Many time series (especially time series representing tax re\'enucs) are 
nonstationary. With nonstationary variables the problem in estimation of equation (1) is 
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that the coefficients should be inconsistently estimated The error term' I lId 
. IS C ear y corre ate 
through time. This serial correlation in the error term results in the coefficient estimate 
being biased and also results in an inconsistent estimation of the standard error of the 
coefficient. Therefore, to avoid regressing one nonstationary time series on another 
nonstationary time series (obtaining spurious or dubious results) we regress the variables 
in first-differenced form (stationary versions). Within the present context the change foml 
is simply the annual growth rate of the variable. Thus the correct form in this case of the 
regression to obtain the elasticity is given by: 
illnT= a + b*illnY+u, (2) 
We have to note here that in this case the coefficient b in equation (2) measures the 
short run relationship (annual change) and is insensitive to the long run relationship 
( Sobel and Holcombe, 1996). 
Following Sobel and Holcombe, (1996) the VAT revenues, are firstly related to the series 
of the Net National Income (NNI) by using regression techniques for the period 1987-1998 
(Greece introduced VAT in 1987). We estimate first linear versions, using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) technique (in Microfit 4.0), of the general model !1T=a+b!1Y, where 
T is representing the VAT revenues, and Y the Net National Income (in first differences). 
The slope coefficient b in this case measures the marginal productivity (annual change) of 
VAT on National Income. Then we estimate the log-linear form of the above equation thus 
!1lnT= a + b *illnY. In this case the slope coefficient b measures the short run elasticity of 
VAT on National Income. The concept of Net National Income (NNI) does not include 
indirect taxes and is derived from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by adding income 
from abroad to and subtracting depreciation from the latter. We have preferred (NNI) to 
other concepts since it is the best index for showing changes in National Income through 
time. The Gross National Income (GNI) figure incorporates depreciation, thus 
overestimating the real means that finance consumption expenditures (and indirect tax 
revenues). On the other hand, the GDP figure does not include income from abroad which, 
nevertheless, does contribute to consumption stream. Likewise, Gross National Product 
(GDP), being derived by subtracting net borrowing and net transfers from the rest of the 
world from the total of the available means, is unsatisfactory, since it includes indirect 
taxes, i.e. the dependent variable. Lastly, personal disposable income and consumption 
expenditures do not accurately reflect the tendencies prevailing in the economy, since the 
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direct tax structure and the propensity to consume, respectively, may \'arv from year to 
- -
year quite independent of the total production effort. 
Due to our small sample (13 observations for V AT) we strengthen our inyestigation 
(comparing the results) using the above methodology for consumption and indirect 
financial taxes for which data are available for the period 1965-1998. The same 
methodology is applied for the examination of the VAT and consumption tax svstem for 
Spain and Portugal for the same period (1965-1998) to gain a better understanding of the 
similarities and differences among these systems. In addition, in our analysis we use the 
consolidated value of total tax revenues (this include taxes paid to the central government 
and local authorities), and total consumption (private and government), using the above 
mentioned regression analysis, in order to estimate and compare the marginal 
productiveness and elasticity with those derived for consumption taxes under the period 
1965-1998. One can question here the inclusion of government consumption in our 
research by assuming that its exclusion could sharpen the ability of the study to detect 
inefficiencies and differences. In general one expects a smaller incentive for government 
purchase of V AT liable goods and services to evade the tax. Therefore including them 
would reduce the power of any research to detect erosion or differences between V AT 
systems in general. Given the special conditions during the years of estimation seem that 
the exclusion of the calculations of the government consumption does not hold. The 
continued dominant presences of the Public sector in key economic activities in the three 
countries of our investigation lead us to include the above-mentioned variable in our 
estimations (Joumard and Varoudakis 2000; Bronchi 2001; Bronchi and Gomes-Santos 
2001). Furthermore, in a comparative study, an important issue is the extent to \\'hich 
possible errors in estimation are common in all countries. If the estimations are equally 
biased (not individually biased) in all countries then comparative ratings are unaffected, 
and the information derived is still useful. 
The data (annual time series) for the present analysis (including the analysis of VAT 
revenues' performance and the estimation of the average effective rates), are obtained from 
OEeD (VAT, total revenues, consumption taxes) "Revenue statistics", 2000 edition (disc 
format). The period under study is 1986-1998 for VAT, and 1965-1998 for total tax 
revenues, consumption and financial taxes. The data in "Reyenue Statistics" are presented 
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In a standardised framework based upon the OECD classification of taxes and 
interpretative guide, which was revised in 1984. The information for the most part of the 
data has been provided by delegates to working party 2 on "Tax policy, analysis and Tax 
Statistics" of the Committee on fiscal affairs. It is worth noting here that there are some 
differences and limitations in the collection methods because of the aggregation in 
macroeconomic data collection in OECD "Revenue Statistics" (Sampling or measuring 
errors). Because of this limitation data on the cascade indirect financial taxes are derived 
from the code 5126 (for both banking and insurance taxes), without including other taxes 
(e.g. taxes on gambling) from OECD "Revenue Statistics-2000 edition". HO\\'eyer, the 
sample size is mainly determined by the availability of information for the three countries 
(Greece, Spain and Portugal) which is important for the estimation of elasticities. From 
IMF we obtained data on Net National Income, total consumption and GDP deflator, 
"International Financial Statistics, Yearbook 2001". All variables have been deflated by 
using the GDP deflator and are finally expressed at 1995 prices (in billions of national 
currencies). 
7.2.2 Methodology and Modelfor VAT revenues' performance 
VAT has become a major tax instrument world-wide. The global trend to introduce V AT 
in more countries is continuing. VAT has also become an indispensable component of the 
tax advice and tax reforms in developing countries. As we have already discussed in our 
literature chapters the growing practice of V AT is reflected in the extensive literature on 
technical, economic, and distribution dimensions of VAT, and there is a growing 
consensus on the "best practice" and desirable features required of a good V AT system. 
However, very few studies have empirically tested some basic hypotheses about key 
features and the performance of VAT as a revenue-raising instrument. In this second part 
of the present chapter we will empirically test some basic hypotheses about the key 
features and the performance of V AT in Greece, Spain and Portugal. for the period 1986-
1998, as a revenue-raising instrument. In particular, revenue performance and its 
determinants have been an issue of special relevance for fiscal authorities. The emerging 
conventional wisdom, based largely on practice and numerous country case studies 
(Bogetic and Hassan, 1993; World bank, 1991; Gillis, 1990) suggests that a simple 
rate V AT, with very few exemptions and, therefore, a broad base is superior to a 
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V AT with multiple rates and many exemptions which reduce its base and complicate 
administration. 
In our analysis we investigate, taking into account the above-mentioned assumption, the 
empirical relationship emerging from the existing data on V AT revenues, V AT rates and 
V AT base. By doing this we deepen our understanding and answer our research question 
on the impact of exemptions (including financial exemptions) on V AT revenues' 
performance in Greece comparing the results with those for Spain and Portugal to examine 
whether there is any statistically significant difference [Research question R4]. To this end 
we provide further quantitative background regarding VAT. The above mentioned 
countries have been chosen because of the similarities in indirect tax system (same period 
of V AT introduction, not many differences in VAT base etc.). In our analysis we look at 
the relationship emerging from the existing time series data (1986-1998) on V AT 
revenues, V AT base and V AT rates in Greece, Spain and Portugal. The strength of this 
relationship will allow us to get a better understanding of the impact of exemptions (V A T 
base) and rates on VAT revenues' performance as measured by a VAT/GDP ratio. The 
stronger the relationship is, between VAT base and VAT revenues' performance, the 
higher the impact of the exemptions on VAT revenues' performance (a broad base 
will give more revenues). 
Because of the multiple rate system applied in the three countries (Appendix 2c) we create 
a new variable to capture the impact of VAT rates on VAT revenues. This is the difference 
(in percentage) between the highest and the lowest V AT rate applied in three Countries. 
Tait (1988) pointed out that administrative and compliance costs rise dramatically as the 
number of VAT rates increases. Thus differentiation, through higher costs, may adversely 
affect revenues. Furthermore, a single rate is almost always revenue superior to multiple 
rates with little rate dispersion. Therefore, when countries use more than one rate. rate 
dispersion tends to be substantial. Consequently, it may be that it is the dispersion of rates, 
rather than the number of rates per se, that may adversely affect V AT revenue. This is the 
main reason for the introduction of the above new variable. The comprehensivc V AT is 
typically levied on a broad base, which includes all goods and sen"ices. HOWC\'CL 
countries vary in their coverage of the base, particularly with regard the treatment of 
services (e.g. financial services). In our case we do not have to distinguish among the three 
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V AT regimes and to calculate the true VAT base because these countries do not differ in 
the coverage of the VAT base; the three countries apply the EU transitional VAT regime 
with a uniform scheme of exemptions following the 6th VAT Directive. \\' e therefore use 
the total consumption as a simple variable to measure the size and the relation of 
exemptions to VAT base. In addition, total consumption includes the financial sen'ices. 
which will strength our research on the impact of financial services on V A T base and V AT 
revenues' performance (this approach assures that the VAT base in three countries 
comprises all goods and services). In total consumption we include government 
consumption for the reasons we mentioned above (the size of the Public sector in three 
countries etc.). Therefore we postulate the following general model: Increases in VAT 
revenues are due to increases in V AT rates and the coverage and the size of the tax base, 
while rate differentiation raises costs and thus negatively affects revenue. That is: 
REV=f (Base +,Rate +,Range-) 
where REV is defined as the VAT revenues to GDP ratio, Base is the total consumption 
and Range is a measure of rate dispersion. We estimate linear versions of the above 
general model using Ordinary Least Square techniques for the three countries. Non-nested 
tests show a better fit for the model with the variables in logarithmic form. In this case the 
above mentioned model may be expressed in logarithmic form as: 
lnREV= a +h*lnBase + b2 *lnRate + b3 *lnRange+ lit, 
The rate variable uses the standard rate in all countries (situation at 1st May 2000)40. The 
weighted average VAT rate for these countries would be clearly preferable, but there are 
not official data available for Spain and Portugal. Such a calculation as we show in our 
chapter about the impact on VAT base of taxing financial services under the V A T system 
in Greece demands a detailed knowledge of the VAT legislation applicable in the country, 
the availability of data about the intermediate consumption of each sector and the specific 
rate applied. 
7. 2. 3 Methodology for the calculation of the average effective tax rates on consumption 
Over the past 15 years, tax reforms (i.e. reforms of the indirect tax systems) have 
profoundly changed the shape of EU tax systems and rekindled interest in measuring 
effective tax rates. Indeed, in order to understand past reforms or to e\'aluate the tax 
40 VAT rates applied in the Member States of the European Community (DOCl2206!2000-EN-see Appendix 
2c), 
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policies of particular countries, it is necessary to go beyond statutory rates since these 
sometimes bear little relation to rates actually paid. An alternative approach, suggested by 
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar, (1994) is to relate realised tax revenues directly to the releyant 
macroeconomic variables in the National Accounts. The resulting estimates, known as 
"average effective tax rates" (AETRs) or "implicit tax rates" take into account the oyerall 
tax burden from the major taxes and are consistent with the concept of aggregate tax rates 
at the National level. The AETR on consumption tc is calculated as the sum of general 
Consumption taxes on goods and services and excise taxes divided by the sum of private 
consumption (Mendoza, 1994; OECD, 2000a). 
Mendoza excludes government wages expenditures from the consumption tax base on the 
grounds that they are not subject to indirect tax. However, many of the services provided 
by the government sector, such as education and medical care, are not subject to indirect 
tax either when they are privately provided. Consequently, failure to include government 
wages in the tax base would result in AETR on consumption being overstated in countries 
where these (labour intensive) services are publicly provided relative to the countries 
where they are private provided. In order to enhance cross-country comparability the 
AETR in consumption is calculated in the following equation using total final 
expenditures as the base. The other change in equation is to express the tax base in gross 
returns (i.e., including indirect taxes). This enhances comparability with the other AETRs 
(i.e. indirect financial taxes). 
General consumption taxes + Excises 
t =------------~-----------------
C Private consumption + Public consumption 
General consumption taxes (derived from the code 5110 from OECD, Revenue Statistics, 
2000) over the period 1965-1998 include all taxes, other than import and export duties and 
indirect financial taxes, levied on the production, leasing, transfer delivery or sales of a 
wide range of goods and/or the rendering of a wide range of services, irrespecti\'e of 
whether they are domestically produced or imported and irrespective of the stage of 
production or distribution at which they are levied. It thus covers value-added taxes, sales 
taxes and multi-stage cumulative taxes. The data on final consumption are taken from 
International Financial Statistics (IMF, 2001). A factor to bear in mind \vhen interpreting 
estimates of the AETR on consumption based in the above equation is that these 
expressions include indirect taxes on investment goods in the numerator. In the case of 
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V AT this occurs for V AT exempt industries that supply inputs to produce in\"estment 
goods. As we discussed in the literature chapter neither the purchaser of these inputs nor 
the tax-exempt suppliers themselves are able to claim back the VAT paid on the VAT-
exempt industries' inputs. This problem does not affect government or the non-profit 
sector, as their inputs are classified as final consumption in the National Accounts. For 
general indirect taxes, other than VAT (such as sales tax and turnover tax) which are only 
levied in few countries (i.e. Greece), the problem is more direct, in that such taxes may 
apply to investment expenditures more generally. However, is not possible to adjust the 
above-mentioned equation for this problem in either case. Data are not generally ayailable 
on VAT paid by exempt sectors that supply inputs to produce investment goods or on the 
proportion of their outputs that are inputs to produce investment goods. With respect to 
other general indirect taxes, data are not readily available on the proportion of such taxes 
that relate to consumption goods. Allocating such taxes to consumption and investment in 
proportion to the share of each in GDP is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution because 
rates are generally lower on investment goods. Thus the above equation overstates the 
AETR on consumption by including indirect taxes on investment in the numerator. 
However, the degree of overstatement is unlikely to be great, especially as the countries of 
interest (i.e. Greece, Spain and Portugal) tend to have either a VAT or other general 
indirect taxes but not both. 
Moreover, we make an additional estimation over the same period 1965-1998 of the 
average effective rate on consumption attributed to the indirect financial taxes by using as 
numerator in the relevant equation the revenues from indirect financial taxes (derived from 
the code 5126 of the OEeD Revenue Statistics, 2000) and as denominator the total (final) 
consumption in order to examine further and to enhance our previous findings, estimating 
the elasticities, about the position of these taxes in consumption tax system in the three 
countries. 
7.3 Findings 
7.3.1 The elasticity of the Greek VAT system (Estimation period 1987-1998) 
As shown in Table 7.1-7.2, the insignificant intercept term in the regression of V:\ T 
revenues on National Income (in first differences) makes VAT less burdensome at low 
levels of income, although V AT is collected in the strictly theoretical case of a negatiye 
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National Income. This aspect of V AT is explained by the fact that it is not imposed at a 
uniform rate on all transactions. Here is the case that even if the Nation as a \\-hole 
produces no income it must survive by dissaving or borrowing, thus gi\"ing rises to 
consumption expenditure taxable by VAT. It means that the tax does not ensure adequate 
funds to the government when National Income is low without borrowing or dissaving. 
On the other hand the low elasticity of VAT on National Income (0.41) shows that \':-\'T 
fails to equip the government with the potential to enlarge its share of National Income as 
the latter grows, at least to the extent that present indirect taxes permit. It implies that VAT 
alone is not able to make up for the budget losses caused by inflation. We have to note 
here that the "inflation cushion" capacity of V AT is manifested in two directions. Firstly 
V AT is suitable to correct automatically the distribution of real income that tends to be 
distorted by inflation in favour of the upper income groups and profit earners. This is the 
strongest point of a multiple rate system of V AT thus its ability to cushion the adverse 
effects of inflation on income distribution. Secondly, as during inflation, V AT does not 
succeed in supplying the tax authorities with adequate real yield. The Greek government 
therefore is compelled to employ other indirect taxes more intensively. As we can see from 
the results in table 7.1 our finding that the National Income elasticity of V AT revenues is 
less than unity may be explained by the multiple rate V AT system (V AT taxation hits 
more spending on non-basic needs). The low elasticity of the existing VAT system causes 
built in flexibility in two contrasting ways: on one hand when National Income increases, 
the ability to pay of the community as a whole rise and ideas about the desirable level of 
public expenditure alter in a way which compels the government to search for additional 
sources of revenues and: on the other hand when National Income falls, the relief of the 
tax burden to consumers may be a decisive factor in speeding up recovery but is difficult 
for the government to avoid trouble resulting from readjustments in tax structure. 
Notwithstanding that the concept of National Income elasticity of tax revenues cannot be a 
gauge of revenue productivity, it is an index for measuring the progressive (or regressi\"c) 
nature of a tax system, something which can hardly be done by the regression coefficient. 
Since V AT on average absorbs a decreasing portion of changes in National Income as the 
latter increases, we find that the Greek VAT system is regressi\"e over time in absolute 
terms. This cannot be easily explained if we take into account the multiple rate system 
used in Greece and the exemptions applied (threshold for small businesses. speci fic 
exemptions such as health and education services etc.). Finally, the regression of total 
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consumption on National Income gives an average elasticity of 0.82 that does not coincide 
with the elasticity index of VAT revenues. The difference between the two indexes (0.4) 
cannot be explained only by changes during this period in tax-rates (e.g. abolishing of the 
increased rate 36% for luxury goods in 1990) and VAT base, but probably by erosion of 
the tax base as well. 
Table 7. 1. Variability of the Greek VAT system (1987-1998) 
Variables 
V AT revenues 
Total consumption 
Marginal 
productiveness 
0.08 
0.73 
Elasticity on 
National Income 
0.41 
0.82 
Table 7.2. (OLS) Regressionsfor Greece. Estimation period (1987-1998) 
Dependent Regressors intercept Regression 
variable coefficient 
V AT revenues Net National 410.35·· 0.08 R2: 0.22 
(Avr) In com e(ANI) (173.79) (0.01) SER: 98.82 
DW: 1.64 
(Alnvr) (AlnNI) 0.08" 0.41 R2: 0.30 
(0.03) (0.2) SER: 0.05 
DW: 1.4 
Total consumption Net National 486.59" 0.73 R~: 0.76 
(Atc) Income( ANI) (308.36) (0.12) SER:273.8 
DW: 1.8 
(Alntc) (AlnNI) 0.02" 0.82 R2: 0.80 
(0.01) (0.06) SER: 0.01 
DW: 1.8 
No major problems suggested from the diagnostic tests (standard errors are expressed in brackets). In the 
regression of VAT revenues 011 National Income the results hG1'e been adjusted for heteroscadasticity. 
7.3.2 Elasticities of the Spanish and Portuguese VAT system 
From the plot of the relevant variables (National income and V AT revenues), figure 7.1-
7.4, for the three countries it seems that these variables have shown a strong upward trend 
in the estimated period (1986-1998) . 
•• Non-significant at 5% and 10% critical level. • significant at 10% critical le\'el: otherwise significant 
coefficient at 5% critical level. 
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There is also an indication of a change in V AT revenues u d t d ' pwar ren m 1993 for both 
Portugal and Spain (a possible effect of the Single Market) How th 
. ever, e systems seem to 
resume an upward trend very quickly. 
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Applying the same methodology as described above, to Spain and Portugal for the 
estimated period 1986-1 998 (both countries introduced VAT in 1986), we obtain the 
following results presented in table 7.3 -7.6. It appears that the marginal revenue 
productiveness of V AT revenues for Spain is approximately double that of the existing 
marginal productiveness in Greece (Table 7.3). For Spain we see an insignificant intercept 
tenn making, like Greece, VAT less burdensome at low levels of income (multiple rate 
V AT system). On the other hand the high elasticity of V AT on ational Income (1.72). 
higher than the Greek VAT elasticity, shows a greater "inflation cushion" capacity of the 
VAT system in Spain. In other words it seems that the VAT structure in Spain is different 
from the Greek one. The elasticity of total consumption on National Income (0 . 9) do 
not coincide with the elasticity of VAT revenues. This difference is relativel high ( . 3 
which canDot be explained only by changes during this peliod in ta rates (e.g. aboli hing 
of the increased rate 28% in 1992) and VAT base. This suggests of T ba e r Ion. 
different structure in consumption VAT controls etc. 
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Variables 
Table 7.3. Variability of the Spanish VAT system (1986-1998) 
Marginal productiveness Elasticity on National 
V AT revenues Income 
1.72 0.13 
Total consumption 0.6 0.89 
Table 7.4. (OLS) Regressions for Spain. Estimation period (1986-1998) 
Dependent Regressors intercept Regression 
variable 
coefficient 
V AT revenues Net National Income 
-76.66** 0.13 R:':0.54 (Avr) (ANI) (204.95) (0.05) SER:165.81 
DW: 1.68 
Alnvr AlnNI 
-0.033 " 1.72 R:': 0.40 
(0.054) (0.65) SER: 0.06 
DW: l.7 
Total Net National Income 1009.4' 0.6 R:': 0.53 
consumption (ANI) (560.1) (0.14) SER:460.76 (Atc) DW: 1.4 
o.ooi' 0.89 R:': 0.88 
(Alntc) (AlnNI) (0.008) (0.09) SER:O.Ol 
DW=1.44 
In addition the marginal productiveness for the VAT system in Portugal (Table 7.5) is 
quite high (the Greek one is 116 of the Portuguese). Portugal seems to have higher 
elasticity of VAT on National Income than Greece. This makes the VAT system applied in 
Portugal more progressive in comparison to that applied in Greece. On the other hand, the 
elasticity of total consumption on National Income almost coincides with the elasticity 
index of VAT revenues. The marginal difference between the two-index (0.1), well below 
the Greek (0.4) and Spanish (0.83), can be explained by changes in V AT rates (e.g. the 
abolition of the high rate of30% in 1992) and VAT base. 
Table 7.5. Variability of the Portuguese VAT system (1986-1998) 
Variables 
V AT revenues 
Total consumption 
Marginal 
productiveness 
0.53 
0.79 
Elasticity on 
National Income 
l.2 
l.1 
• Significant at 10% level, •• non-significant at 5 % and 10% criticalleve 1. 
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Table 7. 6. (OLS) Reg ressions fo r Portugal. Estim ation period (1986-1998) 
Dependent R egressors intercept Regression 
variable coefficient 
VAT revenues Net National Incom e 136.82" 0.53 
. 
R::0.39 
(Avr) (AN I) (96.32) (0. 24 ) SE: 6 . 6 
DW 1.9 
R~:0.38 
(Alnvr) (AlnNI) 0.0 1" 1.2 SE:0.08 
(0.06) (0.48) DI"f.':2 
Total consumption Net National Income 191.56" 0.79 R-' : 0.72 
(ATc) (ANI) (159.98) (0.14) SE:135.6 
DIV:2.2 
(AlnTc) (A I nN J) -0.0 I" 1.13 RC:0.90 
(0.014) (0.1 ) SE:0.02 
DW:1.9 
No maj or problems suggested Fom th e diagnostic tests in th e above equations for Portugal (sta ndard errors 
are expressed in brackets) . The equation of total consumption in logarithmic fo r/11 has been adjllsted fo r 
heteroscedasticity. 
7.3.3 Th e elasticities of Consumption taxes 171 Greece, Spa in and Portugal (Es timation 
period 1965-1998) 
The plot of consumption tax revenues, (Figure 7.5 -7.7), for the three countries show that 
these variables have shown a strong upward trend during the estimated period (1965-
1998). The change in the upward trend in 1993 for VAT revenues for Spain and Portugal 
is shown for the consumption tax revenues as well. Likewise, the systems seem to resume 
the upward trend very quickly. 
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The summary statistics displayed in table 7.7 suggest that Portugal has enjoyed a higher 
growth in revenues from consumption taxes than Greece and Spain over the 1965-1 998 
period. The tax revenues from consumption taxes have grown in Portugal around 18.49 per 
cent per annum, compared to an average annual rate of 6 .96 and 4.8 1 per cent for Greece 
and Spain respectively. 
Table 7.7: SummalY statistics for growth rate of Co II sumptioll taxes. 
Sample period :1966to 1998 
VariableCs): Rate ofgl'owth of Consumption taxes 
COUl1tly 
Maximum: 
M inimum: 
Mean: 
Std. Deviation: 
GR S P 
62.32 32.68 333.36 
-24.66 -2 1.1 8 -1 0.28 
6.96 4. 8 1 18.49 
15.01 10.54 57.88 
Estimating the marginal productiveness of consumption tax revenues and elasticity on 
National income using OLS techniques, we obtain the results shown in Table 7.8-7. 10 (all 
equations are reported in Appendix 2b). In addition, we estimate here for the same period 
(1965-1998) the elasticity of total tax revenues on National Income comparing the results 
with those derived for consumption taxes . Greece appears with the lowest margi nal 
productiveness of consumption taxes in relation to the one derived for total taxation (1 9). 
The same relation for Spain is (1/6) and for Portugal (1/3) . This suggests that , among the 
tlu-ee countries, Portugal relies more on consumption taxes in fiscal policy to generate 
revenues (see also the following figure 7.8-7.10, presenting the tax burden in the thre 
countries and Appendix 2a on the functional form of taxation in Spain and Portugal) . 
Portugal also appears with the more progressive consumption tax system shown th hi gher 
elasticity (1.36) , among the three countIies. Greece on the other hand is the country that 
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appears to be more dependent on consumption taxes (shown a higher elasticity of 
consumption taxes) , to be able to generate revenues as National Inco . I me grows, WIt 1 a \' f\' 
small elasticity (0.46), the smallest among the three countries, of total tax revenues . 
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The relatively high elasticities of total consumption on National income show that 
spending is at high levels in three countries for the estimated period 1965-1 998 as ational 
income grows and do not coincide with the elasticity index of consumption tax revenues 
for Greece and Portugal. The difference between the two indexes is (0.5) for both countries 
and, as in the case for V AT revenues for Greece, cannot be explained only by changes in 
consumption tax rates or tax base. Taking into account the high elasticity for consumption 
tax revenues and the upward trend for the National income for the same period, it seems 
that the consumption tax base erosion can be the possible source for these differences. As 
a difference Spain does not appear to have this problem in the whole consumption tax 
structure (there is a marginal difference of just 0.05) as it was the case for V AT. 
Table 7.8. Variability oftlte Consumptioll taxes ill Greece (1965-1998) 
Variables 
Consumption 
ta.:'(es 
Total tax revenues 
Total cOl/sumption 
M arginal 
productiveness 
0.07 
0.69 
0.91 
167 
Elasticity on 
Natio nal Incom e 
1.19 
0.46 
0.65 
Table 7.9. Variability of the Consumption taxes in Spain (1965-1998) 
Variables 
Consumption 
taxes 
Total tax revenues 
Total consumption 
Marginal 
productiveness 
0.09 
0.55 
0.84 
Elasticity on 
National Incom e 
0.9 
1.12 
0.85 
Table 7.10. Variability of the Consumption taxes in PortugaL (1965-1998) 
Variables MarginaL Elasticity on 
productiveness National Income 
Consumption 
taxes 0.1 1.36 
TotaL tax revenues 0.42 0.77 
Total consUlnption 0.94 0.81 
7.3.4 The elasticities of the cascade (indirect) taxes on financial services in Greece, Spain 
and Portugal (Estimation period 1965-1998) 
From the plot of the indirect (cascade) taxes on financial servIces (Figure 7.1 1-7.13), it 
appears that the indirect financial taxes in three countries show an upward trend for the 
period of estimation. This trend has changed in 1990s (decrease). The system seems to 
regain the upward trend only in Spain. On the contrary in Greece and Portugal there is a 
tendency for fewer revenues resulting from these taxes. 
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The summary statistics displayed in table 7.11 suggest that Spal'n h . d h' as enJoye a 19her 
growth in revenues from indirect financial taxes than Greece and Portugal over the 1965 to 
1998 period. The tax revenues from indirect financial taxes have grown' S . b d m pam yaroun 
10.98 per cent per annum as compared to an average annual rate of 5.53 and 6.81 per cent 
for Greece and Portugal respectively. 
Table 7.11. Summary statistics for the growth rate of indirect 
.financial taxes. 
Sample period: 1966 to 1998 
VariableCs): Growth of indirect fmancial taxes 
Country GR S P 
Maximum: 194.49 65.95 83.12 
Minimum: -29.53 -20.77 -43.88 
Mean 5.53 10.98 6.81 
Std. Deviation: 36.69 21.82 21.97 
Generally, the comparison of the available data on indirect financial taxes in the three 
countries with the data on consumption taxes reveals that the former taxes are designed to 
tax non-basic needs in contrast to consumption taxes which seems to burden all 
consumptions. Simple observation of the data for the three countries reveal that the tax to 
income ratio is higher for consumption taxes than for the indirect financial taxes at low 
levels of National income. In other words, the consumption tax revenues are more stable 
over time than the indirect financial tax revenues as they are less affected by the income 
fluctuations. This happens because consumption taxes are levied on total consumption 
spending which keeps an average rate of growth very close to that of GDP. Consequently, 
the resulting revenues are more evenly spread over time than the revenues from the 
indirect financial taxes that falls on expenses for non-basic needs (banking, insurance and 
auxiliary services) which increase at a faster rate. 
Following the same methodology as in the case of VAT revenues and consumption taxes, 
we estimate the revenue productiveness and the elasticity of the indirect financial taxes 
(annual changes) in Greece, Spain and Portugal for the period 1965-1998 (all equations are 
reported in Appendix 2b). The results presented in Table 7.12 show that the revenue 
productiveness of the indirect financial taxes in Greece is low and is only It iO of the 
existing marginal productiveness of consumption taxes. In addition elasticity is less than 
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unity despite the uniform way of application of these taxes (single rate and no right for 
deduction). Both parameters reveal that these taxes fail to equl'p the g . h h overnment WIt t e 
potential to enlarge their share of National income as the latter a ' ( 
.=,r0\\ S contrary to 
consumption taxes). It seems that although these taxes in absolute terms raised reyenues, 
their significance in the tax system (in comparison to the consumption taxes) can be 
questioned. Furthermore for Spain and Portugal we estimate elasticities greater than unity 
(Spain appears with the highest elasticity (2.23)) which suggest a progressiye \\ay of 
application of these taxes. However, the very low marginal revenue productivity for Spain 
and Portugal, suggests a weak relation with the changes in National income. These taxes, 
(despite the right for deduction being disallowed in the three countries), seem to be 
insignificant as revenue raising instruments in the whole consumption tax system. 
Table 7.12. Variability of the indirect financial taxes in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal (1965-1998) 
Country 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Marginal 
productiveness 
0.01 
0.007 
0.004 
Elasticity 011 
NationalIl1come 
0.96 
2.2 
1.34 
7. 3. 5 Findings on VAT revenues' performance for Greece, Spain and Portugal 
The results seem to provide empirical evidence about the V AT revenues' performance in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. However, they do not support all the theoretical arguments 
mentioned above. As we can see from the results presented in table 7.13, Tait's (1988) 
argument that official administrative costs and traders' compliance cost rise sharply as the 
number of rates multiplies, leading to potential revenue losses, does not seem to hold for 
the three countries. We see insignificant regression coefficient for VAT rates dispersion 
for the three countries. It seems that the multiple rate system in these countries has been 
used mainly as a measure to reduce the regressivity of tax rather than to regulate the VAT 
revenues' performance. The results of the regression for Greece confirm partial hy the 
conventional views of V AT performance. The regression coefficient for V AT rate (at 5()·~ 
and 10% critical level) and for VAT base (at 10% critical level) is significant. The results 
show that a change of 10 per cent in VAT rate has a 6 per cent positiye effect on average 
on V A T revenues' performance pointing to a quite strong relation. On the other hand a 10 
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per cent change on average of VAT base (including the financial services) has an average 
positive effect of 0.8 per cent on VAT revenue perfonnance. 
The base coefficients are significant and with the expected positive sign in all estimating 
equations indicating the robustness of the estimates. For Spain and Portugal stronger 
relationship exists for the VAT base (including financial services) and VAT reyenue 
perfonnance. A change of 10 per cent of the Spanish VAT base (significant at 5% and 
10% critical level) generates an average change of 31.4 per cent in V AT revenues' 
perfonnance. In Portugal a change of 10 per cent of the V AT base (significant at 5% and 
10% critical level) generates a change of 27.8 per cent in VAT revenues' performance. 
The important deduction from these results is that the three countries seem to 
depend on V AT base to generate VAT revenues. These support our previous arguments 
about the importance of exemptions on V AT base. A broader V AT base thus with fewer 
exemptions applied in VAT system appears to have a positive impact on V AT revenues' 
perfonnance. That means that financial services, which constitute one of the major 
components of all exemptions41 applied in three countries, could playa key role in the 
improvement of V AT revenues' performance. This conclusion is very important for Spain 
and Portugal where the relation of V AT rate to V AT revenues' perfonnance seems to be 
weak. Despite the similarities in V AT systems among the three countries, V AT rate seems 
to be more important for policy makers in Greece. This can easily be understood by the 
different geographical features of the application of VAT in Greece. Greece applies a 
preferential VAT rate system. The statutory VAT rates are reduced by 30% (Appendix 2c) 
for specific geographical departments (e.g. remote islands) which seems that helped the 
system to avoid erosion of the tax base (and to weaken its impact on V AT revenues' 
perfonnance) where these rates are applicable. However, this additional potential for tax 
administration in Greece to generate additional V AT revenues through changes in V AT 
rates is very limited. The harmonisation of V AT rates in EU since 1992 and the already 
preferential VAT rate system applied reduce the above mentioned ability. 
41 According to the 6th VAT Directive (77/388/EEC) the exemptions applied in.ElT \lember St~tes are 
clearly specified in article 13.The more important exemptions provided are educatIon, health and tmanclal 
services. 
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Table 7.13. Regressionsfor the VAT revenues' performance. Estimated period 1986-1998) 
Member Depe~dent Intercept Regressors and regression 
State varlable coefficients 
VAT base VAT rate Range 
-2.31 • 0.08** 0.6' 0.3'" Rl:0.70 
Greece In(VATIGDP) (0.57) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04) SER:0.03 
DW:1.3 
-6.74' 0.31* -0.32**' 0.1"· Rl:0.52 
Spain In(VATIGDP) (2.5) (0.13) (0.48) (0.12) SER:0.04 
DJr: 1.76 
-5.46· 0.27' -0.0(** -0.1'" g:?:0.86 
Portugal In(VATIGDP) (0.36) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) SER:0.05 
DW:2 
No major problems suggested from the diagnostic tests (standard errors are expressed in brackets). The 
equation for Spain has been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
7.3.6 Estimates of the Average effective rates 
The estimates of AETRs suggest that the effective rates on consumption have on average 
increased at a faster rate than those on indirect financial taxes (Table 7.14-7.15 and Figure 
7.14-7.15). On average Greece and Portugal focused the increase in the overall tax burden 
on consumption. The trend increased in AETR on consumption was particularly larger in 
Portugal and Greece. In Portugal it exceeded the Spanish average by more than one 
standard deviation. The overall estimations confirm our previous findings on the indirect 
tax system in the three countries. The higher AETR on consumption in Greece and 
Portugal show the dominant position of these taxes in the two countries in relation to 
Spain. In addition the low AETR attributed to the indirect financial taxes, confirm the 
weak position of these taxes as a revenue-raising instrument in the three countries. 
However, these taxes show a greater AETR for Greece and Portugal. On average the 
AETR on consumption and indirect financial taxes were higher for Greece than for Spain 
and Portugal. This suggests that consumption taxes in Greece have played a key role as a 
revenue-raising instrument over the period considered. 
• significant at 5% and 10% critical level:' significant at 10% criticalleyel, , •• insignificant coefficient. 
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These results are not greatly affected by cyclical factors. 't\one of the AETRs on 
consumption is significantly affected by the output rate of growth (insignificant 
coefficient). Cyclical factors appear to be significant for the AETR attributed to indirect 
financial taxes in Portugal (Table 7.16). 
Table 7.16. Influence of the business cycle on AETRs 
AETR on Consumption AETR on indirect 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
insignificant 
insignificant 
insignificant 
financial taxes 
insignificant 
insignificant 
weakly significant42 
The influence of the cyclical factor on AETRs was tested using the following regression 
equation over the period 1965-1998: tAETR=a +btAETR(_l)+cGr(-l)+ut , where tjETR is the 
average effective rate and Gr is the rate of growth of output (GDP). Using the OLS 
technique, and testing the significance of coefficients, we obtain the following equations 
(standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
Greece: 
• Consumption taxes 
tAETRc=1.55 + 0.86 tAETRc(-l)+ 0.93 Gr(-l), R2: 0.75 
(1.39) (0.13) (3.52) DW·1.61 
• Indirect financial taxes 
tAETRift=-O. 038+0.81 tAETRift(-l) +0. 99Gr(-I), R2: 0.90 
(0.09) (0.94) (0.58) DW·1.8 
Spain: 
• Consumption taxes 
tAETRc=1.02 + 0.95 tAETRc(-J}-3.84 Gr(_l), 
(0.73) (0.58) (2.65) 
• Indirect financial taxes 
tAETRijt=O. 077 +0. 7tAETRift(-J}-0. 00 76Gr(-I), 
~5~ ~1~ ~3~ 
-l~ Significant coefficient at 10% critical level. 
R2:0.90 
DW·1.97 
R2: 0.50 
DW·1.83 
17.+ 
Portugal 
• Consumption taxes 
tAETRc=0.95+ 0.86 tAETRc(-I) +3. 14 Gr(_l), 2 R :0.83 
(0.93) (0.06) (3.31) DW·1.92 
• Indirect financial taxes 
tAETRift=-O. 026+0.861 tAETRlft(-l)+O. 68 Gr(-l), R2: 0.85 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.38) DW'2 
7.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we deepened our analysis on the structure of VAT and indirect financial 
taxes for the period 1965-1998. We undertook our analysis with special reference to 
Greece but comparing the results with the case of Spain and Portugal. We chose these 
countries because of the similarities in their indirect tax system. These countries 
introduced VAT around the same time (1986/87), abolishing the old turnover taxes. In 
addition, they apply cascade indirect taxes on financial services uniformly. 
In our analysis we used regression techniques (OLS) to estimate and compare two simple 
indexes: the marginal revenue productiveness and the elasticity of different taxes (annual 
changes) on National income (VAT, total tax revenues, consumption and indirect financial 
taxes). The empirical evidence suggests that, in general, the three countries apply a similar 
consumption tax system showing at the same time a high level of spending as the National 
income grows. For Spain and Portugal, VAT seems to be an important revenue-raising 
instrument. On the other hand, Greece appears to count on other indirect taxes as well 
(higher elasticity for consumption taxes). Greece shows many similarities in the whole tax 
system with Portugal. On the contrary, Spain has a different tax structure. Namely it seems 
that Spain accounts on other than indirect taxes as well. Greece and Portugal seem to face 
the same problem with the application of consumption taxes: base erosion or a compliance 
problem in general for consumption taxes seems to be the case. 
In addition in the three countries the cascade indirect financial taxes. despite the same \\ay , 
of application, appear to show a very weak relation with the National income and to be 
insignificant as a revenue raising instrument in the whole consumption tax system. This 
evidence has been supported by the estimation of the ayerage effectin: tax rates on 
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consumption and indirect financial taxes as well. This relation is stronger when \\'e regress 
the variables in logarithmic form (annual changes), which is natural for a consumption 
type tax. Despite the stronger relation for the variables in logarithmic form for the three 
countries, in the case of Greece the less than unity elasticity suggests for insufficient way 
of application of the indirect financial taxes. 
Moreover from our analysis of V AT revenues' performance it appears that in the three 
countries there is a "weak" relationship between VAT rates dispersion and VAT re\enues' 
performance. This suggests that there are other important characteristics of VAT revenues' 
performance in three countries. The empirical evidence suggests that the V AT revenues in 
three countries as a per cent of GDP rise with increase in the coverage and the size of the 
tax base. Consequently, the V AT exemptions (including financial services) seem to be 
very important for the improvement of VAT revenues' performance. Finally a statistically 
significant difference among the three countries is the importance of tax rate for the Greek 
V AT system. It seems that the relationship between V AT rate and V AT re\enues' 
performance emerging from our time series data is very strong. However, this additional 
potential to influence the V AT revenues' performance is limited due to the harmonisation 
of VAT rates in ED. On the other hand, the "weaker" but statistically significant relation 
between the VAT base and the VAT revenues' performance in Greece can be attributed to 
the inadequacy of the available data as a precise measure of the true V AT base. There is 
often a tax gap between potential and declared taxes, between declared taxes and paid 
taxes, and between taxes paid to those that are received by the treasury43. All these make it 
difficult for policy makers, just as with Spain and Portugal, not to rely on V AT base to be 
able improve the VAT revenues' performance. 
4:1 "A survey of the compliance cost in the Greek tax system" Greek \ll1listry of Finance and Centre of 
Plalming and Economic Research (1998). 
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CHAPTER 8: CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS IN FISCAL POLICY IN GREECE SP . 
! AI.\ 
AND PORTUGAL: THE EFFECTS OF INDIRECT FINANCIAL TAXES ON TOTAL 
TAX REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES. 
8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the revenue productiveness and the elasticity as \\ell 
as the average effective tax rates on consumption, of the different indirect taxes (e.g. 
consumption and indirect financial taxes). This provided us with empirical evidence about 
the structure of these taxes in Greece, Spain and Portugal and their potential as a revenue-
raising instrument. 
In this chapter we examine, by employing a multivariate time-series methodology. the 
impact on total tax revenues and expenditures of indirect taxes applied in Greece over the 
period 1965-1998 and over 1965-1999 for Spain and Portugal (data were not available for 
Greece for the year 1999). First, we seek to provide empirical evidence about the causal 
relationships (in short and long run) among the three variables of interest (total tax rate, 
consumption and financial taxes) and how they interact in a system. Few empirical studies 
have examined the revenue potential of different taxes and their impact on the average 
total tax rate of the economy (e.g. Bogetic and Hassan, 1993; OEeD, 1997c). According 
to these results total tax rate is related (positively or negatively) to the revenue potential of 
different taxes (direct and indirect taxes), through tax base and different tax rates or via 
their effects on capital and labour markets, and on human capital formation. However the 
above empirical results are focused more on direct taxes than on indirect taxes. From their 
findings, they asserted that their results support a view that the level of revenues (i.e. 
direct taxes) Granger cause the average total tax rate of the economy (expressed as a share 
of total tax revenues to GDP). 
In addition we wish to provide empirical evidence about the causal relationship and long 
run trends between the different indirect taxes (consumption and financial taxes) and 
expenditures over the same period stated above. In the literature. a number of studies 
examine the expenditure-taxes relationship with mixed results. Owoye. (1994) applying a 
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cointegration and error-correction model in G7 countries over the period 1961 to 1990 
(annual data), concluded that the error correction models indicated that bi-directional 
causality exists between taxes and expenditures in five of the G7 co t' Th" I' un nes, IS Imp les 
that the fiscal authorities jointly make tax and spending decisions in five of the seven 
countries. Manage and Marlow, (1986) concluded that their results support cases of 
unidirectional causality from taxes to expenditures. In contrast Anderson, (1986) using the 
same technique (testing for cointegration) concluded that government expenditures 
Granger causes government taxes. However, non-of the above studies examined the 
particular relationship between indirect taxes and expenditures. 
Finally, we investigate the long run structural stability of the indirect tax system by 
examining the role and the impact of the introduction of VAT on the long-run relationship 
among the above variables [Research question RS, Table 4.1 p.100]. The results may 
enrich our empirical knowledge on the characteristics that are unique to each country in 
the field of indirect taxation and its impact on fiscal policy. 
8.2 The data 
To assess the impact of the different indirect taxes on the average total tax rate of the 
economy and expenditures in the three countries, we use time series data from the three 
countries over the period 1965-1998 for Greece and 1965-1999 for Spain and Portugal. As 
we said in our previous chapter, we chose these particular countries because of the 
similarities in the indirect tax system and their common characteristics. Therefore, the 
results should also provide evidence for and against indirect tax policies adopted by these 
EU countries. Ideally, we should include more countries in our analysis or more variables 
which may have an impact on the average total tax rate of economy (e.g. direct taxes on 
corporations and individuals, excise taxes or other macroeconomic variables) but the 
completely different tax structure in other EU countries and data unavailability are the 
major constraint which create problems of an econometric nature. To proxy the average 
total tax rate of the economy most studies use the share of the total tax revenues to GOP 
(Jack, 1996; Bogetic and Hassan, 1993; OEeD, 1997c). In fact these tax-to-GOP ratios 
may be affected by statistical distortions and therefore may be a poor proxy for assessing 
tax distortions at macro-level. It is also known that as the tax/GDP ratio does not include 
the excess burden arising from behavioural responses (e.g. differences in tax evasion), it 
may understate the total effect of taxation (OEeD, 1997c). However. this ratio is the best 
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comparable approach to assess the overall average tax rate of ta ' t mJ . 
x s~ s e economy 1O 
the particular countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) b . . . 
, eanng m mmd the 
similarities in their tax system (similarities in categorl·es of t I' d axes app Ie , same 
classification of benefits, transfers and social contributl·ons t d·t ) 
, ax cre I s etc.. 
Therefore, we use the share of the total tax revenues (direct and indirect taxes) to GDP 
(tax rate) as a proxy for the overall average tax rate of the economy in three countries 
(OEeD, 1997c; OEeD Revenue Statistics, 2000). 
As we mentioned before, the total average tax rate of the economy (tr) is a function of the 
revenues (Rev) presently accruing to the government from the existing taxes (OECD, 
1997c), i.e.: 
tr=f(Rev) 
In our analysis for the different indirect taxes (Revenues) we use (derived from the OECD 
Revenue Statistics, 2000) data representing: (a) the general consumption taxes and (b) the 
indirect financial taxes for Greece, Spain and Portugal. The general consumption taxes 
include all taxes, other than import and export duties, levied on the production, leasing, 
transfer, delivery or sales of a wide range of goods and/or rendering of wide range of 
services, irrespective of whether they are domestically produced or imported and 
irrespective of the stage of production or distribution at which they are levied. Included are 
taxes collected on import as part of a general tax on goods and services or on excise 
applicable to both imported and domestically produced goods. It thus covers value-added 
taxes (harmonised taxes in ED Member States) and sales taxes. The indirect financial 
taxes cover multi-stage cumulative taxes where tax is levied each time a financial 
transaction takes place without deduction for the tax paid on inputs, and also those general 
consumption taxes where elements of value-added, sales or cascade tax on financial 
services are combined. These data are derived from the code 5126 in OEeD classification 
of taxes. However in these taxes we do not include other indirect taxes on specific services 
(e.g. taxes on gambling services classified under the same code in the case of Portugal or 
taxes on financial and capital transactions classified under the code 4400 thus as direct 
taxes). The main difference in the above categories of taxes is that, although both are 
levied on a given base, the first category falls only on final consumption through the 
deduction of the tax on intermediate and investment goods, while the latter does not 
fall only on final consumption but may be shifted forward along the production and 
the distribution channels (i.e. taxation of intermediate and investment goods). In 
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addition, to examine the causal relationship between the expenditures and the different 
indirect taxes we use annual data on the total government expenditures derived from the 
International financial Statistics (IMF) edition 2001. Finally all variables are deflated b\' 
the GDP deflator and are finally expressed in logarithmic form at constant (1995) prices. 
8.3 Empirical methodology 
8.3.1 Testing for stationarity 
Analytically, to provide a valid empirical evidence about the causal relationships among 
the variables of interest and to the issue of the structural stability of consumption tax 
policy (fiscal policy) it is important to address the time-series properties of the variables of 
interest, because any empirical analysis from which valid inferences could be drawn must 
ensure that all series are of the same order of integration in order to avoid the problem of 
spurious relationships and erroneous conclusions. Several studies that have examined 
time-series properties of variables concluded that most macroeconomic time-series data 
follow random walks. Phillips and Ouliaris, (1990) among others demonstrated that if the 
time-series variables are non-stationary all regression results with non-stationary series 
will differ from the conventional shown of the regression with stationary series. Put 
another way, regression coefficients with non-stationary series will be misleading. 
Moreover, if we run the regression XI = pXI_1 + Ut and actually find that p = 1 then we can 
say that the stochastic variable Xr has a unit root. In time-series econometrics. a time-
series that has a unit root is known as a random walk, and a random walk is an example of 
non-stationary time-series. 
Consequently the first step in the analysis is to test for stationarity of the relevant 
variables. A process is said to be stationary if its mean and variance are independent of 
time. In this case, a time series (Xr) with mean E(Xr) and variance E[Xr-E(X)jl will be 
stable for any sub-period of the sample period. Instead, if a series (X) is non-stationary 
then, its mean and variance will change over time. This has both economic and statistical 
implications. If a series is non-stationary the effect of any shock in the series is permanent. 
Establishing stationarity is important in econometrics because unless the variables 
involved in a model are all of the same order of integration, then the resulting regression 
would be spurious. If non-stationary series are differenced one or more times they usually 
become stationary. Depending on how many times we have to difference a series we refer 
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to the senes order of integration. If we have to difference a series once to make it 
stationary then this series is said to be of first order. Notationally we use the symbol I (d). 
where d is the order of integration. Thus, the notation for a first order series is 1(1). ~ lost 
economic series are 1(1). To determine the order of a series the most common test is the 
Dickey-Fuller tests (DF) proposed by Dickey and Fuller, (1979, 1981). The simplest form 
of the DF tests amounts to estimating: 
XI = pXH +UI (1) 
and testing whether p = 1. Alternatively we test whether p' = P -1 = 0 against p. < 0 . 
This alternative test simplifies matters if a more complicated autoregressive process is 
considered (Harris, 1995). The above equation (1) assumes that the data generating 
process is a simple first order autoregressive process with no trend component, zero mean 
and that the first observation is also zero. Since these assumptions hardly satisfy any 
empirical series, the test commonly used is: 
Lht = a + f3t + p * X t - 1 + u t • (2) 
where t is the time trend. Equation (2) assumes that the senes follows a first order 
autoregressive process. If this is not true, the residuals Ut will be autocorrelated and the DF 
test will be invalidated because the DF distributions are based on the assumption that the 
residual is white noise. For this reason the test should have sufficient lags to ensure that 
the residuals are not correlated. This results in the augmented DF test. In the presence of 
units roots, the estimates of the autoregressive parameters have a non-standard distribution 
and the critical values for the usual tests (t. F) cannot be used. Instead, we use the 
distributions estimated by Dickey and Fuller. The critical values for their distributions 
have been computed using Monte Carlo techniques and are much larger than those in the F 
table. The null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root, which implies non-stationarity. If 
the null is rejected (i.e. if the F test is larger than the critical value) then there is no 
unit root and the process is stationary. 
8.3.2 Cointegration 
As we mentioned before, the notion of cointegration refers to the case where two or more 
variables move together over time and the difference between them is stable over time, 
Consider two variables Xt and)'1 where Xt is I(1) and Yt is I(O). Then any linear combination 
of these variables will be I(1). Regressions where variables of different orders of 
integration are involved can often lead to spurious results. Consider nO\\' two variables XI 
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and Yt where they are both 1(1). Generally, linear combinations of these two variables will 
be also 1(1). However, there are cases where linear combinations of two or more \'ariables 
of the same order of integration are of a lower order of integration. For example . f· d 
,1 .\t an 
YI are both 1(1) and Zt = Yt - a - /3x[ is 1(0), then Xt and Yt are said to be cointegrated of 
order C1(1,J) (Engle and Granger, 1987). One of the most important implications of 
cointegration is the Granger representation theorem (Granger, 1983; Engle and Granger. 
1987). The theorem states that if two or more variables are cointegrated of order 1, then 
error correction models can represent the data, these models for two variables X t and .1'1 are: 
Llx[ = at + /3tZt + lags(LlxpYI)+U X1 ,(3) 
where (uxt, uyt) is bivariate white noise and at least one of /31 and /32 is non-zero. If Xl and 
YI are cointegrated then Zt is 1(0) and each one of the two equations is 1(0). If this is the 
case, then the two variables move closely together over time and difference between them 
will be stationary. This means that there is a long run equilibrium between the variables to 
which the system converges over time. There are two methodologies to test for 
cointegration: the Engle and Granger, (1987) methodology and the Johansen, (1988) 
methodology. The latter has several advantages over the Engle and the Granger 
methodology, of which the main is that it can estimate the number of cointegrating vectors 
in the system. In addition, this methodology is particularly relevant because we wish 
to investigate not only how the variables of interest are related, but also which of the 
variables are endogenous to the cointegrating vector. Therefore for the present analysis 
we utilise the Johansen methodology. However, for comparison purposes we also run a 
V AR model of the same order as in the Johansen procedure, applying the Engle and 
Granger methodology in order to strengthen our results and to identify possible 
differences. 
8.3.3 The Johansen methodology 
The Johansen (1988, 1991) methodology is rather complicated and by now well known in 
the academic literature. Here we give only a brief overview of the approach. The first step 
is the construction of a multiregressive model of the form: 
ZI = At,:'l-t + AZzt_2 + ... +Ak,:'l-k +Ut , ut~IN(O,2::) (5) 
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where Zt is a (n x 1) matrix of n potentially endogenous variables d h f h . 
an eac 0 t e Ai IS a (n 
x n) matrix of parameters. Equation (3) can be reformulated I'nto a . t . \ ec or error correctIon 
form: 
Llz t =rILlzt_1 + ... +rk-ILlzt_k_1 +IIzt_k +u!' Ut ~(O,L) (6) 
where rj = -(1 - Al - ... - Ai ),(i = 1, ... ,k -1) and II = -(1- Al - ... - A
k
), with I being the identity 
matrix. The vector error correction form gives us information about the short and the lon
o 
~ 
run via the estimates of r i and II respectively. It can be shown that II = afJ', where a 
is the speed for adjustment to disequilibrium and fJ is a vector of long run coefficients. 
Johansen proposes to regress L1z t and Zt-k on a constant and the Zt lagged differences to 
obtain the residual vectors Rot and Rkt respectively. These residual vectors are then used to 
form residual matrices: 
T 
Sij = TII.RifR'jf i,j = O,k (7) 
i=l 
The eigenvectors which correspond to the r largest eigenvalues from solving the equation 
(8) 
are the maXImum likelihood estimate of fJ. This procedure gIves n eigenvalues 
i) > i2 > ... > in and the corresponding eigenvectors V = (\" , ... ,\'n)' The r elements in the V are 
the cointegrating vectors. Furthermore, Johansen shows that a = SOk jJ from which we 
obtain estimates of a . Once we have estimates of a and fJ and test for restrictions, we 
then estimate equations (3), (4) by OLS to obtain the full model. 
8.3.4 The long run equations 
We use Microfit 4.0 Software (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997) to choose the appropriate order 
of V AR (lag length) and cointegration rank and the model for deterministic components. 
First we run the V AR model for several different lag lengths and choose the appropriate 
lag length according to the log-likelihood ratio statistic. We run specification tests on the 
model with the chosen lag length. If the model suffers from any problems (e.g. serial 
correlation), we use a higher order model. We then run tests for cointegration usmg 
different specifications with regards to deterministic components. If we find cointegration 
under different specifications, we determine rank and model specification simultaneously 
using the Pantula principle (Harris, 1995). We estimate three models: one with restricted 
intercepts and no trends, one with unrestricted intercepts and no trends and one \\'ith 
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unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends. We then compare the trace and max-
eigenvalue statistics with their critical values starting from the first model through to the 
third model for each different rank. We stop the first time the null hypothesis is not 
rejected and we choose the model for which the null hypothesis was not rejected and the 
appropriate rank. When the two tests (trace and max-eigenvalue) do not choose the same 
model, we choose the one proposed by the trace statistic because it is more robust to both 
skewness and kurtosis in the residuals than the max-eigenvalue statistic (Harris. 1995). In 
order to construct the long-run equations, once we determine the number of cointegrating 
vectors in our models we run restrictions to obtain the best specification not rejected by 
the data. Once we establish which variables are exogenous to the system, we impose the 
restriction in further estimation. The next step is to find which variables in the 
cointegrating vector(s) are significant. These tests are carried out sequentially and when 
the tests do not reject the null, the variable is dropped from the estimation. Finally, in 
order to establish which of the variables is endogenous to which vector, we run the error 
correction regressions explaining the first differences of the variables and examine the 
significance of each error correction model using the t-ratio. In the cases where only one 
cointegration vector was found (as in our case), the error correction regressions are run to 
verify the endogeinity tests for the reduced cointegration vector. Once we establish the 
endogeinity of a variable to a vector, the vector is then normalised on this variable and 
presented in equation form containing the endogenous variables. 
8.4 Cointegration analysis of the average total tax rate and different indirect taxes 
relationship 
8.4.1 Greece 
As we said before, in this section, we employ a multivariate (trivariate) co integrating V AR 
model for the period 1965-1998. We use in the model the share of total tax revenues to 
GDP (average total tax rate) (tr), sales tax and V AT revenues for consumption taxes (ct). 
and turnover taxes, stamp duties and cascade indirect taxes on financial services for 
indirect financial taxes (ft). We also add a dummy (DGR) for the presence of outliers in 
data set due to the introduction of V AT in Greece in 1987, which takes the \'alue of unity 
for 1987 and zero elsewhere. Non-nested tests indicate that the logarithmic transformation 
is to be preferred over the level equation. 
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The tests for cointegration are done in two steps. The first step is to test whether ayeraoe 
b 
total tax rate (tr) consumption taxes (et) and financial taxes (ft) (in logarithmic form) are 
integrated of order zero, 1(0), that is, whether there are common stochastic trends present 
among the variables. This means that each series contain a unit root that is non-stationary. 
This is accomplished by performing the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests. The ADF test is based on the following regression equations of the 
form: 
/I 
~lntrt = Yo +e1 Intrt_1 + IAi~lntrt_i +£t 
i=1 
p 
~lnctt = Yl +B2 1nctH + IJik~lnctt_k +lll 
k=1 
m 
~lnflt =Y2 +B3 1nflt_1 + I<p~~lnflt_~ +1'1 
~=l 
The difference between the DF and the ADF test is that III the former 
f' 1 _ ~ _ ~ _ o· In all equations the null hypothesis is that IntI', lnet, and lnl( have L. A; - L. f1 k - L. rp f - ~, 
;=1 k=1 f=1 
unit roots, that is 81 = 82 = 83 = 1. The alternative hypothesis is that the variables are 
integrated of order zero 1(0). We reject the null hypothesis if el'B
2
,ande
3 
are significantly 
negative and the t statistics are less (or greater in absolute values) than the critical values 
for the given augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistic. Alternatively in the above equations 
included a linear trend as well. The results reported in table 8.1 indicate that in no case we 
could reject the hypothesis that the logs of series contain a unit root. 
Table 8.1: Dickey-Fuller * unit root tests results (Greece) 
Variable level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
lntr -1.05** -2.34" -5.17 -5.08 
lnct -1.54** -2.96** -6.56 -6.44 
Inft -1.49** -2.62** -5.76 -5.65 
The ADF statistics (for p=J or p=2) are in absolute value below their asymptotic yalue 
(95% critical value). Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis for a unit 
root for the variables in levels (log form). 
• _ ~. Optimal number of lags is chosen by Akaike's Information Criterion MI - ao + a/ + a2 X t - 1 + L..b;Mt- i 
(AI C), and Schwarz-Baye~i~n Criterion (SBC). The values shown in the table 8.1 denote the t-statistics of XI 
J (Xr=lntrt, lnctl> and Inftt ). . . 
.. The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at 5% lewl of slgmficance. 
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On the other hand, for the first differences of the variables, irrespective of the order of the 
augmentation chosen for the ADF test, the absolute values of the ADF statistics are well 
above the 95% critical value given for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (for all 
models, with and without a linear trend). Hence, the hypothesis that the relevant variables 
in first differences have a unit root is firmly rejected (stationary series). Thus the series are 
of the same order /(1) and candidates for cointegration with the variable representing the 
total tax rate of the tax system. This suggests that we can treat the variables (lntr, Inct, Inft) 
as Granger causal. In the first step of our analysis, we determined that the variables are 
/(1). In the second step we can now look for the possibility that they are cointegrated, thus 
that the contained unit-roots have long-run relationships and the variables are moving 
together over time. This will suggest that changes in one variable will have permanent 
and not transitory effects on the other variables. In this case the Granger representation 
theorem states that, the first differences of the variables might be considered to be 
generated by error correction models of the form: 
11 /( p 
~lnXt = CfJo + ICfJli~lnXt_i + ICfJ2i~lnYt_i + ICfJ3i~ In \}l'_i + 62"_1 + u, 
i=1 i=1 i=1 
For cointegration analysis we follow the maximum likelihood estimation approach 
(Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1992). The error correction models for Greece are 
presented as V AR model, following the equation above, with the first and second 
differences of the variables in logarithmic form, and error-correction terms. The general 
error-correction models equations are used to test for causal relationships between the total 
tax rate (lntr), consumption (Inct) and financial taxes (Infl). The inclusion of the error 
correction terms in the above general form of the equations in a trivariate ECM introduces 
additional channels through which causality could emerge and equilibrium could be re-
established in the event of shocks of the variables. 
To select the order of V AR we specify a trivariate unrestricted V AR model in Intr, Inct, 
and lnft containing an intercept term and the Dummy variable (DGR) as its deterministic 
component. We make an initial estimation of a maximum order of V AR to 5 (Table 8.2). 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests a V AR of order 3, and Sch\\'ar7 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and adjusted LR test of order 1. In such situations, it is 
important to check the residuals of individual equations in V AR for possible serial 
correlation. If we choose a V AR of order one (or two) the inspection of results suggests a 
problem of serial correlation in all individual equations in the error correction model 
186 
(ECM). Hence for the case of Greece we choose a V AR of order 3 despite the short time-
series (34 observations). 
Table 8.2: Determining the order of VAR (Greece) 
Based on 29 observations from 1970 to 1998. Order of V AR = 5 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lntl' Inc t lnft 
Deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DGR 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
5 107.8200 56.8200 21.9540 
4 98.1014 56.1014 27.3882 CHSQ( 9)= 19.4373[.022] 8.0430[.530] 
3 90.4409 57.4409 34.8805 CHSQ( 18)= 34.7582[.010] 14.3827[.704] 
2 75.3299 51.3299 34.9223 CHSQ( 27)= 64.9803[.000] 26.8884[.470] 
1 72.2847 57.2847 47.0300 CHSQ( 36)= 71.0706[.000] 29.4085[.773] 
o -.27573 -6.2757 -10.3776 CHSQ( 45)= 216.1915[.000] 89.4585[.000] 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
To test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating V AR (3) 
procedure with restricted intercepts and no trend option chosen via the Pantula principle 
(see Harris, 1995). Based on the results displayed in Table (8.3) both the maximum and 
the trace eigenvalue statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance leveL that there 
is no cointegration among lntr, lnct, and lnft (namely r=O) but do not reject the hypothesis 
that there is one cointegrating relation (vector) (i.e. r=1) among the variables. Reported in 
the same table 8.3 Model selection criteria give different results. Akaike lnfonnation 
Criterion (AlC) favours two cointegrating relations between the variables and Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) one. We accept that there is one cointegrating relation following 
the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics44 . 
Table 8.3: Cointegration Tests: VAR(3) with Dummy (Greece) 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the V AR 
31 observations from 1968 to 1998. Order ofVAR = 3. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lntl' lnet hVt Intercept 
List of 1(0) variables included in the V AR: DGR 
Eigenvalue Test (Order of V AR=3 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.66466 .33653 .11459 .0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
r = 0 r = 1 33.8709 
r<= 1 r = 2 12.7185 
r<= 2 r = 3 3.7730 
22.0400 
15.8700 
9.1600 
19.8600 
13.8100 
7.5300 
Trace Test (Order ofVAR=3) 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r - 0 r>- 1 50.3624 34.8700 3l.9300 
.q When the two tests (trace and max-eigenvalue) do not choose the same model, \\'e choose the one 
proposed by the trace statistic because is more robust to both ske\\'eness and kurtOSIS 10 the resIduals than the 
max-eigenvalue statistic (Harris, 1995). 
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r< 1 r> 2 16.4915 
r<= 2 r = 3 3.7730 
Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL 
r=O 71.5794 
r = 1 88.5148 
r=2 94.8741 
r = 3 96.7606 
AIC 
50.5794 
61.5148 
63.8741 
63.7606 
20.1800 
9.1600 
SBC 
35.5225 
42.1560 
41.6473 
40.0998 
17.8800 
7.5300 
HQC 
45.6712 
55.2043 
56.6287 
56.0478 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The findings of one cointegrating vector are not sensitive to changes in specification. 
When the DGR dummy is not included or other dummies are included in its place (such as 
a dummy equal to 1 for 1993 and zero elsewhere, capturing the dynamics of the 
introduction of the transitional V AT regime in Greece), there is still evidence of 
co integrating relations in data. Moreover in order to identify the cointegrating relations, 
we obtained estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of the variables in the cointegrating 
vector, thus (ECM)Z=I.611ntr + 0.021nct -0.311nft+3.39, which make us to expect one 
co integrating relation among the three variables that is: 
Intr-lnct-lnft, DGR~I(O). 
When we specified the exactly cointegrating relation by normalising on the coefficient for 
total tax rate (lntr) (AI =1) the co integrating vector estimated in the Johansen procedure is 
(standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
Intr=-0.011nct + 0.191nft -2.1 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.7) 
The ECM equations for i11ntr, i11nct, and i1lnft variables with the lagged first and second 
differences and error-correction terms are given in table 8.4: 
Table 8.4: Estimates ofECMsfor Alntr, Alnetand Alnft,1965-1998for Greece. 
Variables ~1ntr ~lnct ~lnft 
Intercept - - -
~lntr (-1) -0.01(0.25) 1.21(0.44) 0.33(0.95) 
~lntr(-2) 0.51(0.3) 0.87(0.48) -1(1.22) 
~lnc t(-l) -0.16(0.09) -0.43(0.15) 0.22(0.41 ) 
~lnc t(-2) -0.23(0.11 ) -0.29(0.14) 0.45(0.51 ) 
~lnft (-1) -0.08(0.05) -0.22(0.08) 0.08(0.17) 
~lnft (2) -0.15(0.09) -0.25(0.08) 0.39(0.41 ) 
21_] -0.38(0.17) -0.62(0.15)* 0.17(0.4)"" 
DGR 0.30(0.02) 0.44(0.09) -0.017(0.07) 
DW 1.83 1.22 1.84 
R- 0.41 0.64 0.12 
SER 0.06 0.09 0.25 
• significant at 5% level," not-significant 
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Generally, the diagnostic test statistics indicated that there is a good fit in model. 
Examining the results, all the ECMs pass the tests for first order serial correlation at 5% 
significance level, but not the equation for consumption taxes (~lnct) which fails on first 
order serial correlation (although it passes the test at 10% significance le\·el). The 
equations for financial taxes (~lnft) and total tax rate (~lntr) fail on normality and 
heteroscedasticity at the 5% level of significance. The new adjusted estimations are 
presented in the above equations. Cusum and Cusum squared tests indicate that the above 
equations are structurally stable45 . In the normalised cointegrating vector the coefficient on 
(lnct) seems to be insignificant. Indeed, when we impose a zero restriction (A2=0) on 
(lnct), this restriction cannot be rejected by the LR statistic (A joint likelihood ratio test for 
the exclusion of the consumption taxes variable) which is given as X2(1)= 0.016 with a p_ 
value of 0.89. Therefore, the new co integrating vector with this over-identifying restriction 
IS: 
(ECM)Z= 1.000 lntr-O. 00lnct-0.19Inft 
(0.02) 
This means that the cointegrating relation has been reduced to the one expressed as: 
lntr-Inft, DGR~I(O), 
The new ECM estimates for the over-identified system are displayed in table 8.5: 
Table 8.5: Estimates of ECMs for Alntr, Alnct and Alnft, J 965-J 998 for Greece. 
Variables ~1ntr ~lnct ~1nft 
Intercept - - -
~lntr(-l) 0.004(0.24) 1.23(0.44) 0.33(0.95) 
~lntr (-2) 0.53(0.3) 0.88(0.49) -1(1.22) 
~lnct (-1) -0.16(0.09) -0.43( 0.15) 0.22(0.41 ) 
~lnc t(-2) -0.24(0.11 ) -0.29(0.14) 0.45(0.51) 
~lnft (-1) -0.08(0.05) -0.22(0.08) 0.08(0.17) 
~lnft (2) -0.15(0.09) -0.25(0.08) 0.39(0.41 ) 
Zt-J -0.41(0.17) -0.65(0.16)* 0.18(0.42)"" 
DGR 0.31(0.02) 0.44(0.1 ) -0.017(0.08) 
DW 1.85 1.22 1.84 
R- 0.41 0.63 0.12 
SER 0.06 0.09 0.25 
45 This test was proposed by Brown (1975) and is based on the test statistic 5, = I: _I II"~ t=k+1,k+:! .. n 
"\' 11'-
L,-.k+1 I 
where s is the standard error of the regression fitted to all i sample poi.nt~ and \\'~ is the squared re~~rs~ve 
residuals. The mean value line giving the expected value of this test statIstIc under the paramete~ sta 1 It} IS 
t - k which goes from zero at t=k to unity at t=n. Microfit displays two graphs, one glvmg the plot 
£(5,)=- . 
ofCUS~;; statistic and the other giving the plot of the CUSUMSQ statistic. Each graph halso dhisPlaysha pal if 
, . f h 1" d the null ypot eSls t at t 1e of strai ht lines drawn at 5% significant level. If eIther ate l~es .IS crosse , 
g .. . db' t d t ,;;0- sIgmficant level. regression equatIon IS correctly speclfie must e reJec e a - 0 
• significant at 5% level," not-significant. 
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Similar results follow from the diagnostic statistics tests for the new ECMs abO\'e. The 
ECM for consumption taxes still fails on serial correlation at 5% significance leyeL and 
the ECMs for total tax rate (~lntr) and financial taxes (~lnft) fails on normality and 
heteroscedasticity at the 5% level. The new adjusted estimations are presented in the 
above equations. As before Cusum and Cusum squared tests indicate that the above 
equations are structurally stable as well. In addition as we can see from the results it 
appears to be that the coefficients and standard errors in the new ECM equations, with and 
without over-identifying restriction, are very similar. The coefficients of the errOf-
correction terms, which measure the speed at which any disequilibrium of the system is 
removed (speed of adjustment), are significant at 5% level in the equation for the total tax 
rate (~lntr) and consumption taxes (~lnct) and also relatively high, suggesting that it 
would not take long time for the total tax rate and consumption taxes equations to return to 
the equilibrium once the system has been shocked (in fact the "economic agents" removed 
41 % and 65% of the resulting disequilibrium each period, for the equation of ~lntr and 
~lnct respectively) (see also figure 8.1 on persistence profile of the effect of a system-
wide shock to contegrating vector). There seems to be a degree of overreaction, 
represented by the negative coefficients on the ECMs equations and on the error correction 
term. However, the convergence back to equilibrium is relatively slow and moderate, with 
adjustment complete in about ten years. 
Figure 8.1: Persistence Profile of the effect of a system shock to CV (Greece). 
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Investigating how the dynamic system is hit by shocks (variable-specific shock or system-
wide shocks), the impulse response of the system is relatively fast and has the right 
feedbacks. Choosing for example to shock the indirect financial taxes (lnft). the effects on 
the cointegrating relation's die out (see figure 8.2). In addition. using the generalised IR 
option the impact effect of a unit shock to financial taxes (lnft) on the average total ta'\ rate 
is relatively large and fast (see also figure 8.3). 
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Figure 8.3: Generalized Impulse Respol1se(s) to one S.E. shock in the equaliollfor (Ir). 
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As we mentioned above, we use the error-correction models to test the causal relationship, 
in short and long run, among total tax rate (Intr), consumption taxes (Inet) and financial 
taxes (lnft). For the first difference of total tax rate of tax system (i1lntr) only the lagged 
value of the second differenced (growth) of consumption taxes has short run (negative) 
effects at the 5% significance level. The last result is expected since typically a period 
of time is necessary for the economy to adjust to a new fiscal policy. There is a 
negative short run effect of the growth of the indirect financial taxes on the growth of the 
total tax rate (i1lntr) at 10% level of significance only in the second set of equations (in the 
over-identified system). In addition there is a positive short run effect in the second set of 
equations (ECMs) on the growth of the total tax rate of the tax system (i1lntr) of the 
second differences of the growth of the same variable (two years lags) at 10% significance 
level. The total tax rate (i1lntr) and financial taxes (i1lnft) have a short run effect on the 
consumption taxes (i1lnet). However, the short run effect from indirect financial taxes 
(i1lnft) has a negative sign in the two sets of equations (ECMs) of consumption taxes 
(i1lnet). On the other hand, in the two sets of equations of consumption taxes (l~lnet) the 
growth of the total tax rate of the tax system (i1lntr) has a positive short run effect (in 
second differences) on the growth of consumption taxes at 10% level of significance. In 
addition the dummy variable DGR is significant at 5% significant leycl in both set of 
equations for consumption taxes (i1lnet) suggesting an important short-run effect of the 
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introduction of VAT in consumption tax system When we imposed add't' I " 
. IlOna restnctlOns 
on coefficients for the dummy variable DGR, using the Wald test, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients were equal to zero was rejected only for the equation for consumption 
taxes (~lnct), [X2(1)=20.2l with a P-value about 0.00]. This reform appears not to have 
any short-run effect on the total tax rate of tax system (Alntr) or on financial taxes 
(Alnft)· 
As the results from the co integrating V AR analysis suggest, the total tax rate, consumption 
and financial taxes are cointegrated, thus that they move together over time. Howe\'er. 
only one long run relationship can be established, namely the one between the total tax 
rate of tax system and financial taxes. In short-run, the error-correction models suggest bi-
directional causation: positive from total tax rate towards consumption taxes, and negati\'c 
from consumption taxes towards total tax rate; and a negative uni-directional relationship 
from financial taxes (lnft) to consumption taxes (lnct) as well. On the other hand, financial 
taxes (lnft) have a positive long run effect (the long-run elasticity, derived from the long 
run equilibrium, is 0.19) on the total tax rate (lntr) of the Greek tax system. On the basis of 
the results (based on the significance of the error correction coefficient in individual 
equations), we can conclude that there is a unidirectional Granger causal relationship from 
financial taxes towards the average total tax rate of the Greek economy. 
lnft-+lntr 
The above results can be attributed to the way the above-mentioned taxes were 
applied in Greece over the period of estimation (no deductions for inputs in the case 
of financial taxes, limited VAT base, introduction of VAT relatively recently etc). 
8.4.2 Spain 
Likewise to the case of Greece, we employ a multivariate (trivariate) cointegrating V AR 
model for the period 1965-1999. As we said before, definite data for 1999 are available for 
Spain. Again in our model we use the share of total tax revenues to GDP (tr). as a proxy 
for the average total tax rate of the economy, sales tax and VAT revenues for consumption 
taxes (ct), and turnover taxes, stamp duties and cascade indirect taxes on financial sen ices 
for indirect financial taxes (ft). We also add a dummy DS for the introduction of VA T in 
Spain in 1986, which takes the value of unity for 1987 and zero elsewhere. Non-nested 
tests indicate that the logarithmic transformation is to be preferred oyer the le\'cl equation. 
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As in the case of Greece we use Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Ful1er (ADF) 
to detennine whether each time series contain a unit root that is non-stationary. The results 
reported in Table (8.6) indicate that in no case could we reject the hypothesis that the log 
of series contains a unit root. On the other hand, first differences of the \·ariables are 
clearly stationary, and thus the series are 1(1) and candidates for cointegration. 
Table 8.6: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests results (Spain) 
Variable level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
Intr -0.18** -1.67** -4.29 -4.26 
Inct -0.14** -2.16** -5.04 -4.94 
Inft -1.22 0 • -0.56** -4.70 -4.64 
In order to detennine the order of VARin cointegration analysis, we make an initial 
estimation of maximum order of V AR to 5, (table 8.7). The relevant statistic tests 
(Adjusted likelihood ratio (LR) , Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC). the Akaike 
lnfonnation Criterion (AIC) and unadjusted LR tests) indicate a first order of V AR. 
However, checking the residuals of individual equations in V AR for possible serial 
correlation suggests a problem of serial correlation in all individual equations. Hence, we 
choose a higher order of V AR (2). 
Table 8.7: Determining the order of V AR (Spain) 
Based on 30 observations from 1970 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 5 
List of variables included in the umestricted V AR: 
lntr lnct lnft 
Deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DS 
Order LL AIC SBC 
5 149.5939 98.5939 62.8634 
4 132.6309 90.6309 61.2058 
3 129.5446 96.5446 73.4248 
2 122.3607 98.3607 81.5463 
1 116.4741 101.4741 90.9651 
o 15.0165 9.0165 4.8129 
AIC-Akaike Information Criterion 
LR test Adjusted LR test 
CHSQ( 9)= 33.9260[.000] 14.7013[.099] 
CHSQ( 18)= 40.0987[.002] 17.3761[.497] 
CHSQ( 27)= 54.4665[.001] 23.6021[.652] 
CHSQ( 36)= 66.2397[.002] 28.7039[.801] 
CHSQ( 45)= 269.1548[.000] 116.6337[.000] 
SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
To test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating \':,\R (2) 
procedure with unrestricted intercepts and no trend option chosen via Pantula principle . 
•• The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at 5% lew 1 of significance. 
193 
Based on the results displayed in Table (8 8) both th . 
. . " e maXImum and the trace eigenvalue 
statIstIcs had to a rejection of the null hypothesis t 5°/ . 'fi a /0 slgm lcance leveL namely that 
there is no cointegration among the variables (r= 1)' but th h h' .-
, e ypot eSlS that there IS one 
cointegrating relation (vector) among the variables is not . t d In h reJec e. t e same table 8.8 
Model selection criteria give different results Akaike Info t' C· . 
. rma IOn ntenon (AIC) fa\'ours 
three cointegrating relations between the variables and Schwarz B . C· . ayesian ntenon (SBC) 
one. We accept that there is one cointegrating relation fiollowl'ng th . I' e maXIma eIgenvalue 
and trace statistics. 
Ta~le 8.8:. Coin.tegration Tests: VAR(2) with Dummy(Spain) 
ComtegratlOn WIth unrestricted intercepts and no trends in the V AR 
33 observations from 1967 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 2. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lntr lnet hift 
List ofl(O) variables included in the V AR: DS 
Eigenvalue Test (Order ofVAR=2) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.67185 .16453 .096782 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=O r= 1 36.7716 21.1200 19.0200 
r<= 1 r = 2 5.9320 14.8800 12.9800 
r<= 2 r = 3 3.3591 8.0700 6.5000 
Trace Test (Order ofVAR=2) 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r = 0 r>= 1 46.0628 
r<= 1 r>= 2 9.2911 
r<= 2 r = 3 3.3591 
31.5400 
17.8600 
8.0700 
28.7800 
15.7500 
6.5000 
Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL 
r = 0 106.0157 
r = 1 124.4015 
r = 2 127.3675 
AlC 
91.0157 
104.4015 
104.3675 
105.0471 
SBC 
79.7919 
89.4364 
87.1577 
87.0890 
HQC 
87.2392 
99.3662 
98.5769 
99.0047 r = 3 129.0471 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The findings of one cointegrating vector are not sensitive to changes in specification. 
When the dummy is not included or other dummies are included in its place (such as a 
dummy equal to 1 for 1993 and zero elsewhere, capturing the dynamics of the introduction 
of the transitional VAT regime in Spain), as in the case of Greece, there is still evidence of 
cointegrating relations in data set. The estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of the 
variables in the cointegrating vector, are: (ECMjZ=4.43Intr-O.771nct-O.86Inft. which make 
us to expect one co integrating relation among the three variables that is: 
lntr-lnct-lnft. DS~1(O). 
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Normalising on the coefficient for the tax rate of the (1 economy ntr) (A. 1 =1) the 
cointegrating vector (long run equilibrium) estimated in the J h d· o ansen proce ure In the 
case of Spain is as under (standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
lntr=0.171nct+0.19lnjt 
(0.02) (0.01) 
The ECM equations for ~lntr, ~lnct and ~lnft variables with the lagged first differences 
and error-corrections terms are given in table 8.9: 
Table 8.9: Estimates ofECMsfor Alntr, Alnct and Alnjt,J965-J999 for Spail/. 
Variables .6.lntr .6.lnct .6.lnft 
Intercept -2.51(0.58) 3.05(1.4) 
-0.17(3.2) 
.6.1ntr(-1 ) -0.23(0.15) -0.17(0.38) -0.54(0.84) 
.6.lnc t(-l) 0.01(0.06) 0.18(0.16) 0.29(0.36) 
.6.lnft (-1) -0.02(0.04) 0.02(0.11) 0.23(0.24) 
ZI_1 -0.68(0.15) 0.81(0.4) -0.06(0.88)" 
DS -0.02(0.03) 0.3(0.1) -0.32(0.22) 
DW 1.67 1.97 1.95 
R- 0.55 0.31 0.10 
SER 0.03 0.09 0.19 
The diagnostic test statistics indicate that there is a good fit in the model. All ECMs pass 
the tests for first order serial correlation, functional form and heteroscedasticity at 5% 
significance level. However, the ECM for consumption taxes (lnct) fails on normality. 
Cusum and Cusum squared tests show that the above equations are correctly specified. 
Unlike in the case of Greece, in the normalised cointegrating vector the coefficient on 
(lnct) and (lnft) are significant. Indeed, when we impose a zero restriction (A2=0) on (Iner) 
or (A3=0) on (lnft) both are rejected by the LR statistic which is given as -/( 1 )=27 .39 with 
a P-value about 0.00 and X\1)=24.66 with a P-value about 0.00 respectively, suggesting 
endogeinity of the variables to the cointegrating vector. 
The results for Spain are more obvious. The coefficients of the error correction temlS 
(speed of adjustment), are significant at 5% level of significance for the total tax rate (lntr) 
and consumption taxes (lnct) and also high, suggesting that it would not take long time for 
the total tax rate and consumption taxes equations to return to the equilibrium once the 
system has been shocked. The convergence back to the equilibrium is \'ery fast, with 
adjustment complete in about three years (figure 8.4). 
• significant at 5% level,·· not-significant 
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Figure 8.4: Persistence Profile a/the effect ora s"stem 'd h' k 
:/1' 'l J -WI e s OC to CV(Spain) 
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The impulse response of the system is fast and has the right feedback. Choosing for 
example to shock the consumption taxes (lnct) and financial taxes (lnft) the effects on the 
co integrating relation die out (figure 8.5-8.6). 
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In addition usmg the generalised IR option, the impact effect of a unit shock to 
consumption taxes (lnct) on total tax rate (lntr) and financial taxes (lnft) is relatiyely large 
and fast. However the impact effect on financial taxes (lnfl) seems larger (figure 8.7-8.8). 
Moreover, the impact effect of a unit shock to financial taxes (lnft) on total tax rate and on 
consumption taxes (lnct) is fast as well with larger impact on consumption taxes (lnc!) 
(negative feedback). 
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The results from the co integrating V AR analysis suggest that in the case of Spain the total 
tax rate of the economy, consumption and financial taxes are cointegrated. In addition the 
individual equations, in short run, suggest a unidirectional causation, from consumption 
taxes and financial taxes towards the total tax rate. On the other hand, in long run, we can 
support the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the average total tax 
rate, consumption and indirect financial taxes in Spain. The long run elasticity for 
financial taxes is equal to the one found for Greece (0.19) indicating that a 1 % change 
(increase) in financial taxes (in logs) generates an (0.19%) increase of the share of total tax 
revenues to GDP. Contrary to the findings for Greece, consumption taxes have a 
positive long run effect on total tax rate (lntr) (endogenous to cointegrating vector) 
for Spain. The long-run elasticity is (0.17), indicating effective revenue collection if we 
take into account the method of the application of these taxes (deductions for inputs, many 
exemptions applied etc.). Based on the significance of the error correction coefficient in 
individual equations we can conclude that there is a bi-directional Granger causal 
relationship between the average total tax rate (lntr) and consumption taxes (Inc!) and a 
unidirectional Granger causal relationship from financial taxes (Inft) towards the ayeragc 
total tax rate (lntr): 
lntr +- -+ lnet, and lnft-+ Intr 
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In addition the dummy variable DS is significant at 5% significant level in the equation 
explaining the consumption taxes (l.nct). This suggests an important short run effect of the 
introduction of V AT in consumption tax system. Like in the case of Greece, \\-hen \\.c 
impose additional restrictions on coefficients for the dummy variable DS, using the \\' aId 
test, the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero is rejected only for the 
equation for consumption taxes (L\lnct) [X2(1)=9.27 with a P-value of 0.002]. 
8.4.3 Portugal 
Likewise to the case of Greece and Spain, we use a multivariate (trivariate) cointegrating 
V AR model for the period 1965-1999. As a difference to Greece and Spain an additional 
modification in data set is necessary for Portugal. In indirect financial taxes we do not 
include other indirect taxes on specific services (e.g. taxes on gambling ser;ices) 
classified, in the case of Portugal, under the same code (i.e. code 5126). Like Greece and 
Spain a dummy (DP) was added for the introduction of VAT in Portugal in 1986. As in 
the case of Greece and Spain, non-nested tests indicated that the logarithmic 
transformation was preferred over the level equation. To determine whether each series 
contain a unit root, that is non-stationary, we use the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the results reported in the following Table (8.10) suggest that we 
can treat the variables (lntr, lnct, lnft) as Granger causal (the series are I (1)). 
Variable 
Intr 
Inct 
Inft 
Table 8.10: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests results (Portugal) 
level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
-1.09** -2.70** -6.82 -6.74 
-1.13" -2.11 ** -6.03 -6.21 
-1.89 ** -0.10** -4.15 -4.90 
To choose the order of V AR we make an initial estimation of maximum order of V AR to 
(5) (Table 8.11). The relevant statistic tests [(Adjusted likelihood ratio (LR), Schwarz-
Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and unadjusted LR tests)] indicate a first order of V AR, though 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AlC) suggests longer lags. Checking the residuals of 
individual equations in a first order V AR for possible serial correlation suggests a problem 
of serial correlation in all individual equations. Hence we choose a higher order of \':,\R 
(2) . 
•• The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at 5% leyel of significance. 
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Table 8.11: Determining the order of VAR(Portugal) 
Based on 30 observations from 1970 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 5 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lntr lnet hift 
Deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DP 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test 
5 149.5804 98.5804 63.7144 
Adjusted LR test 
4 140.2006 98.2006 69.4874 CHSQ( 9)= 18.7596[.027] 7.7626[.558] 
3 129.3714 96.3714 73.8110 CHSQ( 18)= 40.4181[.002] 16.7248[.542] 
2 113.2128 89.2128 72.8053 CHSQ( 27)= 72.7352[.000] 30.0973[.310] 
1 101.8309 86.8309 76.5762 CHSQ( 36)= 95.4990[.000] 39.5168[.3161 
o 2.9851 -3.0149 -7.1168 CHSQ( 45)=293.1906[.000] 121.3203[.000] 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
To test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating V AR (2) 
procedure with restricted intercepts and no trend option chosen via Pantula principle. The 
results displayed in Table (8.12) both the maximum and the trace eigenvalue statistics 
reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level, that there is no cointegration among the 
variables (namely r=1) but do not reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating 
relation (vector) among the variables. Reported in the same table Model selection criteria 
give different results. Akaike Information Criterion (AlC) favours two cointegrating 
relations between the variables and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) one. We accept 
that there is one cointegrating relation following the maximal eigenvalue and trace 
statistics. 
Table 8.12: Cointegration Tests: VAR (2) with Dummy(Portugal) 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
33 observations from 1967 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 2. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
IntI' lnet lnft Intercept 
List ofl(O) variables included in the VAR: DP 
Eigenvalue Test (Order ofVAR=2) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.57759 .22399 .048636 .0000 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=O r= 1 27.5766 22.0400 19.8600 
r<= 1 r = 2 8.1149 
r<= 2 r = 3 1.5955 
15.8700 13.8100 
9.1600 7.5300 
Trace Test (Order ofVAR=2) 
Critical Value 
95% 90% Null Alternative Statistic 
r = 0 r>= 1 37.2870 34.8700 31.9300 
r<= 1 r>= 2 9.7104 20.1800 17.8800 
r<= 2 r = 3 1.5955 
Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL 
1'=0 93.1325 
r = 1 106.9208 
r 2 110.9782 
AIC 
81.1325 
88.9208 
88.9782 
9.1600 7.5300 
SBC 
72.3380 
75.7291 
72.8551 
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HQC 
78.2174 
84.5481 
83.6339 
r 3 111.7760 87.7760 70.1871 81.9458 
AIC = Akaike Info~tion Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Qumn Criterion 
Again the findings of one cointegrating vector are not sensitive to changes in specification. 
When the dummy is not included or other dummies are included in its place, as in the case 
of Greece and Spain, there is still evidence of cointegrating relations. The estimates of the 
cointegrating coefficients of the variables in the cointegrating vector are: (EC~1)Z=-
2. 75Intr+0.66Inct-0. 005 Inft-7. 63, which make us to expect one cointegrating relation 
among the three variables that is: 
lntr-Inct-Inft, DP-I(O) 
After normalising on the coefficient for total tax rate of economy (lntr) (AI =1) the 
co integrating vector (long run equilibrium) estimated in the Johansen procedure in the 
case of Portugal is as follows (standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
Intr=0.24Inct-0. 001lnft-2. 77 
(0.02) (0.02) (012) 
The ECM equations for ~lntr, ~lnct, and ~lnft variables with the lagged first differences 
and error-corrections terms are given in table 8.13: 
Table 8.13: Estimates of ECMsfor Alntr, Alnct and Alnft, 1965-1999 for Portugal. 
Variables ~lntr ~lnct ~lnft 
Intercept - - -
~lntr(-l) 0.15(0.14) 0.51(0.37) 0.89(0.75) 
~lnc t(-l) -0.07(0.02) -0.06(0.07) -0.15(0.14) 
~lnft (-1) -0.007(0.03) 0.006(0.08) 0.14(0.17) 
Zt-J -0.48(0.1)" -0.82(0.26) -1.03(0.53 ) 
DP 0.06(0.03) 0.44(0.09) -0.2(0.19) 
DW 2.1 2.02 2.22 
R- 0.39 0.32 0.22 
SER 0.03 0.09 0.19 
The diagnostic test statistics indicate that there is a good fit in the model. The ECMs pass 
the tests for first order serial correlation and heteroscedasticity at 5% significance lc\'el. 
However the ECM for financial taxes (lnft) fails on normality and functional form. Cusum , 
and Cusum squared tests support the view that the above equations are correctly specified. 
Unlike to the case of Greece and Spain, in the normalised cointegrating vector the 
coefficient on (lnft) seems to be insignificant while the coefficient on consumption taxes 
• significant at 5% critical level, •• significant at 10% critical level 
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(Inet) is significant. When we impose a restriction that th ffi' . 
, e coe lClent on (lnet) IS equal to 
zero (A2=0), this is rejected by the LR statistic which" . ~ ., - . IS gIVen as I.. (l)=7._~) WIth a P-
value of 0.007, suggesting endogeinity of the variable to th' . e comtegratmg vector. On the 
contrary, the restriction that the coefficient on financial taxes (l lilt') . I ~, IS equa to zero (.--\3=0) 
could not be rejected by the LR statistic oiven as 0,2(1)=0 005 ··th P I IY I. . \\ 1 a -ya ue of 0.9-+. 
Therefore, the new cointegrating vector with this over-identifying restriction is: 
(ECM)Z=lntr-0.23lnet+ 0.00lnft+2. 77 
(0.17) (0.12) 
This means that the cointegrating relation has been reduced to the one expressed as: 
lntr-Inet, DP~I(O) 
The new ECM estimates for the over-identified system are displayed in table 8.1-+: 
Table 8.14: Estimates of ECMs for Alntr, Alnct and Alnft, 1965-1999 for Portugal. 
Variables ~lntr ~1nct ~1nft 
Intercept - - -
Mntr(-1) 0.15(0.14) 0.52(0.37) 0.9(0.75) 
~lnc t(-1) -0.07(0.02) -0.06(0.07) -0.15(0.14) 
~lnft (-I) -0.008(0.03) 0.006(0.08) 0.13(0.17) 
ZI_I -0.49(0.1) -0.83(0.26) -1.04(0.53) 
DP 0.06(0.03) 0.44(0.09) -0.2(0.19) 
DW 2.1 2.02 2.22 
R] 0.39 0.32 0.22 
SER 0.03 0.09 0.19 
Similar results follows from the diagnostic statistic tests for the new ECM above. The 
ECM for financial taxes (lnft) fails on normality and functional form at 5% significance 
level. Cusum and Cusum squared tests indicate that the above equations are structurally 
stable as well. The coefficients and standard errors in the ECM representations with and 
without over-identifying restrictions do not differ much. The coefficients on the error 
correction terms, are significant at 5% level for the total tax rate (lntr) and consumption 
taxes (lnet) and weakly significant for financial taxes (lnft) at 10% significance level and 
also high, suggesting that that it would not take long time for the equations to return to the 
equilibrium once the system has been shocked. There seems to be a degree of 
overreaction, represented by the negative coefficients on the ECMs equations and error 
correction terms (as in the case of Greece). However, the com'ergence back to the 
• significant at 5% level, •• significant at 10% critical1evel 
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equilibrium is moderate, with adjustment complete III about seven years (faster than 
Greece and slower than Spain) (Figure 8.9). 
Figure 8.9: Persistence Profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to CV(Ponugal) 
/ CV 
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Horizon 50 Years 
The impulse response of the system is fast and as in the case of Greece and Spain has the 
right feedback. Choosing to shock the consumption taxes (lnct) and financial taxes (l~ft) 
the effects on the cointegrating relations dies out (figure 8.10-8,11), relatively fast. 
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h I, d IR optl'on, the impact effect of a unit shock to In addition using t e genera Ise 
consumption taxes (lnct) on total tax rate (lntr) and financial taxes (lnft) is relati\'cly large 
(but smaller than in case of Spain) and fast. However, the impact effect on financial ta:-;cs 
(llift) seems larger (Figure 8.12), 
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As the results from the co integrating V AR analysis suggest, in the case of Portugal only 
one long run relationship can be established, namely the one between total tax rate and 
consumption taxes. In the short run, the error correction equations, as in the case of Greece 
and Spain, do not suggest any bi-directional causation between total tax rate and 
consumption taxes or between total tax rate (Intr) and financial taxes (Infl)- In add ition, the 
individual equations suggest a unidirectional causation, in short run, from consumption 
taxes (~lnet) towards the total tax rate (~lntr). FU11hermore, financial tax es have a sma ll 
negative short run effect on total tax rate. Unlike in Greece, but simi lar to Spain, 
consumption taxes (Inet) have an imp0l1ant long run effect on the average total tax rate of 
the economy. The long run elasticity (0.23) for consumption taxes (In er) is relativ ly hi gh 
(higher than the one found for Spain, 0.19%) indicating that a 1 % change in growth of 
consumption taxes (in logs) generates an (0.23%) increase of the share of tota l tax 
revenues to GDP. 
On the basis of the cointegration results we can support the hypothesis that the average 
total tax rate (lntr) and consumption taxes (Inet) are Granger causal. From the results in 
individual equations (based on the significance of the error correction term coefficient) we 
can conclude that there is a bi-directional Granger causal relationship (similar to pain) 
between the total tax rate (lntr) and the consumption taxes (lnet) in Portugal: 
Intr +- -+ Inet 
The dun1l11Y variable DP is significant at 5% significance level in equation ex pl aining the 
consUll1ption taxes (lnet) , suggesting an important short-run effect of th introduction r 
V AT in consumption tax system in Portugal as in the cases of Greec and pain . \\'hen \\ c 
impose additional restrictions on coefficients for the dumm variable DP, using the \\ ' aId 
test, the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero is r ject d only [or tiP 
equation for consumption taxes (Lnet) [x.2(1)=2 1.68 \ ith a p-\ alue about O. ]. Contrar~ 
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to the results for Greece and Spain, we found a weakly significant (at 10% 
significance level) coefficient for the dummy variable DP in the equat' I .. IOn exp ammg 
the total tax rate (Alntr) [X2(1)=2.72 with a P-value of 0.09], indicating that the 
reform appears to have a (weak and short-lived) short-run effect on total tax rate of 
tax system as well. 
8.5 Granger type causality tests for Greece, Spain and Portugal for the average total 
tax rate and indirect taxes relationship. 
For comparison purposes we perform the Engle and Granger causality tests in order to re-
examine the causal relationships among the three variables in the three countries by 
estimating an unrestricted V AR46 model in differences of variables with the dummy for 
the introduction of VAT as its deterministic variable. On the whole we obtain quite similar 
results as in Johansen procedure (Table 8.15). However, some differences have been 
identified. Consumption taxes are a causal variable for Greece and the total tax rate of the 
economy a non-causal variable for Spain and Portugal. Finally, as in the Johansen 
procedure the additional restriction that the coefficient of the dummy variable is zero is 
rejected only in the equations explaining the consumption taxes in three countries. 
Table 8.15: Granger type tests based on OLS equation for Greece, Spain and Portugal (tax rate and 
indirect taxes relationship). 
-----
Variable lntf lnct 1rY! Dummy for 
VAT reform (Wald test)_ 
Country LR statistic causal LR statistic causal LR statistic causal LR statistic significant at 5'~;) 
critical level in 
Greece XL(6)=7.38 No XL(6)=17.69 Yes X2( 6)=26.92 Yes l(1)-15.75 (Inct) 
(0.27} (0.007) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spain X2(4)=5.54 No X2(4 )=15.6 Yes l(4)-17.82 Yes X2(1)-6.47 (Inct) 
1°·23) (0.004) (0.0011 (0.011) 
Portugal x2(1)=1.94 No l(1)=16.9 Yes XL(1)-2.75 No X2(1) 13.51 r- (Inct) 
(0.74) (0.002) (0.59) (0.00) 1 
--
. . bl t ther But each endOI.!CIlOliS 4(, Actually in this methodology one considers several endogenous \ ana es oge. . -bl 
. d th I d \"alues of all other endogenous \'ana es In variable is explained by Its lagged, or past, val~es an e agge , ' 
the model; usually. there are no exogenous vanables m the model (GuJaratl. 1995). 
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8.6 Cointegration analysis of total government expendl't d h ' ures an t e different 
indirect taxes relationship. 
A first investigation of the data on expenditures in three countries show that spending has 
increased intensively over the period 1965-1999. The summary statistics reported in Table 
8.l6 suggest that Portugal is the country with the highest percentage growth of 
expenditures (per annum) (6.53%), while Greece and Spain appear \yith quite similar 
percentage growth (4.67%) and (4.57%) respectively. 
Table 8,16: Summary statistics of'the f!rowth of expenditures (1965-1999). 
Country Greece Spain Portuf!ai 
Mean 4.67 4.57 6.53 
St. Dev 9.81 7.37 16.27 
Again to provide empirical evidence to the issue of tax and spend relationship we fo11O\\" 
the same methodology we used before to examine the relationship between the average 
total tax rate and the different taxes. We address first the time-series properties of the 
variables (different indirect taxes and expenditures) and then we test for cointegration by 
using the Johansen methodology. 
8.6.1 Greece 
As we did in the investigation of the total average tax rate and the different indirect taxes 
relationship, we employ a multivariate (trivariate) cointegrating V AR model for the period 
1965-1998. We use the total expenditures (ex), sales tax and VAT revenues for 
consumption taxes (ct), and turnover taxes, stamp duties and cascade indirect taxes on 
financial services for indirect financial taxes (ft). We also add the dummy (DGR) for the 
introduction of VAT in Greece in 1987. Non-nested tests indicate that the logarithmic 
transformation is to be preferred over the level equation. In the first step of testing for 
cointegration we performed the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests in order to verify the presence of common stochastic trends among the 
variables. The results reported in table 8.17 indicate that the series are of the same order 
/(1) of integration and candidates for cointegration with the variable representing the total 
expenditures. 
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Table 8.17: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests results (Greece) 
Variable level 
No trend 
-1.42** 
First differences 
linear trend 
-1.72*" 
No trend linear trend 
Inex 
Inct 
Inft 
-1.54** 
-6.49 -6.53 
-1.49** 
-2.96*· 
-2.62** 
-6.56 
-5.76 
-6.44 
-5.65 
In the second step we look for the possibility that the above variables are cointegrated. In 
this case the Granger representation theorem states that, the first differences of the 
variables may be considered to be generated by error correction models of the same fonn 
we used to investigate the average total tax rate and different taxes relationship. For 
cointegration analysis we follow the maximum likelihood estimation approach as in 
(Johansen, 1988) and (Johansen and Juselius, 1992). To select the order of V AR \ye 
specify a trivariate unrestricted V AR model in lnex, lnct, and lnft containing an intercept 
term and the Dummy variable (DGR) as its deterministic component. We make an initial 
estimation of a maximum order of V AR to 5 (Table 8.18). The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and adjusted LR test suggest a V AR 
of order 1. Therefore we choose a V AR of order 1. 
Table 8.18: Determining the order of VAR (Greece) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the V AR Model 
Based on 29 observations from 1970 to 1998. Order ofVAR = 5 
List of variables included in the umestricted V AR: 
lnex lnct lnft 
List of deterministic andlor exogenous variables: 
C DGR 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
5 97.5121 46.5121 11.6460 
4 83.4608 41.4608 12.7476 CHSQ( 9)= 28.1026[.001] 11.6287[.235] 
3 79.5481 46.5481 23.9877 CHSQ( 18)= 35.9279[.007] 14.8667[.671] 
2 72.1424 48.1424 31.7349 CHSQ( 27)= 50.7393[.004] 20.9956[.786] 
1 68.4649 53.4649 43.2101 CHSQ( 36)= 58.0944[.011] 24.0391[.936] 
o -14.5451 -20.5451 -24.6469 CHSQ( 45)= 224.1143[.000] 92.7369[.000] 
AIC-Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
To test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating V AR (1) 
procedure with unrestricted intercepts and no trend option chosen yia the PantuJa 
principle. Based on the results displayed in Table (8.19), both the maximum and the trace 
eigenvalue statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level, that there is no 
co integration among lnex, lnct, and lnft (namely r=0) but do not reject the hypothesis that 
there is one cointegrating relation (vector) (i.e. r=1) between the variables. Reported in the 
•• The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at 5% level of significance. 
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same table 8.19 Model selection criteria give the same results· d· t· . . 
mIca mg one comtegratmg 
relation between the variables. ~ 
Ta~le 8.19.: Coi~tegration Tests: VAR(1) with Dummy(Greece) 
ComtegratlOn wIth umestricted intercepts and no trends in the V AR 
33 observations from 1966 to 1998. Order ofVAR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lnex lnet lnft 
List ofl(O) variables included in the V AR: DGR 
Eigenvalue Test (Order ofVAR-l) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.53694 .076069 .052606 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r = 0 r = 1 25.4069 
r<= 1 r = 2 2.6109 
r<= 2 r = 3 1.7833 
Trace Test (Order of V AR=I) 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r = 0 r>= 1 29.8011 
r<= 1 r>= 2 4.3942 
r<= 2 r = 3 1.7833 
Model Selection Criteria 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
2l.1200 
14.8800 
8.0700 
19.0200 
12.9800 
6.5000 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
31.5400 28.7800 
17.8600 15.7500 
8.0700 6.5000 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=O 62.5735 56.5735 52.0839 55.0629 
r=1 75.2769 64.2769 56.0461 6l.5075 
r=2 76.5823 62.5823 52.1068 59.0576 
r=3 77.4740 62.4740 5l.2502 58.6975 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The findings of one cointegrating vector are not sensitive to changes in specification. 
When the DGR dummy is not included or other dummies are included in its place, as 
before, there is still evidence of cointegrating relations in data. The estimates of the 
co integrating coefficients of the variables in the cointegrating vector are: (ECM)Z= 
1.13Inex-l. Olnet-O. 231lnJt, which make us to expect one cointegrating relation among the 
three variables that is: 
lnex-lnet-InJt, DGR~I(O). 
Nonnalising on the coefficient for total expenditures (lnex) (Al=l) the cointegrating 
vector (long-run equilibrium) estimated in the Johansen procedure is (standard errors are 
expressed in brackets): 
Inex=0.88Inet+ 0.20 lnft 
(0.07) (0.05) 
The ECM equations for ~lnex, ~lnct, and ~lnJt variables with the error-correction terms 
are given in table 8.20: 
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Table 8.20: Estimates of ECMs for Alnex, Alnct and Alnft, 1965-1998 for Greece. 
Variables .Mnex ~lnct ~hifi 
Intercept 0.09(0.16) -0.63(0.15)" -0.14(0.41( 
Zt-l -0.03(0.10) 0.45(0.10)" 0.10(0.27)" 
DGR 0.009(0.09)** 0.42(0.09) 0.02(0.24j"* 
DW 2.3 1.79 1.88 
R- 0.03 0.59 0.05 
SER 0.09 0.08 0.23 
The diagnostic test statistics show that there is a good fit in model. All the ECMs pass the 
tests for first order serial correlation at 5% significance level. The equation for financial 
taxes (~lnft) fails on normality at 5% level of significance. In the normalised cointegrating 
vector the coefficients on (Inct) and lnft are significant. Indeed, when we impose a zero 
restriction (A2=0) on (Inct), and (A3=0) on (lnft) these restrictions are rejected by the LR 
statistic which is given as X\1)=23.17 with a P-value about 0.00 and x2(1)=7.28 \\'ith a P-
value of 0.007 respectively. As the results from the co integrating V AR analysis suggest, 
we can infer that the expenditures, consumption and financial taxes are cointegrated thus 
that they move together over time. On the basis of the results (based on the significance of 
the error correction coefficient in individual equations) we can conclude that there is a 
unidirectional Granger causal relationship from expenditures towards the consumption 
taxes. 
lnex-+lnct 
Based on the above results we can conclude that the findings support the view that 
the political system in Greece somehow determines how much to spend and then 
looks for revenues from taxing the final consumption to finance a part of that level of 
spending. 
On the other hand, the long run equilibrium indicates that an increase of consumption and 
indirect financial taxes by 1% increases the level of expenditures by 0.88% and 0.20% 
respectively. The coefficient of the error correction term in the equation explaining the 
growth of consumption taxes is positive and high, indicating a fast adjustment to the 
equilibrium once the system is shocked. Convergence back to equilibrium is fast \\'ith 
adjustment complete in about four years (figure 8.13). 
• significant at 5% level, •• not-significant 
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Figure 8.13: Persistence Profile of the effect of a system shock to CV(Greece). 
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In addition the impulse responses have the right feedback. For example the impact effect 
of a unit shock to expenditures on consumption taxes is quite large and is larger than the 
effect on expenditures itself. The results given in the figure 8.14 suggest an important 
cyclical effect of an expenditure shock on consumption taxes, with consumption taxes 
responding very strongly to an expenditure shock and then increasing very sharply. 
Figure 8.14:Impulse Response to one s.E. shock in the equation for Inex(Greece). 
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8.6.2 Spain 
For Spain we employ the same model as in Greece for the period 1965-1999. We also add 
a dummy (DS) for the introduction of VAT in Spain in 1986. Non-nested tests indicated 
that the logarithmic transformation is to be preferred over the level equation. The results 
reported in table 8.21 (the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
tests) indicate that the series are of the same order /(1) of integration and candidates for 
cointegration. 
Table 8.21: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests results (Spain) 
Variable level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
loex -1.09" -0.33*" -4.93 -5.19 
loct -0.14 0 • -2.16"" -5.04 --+.9-+ 
loft -1.22"" -0.56"" -4.70 -4.64 
.. The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at 5% level of significance. 
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For cointegration analysis we follow the same procedure as becore T 1 h d 11 • 0 se ect t e or er of 
V AR we specify a trivariate umestricted V AR model in lnex lnet a d I ,fit t" 
, , n ry. con ammg an 
intercept term and the Dummy variable (DS) as its deterministic component. \Ve make an 
initial estimation of a maximum order of V AR to 5 (Table 8.22). The Akaike Information 
Criterion (AlC), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and adjusted LR test suggest a V AR 
of order 1. Therefore we choose a V AR of order 1. 
Table 8.22: Determining the order of VAR (Spain) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the V AR Model 
Based on 30 observations from 1970 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 5 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lnex lnct lnft 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DS 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
5 137.5939 86.5939 50.8634 
4 123.2034 81.2034 51.7783 CHSQ( 9)= 28.7810[.001] 12.4718[.188] 
3 117.5202 84.5202 61.4004 CHSQ( 18)= 40.1474[.002] 17.3972[.496] 
2 110.3829 86.3829 69.5685 CHSQ( 27)= 54.4220[.001] 23.5829[.653] 
1 106.9969 91.9969 81.4879 CHSQ( 36)= 61.1940[.005] 26.5174[.876] 
o -17.5633 -23.5633 -27.7669 CHSQ( 45)= 310.3144[.000] 134.4696[.000] 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
As before to test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating 
V AR (1) procedure with restricted intercepts and no trend option chosen by the Pantula 
principle. Based on the results displayed in Table (8.23) both the maximum and the trace 
eigenvalue statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level, that there is no 
cointegration among lnex, lnet, and lnfl (namely r=0) but do not reject the hypothesis that 
there is one cointegrating relation (vector) (i.e. r=1) between the variables. Reported in the 
same table Model selection criteria support the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating 
relation between the variables. 
Table 8.23: Co integration Tests: VAR(1) with Dummy(Spain) 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the V AR 
34 observations from 1966 to 1999. Order of V AR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
Incx lnct lnft Intercept 
List ofI(O) variables included in the V AR: DS 
Eigenvalue Test (Order of V AR=l) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.58542 .30681 .075379 0.00 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative 
r=O r=l 
r<= 1 r = 2 
r< 2 r 3 
Statistic 
29.9365 
12.4596 
2.6646 
95% 90% 
22.0400 19.8600 
15.8700 13.8100 
9.1600 7.5300 
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Trace Test (Order ofVAR 1) 
Null Alternative 
r = 0 r>= 1 
r<= 1 r>= 2 
r<= 2 r = 3 
Statistic 
45.0607 
15.1242 
2.6646 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
34.8700 31.9300 
20.1800 17.8800 
Model Selection Criteria 
9.1600 7.5300 
Rank: Maximized LL AIC SBC 
r=O 77.2863 74.2863 71.9968 
r=l 92.2546 85.4844 76.3859 
r=2 98.4844 83.2546 75.5630 
r=3 99.8167 84.8167 73.3690 
HQC 
73.5055 
80.9122 
82.1009 
80.9127 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
There is no sensitivity again to changes in specification. When the DS dwnmy is not 
included or other dummies are included in its place there is still evidence of cointegrating 
relations in data. The estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of the variables in the 
cointegrating vector, are: (ECM)Z=-O. 11lnex-O.24Inct+O. 121nft+ ].41, which make us to 
expect one co integrating relation among the three variables that is: 
lnex-Inct-Inft, DS~I(O). 
Normalising on the coefficient for total expenditures (lnex) (AI =1) the cointegrating 
vector (long mn equilibrium) estimated in the Johansen procedure is (standard errors are 
expressed in brackets): 
Inex=-2.2Inct + 1.13Inft+ 21.5] 
(8.92) (2.86) (58.12) 
The ECM equations for ~lnexJ ~lnctJ and ~lnft variables with the error-correction tenns 
are given in table 8.24: 
Table 8.24: Estimates of ECMs for Alnex, Alnet and Alnft, 1965-1998 for Spain. 
Variables ~lnex ~1nct ~lnft 
Intercept - - -
Zt 1 -0.032(0.007) -0.02(0.01) -0.06(0.02) 
DS 0.01(0.06) 0.23(0.09) -0.27(0.19) 
DW 2.03 1.70 2 
R- 0.17 0.17 0.08 
SER 0.06 0.09 0.18 
The diagnostic test statistics indicate that there is a good fit in model. All the EC\ls pass 
the tests for first order serial correlation at 5% significance level. The equation for 
financial taxes (~lnct) fails on normality at 5% level of significance. In the nonnalised 
cointegrating vector the coefficients on (lnct) and Inft seem insignificant. \\'hen we impose 
• significant at 5% level, •• not-significant 
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a zero restriction (A2=0) on (Inct), this is not rejected by the LR t t' t' h' . . s a IS lC w lch IS glyen as 
x2(l)=1.45 with a P-value of 0.22. On the other hand when we l'm d . . pose a zero restnctlOn 
(A3=0) on the coefficient of (lnft) this restriction is reJ'ected by the LR t t" I . h . s a IStlC W 11C IS 
given as X2(l)=7.04 with a P-value of 0.03. The new over-identl'fied 1 'l'b . ong run eqUl 1 num 
IS: 
lnex=0.42lnft -7.26 
(0.05) (0.32) 
The new ECM equations for ~lnexJ ~lnctJ and ~lnft variables with the error-correction 
terms are given in table 8.25: 
Table 8.25: Estimates of ECMs for Alnex, Alnct and Alnft, 1965-1998 for Spain. 
Variables ~lnex ~lnct ~lnft 
Intercept - - -
ZI.1 -0.15(0.03),'- -0.07(0.05) -0.24(0.10) 
DS -0.03(0.06) 0.23(0.10) -0.27(0.20) •• 
DW 1.88 1.68 1.99 
R- 0.24 0.12 0.09 
SER 0.06 0.09 0.19 
The results in the over-identified system are slightly different (insignificant coefficient for 
the error correction term in the equation explaining the growth of consumption taxes). The 
equation explaining the growth of indirect financial taxes still fails on normality at 5% 
significance level. As the results from the cointegrating V AR analysis suggest, 
expenditures, consumption and financial taxes are cointegrated thus that they move 
together over time. On the basis of the results (based on the significance of the error 
correction coefficient in individual equations) we can conclude that in the case of Spain 
there is a bi-directional Granger causal relationship between expenditures and financial 
taxes. 
lnex+-~ lnft 
Hence, for Spain indirect financial taxation and spending decisions are jointly made 
by fiscal authorities. On the other hand, the long run equilibrium indicates that an 
increase of indirect financial taxes by 1 % increases the level of expenditures by 0.'+2%. 
• significant at 5% level, •• not-significant 
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The coefficient of the error correction term in the t' I . equa Ion exp aming the grO\\1h of 
indirect financial taxes is negative (indicating overreaction to shocks of the equation) and 
low indicating a moderate adjustment to the equilibrium once the system is shocked . 
Convergence back to equilibrium is moderate with adjustment complete in about t n year 
(figure 8.15). 
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In addition the impulse responses had the right feedback. For example the impact effect of 
a unit shock to indirect financial taxes on expenditures is quite large and is larger than the 
effect on indirect taxes itself. The results given in the figure 8.16 suggest an important 
cyclical effect of an indirect financial taxes shock on expenditures with expenditures 
responding strongly to an indirect financial shock and then increasing sharply. 
8.6.3 Portugal 
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For Portugal, we again use the same model as in the case of Greece and Spain for the 
period 1965-1999. We also add a dummy (DP) for the introduction ofYAT in POliuga l in 
1986, which takes the value of unity for 1986 and zero elsewhere. on-TIe ted te t 
indicate that the logarithmic transformation is preferred over the I vel quation . The 
results reported in table 8.26 (The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the augment d Dickey-Ful ler 
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(ADF) tests) indicate that the senes are of the same order 1(1) of integration and 
candidates for cointegration. 
Table 8.26: Dickey-Fuller unit root tests results (Portugal) 
Variable level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
-1.34 ** -1.05** -4.35 
-4.50 Inex 
Inct 
Inft 
-1.13 ** 
-2.11 ** 
-6.03 -6.21 
-1.89** -0.10** 
-4.15 
-4.90 
For cointegration analysis, as before, we follow the maXImum likelihood estimation 
approach (Johansen, 1988) and (Johansen and Juselius, 1992). To select the order of V AR 
we specify a trivariate unrestricted V AR model in lnex, Inct, and Inft containing an 
intercept term and the Dummy variable (DP) as its deterministic component. The 
procedure is similar to the previous cases. We make an initial estimation of a maximum 
order of V AR to 5 (Table 8.27). The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and adjusted LR 
test suggest a V AR of order I while Akaike Information Criterion (AlC) of order 3. 
Checking the residuals of individual equations in a V AR model of order 1 there is no 
indication of serial correlation. Therefore we choose a V AR of order 1. 
Table 8.27: Determining the order ofVAR (Portugal) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Based on 30 observations from 1970 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 5 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: 
Inex Inct hift 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
DP C 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
5 96.0766 45.0766 9.3461 
4 88.8944 46.8944 17.4692 CHSQ( 9)= 14.3645[.110] 6.2246[.717] 
3 87.5035 54.5035 31.3837 CHSQ( 18)= 17.1463[.513] 7.4300[.986] 
2 77.0862 53.0862 36.2719 CHSQ( 27)= 37.9808[.078] 16.4583[.944] 
1 68.8869 53.8869 43.3780 CHSQ( 36)= 54.3793[.025] 23.5644(.9451 
o -55.1107 -61.1107 -65.3143 CHSQ( 45)= 302.3747[.000] 131.0290[.000] 
AIC-Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
To test for cointegration among the three variables we apply a cointegrating \'AR (l) 
procedure with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend. The results displayed in Table 
(8.28) show that both the maximum and the trace eigenvalue statistics reject the null 
hypothesis at 5% significance level, that there is no cointegration among lnex, lncl, and 
lnft (namely r=O) but do not reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating relation 
•• The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at Y) II level of significance. 
21.+ 
(vector) (i.e. r=1) among the variables. Reported in the t bl M '. . 
same a e odel selectlOn cntena 
give different results. The Akaike Infonnation Criterio (AlC).c: '. 
n laVours two cOllltalITatlll 0' 
relations while Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) one W . . b b 
. e assume III the followlll S! that 
there is one cointegrating relation between the variables. ~ 
Ta~le 8.28.: Coi~tegration. Test~: VAR(1) with Dummy (Portugal) 
ComtegratlOn wIth unrestrIcted mtercepts and restricted trends in th \'AR 
34 observations from 1966 to 1999. Order ofVAR= 1. e 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lnex lnet lnft Trend 
List ofI(O) variables included in the VAR: DP 
Eigenvalue Test (Order of V AR-1) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.50476 .25519 .22340 0.00 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r=O r=1 25.4200 
r<= 1 r = 2 10.0175 
r<= 2 r = 3 8.5961 
Trace Test (Order ofVAR=1) 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r=O r>= 1 42.5061 
r<= 1 r>= 2 18.6136 
r<=2 r=3 8.5961 
Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL 
r = 0 26.5267 
r = 1 38.4730 
r = 2 43.4817 
r = 3 47.7798 
AIC 
20.5267 
26.4730 
27.4817 
29.7798 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
23.8926 
19.2200 
12.3900 
23.1000 
17.1800 
10.5500 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
42.3400 
25.7700 
12.3900 
SBC 
15.9476 
17.3148 
15.2708 
16.0425 
39.3400 
23.0800 
10.5500 
HQC 
18.9651 
23.3498 
23.3175 
25.0950 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
When the DP dummy is not included or other dummies included in its place, as in the 
previous cases, there is still evidence of cointegrating relations in data showing no 
sensitivity to changes in specification. The estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of 
the variables in the cointegrating vector, are (ECM)Z=-0.21lnex+0.471nct +O.l61nJt-
0.01 *Trend, which make us to expect one co integrating relation among the three yariables 
that is: 
lnex-lnct-lnJt, DS~I(O). 
After normalising on the coefficient for total expenditures (lnex) (A 1 = 1) the cointegrating 
vector (long run equilibrium) estimated in the Johansen procedure (long-run equilibrium) 
is (standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
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lnex=2.22lnet+0.80 lnfl-O. 65*Trend 
(2.15) (0.32) (0.22) 
The ECM equations for ~lnex, ~lnet and ~lnl( variables wl'th the erro t' 
,YL r-correc IOn tenns 
are given in table 8.29: 
Table 8.29: Estimates of ECMs for Alnex, Alnct and Alnft, 1965-1998 for Portugal. 
Variables ~lnex ~lnct ~lnft 
Intercept -0.55(0.24) 1.57(l.24)**- -0.63(0.36)'-'-
Zt-J -0.08(0.02f 0.16(0.13)*,' -0.07(0.03 )'" 
DP 0.06(0.13) <n 0.25(0.08) -0.27(0.19)" 
DW 1.4 2.17 2 
R- 0.22 0.30 0.08 
SER 0.12 0.22 0.18 
The diagnostic test statistics indicate that there is a good fit in model. Examining the 
results, all the ECMs pass the tests for first order serial correlation at 5% significance 
level. The equation for financial taxes (~lnet) fails on normality at the 5% level of 
significance. The equation explaining the growth of consumption taxes has been adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity. In the normalised cointegrating vector the coefficients on (Inet) and 
(lnft) are significant. When we impose zero restrictions (A2=0) on (Inet), and (A3=0) on 
the coefficient of (lnfl) both are rejected by the LR statistic given as X\1)=11.35 with a P-
value of 0.001 and X2(1)=23.62 with a P-value about 0.000 respectively. Hence for the 
case of Portugal it is not possible to estimate any over identified system. 
The results from the cointegrating V AR analysis show that the expenditures, consumption 
and financial taxes are cointegrated. On the basis of the results (based on the significance 
of the error correction coefficient in individual equations) we can conclude that there is a 
bi-directional Granger causal relationship between expenditures and financial taxes as in 
the case of Spain. However the error correction coefficient in the equation explaining the 
growth of financial taxes is weakly significant at 10% significance level. In addition there 
is a unidirectional Granger causal relationship from consumption taxes towards the 
expendi tures. 
lnex+- -+ lnft and lnet-+ lnex 
Based on the above results we can conclude that the findings support the view that in 
Portugal, similarly to Spain, indirect financial taxation and spending decisions are 
• significant at 5% level, •• significant at 10% critical level, ·"not-significant. 
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jointly made by fiscal authorities. In addition the decisions to s d d d pen epen on tax 
revenues derived from final consumption as well. On the other hand the long-run 
equilibrium indicates that an increase of consumption and indirect financial taxes by 10 0 
increases the level of expenditures by 2.22% and 0.80% respectively. The con\' rgene 
back to equilibrium is relatively fast with adjustment complete in about fi e years (figur 
8.17). 
Fig ure 8. I 7:Persistel1ce Profile of th e effect ofll system shock to CV(Porlllglllj. 
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In addition the impulse responses have the right feedback. The results illustrated in the 
figure 8,18 suggest a cyclical effect of an indirect financial taxes shock on expenditure 
with expenditures responding to an indirect financial shock (increase). 
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Lastly the dummy variable which captures the dynamics of the V AT introduction in 
Portugal, similar to the case of Greece and Spain, is insignificant in the eq uations 
explaining the growth of expenditures and the growth of indirect financial taxes while it i 
significant in the equations explaining the growth of consumption taxes . 
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8.7 Granger type causality tests for Greece Spain and P t 1 f . 
, or uga or the expenditures 
and indirect taxes relationship. 
For comparison purposes we perform the Engle and Granger causality tests in order to re-
examine the causal relationships among the three variables in thr . b . . ee countnes y estlmatmg 
an unrestricted V AR model in differences of variables with the dummy for the 
introduction of V AT as its deterministic variable. As it appears from table 8.30 \ye obtain 
similar results as in Johansen procedure. 
Table 8.30: Granger type tests based on OLS equation for Greece, Spaill alld I I 
PortuKal (expenditures and indirect taxes relatiollship). I 
M~~ ~ ~ ~ i 
Co UII try LR statistic causal LR statistic causal LR statistic causal I 
Greece l(2)-10.93 Yes X1(2)=0.57 No l(2)=5.70 I No 
(0.004) (0.75) (0.05) 
Spain X2(2)=7.099 Yes l(2)=4.43 ?(2)=10.89 
. -
----< 
No Yes 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.004) 
Portugal X2(2)-11.5 Yes X2(2)=8.07 Yes l(2)= 10.89 Yes , 
(0.003) (0.01) (0.004) 
8.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter we provided empirical evidence in order to answer our research question on 
how changes in consumption tax policy (i.e. changes in consumption taxes and indirect 
financial taxes) affect the whole tax structure in Greece (i.e. the impact on total tax 
revenues and expenditures) comparing the results with those derived for Spain and 
Portugal [Research question RS]. This has been accomplished by looking at the ayerage 
total tax rate of the economy and indirect taxes (consumption and financial taxes) as well 
as the expenditures and indirect taxes relationship. Using annual OEeD data, we applied a 
trivariate V AR model to test for cointegration and to consider short and long run 
relationships between the variables of interest both across countries (Greece, Spain and 
Portugal) and over time. To strengthen and to compare our results we re-examined the 
causal relationships between the variables by using the Engle and Granger cointegration 
tests in an unrestricted V AR model in differences of the variables with the dummy 
variable of the introduction of VAT as its deterministic component. On the basis of the 
results we can support the hypothesis that there is a positiye long run relationship between 
the average total tax rate of the economy and indirect financial taxes in Greece. 
Surprisingly the empirical results do not support the hypothesis that there is a long run 
relationship between consumption taxes (sales taxes and VAT) and total tax rate. Greece 
appears to be the only country not showing a long run relationship between consumption 
218 
taxes and the average total tax rate. On the contrary the long run relat' h' b IOns Ip etwcen total 
tax rate and financial taxes is strong showing relatively high long I" I run e astlclty. 11 
addition, the results of the study on the short run effects of the st· ys em were quIte 
problematic. The last results suggested a negative short run effect from consumption taxes 
to tax rate and a positive effect from total tax rate towards consumption taxes indicating a 
problematic way of application and low efficiency collection of revenues as well. These 
results on Greece support the view that although financial taxes are levied on a given 
base and may be shifted forward along the production and distribution chain they 
affect the total tax rate of tax system more than consumption taxes. 
Spain on the other hand appears with more balanced indirect tax system. The results 
provide evidence that both consumption and financial taxes have affected, in the long run, 
the total tax rate of tax system (high long-run elasticities). The short run effects do not 
differ much from those of Portugal. In all cases we found a clear unidirectional short run 
effect from consumption and financial taxes towards average total tax rate. In addition, for 
Spain we identified a bi-directional Granger causal relationship, in the long run, between 
the average total tax rate of economy and consumption taxes. Furthermore, Portugal 
appears with quite similar results with Spain regarding the consumption taxes in short and 
long run. In long run we identified a bi-directional relationship between the average total 
tax rate of the economy and consumption taxes. However as a difference to both Greece 
and Spain, there is no relationship between financial taxes and total tax rate in long run (as 
we discussed in our previous chapter Portugal appears with the weakest relationship 
between financial taxes and Net National Income as well). 
As a generalisation, according to our findings although in all cases we found a 
cointegrating relationship between the variables, bi-directional relationships could 
appear only between consumption taxes (i.e. taxes that fall only on final 
consumption) and the total tax rate of the economy. In addition the direction of the 
relationship between the indirect financial taxes (i.e. taxes that might fall on 
intermediate and investment goods) and total tax rate is from the different indirect 
financial taxes towards the total tax rate and not vice-versa. 
Moreover in this part of our thesis we applied cointegration and error-correction models to 
test the causal relation between the indirect taxes and expenditures in Greece. Spain and 
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Portugal over the period 1965 -1999 (for Greece over the period 1965 -1998). The empirical 
results obtained from the error-correction models indicate that bi-directional causalih 
exists between indirect financial taxes and expenditures in Spain and Portugal. Howc\er, 
for Portugal the decisions to spend depend on tax revenues derived from taxing the final 
consumption as well. This implies that indirect financial taxation and expenditures 
decisions are jointly made by the fiscal authorities in these countries. Howeyer in Grcece. 
causality runs from expenditures to different consumption taxes with no feedbacks. 
implying that the fiscal authorities determines how much to spend and then look for 
revenues from taxing final consumption. 
On the basis of the above results we could conclude that indirect financial taxes are 
important for spending decisions in Spain and Portugal, while in Greece such a 
relationship could not be identified despite the causal relationship between these 
taxes and the total average tax rate of the economy. 
Finally reforms in indirect tax system are unlikely to have any long run effect on the 
average total tax rate of the economy or on expenditures in the three countries. Although 
the different statistical tests provided evidence for relatively structurally stable equations 
explaining the different variables, reforms in consumption taxes appear to have strong 
short run effects on the relevant taxes. However, such changes have a very weak, if any, 
direct effect on total tax rate of tax system or on expenditures. Lastly from tax policy vie\\' 
the empirical results suggest, that a change (increase) of financial taxes can affect in long 
run the total tax rate in Greece and Spain where the same policy in Portugal do not have 
any long run effect on the total tax rate of the economy. However in Spain and Portugal 
the indirect financial taxes affect in long run the level of expenditures. 
220 
CHAPTER 9: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INDIRECT TAXES (COSSCJJPTIOS 
AND FINANCIAL) IN A COINTEGRATING VAR FRAMEWORK: EJJPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE FROM GREECE, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. 
9.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we examined the causal relationship between indirect taxes 
(consumption and financial taxes) and the average total tax rate of economy as well as 
with the expenditures in Greece, Spain and Portugal. We identified some similarities and 
differences in the three tax systems regarding causal relationships and long run responses 
of relevant variables. The next step in our analysis is to provide empirical evidence and to 
answer our research question as to whether there is any relationship (negative or positive) 
between indirect taxes (consumption and indirect financial taxes) and economic growth 
[Research question R6, Table 4.1 p.l 00]. In this part of our thesis we investigate the 
causal relationship between indirect taxes (consumption and financial taxes) and growth in 
a model including the main components of growth, namely investment and labour force 
supply, over the 1965-1999 period in Greece, Spain and Portugal (for Greece for the 1965-
1998 period). Our aim here is not only to assess the validity of previous conclusions, but 
also to examine the direction of causality between indirect taxes and growth. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter about the variability of different taxes in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, in the past two or more decades public finances in these countries 
have been characterised by a remarkable growth in tax revenues (including consumption 
and financial taxes). It would be interesting to see what causes what, that is, the directions 
of causality between indirect tax revenues and growth in the above mentioned countries. 
Obviously, evidence of one way of causality (positive) from indirect tax revenues to 
growth would imply that higher indirect taxes (consumption and financial taxes) lead to 
higher growth. On the other hand evidence of unidirectional causality in the opposite 
direction would confirm the conclusions reached by some researchers that gro\\"th affects 
the level of the economic performance of different taxes (see Karras, 1999). In addition 
evidence of bi-directional causality would imply the existence of simultaneity between 
indirect tax revenues and growth. This part of study covers countries \\"ith history of rapid 
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growth in GDP and indirect tax revenues. Given the high econo' h' h 
mlC growt III t e past few 
decades, an empirical examination covering these countn'es wI'II sh 'h h 
ow \\ et er or not they 
have similar patterns of causality in the relationship between growth d' d' 
an III lrect taxes. In 
other words, the analysis of the causality issue in the three countries provides a broader 
base for valid empirical inferences regarding the taxation of financial flows as well. To 
test the causal relationship between indirect taxes and growth, we use, as in the pre\'ious 
chapter, the Johansen methodology and error-corrections models. Although it is rather 
complicated, the appeal of this technique stems from the relevance it offers in analysing 
long run causal relationships in time-series data. Our aim here is first to identify 
permanent changes in the relevant variables explaining the different indirect taxes 
(through tests for stationarity of variables) and then to investigate whether the effects of 
these changes on the growth (level and rate) of output are permanent and in what 
direction. 
9.2 Theoretical and empirical work on the taxation-growth relationship 
There is a voluminous literature on the effects of taxes on the economy and its rate of 
growth. Briefly, in neo-classical economic growth models, taxation affects only the level 
of output but not the rate of growth, whereas endogenous growth models suggest that 
taxes may affect the long run rate of growth. In fact, when growth is endogenous taxation 
can influence the "factors" that determines the growth rate. Box 9.1 gives a summary of 
the theoretical work on the taxation and growth relationship. 
Box 9.1: Summary ofthe theoretical work on the taxation-growth relationship 
Endogenous growth theories provide models that can assess the effects of taxation upon economic growth 
Numerous channels were identified through which taxation can affect growth. Given the various I!ffects of 
taxes on savings, investment (including human capital) and labour, and the possible substitution of these 
factors of production, attempts to quantify the overall impact of taxes on economic growth are fraught with 
difficulties and may only serve to illustrate the orders of magnitude involved. In quantitatil'l! terms a wide 
range of theoretical predictions arise for the size of tax effect. They range from insignificant to dramatically 
large. The size of the growth rate effect depends just about equally on the structure of the model alld 011 
parameter values within the model. The growth-reducing effect of taxation is increased in open economy 
models, and reduced, and possibly even reversed. if life-cycle behaviour is considered. It is clear Fom the 
literature review that the effects of taxes on economic growth are ambiguous in SOllie areas and unsettled I 
and controversial in others. Nevertheless, there would appear to be severalmzys in which tax polin' could 
be adopted to increase economic growth. Engen and Skinner, (/996) ident~fied five ways that t(LlCS may 
. d' ,. tm t 'ato or the net growth in thc capital affect output growth. First, higher taxes can zscourage tIe l11ves en' <.., 
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stock, through high statutory tax rates, and low depreciation allowa S d 
nces. econ, taxes mm' attenuate 
labour supply growth by discouraging labour force participation or ho J"k b' d' -urs oJ llOI , or y IstortlTlg 
occupational choice or the acquisition of education skills and training Third t I' I h ' 
. , a:I: po ICY laS t e potentwl to 
discourage productivity growth by attenuating research and development (R&D) and the development of 
venture capital for "high-tech" industries activities whose spill over ei+:ects can t t - II h I 
' :fJ' po en w y en ance tIe 
productivity of existing labour and capital. Fourth, tax policy can also influence the marginal productivity of 
capital by distorting the investment from heavily taxed sectors into more lightly taxed sectors with lower 
overall productivity, And fifth, heavy taxation on labour supply can distort the efficient use of human capital 
by discouraging workers from employment in sectors with high social productivity but heavy tax burden, 
Through all the above-mentioned mechanisms taxation can affect economic growth. Therefore, it might 
appear that taxes should play a central role in determining long run term growth. HOII'en'/', the 
conventional Solow, (1956) growth model implies that taxes should have no impact on long-term growth 
rates. In part this in the neo-classical growth models occurs by assumption, since output growth is assumed 
to be fixed and unaffected by tax policy. But this paradoxical result holds also because, as we mentioned 
above, of a distinction between changes in the level of GDP and changes in the growth rates of GDP, 
The theoretical evidence has produced a wide range of estimates for the effect of taxation 
upon economic growth. Since the theory is so inconclusive, it becomes paramount to 
consider the empirical evidence. The conclusions of the empirical evidence are not quite 
as diverse as those of the theory. Recently a number of studies (influenced by the neo-
classical growth theories) have investigated the causal relationship between economic 
growth and taxation. Although there are some disagreements, the picture that emerges is 
that the effect of taxation, if there is any at all, is relatively minor. As far as policy is 
concerned, the conclusion is reassuring since it removes the need to be overly concerned 
about growth effects when tax reforms are being planned. The empirical evidence can be 
interpreted as supporting the argument that the level of taxes is not that significant. 
but the structure of taxation is important. 
On the other hand there are a number of studies, influenced by the endogenous gro\\th 
theories, which attempted to assess the impact of taxes on per capita income and growth at 
the macro-level. Several of them purport to demonstrate significant negati\'e relationship 
between the level of the tax/GDP ratio and the growth rate of the real GDP per capita. 
implying that the high tax rates reduce economic growth (e.g. OEeD, 1997c). In Box 9.2 
we present a summary of the empirical work on the taxation-growth relationship: 
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Box 9.2: Summary oUhe empirical work on the taxation-growth relationship 
Empirical results based on statistical analysis of data from developed tr' I I '. ' 
coun les s lOW t Ie steady nse III 
taxation and the relative constancy of the mean of the growth rate (<\fries 200011 j d' 
J., / • • "1ccor zng to\/yles, a \'ell' 
clear picture emerges from this: tax revenues as a proportion 0+ GDP has risen . ifi I' II d I . 
'j Slgnl lcant Y In a eve oped 
countries over the course of the last century, but the level of growth has remained relatively stable. This 
suggests the immediate conclusion that, in practice taxation does not af+'ect the rate .+ th 7'7' . r 
'lJ' OJ grow . 1 diS review 0. 
the empirical evidence leads to the following observation: A visual inspection of tax rates and groWTh rates 
suggests that there is little relationship between the two (other regressions found a small but significant tax 
effect) (e.g. Engen and Skinner, 1996). In addition Plosser, (1992) finds a significant negati\'e correlation 
between the level of taxes on income and profits (as a share of GDP) and growth of real capita GDP. King 
and Rebelo, (1990) simulate changes in the income tax by applying an endogenous growth model and find 
that an increase by 20 per cent reduces the rate of growth by 2 percentage points. In a Solow-type neo-
classical growth model, the tax effect is much smaller and the welfare loss is equivalent to a permanent drop 
in real consumption by only 1.6 per cent. Agell, Englund and Sodersten, (1996) also conclude that the 
relationship between taxation and economic growth is not robust in OEeD countries. Silllilarh', Easterly 
and Rebelo, (1993) find that the level of taxes is not significant in the endogenous theory npe regressions. In 
their view, the reason that Plosser founds significant effects is the strong positi1'e correlation behH'cn {he 
level of taxes and the initial level of il1come; tax-to-GDP ratios are relatively low in poorer countrics, 1I,hich 
then start to catch up (the convergence effect). When the initial level of income is controlled for, Plosser's 
results break down. Slemrod, (1995) finds a positive, negative or no correlation between {axcs and the /('\'e/ 
of per capita income depending on specification of the parameters and the countries considered. He finds a 
strong positive correlation between the level of general government tax revenue-to-GDP-ratio and the /CI'ei 
of real GDP per capita in time series for United States between 1929 and 1992. In addition, he finds a 
positive correlation between the level of the tax revenuelGDP ratio and the level of real GDP per capita 
across countries in particular when developing countries (with lower GDP per capita and lower fax rates) 
are included in the sample. For OEeD countries alone, Slemrod finds no obviolls positive or negativc 
relationship between the level of tax rates and the level of GDP per capita. Easterh' and Rebelo, 
(1993)report that only income-tax rates have significant negative effect on per capita growth, but no other 
tax measures do. Their overall assessment of the results of such aggregate studies on taxation and growth is 
that taxes matter for growth, but that it is \'el)' difficult to measure tax distortions with such analysis. 
Finally, in a cross-country analysis for the 1970s Koester and Kormendi, (1989) report a significant 
negative effect of the marginal tax rates on the level of real GDP per capita, but not on the ratc of growth 
when the latter is controlled for the initial level of income. They suggest that holding average rates constant, 
a 10-percentage point decrease ill marginal tax rates would increase per capita income in an (/\ 'crage 
industrial country by more than 7 per cent (and in average developing counll)' by more than 15 per cenO 
Thus, a revenue-neutral tax reform, which reduces ta.r: progressivity, would raisc income and lead to an 
upward shift in the \I'hole growth path. Karras, (1999) examines the etrects of the ta.r: ra{e 011 ecollomic 
grow,th to test the theoretical predictions of the neo-classical and endogenous growth mechanisms Using 
data fi'om the 1960-1992 period for a panel of 11 OEeD economies, a number of difrerent specijications 
. . } . I d' t' f tlz' n 'o-classical growth model and were shown to be consIstent With the t leoretlca pre Ie lOns 0. (. (. 
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inconsistent with those of endogenous models. Specifically th " I 
, ese emplTlCa results shown that taT rates ha\'c 
exhibited significant persistent changes while output growth rat h F 
es ave not. urthermore, a higher taT rate 
permanently reduces the level of output but has no permane t ,1+, t h 
n eJJec s on t e Olltput gr01l"rh rare These 
findings according to his research suggest that the relationship betw d . 
een output an taT rate IS best described 
by the neo-classical growth model (tax rates are incapable ot explain' th I b h . 
'J mg e ong-l1ln e anOll,. of GDP). In 
addition, Perotti, (2002) using a VAR model finds that in a samnle o'tft OEeD' . 
r 'J lve countries. the countrIes 
with the larger output elasticity of net taxes are also the countries where the . t ,I+, f . lmpac eJJect ~ ta-raflon 01/ the 
level of output is negative. On the other hand Barro, (1990) and Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller. (;;00/) 
predict that government expenditure and taxation will have both tempol'alY ad, iffi i n pel manent e ec{, 011 . 
. I 
growth. Their result also suggests that non-distortionan' taxation ral'ses the growth . r h'/ d' . . ~ I a e II' I e IstortlOnarr 
taxation reduces it. According to their research, consumption taxation can realistically be regarded as n01/-
distortionary, rather than as merely less distortionary than income taxation. 
9.3 Empirical methodology 
9.3.1 Introduction to the model 
In a simple accounting framework the output of an economy typically measured by GDP 
is determined by its economic resources, the size and the skills of its workforce and the 
size and the technological productivity of its capital stock. Therefore, an aggregate output 
equation can be expressed as follows: 
Y=a *Lb1 *~2 (1), 
where with K denotes the investment and L the effective labour force (Engen and Skinner, 
1996). The growth rate of economic output on the other hand will depend on the growth 
rate of these resources, physical capital and human capital. If we assume that taxes enter 
the above growth accounting framework in the above equation in a linear fashion (taxes 
are supposed to exercise an "externality" effect on total output through their impact on the 
public sector' s output) we can explore the possible primary growth effect of these taxes in 
the following framework: 
Y=a *Lb1 *~2*T/3 (2), 
where with Ti we denote the different applied taxes. Most empirical studies of taxation and 
growth are "reduced form" estimates in that they specify a linear model of output gro\\th 
rate, with tax rates (or expenditures), labour resource growth, and inYestment rates in the 
right hand side of the equation (e.g. Karras, 1999; Dalamagas. 2000). All these models are 
modified versions of equation (2) mainly expressed in growth rates. In our empirical 
analysis the following formulation of the above equation (2) \yill be used: 
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dlnY=a+b 1 dlnL+b2 dInK +b3dln(TJY) (3YP. 
where, with dlnY denotes the growth rate of real GDP, dlnL is the growth rate of labour 
force, dlnK is the change over time of capital stock and dln (Ti I}) is the growth rate of 
different taxes (e.g. consumption and financial taxes) as a share of GDP. The inclusion of 
the variable Ti /Y as an independent variable is necessary for assessing the pure impact of 
different taxes on growth. 
9.3.2 Time series properties a/variables 
As we mentioned before where we briefly reviewed the theoretical and empirical results 
on taxation and growth, neo-classical and endogenous growth theories have substantially 
different implications as to how economic growth is affected by changes in certain tax 
variables. In particular, the neo-classical growth model predicts that such changes, while 
permanently changing the steady-state level of output, will alter its growth only 
temporarily, having no permanent effect on the economy's steady-state growth rate. On the 
contrary, endogenous growth models predict that such changes will pennanently change 
the growth rate of output. Theoretically, a test of the above-mentioned theories, in the field 
of indirect taxation, can be constructed as follows. First, suppose pennanent changes in a 
certain tax variable (consumption and financial taxes as a fraction of GDP) can be 
identified. Then the endogenous paradigm will be supported if the effects of these changes 
on the "growth rate of output" are found to be permanent, while the neo-classical paradigm 
will be supported if the effects are found to be transitory. In practice, for this approach to 
become empirically operational, the tax variables (consumption and financial taxes) must 
be non-stationary so that they will exhibit permanent changes. In addition the investigation 
of the effects of the same tax variables on the level of growth will provide further 
empirical evidence of the relationship between the particular indirect taxes and growth. 
Our goal in this part of our thesis is to investigate the effects of the tax-to GDP ratio, thus 
the share of consumption taxes to GDP and the share of financial taxes to GDP, on the 
level and growth of real GDP. 
47 This equation is derived from equation (2) by dividing through by }b3 and taking the total differential of 
the corresponding log linear form of the variables. 
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As in our previous chapter to test for causal relationships and long t d b 
-run ren s etween the 
above-mentioned variables in the econometric model we use the J h h d 1 
' 0 ansen met 0 oogy 
(Johansen 1988, 1991) in an error correction framework. 
In our study we use OEeD data, annual time series, taken from the OEeD "Revenue 
statistics" edition 2000 over the period 1965-1999. As a limitation for Greece. definite 
data are not available for the year 1999 so the period for estimation is from 1965 to 1998. 
In the share of consumption taxes to GDP, as in the previous chapter, we use general 
consumption taxes (sales taxes and VAT) from the code 5110 in OEeD classification of 
taxes. For the share of financial taxes to GDP we use indirect financial taxes from the code 
5126 (indirect taxes on banking services, turnover taxes on insurance services, stamp 
duties e.t.c.). In these taxes, as we did in our previous chapter, we do not include other 
indirect taxes on specific services (e.g. taxes on gambling services classified under the 
same code in the case of Portugal or taxes on financial and capital transactions classified 
under the code 4400 thus as direct taxes). In addition for output and the main components 
of growth, namely investment and labour force, we use data on real GDP (at 1995 prices), 
gross fixed capital formation at 1995 prices from IMF (International Financial Statistics, 
2001 edition), and on effective labour force (in thousands) from ILO (Laborsta database). 
A first look at the data (see table 9.1 with summary statistics) shows that average growth 
per annum of real GDP has ranged from 1.6% in Greece to 2.64% for Spain and 2.15% for 
Portugal. In addition, the Spanish and Portuguese economies enjoyed higher growth than 
Greece ( almost double) in per capita GDP over the 1965-1999 period. In Greece the real 
GDP per capita has grown around 0.97% per annum as compared to an average annual 
rate of 2.01 % for Spain and 1.89% for Portugal. Moreover, consumption and indirect 
financial taxes as a fraction of GDP have increased in the three countries almost 
monotonically. Spain has enjoyed the highest growth rate per annum for the share of 
consumption taxes to-GDP (2.19%) and for the share of financial taxes-to-GDP ('+.'+1%). 
On the other hand if we look at the summary statistics of the main macroeconomic 
determinants of the growth of output, namely investment (gross fixed capital formation) 
and labour supply, we realise that the three countries show very close growth rates per 
annum (Portugal shows slightly higher growth rates per annum for the aho\'e variables). 
Therefore, the above variability of the growth rate for consumption and especially of 
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financial taxes both across the three economl'es and over tl'me should "facilitate" an 
empirical identification of its role for economic growth, 
Table 9,1: Summary statistics for rate of growth (orreal GDP real GDPper capl'ta h ,re --;--
'J, ,s are OJ ollsumptlOll 
_taxes to GDP, share offillancial taxes to GDP, Investment and labour supply) over the period 1965-1999 
. Variable real GDP real Gv.p per share of share of III vestmellt Labour ' 
capita consumption financial sllpp(r 
taxes to GDP taxes to GDP 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean I Std. I Mean i Std. 
Country dey. dey. dey. dey. I dey. Dey. 
Greece 1.6 4.78 0.97 4.69 1.4 23.23 1.05 37.58 3.01 I 11.33 
I 0.81 1.65 
Spain 2.64 4.3 2.01 4.34 2.19 9.92 4.41 48.58 2.96 8.39 0.85 l _Q.82 
Portugal 2.15 4.7 1.89 4.83 1.44 25.73 1.56 19.58 3.82 8.68 1.12 2.58 
Data source: "GEeD Revenue Statistics, edition 2000". 
The first step in testing for causality or for cointegration between the variables is to \'erify 
the order of integration of variables, since the causality tests are valid if the variables havc 
the same order of integration, As in the previous chapter the Dickey-Fuller and the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are used to test for the presence of a unit-root in 
variables and thus to investigate the degree of integration of the logarithm of the lcvel of 
real GDP, the log of investment (log of gross capital fixed formation) the log of labour 
supply and the logarithm of the share of consumption and financial taxes to GDP in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. The ADF test is based in the following regression equations 
of the form: 
n 
~lngdpt = Yo + Bo lngdpt_1 + IA;~lngdpt-i + Ct 
;=1 
T 
L1lnit =YI +BIlnit-l + Ip\ll~lnit_\II +Kt 
\11=1 
k 
~lnlt = Y2 +B21nl(_1 + ISo~lnlt_O +V( 
0=1 
p 
~lnct / gdpt = Y3 + B3 lnct / gdpt-l + IJLk~lnct / gdPr-k + U t 
k=1 
m 
~lnft / gdpt = Y4 + B4 ln ft / gdpt-l + Icpt;~lnft / gdpt-t; + \'/ 
t;=1 
In all equations the null hypothesis is that real gdp, i, I, ct/gdp, and jt/gdp (in logarithmic 
form) have unit roots, that is eo = e
1 
= e
2 
= e3 = e4 = I, The alternative hypothesis is that the 
variables are integrated of order zero 1(0). We reject the null hypothesis if {}o. {}I, {}~. 0, and 
{}" are significantly negative and the t statistics are less (or greater in absolute values) than 
the critical values for the given augmented Dickey-Fuller Statistic. Altemati\cly in the 
above equations a linear trend was included as well. The results reported in the following 
228 
! 
table 9.2-9.4 for the three countries indicate that in no cas th h . 
. . . e can e ypothesls that the logs 
of senes contam a umt root can be rejected. 
Table 9.2: Dickey-Fuller * Unit root tests results (Greece) 
Variable level F' . zrst differences 
Ingdp 
Ini 
Inl 
Inct/gdp 
In(tlgdp 
No trend 
-2** 
-0.49" 
0.6** 
-1.22*' 
-1.38** 
linear trend 
-1.66** 
-2.54 ** 
-3.53** 
-2.06** 
-1.08*' 
No trend linear trend 
-5.05 -5.04 
-7.6 -7.96 
-6.53 -6.63 
-5.48 -5.36 
-5.15 -S.19 
Table 9.3: Dickey-Fuller Unit root tests results (Spain) 
Variable level First differences 
No trend linear trend No trend linear trend 
-3.89 -3.6 
-4.08 -3.99 
Ingdp -1.44 ** -2.54" 
Ini -1.27" -2.87** 
Inl -2.01" -1.72** -3.78 -3.39 
-5.26 -5.24 
-4.53 -4.61 
Inct/gdp -0.41 ** -1.89** 
1~(tIgdp -1.29** -0.82** 
Table 9.4: Dickey-Fuller Unit root tests results (Portugal) 
Variable level 
Ingdp 
Ini 
Inl 
Inct/gdp 
In(tlgdp 
No trend 
-0.21'* 
-0.55" 
-0.03*' 
-1.07"* 
-1.15" 
linear trend 
-2.05" 
-2.1*" 
-2.74" 
-2.87" 
-0.39'* 
First differences 
No trend linear trend 
-5.04 -4.96 
-4.96 -4.93 
-5.09 -5.07 
-6.6 -6.65 
-4.94 -5.22 
The ADF statistics (for p=J or p=2) are in absolute value below their asymptotic \'alue 
(95% critical value). Therefore it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis for a unit root 
for the variables in levels (log fonn). On the other hand for the first differences of the 
variables, irrespective of the order of the augmentation chosen of the ADF test the 
absolute values of the ADF statistics are well above the 95% critical value given for the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic (for all models, with and without a linear trend) and 
hence the hypothesis that the relevant variables in first differences have a unit root is 
finnly rejected (stationary series). Thus the series representing the investment, labour 
supply, share of consumption and financial taxes-to-GDP are of the same order !( I) and 
candidates for cointegration with the variable of real gdp. In this case the first differences 
• ~\X I = a () + a I t + a 1 X I_I + :t b; ~x /_;' Optimal number of lags is chosen by Akaike's Information Cnterion 
;=1 
(AIC), and Schwarz-Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The values shown in the table 9.2-9.4 denote the t-statistics 
of X1_J (Xt=lngdpt. lnl. lni. InctlgdPI' and lnftlgdpt ) . 
.. The null hypothesis of the unit root is not rejected at So 0 le\'el of significance. 
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of the variables, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, may be considered to be 
generated, in a model with five variables, by error correction models of the form: 
n K P 
t>. In X, ~ rp 0 + i; 9'" t>. In K ,-, + i; 9' ut>. In L ,_, + i; 9' "t>. In X ,_, + ~ 9' ",'dn f,_, 
j 
+ L cP 4i~ In \Jf I-i + oZ I-I + U I 
i=1 
( 1). 
where, in our case, Xc=gdpt, Kt=i, Lt=l, Yt= c/gdpt, ~t =ftlgdpt and Zt is the error correction 
term. Having determined that the variables are first differenced stationary, cointegration 
tests, as in the previous procedures in chapter 8, of the sort suggested by Johansen. (1988, 
1991) and Johansen and Juselius, (1992) were performed to examine whether the \'ariables 
in question have common trends. Thus, we test for cointegration amongst the variables. To 
determine the order of V AR we run an unrestricted V AR model with an intercept and 
again the dummy for the introduction of VAT for each country as its deterministic 
component. To choose the order of V AR we use the adjusted LR test, the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). In order to 
check the robustness of the results to the order of V AR we check the residuals of the 
unrestricted V AR model for possible serial correlation. Finally, all the error correction 
models for the three countries are presented as V AR models, following the equation (1) 
above, with the differences of the variables in log form, and the error correction tenns. 
These models are used to test for causal relationships between the real gdp, investment, 
labour supply and the share of consumption and financial taxes-to-GDP. 
9.4 Empirical results from the cointegration analysis of growth and indirect taxes 
relationship 
9.4.1 Greece 
In the case of Greece, to select the order of V AR we specify a five variable unrestricted 
V AR model (lngdp, lni, lnl, lnctlgdp, and lnftlgdp) containing an intercept tenn and the 
dummy variable (DGR) as its deterministic component. We make an initial estimation of 
V AR to 4 (Table 9.5). 
Table 9.5: Determining the order of VAR, Greece (1965-1998) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR Model 
Based on 30 observations from 1969 to 1998.0rder ofVAR=~ 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lngdp lni In! lnct/gdp lr~ft/gdp 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous varIables: 
C DGR 
LL AIC SBC Order 
4 352.6074 242.6074 165.5416 
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LR test Adjusted LR test 
3 300.4815 215.4815 155.9306 CHSQ( 25)-104.2519[.000] 27.8005[.317] 
2 266.9565 206.9565 164.9206 CHSQ( 50)= 171.3018[.000] 45.6805[.647] 
1 229.9501 194.9501 170.4291 CHSQ( 75)= 245.3148[.000] 65.4173[.7771 
o ~0.7488 80:7488. 7~.7428 CHSQ(100)= 523.7172[.000] 139.6579[.005] 
AlC=Akaike lnfonnatlOn Cntenon SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
As the results, reported in the above table 9.5, suggest, the adjusted LR test and the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) favour a V AR model of order I while the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AlC) of order 4. After the inspection of results for possible serial 
correlation, we choose a V AR of order 1. To test for cointegration \\·e apply a 
cointegrating V AR (1) procedure, for the model (lngdp, lni, lnl, lnctlgdp, lnftlgdp) , \\·ith 
unrestricted intercepts and trend option chosen via the Pantula principle (Harris, 1995). 
Based on the results displayed in Table 9.6 both the maximum and the trace eigenvalue 
statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% ·significance level, that there is no cointegration 
among the real gdp, investment (lm) labour supply (In!) and the share of consumption and 
financial taxes-to-gdp (lnct/gdp, lnjtlgdp) , (namely FO) but do not reject the hypothesis 
that there is one cointegrating relation (vector) (i.e.F 1) among the variables. We accept 
that there is one cointegrating relation following the maximal eigenvalue and trace 
statistics (Table 9.6). 
Table 9.6: Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests among Ingdp, Ini, Inl, Inct/gdp, 
Inftlgdp, 1965-1998 (Greece). 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR 
33 observations from 1966 to 1998. Order ofVAR = 1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lngdp lni lnl lnctlgdp lnftlgdp Trend 
List ofI(O) variables included in the V AR: DGR 
Eigenvalue test (Order ofVAR=l) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order (order ofVAR=1): 
.81698 .53355 .46193 .31724 .15763 .0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r = 0 r = 1 56.0391 
r<= 1 r = 2 25.1657 
r<= 2 r = 3 20.4521 
Trace test(Order ofVAR=I) 
Null Alternative Statistic 
r = 0 r>= 1 119.9109 
r<= 1 r>= 2 63.8718 
r<= 2 r>= 3 38.7061 
Model Selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AlC 
r = 0 214.1488 204.1488 
r = 1 242.1684 222.1684 
r=2 254.7512 226.7512 
r = 3 264.9773 230.9773 
r 4 271.2740 233.2740 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
37.8600 35.0400 
31.7900 29.1300 
25.4200 23.1000 
Critical Value 
95% 90% 
87.1700 82.8800 
63.0000 59.1600 
42.3400 39.3400 
SBC 
196.6663 
207.2033 
205.8001 
205.5367 
204.8403 
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HQC 
201.6312 
217.1331 
219.7018 
222.4173 
223.7069 
r 5 274.1043 234.1043 204.1741 224.0337 
AlC = Akaike lnfonnation Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The next step is to obtain the estimates of the cointegrating coefficients of the \'ariables in 
the co integrating vector. The identified long-run relationship (error co t' d I . rrec IOn mo e ) IS as 
follows: 
2/=0. 72Ingdp-0. 03 Ini+O. 936 lnl +0. 64Inctlgdp-0. 08 Injilgdp-0.1 * Trend 
After normalising on the coefficient for the real gdp, the cointegrating vector (long run 
equilibrium) estimated in the Johansen procedure is (standard errors are expressed 111 
brackets): 
lngdp= 0.04Ini-1.29Inl-0.88Inctlgdp+0.11lnjilgdp-0.14*Trend 
(0.27) (0.541) (0.35) (0.05) (0.05) 
ECM equations for ~lngdp, ~lni, ~lnl, ~lnctlgdp, ~lnjilgdp variables with the error 
correction terms are given in the following table 9.7. 
Table 9.7: Estimates of ECMs for Alngdp, Alni, Alnl, Alnctlgdp and Alnftlgdp, 1965-1998 for 
Greece. 
Variables illngdp illni illnl illnct/gdp D.lnjt/gdp 
Intercept 11.02(3.56)* -10.03(9.89)*** 4.04(1.19)" -14.98(8.03)** -12.66( 19.65)-'-'-'-
ZI_1 -0.09(0.03) 0.08(0.008) -0.03(0.01) 0.13(0.07) -0.11(0.17) 
DGR -0.006(0.044)*·· -0.09(0.12)'" -0.002(0.002)' 0.43(0.09) -0.02(0.24 ) 
DW 2.1 2.04 2.3 1.65 1.91 
R- 0.24 0.4 0.41 0.45 0.01 
SER 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.23 
The diagnostic test statistics suggested that in general there is a good fit in the above 
models. All the ECMs pass the test for first order serial correlation and functional form at 
5% level of significance. Only the equations for ~lni and ~lnjilgdp fail on normality. The 
equation explaining the ~lnl has been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Cusum and cusum 
squared tests indicate that the above equations are structurally stable. The null hypothesis 
that the regression equations are correctly specified cannot be rejected at 5% significant 
level (similar results followed for the cases of Spain and Portugal). In the normalised 
cointegrating vector the coefficients on lni, and lnjilgdp seem to be insignificant. \\'hen \\c 
imposed additional restrictions for the exclusion of the variables (A2=0 for lni and .-\)=0 
for lnftlgdp) the restrictions could not be rejected by the LR statistic at 5% significance 
level which is given as x2(l)=0.02 with a P-value of 0.86, for A2=0. and /(2)=2.78 with a 
• significant at 5% critical level, .. significant at 10% critical le\"e L ••• insignificant. 
232 
P-value of 0.24 for the joint restriction A2 A5=0 The new c . t t' 
,. om egra mg vector (long-run 
coefficients) with these over-identifying restrictions is: ~ 
Zt=lngdp-O. Olni+ 1. 931nl+ 1.46lnct/gdp-0.Olnft/gdp-0.2~* Trend 
(J.087) (0.72) (0.1) 
This means that the cointegrating relation has been reduced to the one expressed as: 
lngdp-Inl-Inct/gdp, DGR~I(O) 
The new ECM estimates for the over-identified system are displayed in the following table 
9.8: 
Table 9.8: Estimates ofECMsfor Alngdp, Alni, Alnl, Alnctlgdp and Alnftlgdp, 1965-1998for 
Greece. 
Variables ~lngdp ~lni ~lnl ~lnct/gdp ~lnft/gdp 
Intercept 10.45(3.34)* -8.8(9.31) 3.81(1.11) -12.88(7.62) . -4.34( 1857) . 
ZI-1 -0.06(0.02) 0.053(0.05)**' -0.02(0.006) , 0.07(0.04)**' 0.02(0.11)'" 
DGR -0.009(0.04) *** -0.09(0.12) -0.003(0.002) 0.44(0.1) -0.01 (0.24) 
DW 2.2 2.03 2.34 1.59 1.95 
R- 0.24 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.01 
SER 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.2 
Similar results follow from the diagnostic statistic tests from the new ECMs above. All the 
ECMs pass the tests for first order serial correlation and functional form at 5% 
significance level. Again the equations for ~lni and ~lnfl/gdp fail on normality. The 
equation explaining the ~lnl has been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. In addition the 
coefficients and standard errors in the over identified system are slightly different for the 
equation explaining the ~lnct/gdpt (the coefficients for the error correction term and 
intercept are insignificant). As we mentioned above, we use the error-correction models to 
test for causal relationships between the variables. As the results suggest (table 9.8) the 
coefficients on the error correction term are significant at 5% level of significance in the 
equations explaining the growth of output and the growth of labour supply. This suggests 
that bi-directional causality exist between the real gdp and labour supply. In addition the 
insignificant error correction coefficient in the equation explaining the growth of the share 
of consumption taxes to gdp suggests that a Granger causal relationship exist from the 
share of consumption taxes to gdp towards the level of the real gdp. 
lngdp +--+ lnl, and IngdpE-lnct/gdp 
Looking at the equation explaining the share of consumption taxes-to-gdp we found that 
the coefficient on dummy variable DGR is significant at 5% significance le\'el suggesting 
• significant at 5% criticallevel:* significant at 10% critical lewl. ••• insignificant. 
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a significant impact of the introduction of V AT. On the contrary, this r form do 
not 
seem to have any impact on the growth of output, growth of investment. grO\\1h of labour 
supply and growth of financial taxes (insignificant coefficients). As we said abo\'e the 
coefficients on the error correction tem1S (speed of adj ustment) in the ind ividual equation 
for ~lngdp and L1lnl are significant at 5% and relatively low, suggesting a moderate speed 
of convergence to equilibrium once the system has been shocked. The convergence back 
to equilibrium is complete in about fi ve years (see also the following figure 9. 1 on 
persistence profile of the effect of a system-wide shock to cointegrating vector~ ). 
Fig ll re 9. 1: Persistence Profile of the ejJecr of a system'II'ide shock to C/ ' (Greece) . 
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Considering the dynamic effects of a shock to the labour supply on all vari ables in the 
cointegrating V AR model we can identi fy an important cyclical effect (negati ve) on outpu t 
(real gdp) . The results (figure 9.2) suggest that the impact effect of a unit shock in labour 
supp ly (measured as one standard error) on consumption and financia l taxes as a share to 
gdp is positive. The impact effect on consumption taxes is quite large and in fact larger 
than the effect on the labour supply itself. It appears that the negative cycli ca l effect on the 
output is caused mainly through the impact on the consumption taxes as a share to gdp as 
well. 
Figllre 9.1: Impuls(, Rcsl'01lse(s) 10 011(' S.E. shock III rh (' cqu(l{iOll jor /,, / 
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To summarise in the case of Greece, as the cointegrating V AR analysis suggests, \\·e can 
identify that the real gdp, labour supply and the share of consumption taxes to gdp arc 
cointegrated. In this case we are able to establish a long run relationship between the 
above-mentioned variables. In long run, the error correction models suggest bi-directional 
causation between real gdp and labour supply. The long run elasticities (derived from the 
long-run equilibrium) for labour supply and the share of consumption taxes to gdp (l.93% 
and 1.46% respectively) are quite high indicating a significant impact, from the labour 
supply and the share of consumption taxes to gdp towards the level of real gdp. The results 
indicate that an increase in consumption taxes as a share of gdp by 1 % decreases the level 
of the real gdp by 1.46%. On the other hand in short run it appears that the negative impact 
on the growth of gdp is caused mainly by changes in the growth of the labour supply and 
their effect on the share of consumption taxes to gdp. 
9.4.2 Spain 
In the case of Spain, to select the order of V AR we specify, as in the case of Greece, a five 
variable unrestricted V AR model (lngdp, lni, lnl, lnctlgdp and lnftlgdp) containing an 
intercept term and the dummy variable (DS) as its deterministic component (Table 9.9). 
Table 9.9: Determining the order of VAR, Spain (1965-1999) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the V AR Model 
Based on 31 observations from 1969 to 1999. Order of V AR = 4 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lngdp lni In! lnctlgdp lnftlgdp 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DS 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
4 409.5167 299.5167 220.6475 
3 340.5045 255.5045 194.5600 CHSQ( 25)= 138.0245[.000] 40.0716[.029] 
2 299.4446 239.4446 196.4250 CHSQ( 50)= 220.1443[.000] 63.9129[.089] 
1 264.9323 229.9323 204.8376 CHSQ( 75)= 289.1688[.000] 83.9522[.2241 
o 100.7284 90.7284 83.5584 CHSQ(100)= 617.5767[.000] 179.2965[.000] 
AIC-Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
As the results in the above table 9.9 suggest, the adjusted LR test favours a V AR of order 
I while the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of 
order four. After the inspection of results we choose an order of V AR (2) for the model 
(lngdp, lni, lnllnctlgdp and lnftlgdp) to avoid the problem of serial correlation. To test for 
cointegration we apply a co integrating V AR (2) procedure, for the model (lngdp, lni. lnl, 
lnctlgdp and lnftlgdp) with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend chosen via the 
to the spectral density function of Z, (error correction term) at zero frequency. 
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Pantula principle. Based on the results displayed in Table 9.10, both the maximum and the 
trace eigenvalue statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance le\"eL that there is 
no cointegration among the level of real gdp (lngdp), investment (lni), labour supply (lnl) 
and the share of consumption and financial taxes-to-gdp (lnct/gdp, lnjtlgdp) , (namely r=0) 
but do not reject the hypothesis that there is one cointegrating relation (vector) (i.e.r=I) 
among the variables. We accept that there is one cointegrating relation following the 
maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics. 
Table 9.10: Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests among Ingdp, Ini, 1111, Illct/gdp 
,lnftlgdp,1965-1999 (Spain) 
Cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the V AR 
33 observations from 1967 to 1999. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lngdp lni 1nl lnctlgdp lnjtlgdp 
Trend 
List ofl(O) variables included in the VAR: DS 
Eigenvalue test (Order of V AR=2) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.91402 .51271 .36277 .24777 .069951 .0000 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r = 0 r = 1 80.9693 37.8600 35.0400 
r<= 1 r = 2 23.7238 31.7900 29.1300 
r<= 2 r = 3 14.8708 25.4200 23.1000 
Trace test (Order ofVAR=2) 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r = 0 r>= 1 131.3524 87.1700 82.8800 
r<= 1 r>= 2 50.3831 63.0000 59.1600 
r<= 2 r>= 3 26.6593 42.3400 39.3400 
Model selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=O 257.5613 222.5613 196.3724 213.7495 
r=1 298.0459 253.0459 219.3745 241.7165 
r=2 309.9078 256.9078 217.2504 243.5643 
r=3 317.3432 258.3432 214.1962 243.4891 
r=4 322.0409 259.0409 211.9009 243.1798 
r=5 323.2375 258.2375 209.6010 241.8728 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
HQC Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
The identified long run relationship (error-correction model) is as follows: 
Zt= -4. 771ngdp + 1.92Ini-2.671nl-0.25Inctlgdp-0.I61nftlgdp +0.1 *Trend 
Normalising on the coefficient of the real gdp (lngdp) (AI = 1) the cointegrating relation 
(long run equilibrium) is (standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
Ingdp=0.4Ini -0. 55lnl -0. 05Inctlgdp-0. 03lnftlgdp +0.02* Trend 
(0.04) (0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00]) 
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In the nonnalised cointegrating vector the coefficients of all . bl " vana es are sIgmficant. 
Hence in the case of Spain it is not possible to estimate a 'd'fi d ny over-I entl e system. 
Therefore in the case of Spain we could identify a long run reI t' h' d a IOns lp expresse as 
follows: 
lngdp- lni -lnl- lnctlgdp -lnftlgdp, DS~I(O) 
ECM equations for ~lngdp, ~lni, ~lnl, ~lnctlgdp, and ~lnftlgdp with the lagged first 
differences and error correction tenns are given in the following table 9.11: 
Table 9.11: Estimates of ECMs for Alngdp, Alni, Alnl, Alnctlgdp and Alnftlgdp,1965-1999 for Spain. 
Variables ~lngdp ~lni Mnl ~lnct/gdp ~lnft/gdp 
Intercept 9.76(1.19)* 7.09(4.5) -0.52(1.01)*** 6.51(5.49(' 6.11(11.73) •• 
~lngdp(-l) 0.44(0.13) 0.37(0.48) .. * -0,11 (0.1) *** 0.12(0.59) 1.47(1.27) 
~lni(-l) -0.24(0.08) -0.23(0.32) 0.1(0.07) 0.01(0.39)'" -0.89(0.83) .. 
~lnl(-l) 0.83(0.24)* 1.67(0.91)"" 0.47(0.2)" -0.006(1.11) ... 0.42(2.37)" 
~lnc t/gdp(-l) 0.007(0.03) 0.07(0.14) 0.05(0.03) -0.007(0.17) -0.14(0.38) •• 
Mnjt/gdp (-1) -0.8(0.09)*** 0.007(0.07)'" -0.01(0.01)'" 0.05(0.09) ••• 0.26(0.19)"" 
ZI-1 -0.8(0.09) -0.58(0.37) 0.04(0.08) -0.53(0.45) -0.5(0.97) 
DS 0.009(0.023)'" 0.04(0.08)*'" 0.02(0.01) 0.22(0.1) -0.37(0.22)' •• 
DW 1.66 1.96 1.79 1.93 2.2 
R- 0.74 0.22 0.58 0.25 0.20 
SER 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.2 
The diagrlOstic test statistics indicate that all the above equations pass the test for first 
order serial correlation, functional fonn and heteroscedasticity at 5% significance le\'el. 
The equations explaining the share of consumption and financial taxes to gdp (~lnctlgdp 
and ~lnftlgdp) fail on nonnality. Looking for causal relationships in the above equations 
we can identify a short-run effect from the growth of investment and labour force towards 
the growth of the real gdp (significant coefficients in the equation explaining the growth of 
the real gdp), In addition there is a sho'rt run effect from the growth of real gdp with one-
year lag towards the growth of real gdp, and from the growth of investment with one-year 
lag towards the growth of investment. In long run the insignificant coefficient of the error 
correction tenn in the equations explaining the lni, lnl, lnctlgdp, lnft/gdp and the 
significant coefficient on error correction tenn in the equation explaining the growth of 
real gdp support the view that the direction of causality is from investment (ini), labour 
supply (In/), consumption and indirect financial taxes (lnctlgdp, lI~fl gdp) towards the real 
gdp (lngdp) , 
Ingdp+- lni, lnl, lnctlgdp, Inftlgdp 
• significant at 5% critical level , •• significant at 10% critical level .• -- insignificant. 
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Again the coefficient of the dummy for V AT introduction as in the case of Greece i 
significant at 5% significance level in the equation explaining the gro\\1h of th har of 
consumption taxes to gdp. This reform appears not to have any impact on the grO\\·th of 
the rest of variables (insignificant coefficients). The coefficient on the error correcti on 
model in the equation explaining the growth of real gdp is rather small indicating a 
moderate speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium. Convergence back to equilibrium 
is around six years (Figure 9.3). Finally examining the above results we can not identify 
any causal relationship between the growth of taxes and the growth of real gdp 
(insignificant coefficients). 
Figure 9.3: Persistell ce Profile of th e effect of n s)'stem·" ide shock to CI '(Spain) 
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Investigating the dynamic effects of a shock to the investment on all vari ab l s in the 
cointegrating V AR model we can identify an important cyclical effect (pos iti ve) to the rea l 
gdp and a negative on the share of financial taxes to gdp. The results given in the 
following figure 9.4 suggest that the impact effect of a unit shock in investment (measured 
as one standard error) on the real gdp and labour force is positive while the impact effect 
on consumption taxes is very small and dies out very quickly. 
Fig ll re 9A : lfIIfJIIISf! RcspolIsc(s) (0 on(' S.£. shock in the cqllfltlonjor Inl.. 
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' th of pain \\'c arc As the results from the cointegrating V AR analysis suggest, III e ca 
able to establish a long run relationship among the Ie el of th r al gdp, th I \'(,;1 or 
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investment, labour supply, and the share of consumption and financial taxes to gdp. On the 
other hand, on the basis of the same results, we can support the hypothesis that there is a 
negative long run relationship between the level of the real gdp and the share of 
consumption and financial taxes to gdp. The long run elasticities (derived from the long 
run equilibrium) are -0.05% and -0.03% respectively. These results indicate that in long-
run period there is a negative effect on the level of the real gdp caused by changes in 
consumption and financial taxes as a share to gdp thus an increase of consumption and 
financial taxes as a share to gdp by I % decreases the level of the real gdp by 0.05% and 
0.03% respectively. Especially, looking at the results for the financial taxes although these 
taxes show the highest annual growth rate among the three countries in Spain (.f . .f 1 %_ 
Table 9.1) they fail to have any positive impact on the economy's output. Finally, from the 
results (individual equations) we cannot identify any short run effect on the growth of real 
gdp caused by changes in the growth of consumption and financial taxes to gdp as a share 
to gdp. The results suggest that the changes in the growth of the real gdp are mainly 
caused by changes in its main components namely the growth of investment and labour 
supply. 
9.4.3 Portugal 
In the case of Portugal, as in the case of Greece and Spain to select the order of V AR we 
specify, a five variable unrestricted V AR model (lngdp, lni, In I, lnct/gdp and lnjt/gdp) 
containing an intercept term and the dummy variable (DP) for the introduction of V AT in 
Portugal as its deterministic component (Table 9.12). 
Table 9.12: Determining the order of V AR, Portugal (1965-1999) 
Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR ~lode1 
Based on 31 observations from 1969 to 1999. Order of V AR = 4 
List of variables included in the unrestricted V AR: 
lngdp lni lnl lnctlgdp lnjtlgdp 
List of deterministic and/or exogenous variables: 
C DP 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
4 346.9085 236.9085 158.0392 
3 301.1166 216.1166 155.1721 CHSQ( 25)= 91.5838[.000] 26.5889[.377] 
2 281.1017 221.1017 178.0820 CHSQ( 50)= 131.6137[.000] 38.2104[.889] 
1 2622567 227.2567 202.1620 CHSQ( 75)= 169.3035[.000] .t9.1526].991] 
o 111:1529 101.1529 93.9830 CHSQ(lOO)= 471.5112[.000] 136.8903[.008] 
AIC Akaike Information Criterion SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
As the results, in the above table suggest, the adjusted LR test favours a VAR of order 1 
while the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of 
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order four. After the inspection of results we choose an order of V AR (2) for the model 
(lngdp, lni, lnllnctlgdp and lnjilgdp) to avoid the problem of serial correlation. To test for 
cointegration among the three variables we apply a co integrating V AR (2) procedure, for 
the model (lngdp, lni, lnl, lnctlgdp and lnjilgdp) with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trend chosen via the Pantula principle. According to results displayed in Table 9.13. both 
the maximum and the trace eigenvalue statistics reject the null hypothesis at 5% 
significance level that there is no cointegration among the level of real gdp (lngdp). 
investment (lni), labour supply (lnl) and the share of consumption and financial taxes-to-
gdp (lnct/gdp, lnjilgdp) , (namely r=0), but do not reject the hypothesis that there is one 
co integrating relation (vector) (i.e.r=l) between the variables. We accept that there is one 
cointegrating relation following the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics. 
Table 9.13: Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests among lngdp, llli, 1111, 
Illctlgdp,lllft!gdp,1965-1999 (Portugal) 
Cointegration with umestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the V AR 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
33 observations from 1967 to 1999. Order ofVAR = 2. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
lngdp lni InI lnct/gdp lnjt/gdp 
Trend 
List of 1(0) variables included in the V AR: DP 
Eigenvalue test (Order ofVAR=2) 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.96532 .60746 .51966 .20633 .11171 0.00 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r = 0 r = 1 11 0.9285 37.8600 35.0400 
r<= 1 r = 2 29.1300 31.7900 30.8587 
r<= 2 r = 3 24.1975 25.4200 23.1000 
Trace test (Order ofVAR=2) 
Critical Value 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=O r>=l 177.5198 87.1700 82.8800 
r<= 1 r>= 2 59.1600 66.5913 63.0000 
r<= 2 r>= 3 35.7326 42.3400 39.3400 
Model selection Criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r = 0 209.0128 174.0128 147.8240 165.2011 
r = 1 264.4771 219.4771 185.8057 208.1477 
r = 2 279.9065 226.9065 187.2490 213.5629 
r = 3 292.0052 233.0052 188.8582 218.1511 
r = 4 295.8181 232.8181 185.6781 216.9570 
r = 5 297.7727 232.7727 184.1363 216.4080 
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion 
HQC Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
The identified long run relationship (error-correction model) is as follows: 
Zt= -0.22Ingdp -0.14Ini-l.171nl +0. 6lnctlgdp-O. 02 I njt/gdp -0.007* Trelld 
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Normalising on the coefficient of the real gdp (lngdn ) (AI =1) th . t' . 
r e com egratmg relatIOn 
(long run equilibrium) is (standard errors are expressed in brackets): 
lngdp=-0.65lni -5. 31lnl +2. 74lnct/gdp-0.11lnjt/gdp -0.03*Trend 
(1.66) (9.21) (4.1) (0.12) (0.065) 
ECM equations for lllngdp, lllni, lllnl, lllnct/gdp, and lllnji/gdp with the lagged first 
differences and error correction terms are given in the following table 9.14: 
Table 9.14: Estimates of ECMs for Alngdp, Alni, Alnl, Alnctlgdp and Alnftlgdp for Portugal 
(1965-1999). ' 
Variables ~lngdp ~lni Mnl fllnct/gdp ~lnft/gdp 
Intercept 1.16(0.41) 0.71(0.89)'" -0.007(0.2)'" 
-18.11(1.03) -0.44(2.31 (. 
~lngdp(-1) -0.08(0.16) -0.33(0.35) 0.18(0.25) ... 
-0.4(0.4) 0.02(0.91 f"'-
~lni(-1) 0.19(0.08) 0.58(0.17) -0.01(0.06) 0.62(0.2)" 0.46(0.45) 
~lnl(-1) -0.29(0.23) -0.37(0.51) -0.1(0.19)---
-1.04(0.59) 0.47(1.32) 
~lnc t/gdp(-1) -0.05(0.02) -0.1(0.05)" 0.005(0.01) -0.04(0.05) -0.03(0.13)'" 
~lnft/gdp (-1) -0.003(0.03) -0.11(0.07) 0.02(0.01 ) -0.22(0.08)· 0.09(0.19),,' 
ZI_1 -0.02(0.007) -0.01 (0.0 1) ••• 0.001(0.003) 0.32(0.01) 0.007(0.04) 
DP -0.1(0.03) 0.14(0.07) -0.01(0.01) 0.24(0.08) -0.16(0.19) 
DW 2.01 1.94 2.01 1.89 2.19 
R- 0.58 0.47 0.14 0.93 0.10 
SER 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.18 
The diagnostic test statistics indicate that all the above equations pass the test for first 
order serial correlation, functional form and heteroscedasticity at 5% significance level 
with exception of the equation explaining the growth of financial taxes (!1lnji/gdp) which 
fails on serial correlation at 5% level (although it passes the test at 10% level of 
significance). In addition the equation explaining the growth of labour force (!1lnl) has 
been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. In the normalised cointegrating vector the coefficient 
on lni, seems to be insignificant49 . When we impose additional restriction for the exclusion 
of the variable lni (A2=0) the restriction could not be rejected by the LR statistic at 5% 
significance level which is given as x2(l)=0.61 with a P-value of 0.43. The new 
cointegrating vector (long run equilibrium) with this over-identifying restriction is: 
lngdp=-2. 79lnl +1.48lnct/gdp-0.09Inji/gdp -0. 01 * Trend 
(2.56) (0.88) (0.06) (0.02) 
• significant at 5% critical level, •• significant at 10% critical level, ••• insignificant. , 
49 All the joint restrictions for the exclusion of the other variables were not accepted by the LR S~~llIS(IL: 
[Al=L A2=0, A3=0 X2(l)=5.95(0.01); A1=1, A2=0, A4=0 i(1)=86.23(0.00); and Al=1. A2=O, .\:-=0 1.-
(1 )=83.99(0.00)). 
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Therefore in the case of Portugal we are able to identify a long- I' hi run re atlOns p expressed 
as follows: 
lngdp -lnl- lnctlgdp -lnftlgdp, DP~I(O) 
The new ECM estimates for the over-identified system are displayed in table 9.15: 
Table 9.15: Estimates ofECMsfor Alngdp, Alni, Alnl, Alnct/gdp and Alnft/gdp fi P rt a I (1965-1999). ' or 0 u~a 
Variables ~lngdp Mni Mnl ~lnct/gdp ~Inft/gdp 
Intercept 1.18(0.41f 0.64(0.9) -0.001(0.2(* 
-18.39(0.99) -0.24(2.34) . 
~lngdp( 1) -0.08(0.16) -0.33(0.35) **. 0.18(0.25) -0.38(0.38)*** 0.007 (0.91) 
~lni(-l) 0.18(0.08)" 0.58(0.17) -0.01(0.06) 0.74(0.19)* 0.46(0.45) 
~lnl(-l) -0.3(0.23),** -0.38(0.51) -0.1(0.19)'" -0.94(0.56) 0.49(1.32)' 
~lnc t/gdp(-l) -0.05(0.02)" -0.1(0.05) 0.005(0.01) -0.04(0.05)*** -0.03(0.13)·" 
~lnft/gdp (-1) -0.005(0.03) -0.11(0.07) 0.02(0.01) •• * -0.19(0.08)* 0.09(0.19) 
ZI.1 -0.03(0.01)" -0.01(0.02)*,"· 0.003(0.006) 0.59(0.03) 0.007(0.07) 
DP -0.1(0.03f 0.14(0.07) -0.01(0.01 ) 0.19(0.08)* -0.16(0.19)" 
DW 2 1.94 2.01 1.91 2.19 
R- 0.59 0.46 0.14 0.94 0.10 
SER 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.18 
Similar results follow from the diagnostic statistic tests from the new ECMs above. The 
equation explaining the i1lnl has been adjusted for heteroscedasticity and the equation 
explaining the growth of financial taxes to gdp still fails on serial correlation at 5% level 
of significance. In addition, the coefficients and standard errors in the over identified 
system do not differ from the coefficient and standard errors estimated in the normalised 
vector. Looking for causal relationships in the above equations we can identify a short-run 
effect from the growth of investment (positive) and the growth of consumption taxes as a 
share to gdp (negative) towards the growth of the real gdp (significant coefficients in the 
equation explaining the growth of the real gdp). In addition there is a short run effect from 
the growth of the share of consumption taxes to gdp (negative) and the growth of 
investment with one-year lag (positive) towards the growth of investment. 
In long run, on the basis of the significance of the coefficient of the error correction term 
in individual equations, we can conclude that there is a bi-directional causal relationship 
between the real gdp (lngdp) and the share of consumption taxes to gdp (lnctlgdp). In 
addition there is a Granger causal relationship from labour supply (In/) and the indirect 
financial taxes as a share to gdp (lnjtlgdp) towards the real gdp (lngdp). 
• significant at 5% critical level, , •• significant at 10% critical1evel, ••. insignificant. 
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lngdp+--+lnctlgdp and lngdp+-lnl,lnftlgdp 
Again the coefficient of the dummy for the introduction of V AT is significant at 5% 
significance level in the equation explaining the growth of the share of consumption taxes 
to gdp. However, contrary to Greece and Spain, this reform appears to haye an impact on 
the growth of the real gdp and investment as well (significant coefficients at 5° n 
significance level for the growth of the real gdp and at 10% significance level for the 
growth of investment). The coefficient of the error correction term in the equation 
explaining the share of consumption taxes to gdp is rather high indicating a faster speed of 
adjustment towards the equilibrium in comparison to Greece and Spain. Indeed conyerge 
back to equilibrium is around three years (Figure 9.5). Finally examining the above 
results, similar to the case of Greece and Spain, we could not identify, in sh;)rt run, any 
causal relationship between the growth of financial taxes and the growth of real gdp 
(insignificant coefficients). 
Figure 9.5: Persistence Profile oJthe e!feetoJa system-wide shock to CV (Portl/gal) 
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Considering the dynamic effects of a shock on the share of consumption taxes to gdp on 
all variables in the co integrating V AR model, we can identify an important cyclical effect 
(positive) on output (real gdp) and investment. The results given in the following figure 
9.6 suggest that the impact effect of a unit shock in the share of consumption taxes to gdp 
(measured as one standard error) on real gdp and investment is positive. It appears that the 
above mentioned positive cyclical effect on the output is caused mainly through the impact 
on the investment of the changes of consumption taxes as a share to gdp. 
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Figure 9.6: Impulse Response(s) to one S.E. shock in the equation for lnet 
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As the results from the cointegrating V AR analysis suggest, in the case of Portugal we are 
able to establish a long run relationship among the level of the real gdp, labour force 
supply, and the share of consumption and financial taxes to gdp. On the other hand on the 
basis of the same results, we can support the hypothesis, as in the case of Spain, that there 
is a negative long run effect of the share of indirect financial taxes as a share to gdp on the 
level of the real gdp. The long run elasticity (derived from the long-run equilibrium) is (-
0.09) and is close to the one found for Spain (-0.03). This indicates that in long-run period 
there is a negative effect on the level of the real gdp caused by changes in and financial 
taxes as a share to gdp thus an increase of financial taxes as a share to gdp by 1 % 
decreases the level of the real gdp by 0.09%. In addition, unlike in the case of Greece and 
Spain we are able to identify a positive (bi-directional) long run relationship between the 
share of consumption taxes to gdp and the level of gdp. The long run elasticity is positive 
and quite high (1.48%, derived from the long-run equilibrium), indicating that a change by 
1 % on consumption taxes as a share to gdp increases the real gdp by 1.48%. This result 
confirms the dominant position of these taxes in the Portuguese tax system and economy, 
especially if we take into account the high annual rate of growth for these taxes in Portugal 
(1.44%-Table 9.1 p.228) as well. However, in the short run the impact of consumption 
taxes (growth), as a share to gdp on the growth of real gdp is relatively small (0.05) and 
negative. In addition there is a positive short run effect from the growth of investment 
towards the growth of real gdp and consumption taxes as a share to gdp. Finally, unlike to 
the case of Greece and Spain, the dummy for the introduction of V AT is significant in the 
equation explaining the growth of the real gdp (at 5% level of significance) and the growth 
of investment (at 10% level of significance). 
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9. 5 Granger type causality tests for Greece, Spain and Portugal 
For comparison purposes, we perform the Engle and Granger causality tests (bearing in 
mind the limitations regarding the identification of long-run relationships) in order to re-
examine the causal relationships among the five variables in three countries by estimating 
an unrestricted V AR model in differences of variables with the dummy for the 
introduction of VAT as its deterministic variable. From the results reported in table 9.16 
we can identify some differences with the results obtained in the Johansen procedure. In 
the case of Greece consumption taxes proved to be a non causal variable. Finally, in the 
case of Spain, consumption and indirect financial taxes proved to be non-causal variables. 
--
--
Table 9.16: Granger type tests based on OLS equation for Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Model (lngdp, Ini, lnl, Inctlgdp, lnftlgdp) 
Variable lngdp Ini lnl lnct lrifl 
LR causal LR causal LR causal LR causal LR causal 
statistic stastistic statistic statistic statistic 
I 
Greece X2(8)= 15.31 Yes l(8)= 16.19 Yes X"(8)= 10.80 Yes l(8)= 2.94 No [(8)= 2.98 No I 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.029) (0.568) (0.56) I 
Spain l(8)= 19.66 Yes X2(8)= 22.00 Yes X2(8)= 5.67 No X-(8)= 11.12 No X-(8)= 11.3:" :\0 
(0.012) (0.005) (0.68) (0.194 ) (0.183) I 
X\8)= 21.~-R .-)~~ Portugal l(8)= 31.63 Yes l(8)= 30.43 Yes l(8)= 51.24 Yes X2(8)= 24.08 Yes 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.002) (0.00) I 
9.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated the effects of consumption and financial taxes (as a share-
to-gdp) on economic growth, testing some theoretical predictions and assumptions derived 
from the neo-classical and endogenous growth mechanisms. Theoretically, a permanent 
increase in tax revenues (as a percentage of gdp) will permanently reduce the growth rate 
of real gdp, according to the endogenous growth theory, but not in the neo-classical model, 
where the rate of growth will be affected only temporarily, the only permanent effect 
being a decrease in the level of the real gdp. Using data from 1965-1999 (1965-1998 for 
Greece) in a cointegrating V AR framework (Johansen procedure) with five variables (the 
two categories of taxes, real gdp and the two main components of growth of real gdp 
namely investment and labour force supply) we obtained results that are closer to the 
theoretical prediction of the neo-classical model than endogenous growth theory for 
Greece and Spain. The results for Portugal were slightly contradictory (only for the 
consumption taxes). 
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I 
I 
In the specific case of Greece, the empirical results support the fi 11 " l' o 0\\ mg conc USlOns. 
First, consistent with the neo-classical model, we found that consumption taxes (as a share 
to gdp) have a significant negative impact on the level of the real gdp (unidirectional 
causality with long-run elasticity 1.46%) while we were not able to identify any effect on 
growth of real gdp. The results suggested that effects on the growth of the real gdp were 
affected mainly through changes on the main components of the real gdp (e.g. through 
changes in labour force supply). In addition, we were not able to identify any effect on 
level or the growth of real gdp caused from the indirect financial taxes confirming our 
previous results (e.g. elasticities of these taxes on National Income, relation with total tax 
rate, etc.). The results contradict the findings from Barro, (1990) and Bleaney, Gemmel 
and Kneller, (2001) predicting that changes in consumption taxes (as a percentage to gdp) 
will have a positive effect, classified in their study as distortionary taxers, on the growth of 
real gdp. However the results are closer to the findings from Karras, (1999) and Perotti, 
(2002) especially on the impact of consumption taxes on growth of real gdp. 
Just as for Greece, so for Spain, we identified a negative long run relationship between the 
consumption taxes (as a share to gdp) and the level of real gdp. However, the long nm 
elasticity is lower than the Greek one (-0.05). In addition a negative relationship exists 
between indirect financial taxes (as a share to gdp) and the level of real gdp (the long-run 
elasticity is: -0.03). However, we were not able to identify any effect on the growth of the 
real gdp from consumption or the indirect financial taxes. 
The results for Portugal were different from those derived for Greece and Spain-
especially concerning the consumption taxes. We found positive long run relationship (bi-
directional) between the consumption taxes (as a share to gdp) and the level of gdp with a 
relatively high long-run elasticity (1.48). In addition we were able in the case of Portugal 
to identify a causal relationship from the growth of consumption taxes towards the growth 
of real gdp as well. However, in the short run this effect is negative. The results regarding 
the consumption taxes are closer to the above mentioned findings by Barro, (1990) and 
Bleaney, Gemmel and Kneller, (2001). Moreover the empirical eyidence regarding 
indirect financial taxes and growth does not differ from Spain and Greece. Again in the 
same framework we identified a negative relationship between the indirect financial taxes 
(as a share to gdp) and the level of real gdp (the direction of the causal relationship is from 
the indirect financial taxes towards the real gdp). The long run-elasticity is (-0.09). 
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Similarly to Greece and Spain, we were not able to identify any effect from the growth of 
indirect financial taxes (as a share to gdp) towards the growth of real gdp or "ice-versa. 
The policy implications of the results for the three countries are quite significant. In the 
case of Greece, the most important policy implication is that changes in the consumption 
taxes as a share of gdp may have permanent effects on the level of the real gdp. The 
direction of causality (from consumption taxes towards the real gdp) and the high negatiye 
long run elasticity support the view that the level and structure of the consumption taxes is 
significant in order to affect the level of the output of the economy. However, changes in 
indirect financial taxes do not have any effect either on the level of gdp or on the growth 
of the real gdp (not even temporary). Changes in consumption taxes for Spain and 
Portugal again alter the level of real gdp. However, while these changes for Spain, like 
Greece, have a negative effect on the level of gdp and no impact of growth, for Portugal 
they have a long run positive effect; though there are some negative temporary effects on 
the rate of growth of real gdp. In addition, increases in indirect financial taxes in both 
countries (even in Spain which is the country with a very high annual rate of growth for 
these taxes, 7.27%) have a negative effect on the level of the real gdp and no effect on the 
growth of gdp. In terms of tax policy, the findings imply that, due to the special structure 
of the indirect financial taxes (i.e. no right for deductions, distortions in capital formation 
through the taxation of intermediate and investment goods) they are very unlikely to affect 
growth in a positive way. 
Lastly, with the exception of Portugal the empirical evidence suggests that the introduction 
of VAT does not seem to have affected the indirect tax structure and its relation to the , 
output of economy: the change resulted in the same or increased total revenues but without 
effect on output. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
This final chapter brings together the themes, issues, concepts, and findings of chapters 1 
to 9. The findings are linked to the existing body of knowledge, which allows conclusions 
to be formulated on the indirect taxation of financial services as well as providing tax 
implications. In addition this chapter outlines the limitations of the study and suggests 
avenues for future research. 
Briefly, this thesis discusses differences and distortions in taxing financial services by 
studying the relevant legislation (indirect taxes) in Greece and the other EU Member 
States. In addition, this thesis investigates, in a co integrating V AR framework, the impact 
on total tax rate, expenditures and growth of the existing indirect financial and 
consumption taxes in Greece, Spain and Portugal, identifying the similarities and 
discussing the differences. Furthermore, in the particular case of Greece, the thesis 
examines the implications on the total tax revenues, in the hypothetical case of taxing 
financial services under the Greek VAT system using data from National Accounts. It also 
proposes a model for a transitional V AT treatment of financial services. Finally, the 
findings are compared to results (both theoretical and empirical) from the existing 
literature on the subject. 
10.2 Main findings and conclusions 
10.2.1 Differences in the VAT treatment affinancial services between Greece and the EU 
Member States 
The analysis of the legislation applied in the EU Member States to tax financial ser,ices 
has clearly shown that many of the obstacles and the differences depend on the differing 
implementation by Member States of the 6th VAT Directive. Such differences (e.g. right 
for deduction and option to tax) are to some extent intrinsic to the legal instrument of a 
"Directive" but also depend on the differences in the scope and liability of the \'.\ T 
treatment of financial services. 
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Especially for Greece, differences can be identified in the interpretation of the rules of the 
6th V AT Directive (e.g. right for deduction for financial services supplied to customers 
established outside the EU and no option to tax) and in the VAT treatment of some 
categories of financial services such as: dealing in money, credit and auxiliary sen'ices, 
credit card services, financial leasing, factoring, claims, insurance, fund management and 
professional services. At this stage the same conclusion can arise from the comparative 
evaluation of tax treatment of financial services among Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Although a similar form of indirect tax has been applied to the main banking sen'ices in 
the three countries, differences related to the VAT treatment of some specific categories of 
financial servIces have been identified. We have identified eight main categories of 
financial servIces where the VAT treatment differs: credit card services, dealing III 
financial shares and instruments, share dividends, financial leasing, factoring, fund 
management, settlement of insurance claims and professional services. Finally, Greece is 
the only EU Member State applying turnover tax and stamp duty on insurance sen'ices 
while the other Member States favours an insurance premium tax. 
10.2.2 Differences and potential distortions betvw?en the EU Member States 
Generally, by studying the different taxes applied on financial services (both direct and 
indirect) we can conclude that for the EU Member States it is more common to apply 
direct taxes (with some elements of indirect taxes) on banking sen'ices than to apply pure 
indirect taxes. This is an indication of the difficulties in applying indirect taxes (including 
VAT) on banking services. However, all EU Member States apply pure indirect taxes as 
well as direct taxes on insurance services. 
Regarding the VAT treatment of financial services, beyond the differences arising out of 
the interpretation of the main rules of the 6th VAT Directive (right for deduction, option to 
tax) there are differences arising from the different VAT treatment of some categories of 
financial services such as: dealing in foreign exchange, financial leasing. factoring, fund 
management and professional services. As a result of these differences, we can identify 
potential distortions of competition which have been categorised in three types: (a) 
distortions leading to competitive advantage/disadvantage among suppliers of financial 
. . the Member State (b) distortions leading to competiti\c 
servIces III same 
advantage/disadvantage among suppliers of financial sen/ices in different \ lember Statcs 
2.+9 
and (c) distortions caused by the variation in the level of "cascade effect" passed through 
to taxable businesses. 
In addition, as far as it concerns the taxation of insurance services, although there is some 
consistency in the V AT treatment of such services, the study of the indirect taxation of 
these services (other than V AT, applied indirect taxes) shows that we are far from a 
common tax system on insurance services. This contradicts the core principles of the 
Single Market. As we already stated the latter requires tax harmonisation in the field of 
indirect taxation. The legislative study confirms the conclusion reached by previous 
studies of the indirect taxation of financial services carried out by the Commission (EC, 
1996b) and OECD (OECD, 1998) that the VAT treatment of financial services is not 
harmonised throughout the EU. However, we extend the above results and conclusions by 
including in our research all categories of indirect financial taxes as well as the 
international financial and insurance services. 
In conclusion, the legislative study enabled us to confirm that, despite the high degree 
of harmonisation reached by the EU Member States in the application of VAT. so far 
the EC has not really made progress in the field of financial services. All the above 
existing differences in tax treatment of both banking and insurance services can 
easily lead to potential distortions of competition within and across the EV Member 
States. Possible solutions to these problems include a "collective monitoring" of the 
relevant rules of the 6th VAT Directive or the introduction of a common scheme of 
taxing financial services under the VAT system throughout the EV. The ECJ and the 
VAT Committee can playa key role towards the target of harmonisation (necessary 
in the concept of Single Market) of the indirect financial taxes. 
10.2.3 The impact on total tax revenues of taxing financial services under the VAT system 
in Greece 
This analysis has enabled us to estimate the economic effect in the hypothetical case of 
taxing financial services (banking and insurance) under the VAT system in Greece. \\'e 
follow the "National Accounts" approach by using aggregate data to estimate the "fiscal 
revenue loss" from the existing system of financial exemptions and to calculate the VAT 
base for the financial sector. Although this mechanism is well known in the \r AT literature 
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we have developed some modifications with special reference to the Greek V AT system 
(i.e. calculation of the average weighted V AT rate). 
Our results confirm previous general research results on the subject reached by Tait 
(1988); Gillis, (1987); Bogetic and Hassan, (1993) where a positive impact of the abolition 
of VAT exemptions on VAT base and tax revenues has been pointed out. In our analysis 
we have obtained an estimate of 5.51 % of VAT revenues over the period 1989-1998 for 
the fiscal revenue loss of exempting financial sectors from V AT and positive net revenue 
effect (68.5 billions of GDR for the year 1998). The above result is close to the one found 
by Wenser and Winker, (1997) using desegregated data for Germany (the fiscal revenue 
loss accounted for the year 19944% of VAT revenues). 
In conclusion the results contribute to the fairly minimal extant research that there 
would be a positive impact of abolishing financial exemptions on the VAT base and 
on total tax revenues. The second conclusion reached in our analysis is that the 
inclusion of financial services in the VAT base gives less embedded/blocked YA T on 
financial institutions inputs (the inputs of financial institutions accounted 
approximately 0.8% of VAT revenues for Greece), confirming the results reached by 
Gottfried and Wiegard, (1990) for the remaining VAT on the intermediate 
production of the total tax-exempt sectors. Finally in this analysis it is revealed that 
the exempted financial sector in Greece shows very low efficiency of VAT revenue 
collection (approximately 29.04%) which is in accordance with the conclusions 
reached by Jack, (1996). 
10.2.4 The profile of the indirect tax system in Greece, Spain and Portugal: The 
variability of VAT, consumption and indirectfinancial taxes over the period 1965-1998 
By looking mainly at the revenue productiveness and elasticity on National Income of the 
different taxes we have found that the three countries apply in principle a similar 
consumption tax system showing at the same time a high level of spending as the National 
Income grows. The results suggest that V AT is an important raising instrument for Spain 
and Portugal. However, Greece appears to count on other indirect taxes than \' AT. 
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In addition, an important conclusion revealed by the above analysis is the weak 
relation between the existing indirect financial taxes and National Income in the 
three countries. This finding is supported by the calculation of the average effective 
rate for the financial taxes in the above countries. 
Finally analysing the VAT revenue perfonnance (VAT revenues as a share to gdp) \\'e 
have found that V AT exemptions (including financial exemptions) are significant for the 
improvement of the VAT revenue perfonnance. This conclusion confinns, for the specific 
case of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the general argument expressed by Bogetic and 
Hassan, (1993) that VAT revenue perfonnance depends on the VAT base and rate. 
10.2.5 The impact of indirect financial taxes on the average total tax rate of the econom.l', 
expenditures and growth in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
In our thesis, by applying a V AR model and using Johansen procedures we have examined 
the impact of the existing indirect financial and consumption taxes on the total average tax 
rate of the economy and expenditures in Greece (over the period 1965-1998) as well as in 
Spain and Portugal (over the period 1965-1999). In addition, we have been able to test the 
impact of tax refonns in consumption tax policy in the same model by examining the 
specific impact of VAT introduction on the long run relationships amongst the above 
stated variables. 
As the results revealed (Figure 10.1), there is a positive long run relationship (uni-
directional causal relationship) between the existing indirect financial taxes and the total 
average tax rate of the economy (with long-run elasticities 0.19% for both countries) for 
Greece and Spain. The same positive relationship is found for consumption taxes and the 
total average tax rate in the case of Spain and Portugal as well (with long run elasticities 
0.17% and 0.23% respectively). In addition, using the same method, we have identified a 
long run causal relationship from expenditures towards the consumption taxes in Greece 
as well as a bi-directional causal relationship between indirect financial taxes and 
expenditures for Spain and Portugal. Finally, for Portugal there is an additional important 
long run effect on expenditures from consumption taxes (with long run elasticity 2.2( 0 ). 
The above findings for Greece are consistent with the arguments of Andersson. (1986) that 
government expenditures Granger cause government taxes while the findings for Spain 
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and Portugal are closer to the findings of Owoye, (1995) that tax and spending decisions 
are jointly made by the fiscal authorities. 
Furthermore, using the same techniques (i.e. applying five variable V AR model and 
Johansen procedures to test for cointegration between the variables in model), we have 
examined the impact of indirect financial and consumption taxes on economic growth 
(Figure 10.1). We have been able to identify a causal relationship (uni-directional) from 
consumption taxes towards the level of real gdp. This relationship is negative for Greece 
and Spain, and positive for Portugal. It is worth noting here that Portugal is the country 
with the higher elasticity of consumption taxes on National Income (1.36%) and quite high 
estimated average effective rate on consumption taxes (9.7%) as well. The results 
concerning the consumption taxes for Greece and Spain are closer to the findings by 
Karras, (1999) that taxes can affect only (negatively) the level of the output and they do 
not affect permanently the rate of growth while for Portugal the results are closer to the 
findings by Barro, (1990) and Bleaney, Gemmel and Kneller, (2001) where a positive 
impact from consumption taxes (classified as distortionary taxes) on the level of real gdp 
has been argued. 
Moreover, the existing indirect financial taxes show a negative impact (uni-directional 
causal relationship) on the level of real output, and no short run effect on the growth of 
output of the economy, for Spain and Portugal (with long run elasticities -0.03 and -0.09 
respectively). 
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After the above mentioned cointegration analysis the most important conclusion is 
that, although they may have a positive impact on the total average tax rate of the 
economy, the existing indirect financial taxes (i.e. taxes that might fall on 
intermediate and investment goods) can only affect the level of the real output 
negatively. In addition, consumption taxes, including VAT (i.e. taxes that fall only on 
final consumption) can affect permanently the level of the real output, through their 
impact on the main determinants of growth, namely labour force supply and/or 
investment. This effect can be either negative or positive depending on the whole tax 
structure. Countries with a dominant position of consumption taxes with high 
elasticity of consumption taxes on National income as well as high average effective 
rates on consumption are more likely to appear with positive impact on the level of 
the real output (e.g. the case of Portugal). 
Moreover indirect financial taxes are important for spending decisions for Spain and 
Portugal, where a clear long run relationship has been identified. For Greece on the 
other hand the decision to spend Granger causes consumption taxes. However 
consumption taxes are important for spending decisions for Portugal. 
The last important conclusion is that reforms in indirect tax system (e.g. V AT) are 
unlikely to have any direct long run effect on the total average tax rate, expenditures 
or growth. Rather, these reforms will have short run effects on the revenues accruing 
to the tax administration from the relevant taxes (e.g. consumption taxes). 
10.3 Implications of the study 
The study detailed in chapters 1-9 leads to both fiscal (tax) and economic implications. 
10.3.1 Tax implications 
The conclusions drawn from the legislative study (see also section 10.2.2) show that there 
are many differences and little harmonisation in indirect taxation (including \':\T) of 
financial services in the EU Member States. These can lead to potential distortions of 
competition within and across EU Member States, thus contradicting the core principle of 
the "Internal Market", namely the harmonisation of indirect taxes across the EU \lember 
States and hindering the efforts of the European Commission for a Single i'.larket on 
financial services. 
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Especially article 93 of the consolidated version of the treaty of the European Union (EU, 
1997) states that: "The Council shall, acting unanimously, ... adopt provisions for the 
harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other form of 
indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the 
establishment and the functioning of the Internal Market ... ". Consequently, the main 
implication of the lack of harmonisation in the indirect taxation of financial services is the 
need for organised efforts in order to eliminate differences and to apply harmonised rules 
in EU Member States50 . This demands work in two directions. Should the EU Member 
States prefer the existing system of financial exemptions then the efforts \\'ould 
concentrate on option 1 (Table 10.1) (i.e. improvement of the current system of financial 
exemptions and harmonisation of indirect taxation of insurance services). In case a tax 
reform is preferred, option 2 can be developed instead (i.e. application of V AT on 
financial services) . 
.-----~~~--~~----~--~~--~--~~~~----~--~~--~~~--~-~ -
Table 10.1,' Different options for harmonisation of indirect taxation of financial services ill _E U. 
Option 1 Optioll 2 
Harmonised financial exemptions in VAT system: Taxation of financial services under 
Narrow interpretation of article 13a, 13b(d) 1-6 of the 6th VAT the VAT system: 
Directive. Nonnal scheme: Identification of feasible 
Legislative modifications to article13a, 13b(d) 1-6, 13c of the 6th method. 
VAT Directive. I Special scheme: Development of rules. 
Introduction of common rules for calculation of deductions: I 
uniform application of article 17(3) c, 18 and 19(2) of the 6th VAT 
Directive. 
Detailed definition of financial services. 
Production of blueprints: Providing list offmancial services and 
their VAT status. 
Harmonised indirect taxes on insurance services: 
Approximation of rates and exemptions. 
10.3.2 Economic implications 
The most important economic implication drawn from the empirical study (see also 
section 10.3.5) regarding the existing indirect financial taxes in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal is that, although they can affect positively the total tax rate of the economy, any 
increase of these taxes can only decrease the real level of the output of the economy 
through changes in the main determinants of growth, namely in\'estment and labour 
supply. 
50The need for harmonised rules on indirect taxation of financial services is clearly supported by ~e findmgs 
of a recent study on behalf of the European Commission (London Econonucs~ 2002) .. The f~dmgs rev~al 
that trading costs could fall sharply as a result of full European finanCIal market mtegr~otlobnl'l:\ ~mgle \ 12arok
o
e
2
t 
. wth· 1 by at least 1 1 % or 1 ' 1 IOn euro In on financial services would mcrease the EU gro m ong run . " -
prices, and the total employment by 0.5%. 
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This negative impact of the applied indirect financial taxes 0 th I f n e rea output 0 the 
economy must lead the relevant tax administrations to question and reconsider the role and 
existence of these taxes in the whole tax system However thes t b 
. ,  axes seem to e more 
important for the spending decisions of the fiscal authorities. 
Moreover, changes in consumption taxes are likely to affect the level of the real output of 
the economy positively or negatively depending on the whole tax structure. Subsequently. 
changes in VAT (e.g. application of VAT on financial services) can alter the re\"enues 
accruing to the government as well as the real output of the economy. The net effect 
depends on the whole tax structure (relation between direct/indirect taxes, the structure of 
the abolished indirect taxes etc.). In the case of Greece the above implication is more 
relevant taking into account that although consumption taxes show a dominant position in 
the whole tax structure [high elasticity on Net National Income (1.36%) and high average 
effective tax rate on consumption (11.45%)], they may affect negatively the real output of 
the economy. This implication obviously requires a comprehensive reform of tax system 
in order to benefit of changes in indirect taxation of financial services. The application of 
VAT on financial services may have a positive impact on VAT base, VAT revenues 
efficiency and total tax revenues as well as to result in less embeddedlblocked V AT on 
financial institutions inputs (see section 10.2.3). However, in order for this positive impact 
to affect the real output of the economy the tax administration must accompany this 
change with a comprehensive tax reform. 
10.4 Recommendations 
There are some recommendations derived from the findings and conclusions of this study. 
The main categories of recommendations are derived mainly from the study of legislation, 
taking into account the economic implications discussed above. In addition there are some 
recommendations for the specific case of Greece. 
Differences in indirect tax rules and practices between the EU Member States result in 
distortions of competition, in compliance cost and double or avoidance of taxation. e\"en 
where there are EU measures already in place which are designed to avoid these problems. 
In addition the creation of EMU and the adoption of euro in 1999 has successfully remO\"c 
the distortions related to exchange risks within the Euroland and simultaneously has shed 
more light on the remaining tax distortions (i.e. distortions arising of different \" AT 
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treatment of financial services across EU Member States). Moreoyer, financial institutions 
need to be able to comply with their obligations in a way, which does not inyolve 
disproportionate time and resources. As a first step towards harmonising and streamlining 
the indirect taxation of financial institutions within the "Single Market", we haye 
identified a number of key changes that would substantially ease the impact of indirect 
taxation on a cross-border economic financial activities in EU and enable financial 
institutions to operate on a genuinely European basis. These general changes are as 
follows: 
• The scope of the 6th VAT Directive regarding financial services needs to be reviewed. 
The Directive needs to be implemented and interpreted consistently across the EU and 
both Member States and the European Commission must act in accordance with their 
commitment to the Single Market. 
• A Single Market needs a consistent approach to the V AT treatment of financial 
servIces. 
• Proposed methods and practices must recognIse the increasing move away from 
nationally organised efforts and the impact of new technology on financial transaction 
processes. 
For the specific case of Greece considering the economic implications as well (see section 
10.2.3-5) the main recommendations are as follows: 
• Greece needs to support any future change in EU legislation towards harmonisation of 
the VAT treatment of financial services. 
• In order to benefit from a future change in the V AT treatment of financial services 
Greece has to consider a comprehensive tax reform. 
• In the case of application of VAT on financial services in EU (i.e. the second option 
detailed above in table 10.1) a special VAT scheme, similar to the one applied the 
agricultural sector (article 25 of the 6th V AT Directive), seems to hold considerable 
promise for Greece as a transitional alternative to the present exemptions for financial 
services given that this system can easily be adopted and be operational in accordance 
with the existing invoice credit V AT system. 
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Finally, this study resulted in the development of th I f f1 
e ru es 0 a at-rate scheme for taxina 
financial services under the V AT system The d I b 
. " . propose ru es are developed and presented 
III detaIl III Appendix 3. Lastly a brief review of th b I'. • 
e a ove system s baSIC pnncIples and 
fu . 51 . nctlOns are presented III the following Figure 10.2. 
51 This method satisfies the basic goal of an invoice credit system, by taxing only the final consumption. 
Briefly under this scheme financial institutions will not have the right to deduct the V A T charged on their 
inputs. However, their customers will indirectly compensate the financial institutions for VAT charged on 
their inputs since it will be part of their sales price. In order to avoid the problem of the "cascade effect" in 
production chain, the taxable entities participating in financial transaction will have the right to deduct the 
average tax charged on the inputs of the particular financial institution which supplies the financial sen'ice, 
fixed at a percentage of the sales price. For non-business customers' financial sen'ices will be taxed, though 
at lower effective rate, due to lack of the right of deduction of tax. 
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10.5 Limitations of the study 
Two categories of research limitations are discussed below. These are: general limitations 
and limitations in methodological approach and design. 
10.5.1 General limitations 
Firstly, a review of the research on indirect taxation of financial services of the last decade 
reveals relatively little attention to the study of the economic effects of these taxes in a 
particular ED context. In addition, regarding the issue of the feasibility of applying V AT 
on financial services, it is the American researchers (i.e. Canada) who have dominated the 
field. Given the relative paucity of research into the issue of the indirect taxation of 
financial services, this study is just a start towards a new approach in an ED context. 
Moreover, the findings and conclusions of this study are limited by the "Public finance" 
focus of the research. The focus of the study is the indirect taxation of financial services 
resulting in findings and conclusions which mainly apply to govennents/tax 
administrations policies on the subject. Indeed the purpose of the study is to investigate 
the above issues by adopting a "Public finance" perspective and not to attempt at this stage 
to assess the pure implications (i.e. administrative and compliance implications) for the 
financial sector. Whilst the aim of the study may have been accomplished, the limitations 
of a non-generalisable theory, including the financial sectors' implications and views, limit 
the findings and the conclusions presented earlier. 
10.5.2 Limitations of methodological approach 
There are some limitations in the methodological approach used in this study. Firstly, a 
more comprehensive and deep fieldwork by adopting "financial institutions" perspective, 
was beyond the mandate and time limit of this research. The inclusion of the above 
approach would require longer time and a different mandate from the Greek Ministry of 
Finance. 
Secondly, the difficulty to access detailed infonnationldata necessary to estimate the fiscal 
revenue loss of the applied exemptions in Spain and Portugal (i.e. data on the average 
weighted VAT rate, on financial sectors intennediate consumption, dispersions of rates for 
intennediate consumption, output etc.) prevented us, at this stage, from conducting similar 
analysis to the one conducted for Greece. 
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Finally, our estimation of the fiscal revenue loss of the appll·ed fina . 1 .. nCla exemptIons III 
V AT system in Greece does not capture general equilibrium effects. This is beyond of the 
scope of this thesis. Lastly, the method used ("National accounts approach") can only be 
used for forecasting as long as there in no change in tax rates on services (financial 
services) affected since it is based on the calculation of the average weighted V AT rate. 
10.6 Contribution to knowledge 
Nevertheless, this thesis is valuable because it clearly reached its aims, answered the 
research questions, and made important contributions and practical policy implications. 
These included: 
• A comparative evaluation of VAT and the indirect tax treatment of financial services 
in Greece and the other EU Member States and the identification of potential 
distortions of competition. 
• The estimation of the fiscal revenue loss caused by financial exemptions in the V AT 
system in Greece, as well as the identification of financial institutions' inputs (i.e. the 
"cascade effect" arising from taxing intermediate consumption). 
• The identification of similarities and differences of tax system in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. Investigation and findings on the impact of indirect financial taxes on the 
total average tax rate of the economy, expenditures and growth in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal as well as the identification of causal relationships. 
• The development of rules needed for the application of a flat-rate scheme for taxing 
financial services under the VAT system. 
Generally, we contributed to the limited and incomplete theoretical and empirical research 
that exists in this area (the empirical research has so far concentrated on direct taxation 
than on indirect taxation). This thesis is therefore a first step towards a better 
understanding of the indirect taxation of financial services. Indeed, as we discussed in our 
literature review the research on V AT treatment of financial services in EU has neglected , 
the issues of international financial services as well as the analysis of practices used to tax 
insurance services. In addition, we contributed to the existing empirical findings on the 
economic effects of financial exemptions (i.e. effects of cascade tax on intermediate 
goods) in V AT system, as well as the effects of existing indirect financial taxes on the 
total average tax rate, expenditures and growth. 
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10.7 Suggested avenues for future research. 
It can be argued that the research on indirect taxation of financial services is frequently 
characterised by the efforts to develop a feasible method in order to tax financial services 
u~der the V AT system abolishing the existing exemptions. This study provides a starting 
point for helping tax administrations and ED institutions to reach a definitive policy in 
indirect taxation of financial services that will satisfy the goal of "Single Market". Hence. 
this section suggests potential avenues for future research. 
Firstly, the findings enable general inferences to be drawn about the economic effects of 
indirect financial and consumption taxes (i.e. effects on total average tax rate, expenditures 
and growth). In addition this study used the "National accounts" approach to examine the 
economic effects (i.e. the fiscal revenue loss) of the applied financial exemptions in VAT 
system in Greece. Further research could use the same or a different method to extend the 
findings to other ED countries. Additional comparative research is also necessary to 
determine findings on fiscal revenue loss and "cascade effect" (embedded V A T) in other 
ED countries, preferably in Spain and Portugal in order to verify the general validity of the 
conclusions reached by this study. 
Secondly, in our study we investigated the impact of consumption and indirect taxes on 
growth by using a relatively simple model. Lack of data before 1965 led us to apply a 
small model that omits variables that could also explain the growth of real output such as 
exports, productivity growth e.t.c. This was done to avoid problems of an econometric 
nature. Depending on data availability (e.g. by using quarterly data), future research could 
extend the above model by including more variables. 
Thirdly, more comprehensive fieldwork is necessary in order to study the implications on 
financial sector in the benchmark case of taxing financial services under the V A T system 
in Greece. This can be done by looking at the subject from the financial institutions' 
perspective as well, investigating the impact of such a measure on financial institutions 
administrative obligations, compliance cost, perception of taxation, etc. 
Finally, further comparative research will be necessary III order to detemline the 
appropriateness of each method proposed (cash-flow method, TCA method, special V.\ T 
regIme etc.) to tax financial services under the V AT system in the EU context. For 
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example the application of the special regime proposed by this study or of the TCA 
method (Tax Calculate Account) could be examined in the case of Greece, through a pilot 
study in collaboration with the Hellenic Banks Association52 . 
. . ., of Finance are, in principle, agreeable to such a 
52 The Hellenic Banks ASSOCIatIOn and the Gr~e~ MlID~6 k Ministry of Finance, Working document );0 
pilot study in the future (Hellenic Banks ASsoclatIOn an ree 
999,21108/1998). 
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Appendices 
and 
Bibliography 
Appendix 1: Calculation of VAT base of financial institutions (Input-Output tables) 
Table al: Input-output table-Calculation of VAT base of Financial Institutions Year 1989 (At 
. ,current 
Pnces-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions I Insurance Total 
..\\\\'R 
Output 391.234 55.873 447.107 12.2.+0 0 
Intermediate Consumption 60.659 35.913 96.572 
Gross Value-added 330.575 19.96 350.535 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 10.006 1.563 11.569 
Net Value-addedN AT base 320.569 18.397 338.966 
Yield from taxation 338.966*12.236%=41.47 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a]: Input-output table-Calculation of V A T base of Financial Institutions, Year 1990 (At current 
Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total AWVR 
Output 522.718 73.912 596.63 13.41% 
Intermediate Consumption 75.624 49.72 125.334 
Gross Value-added 447.094 24.192 471.286 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 13.445 2.049 15.494 
Net Value-addedN AT base 433.649 22.143 455.792 
Yield from taxation 455.792*13.4057%=61.10 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a3: Input-output table-Calculation of V AT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1991 (At current 
Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total AWVR 
Output 668.723 92.828 761.551 14.05% 
Intermediate Consumption 87.442 67.891 155.333 
Gross Value-added 581.281 24.937 606.218 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 18.445 2.516 20.961 
Net Value-addedN AT base 562.836 22.421 585.257 
Yield from taxation 585.257*14.054%=82.25 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a4: Input-output table-Calculation of V AT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1992 
(At current Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Insurance Total AWVR 
Institutions 
Output 839.986 122.693 962.679 13.91% 
Intermediate Consumption 111.988 77.825 189.813 
Gross Value-added 727.998 44.868 772.866 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 24.229 3.401 27.63 
Net Value-addedN AT base 703.769 41.467 745.236 
Yield from taxation 745.236*13.913%-103.68 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a5: Input-output table - Calculation of V AT base of Financial 
Institutions, Year 1993 (At current Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total AWVR 
Output 724.043 142.86 866.903 1.3.+8°
/
0 
Intermediate Consumption 135.293 91.956 227.249 
Gross Value-added 588.75 50.904 639.65.+ 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 20.852 3.95 2.+ S02 
Net Val ue-addedN A T base 567.898 46.95'+ 61'+S52 
Yield from taxation 614.852*13.482% 82.89 billion of Drachmas. 
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Table a6: Input-output table-Calculation of V A T base of F' . I I . . 
. . . mancla nStltutlOns, Year 1994 (At current 
Pnces-In bllhon of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total A \\'YR 
Output 917.205 164.668 1081.873 1352 0 0 
Intermediate Consumption 152.165 106.919 259.084 
Gross Value-added 765.04 57.749 8')2789 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 26.416 7.627 34.043 
Net Value-addedlV AT base 738.624 50.122 788.746 
Yield from taxation 788.746*13.526%-106.68 billion of Drachmas. 
Table ai Input-output table-Calculation of V AT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1995 (At current 
Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total AWVR 
Output 1105.668 189.440 1295.108 1-1-.50 0 0 
Intermediate Consumption 198.539 120.499 319.038 
Gross Value-added 907.129 68.941 976.070 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 31.843 5.186 37.029 
Net Value-addedlV AT base 875.286 63.755 939.041 
Yield from taxation 939.041 *14.50%=136.16 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a8: Input-output table-Calculation of V AT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1996 (At current 
Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total A \\,YR 
Output 1233.851 196.775 1430.626 13.29°0 
Intermediate Consumption 223.368 125.940 3-1-9.308 
Gross Value-added 1010.483 70.835 1081.318 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 37.475 6.547 44.022 
Net Value-addedlV AT base 973.008 64.288 1037.296 
Yield from taxation 1037.296*13.298%=137.939 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a9: Input-output table-Calculation of VAT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1997 (At 
current Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Insurance Total AWVR 
Institutions 
Output 1347.858 219.477 1567.335 13.32% 
Intermediate Consumption 259.710 137.854 397.564 
Gross Value-added 1088.148 81.623 1169.771 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 41.330 7.221 48.551 
Net Value-addedIV AT base 1046.818 74.402 1121.22 
Yield from taxation 1121.22*13.3252%-149.404 billion of Drachmas. 
Table a 10: Input-output table - Calculation of V AT base of Financial Institutions, Year 1998 (At current 
Prices-In billion of Drachmas). 
Credit Institutions Insurance Total AWVR 
Output 1499.497 240.700 1740.197 13.51% 
Intermediate Consumption 306.023 149.234 -1-55257 
Gross Value-added 1193.474 91.466 128-1-9-1-
Consumption of Fixed Capital 45.358 7.919 53.277 
Net Val ue-addedlV A T base 1148.116 83.547 1231.663 
Yield from taxation 1231.663 * 13 .5182%-166.498 billion of Drachmas. 
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Appendix 1: Calculation of the Average weighted statutory VAT rates (1989-1998) 
Table b( Calculation of the A WVR-Year 1989. 
Categories/Rates 
Breakdown of the VAT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
3.32% 3% 6% 16% 36° 0 Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 73550 73~~() 
Private consumption 48928 2082912 1015897 3 ().f() 2-1 3~ II-C) 1 
Government consumption 972 123684 185491 7008 317155 
Intermediate consumption of exempt sectors 2039 50774 59092 1972 II-I-+r 
Public fixed capital investment 887 169981 I "ns()s 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 1350 258903 260253 
Fuels and lubricants (intermediate consumption) 134 36 173 3-13 
Purchases of private cars for professional use 103 103 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non industrial use 
Construction of Buildings and land 
for industrial use 
Total 73550 51939 2259844 1690000 373177 -I-I-IS51O 
A WVR=( 73550*3.3186%+51939*3%+2259844*6%+ 1690000*16%+373177*36%)/4448510=12.2363% 
Table b] Calculation of the A WVR-Year 1990. 
Breakdown of the VAT base in VAT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
Categories/Rates 3.24% 3% 4% 6% 8% 16% 18% 36~o Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales 80248 802-18 
of farmers 
Private consumption 24798 34717 1010626 1414873 513261 718582 -13-1260 -1151117 
Government consumption 698 977 62659 88631 9447-1 133500 7672 388611 
Intermediate consumption of 3198 4478 26342 36704 53897 75455 3946 20-1020 
exempt sectors 
Public fixed capital 380 531 86996 121795 209702 
investment 
Fixed capital investment of 550 767 125785 176103 303205 
exempt sectors 
Fuels and lubricants 73 102 20 27 224 -I-I() 
(intermediate consumption) 
86 I-I~ Purchases of private cars 62 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-
industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
1225-162 -I-I() 1 () 2 533--19-Total 80248 28694 40172 1100692 1541694 87-+-133 
A WVR=(80248*3.2365%+28694*3%+40172*4%+ 1100692*6%+ 154163-1 *8° 0+87-1-133 *16%+ 1 ' 2~-I()' *1 So n --I-Ih 1 02*3()0 0) 
5337497= 13.4057° 0 
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Table b3: Calculation of the A WVR-Year 1991 
Categories/Rates 
Breakdown of the V AT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
Self-supplies and direct sales of fanners 
4.37% 4% 8% 18% 36° ° Total 
159459 
Private consumption 80874 
1~9-1~9 
Government consumption 
2820061 1-116793 503962 -I~2169u 
Intermediate consumption of exempt 
2194 162810 2-15858 7876 -118738 
9550 78443 160943 
-1910 2~.'~-Ih 
sectors 
Public fixed capital investment 1009 25-1297 2553ilh 
Fixed capital investment of exempt 1486 37-1-161 .'-~l)-I7 
sectors 
Fuels and lubricants 457 
(intermediate consumption) 
122 588 1167 
Purchases of private cars 249 2-19 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold 
for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings and land 
for industrial use 
Total 159459 92618 3064515 2-152-17-1 517336 6286402 
A WVR-(159459*4.3665%+92618*4%+3064515*8%+2452-1 7-1*18%+517336*36%)/6286402=1-1 ()5-1-1" " 
Table bi Calculation of the AWVR-Year 1992 
Breakdown of the V AT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
Categories/Rates 3.77% 4% 8% 18% 36% Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 197011 197011 
Private consumption 93788 3212127 2119171 431225 585(1.1 II 
Government consumption 2443 164167 258709 7736 433055 
Intermediate consumption of exempt sectors 11772 87075 208209 -1057 311113 
Public fixed capital investment 477 27815-1 278631 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 861 502640 503501 
Fuels and lubricants 649 1045 84() 2534 
(intermediate consumption) 
Purchases of private cars 334 152 486 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 197011 108003 3465690 3368080 443858 75S2(l-l2 
A WVR=(197011 *3.7693%+ 108003 *4%+3465690*8%+3368080*18%+443858*36%)17582642=13.9139% 
Table b5 Calculation of the AWVR-Year 1993 
Breakdown of the V A T base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas) 
Categories/Rates 4.66% 4~0 8% 18% Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales offarmers 304017 3(}-I()1-
Private consumption 102256 3285795 34976% 688568-
Government consumption 2496 131463 349990 -IS3()-I9 
Intermediate consumption of exempt sectors 14740 75840 296585 3871(15 
Public fixed capital investment 41 14()j -III-I()\ 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 52-1763 52-1763 
Fuels and lubricants 292-
2()2-
(intermediate consumption) 637 (13-Purchases of private cars 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 304017 119492 3493098 
511~4112() 90006~(l 
A WVR =(304017*4.6610° 0+ 119492*4%+ 3493096*8%+5084029*1 S",,) (lllllll(l.'(1 13 -IS '()ll " 
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Table b6: Calculation of the AWVR-Year 1994 
Categories/Rates 
Breakdown of the V AT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas) 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 
4.79% 4% 8% 18° 0 Total 
320252 
Private consumption 112405 
3~()~:,~ 
Government consumption 
3853281 417~51-+ S 13:--~1111 
Intennediate consumption of exempt sectors 
4435 151905 
-+03-+58 :' :,\)-\)~ 
Public fixed capital investment 
17263 88822 347353 -+53-+.'~ 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 
509~J~ ~11\)2-2 
Fuels and lubricants 
528538 52853~ 
5205 5211:' 
(intermediate consumption) 
Purchases of private cars 70S 7(15 
for professional use 
(intennediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 320252 134103 4094008 5967105 10515468 
A WVR (320252*4.7948%+ 1341 03*4%+4094008*8%+5967105*18%)I10515468=13.526()0 0 
Table b7 : Calculation of the A WVR-Year 1995 
Breakdown of the VAT base in VAT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
Categories/Rates 5.37% 4% 8% 18% Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 368876 368S7(1 
Private consumption 244724.04 6559847.6 6809798.75 13614370.4(1 
Government consumption 5460.58 173725.72 6078899.45 6258085.75 
Intennediate consumption of exempt sectors 44717.59 896008.99 931238.98 1871%556 
Public fixed capital investment 717791 717791 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 1474808 1474R08 
Fuels and lubricants 29-+7.16 2()-+716 
(intermediate consumption) 
Purchases of private cars 31-+63-+ 3146.34 
for professional use 
(intennediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 368876 294902.21 7629582.38 16018629.68 24311990.27 
A WVR=(368876*5.37%+294902.21 *4%+7629582.38*8%+ 16018629.68*18%)12-+311990.27=14.50% 
Table b8: Calculation of the AWVR-Year 1996 
Breakdown of the V AT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
Categories/Rates 4.64% -+~o 8% 18°'0 Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 395898 395898 
Private consumption 150117 5137996 5()90554 10378667 
Government consumption 4941 213715 -+91003 709659 
Intennediate consumption of exempt sectors 24915 93306 -+ 771-+() 595367 
Public fixed capital investment 561811 
561811 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 591200 
59121111 
Fuels and lubricants 
771-+ --1-+ 
(intermediate consumption) ..", 
-" 1_-
--Purchases of private cars 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of bui ldings 
and land for industrial use 722() i-+8 132-+\03E\ 
Total 395898 179974 
5-+-+5017 
A WVR=(395898*4.6410%+ 179974*4%+5445017*8°0+ 7220148*1 So 0) \ 32-+ 1038 13 2()~O (l 
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Table b9: Calculation of the AWVR-Year 1997 
Categories/Rates 
Breakdown of the V AT base in V AT rates (Amounts in million of Drachmas). 
5.37% 4% 8% 1 8~ (, Total Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 368876 )(lSS -() 
Private consumption 244724.04 6559847.67 6809798.75 1361.+) -11"+6 Government consumption 5460.58 173725.72 ()()-SlJ9.45 
-8 -OS5 75 
Intermediate consumption of exempt sectors 44717.59 896008.99 93123898 1871965 5() 
Public fixed capital investment 717791 -1--91 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 59J2()I) 59121111 
Fuels and lubricants 950.+.+07 956.+.+ 1)-; (intermediate consumption) 
Purchases of pri vate cars 
for professional use 
153036.38 153036.38 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 368876 294902.21 7629582.38 9906608.63 1 S 199969.22 
A WVR-(368876*5.3 798%+294902.21 *4%+7629582.3 8*8%+9906608.63*18%)118199969.22= 13.3252% 
Table b 10 Calculation of the A WVR-Year 1998 
Breakdown of the VAT base in VAT rates (Amounts in mi11ion of Drachmas). 
Categories/Rates 5.32% 4% 8% 18% Total 
Self-supplies and direct sales of farmers 386120 386l2() 
Private consumption 362014.42 7159087.99 7834736.+..+ 1535583885 
Government consumption 6022.12 178539.41 611 L2'+ l )) 795()SCl'+() 
Intermediate consumption of exempt sectors 55166.20 1028393.65 10453.+2.37 212890222 
Public fixed capital investment 83981.+ 83981.+ 
Fixed capital investment of exempt sectors 1568080.50 1568080.50 
Fuels and lubricants 3217.40 3217.40 
(intermediate consumption) 
Purchases of private cars 2837.51 2837.51 
for professional use 
(intermediate consumption) 
Transactions in gold for non-industrial use 
Construction of buildings 
and land for industrial use 
Total 386120 423202.74 8366021.05 11905153.15 21080496.94 
A WVR=(386120*5.3296%+423202.74*4%+8366021.05*8%+11905153 .15*18%)121080496.94-13.5182% 
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Appendix 2a: The functional form of taxation in Spain and Portugal. 
• The functional form of taxation in Spain 
In general the Spanish tax mix has a different balance compared with other EU Member States. with a 
relatively strong reliance on labour taxes, largely to finance social security expenditures, and a relativeZv 
low share of consumption taxes. Recent reforms have improved incentives to work and removed barriers to 
the internationalisation of the Spanish firms, and have helped to make the tax system Simpler and more 
neutral, especially as regards company taxation. However, the structure of tax wedges, combined lI"ith 
significant labour market rigidities continues to inhibit job creation, and especially job creation for the 
unskilled. Until the mid -1970s government spending in Spain was fairly low by international comparisons. 
keeping the tax pressure considerable below the OECD average. However, after 1975 and up until the late 
1990s, taxation rose sharply to finance escalating government expenditures. Recent changes in tax system 
have achieved progress in streaming taxation, reducing compliance cost and redressing previous distortions 
resulting from tax progressivity and lack of neutrality. Despite improvements, the tax system contains 
imbalances, reflected in relative strong pressure on labour income, lack of neutrality in the taxation of 
savings, preferential corporate tax regimes and weaknesses in tax decentralisation (Joumard and 
Varoudakis, 2000). 
In 1996 the level of aggregate taxation in Spain was almost seven percentage points below the E U average 
and the third lowest in the EU Social security contributions are the most important category of revenues 
(36.4%) of total taxation. Spain on the other hand has the lowest indirect taxlGDP ratio 00,8%) of the EU 
Member States and a lower than average directlGDP ratio 01.8%). VAT accounts for 52.7% and excise 
duties for 26.8% of indirect taxation. The most important direct taxes are taxes on personal income (71 % of 
total direct taxes). Taxes on consumption in % of GDP increased Significantly during the first half of 1980s 
from 5.3% ofGDP in 1980 to 9.8% in 1986. After 1986 the level remained relatively stable around 9.7% of 
GDP. The reason for this can be found in Spain's accession to the EU, which led to VAT replacing a 
multiphase tax based on the final price in each production level. However, the level of taxes on consumption 
as a % of GDP or total taxation is the lowest among the EU Member States (OECD, 2000). Finally, Spain 
applies indirect cascade taxes on financial services as well. These are mainly a turnover tax on banking 
services, a tax on economic activities (stock market transactions) as well as a premium tax on insurance 
contracts. 
• The functional form of taxation in Portugal 
The Portuguese tax system has developed positively in the past decade. Following the 1989 tax reform, tax 
bases have been broadened and statutory tax rates are lowered. The overall tax burden is not high by the 
international comparison and the tax mix relies more on the neutral consumption taxes. Howe\·(!/". further 
reform should be envisaged to make the system more neutral efficient and equitable (Bronchi and Gomes-
Santos, 2001). The system has mainly criticised for a number of features, which continue to add to the 
complexity of the system and make tax administration difficult, creating loopholes. which hamper efficiency 
and equity. 
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In 1996 the level of aggregate taxation in Portugal was 37.1% of GDP more than five percentage points 
lower than the EU average (42.3%) and among the lowest in EU (only Greece, Spain, Ireland and UK had 
lower levels). Indirect taxes were the most important category of revenues (41% of total taxation); direct 
taxes accounted for only 27.4 of total taxation. Social security contributions made up 31.6% of total 
taxation. Revenues from VAT reached 53.3% of total indirect taxation while excise duties brought in 27% of 
GDP to 8.1% to GDP. The Portuguese direct taxlGDP ratio (10.2% in 1996) was one of the lowest in EU. 
The most important direct tax is personal income tax. In addition over the period 1980-1983 the overall 
level of taxation as % of GDP increased by more than 9 percentage points from 25.5% to 34. r() (GEeD. 
2000). The strongest increase can be observed in the early 1980s and in the early 1990s. Finally Portugal. 
as Greece and Spain, applies indirect cascade taxes on finanCial services. These are mainly a stamp duty on 
banking operations, a tax on credit and capital transactions as well as a premium tax on insurance 
contracts. 
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Appendix 2b: Equations of computation of elasticities (Consumption, total and indirect 
financial taxes) for Greece, Spain and Portugal. Estimation Period 1965-1998. 
Greece 
• Consumption taxes 
~ct=7. 6+0. 07!1NI 
(IS.2) (0.01) 
R2=0.64, SER=64.71, DW=2.1 
• Total Tax Revenues 
~Tr=39.4S+0.69!1NI 
(121.S) (0.16) 
R2=0.39, SER=SOO.8, DW=l.S 
Mnct=O. 21 + 1.19 !:J./nNI 
(0. OS) (0.16) 
R:=0.S7, SER=O.lS, DW=1.8 
Mn Tr=O. 93 +0. 46~/nNI 
(0.03) (0.2) 
R2=0.14, SER=0.08, DIJ"=1.3 
• Total consumption (adjusted for heteroscedasticity) 
~c=30.S6+0.91 !1NI 
(1S.78) (0.03)) 
R2=0.90, SER=17S.8S, DW=2.1 
• Financial taxes 
~ft=1.S+0.01 !1NI 
(1.69) (0.003) 
R:!=0.64, SER=6.88, DW=1.74 
Spain 
• Consumption taxes 
~ct=-49.06+0.91 ~NI 
(40.11) (0.01) 
R2=0.S3, SER=130.6S, DW=2.1 
• Total Tax Revenues 
~Tr=-292.31 +O.SS!1NI 
(2S0.7) (0.09) 
R2=0.Sl, SER=816.6, DW=2.1 
~/nc=O. 062 +0. 6S !:J./nNI 
(0.02) (0.13) 
R]=0.69, SER=0.03, DW=1.47 
~/nft=O. OS +0. 96~/nNI 
(0.09) (0.23) 
R:!=0.32, SER=O.23, DW=J.8 
~/nct=0.27+0.90!:J./nNI 
(0.04) (0.32) 
R2=0.20, SER=0.09, DW=1.9S 
~/nTr=O. 06+ 1.12 MnNI 
(0.07) (0.19) 
R:=0.47 SER=O.IS, DW=2.2 
• Total consumption (adjusted for heteroscedasticif1) 
~/nc=O.OJ +0. 85!:J./nNI 
~c= 1 03. 7+0. 84!1NI 
(82.34) (O.OS) 
R2=0.9, SER=336.69, DW=l.4 
• Financial taxes 
~fi=-2. 7+0.007~NI 
(9.1) (0.003) 
R:!=0.13, SER=29.6, DW=1.S3 
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(0. OJ) (0.13) 
R2=0.76, SER=0.02, DW=J.S 
~/nft=-0.9S + } 23!:J.IIl.VI 
(0.08) (O.M) 
R:!=0.27. SER=0.18, DJr=2 
Portugal 
• Consumption taxes 
I1ct=-8.1 +0.1 ~J 
(4.58) (0.01) (adjusted for heteroscedasticity) 
R:!=0.62, SER=42.34, DW=2.4 
• Total Tax Revenues 
I1Tr=-15.92+0.42~I 
(11.63) (0.03) (adjustedfor heteroscedasticity) 
R:!=0.86, SER=202, DW=2.4 
• Total consumption 
I1c=6.01 +0.94~J 
(22.4) (0.03) 
R:!=0.84, SER=89.05, DW=1.9 
• Financial taxes 
I1ft=O. 77 +0. 004~I 
(2.69) (0.002) 
R:!=0.30, SER=10.71, DW=1.3 
27-+ 
I1lnct=0.14 + 1.3 611Inf.,'[ 
(0.11) (0.3) 
R:!=0.37, SER=0.2, DII'= 1.4 
11 In Tr=O. 05+0. 77 /':,,!IlXI 
(0.0]) (O.[]) 
R:!=0.53 SER=0.05, DIJ'=1.8 
!::..lnc=0.03+0.8111InNI 
(0.01) (0.09) 
R~=O.71, SER=0.03, DII'=1.8 
!::..lnft=-0.04+ 1. 34!::..lnNI 
(0.068) (O.4!) 
R:!=0.]5, SER=O.17, DII'== 1.66 
Appendix 2c: VAT rates applied in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
• List and evolution of VAT rates ap'Plied in Greece S . dP I 
' '/Jam an ortuga 
Member States Reduced rate Standard rate Increased 
and Dates 
Greece 
rate 
1101/1987 3/6 18 36 
110111988 3/6 16 36 
28/04/1990 4/8 18 36 
8/08/1992 4/8 18 
-
Spain 
1/0111986 6 12 33 
1/0111992 6 13 28 
1108/1992 6 15 28 
110111993 3/6 15 -
110111995 417 16 -
Portugal 
110111986 8 16 30 
1102/1988 8 17 30 
24/03/1992 5 16 30 
110111995 5 17 -
1/07/1996 5/12 17 -
Data source: European Commission (DOC/2206/2000-EN) 
• Geographicalfeatures of the application of VAT in Greece, Spain and Portugal 
Greece 
For the departments of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, the Dodecanese and the Cyclades, and on the Aegean islands 
of Thasssos, the Northern Sporades, Samothrace and Skiros, the rates of 4%,8% and 18% have been reduced 
by 30% to 3%, 6% and 13% respectively. These rates apply to imports, intra-Community acquisitions, and 
supplies of goods and services effected on these islands and supplies of goods from other areas of Greece to 
persons established on these islands. The preferential system does not, however, apply to tabacco products 
and means of transport. Mount Athos is excluded from the scope of VAT. 
Spain 
For VAT purposes, the country does not include the Canary islands, Ceuta and Melilla. 
Portugal 
A special reduced rate of 4% is applied in the Azores and Madeira. 
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A 
mandaI services. 
1. Introduction 
All the alternative methods of taxing financial servIces are developed from a purely 
economic concept of what constitutes value added in financial services. It is worth noting 
here that as we have discussed in the chapter 2 on the structure of V AT (i.e. the methods 
developed for the VAT calculation), the aim of VAT from a purely economic concept is 
not to tax value added but to tax the final consumption (which is the goal of the applied 
credit-invoice method in V AT system). The different methods proposed for taxing 
financial services under the European V AT system could more or less satisfy this goal. No 
matter how valuable and enlightening the adopted method from the economic perspective. 
a special regime of taxation of financial services will take place within an already difficult 
and as we have seen not fully harmonised existing legal context. In this appendix we 
develop a special operation regime for taxing financial services-a common flat-rate 
scheme- and describe as a feasible solution, bearing in mind the empirical results emerged 
in our thesis, for the Greek and ED V AT system. 
2. Application of the proposed methods to tax financial services. 
Before starting the discussion of the design features of the proposed flat rate system it is 
necessary to provide here an overview of the application of the proposed methods (already 
mentioned in the literature review) of taxing financial services in order to explain the 
problems in adopting them in the Greek and ED VAT system. As we have seen in the 
literature review there are mainly two applicable methods of taxing financial services, 
namely the cash flow and the subtraction method. We would like to recall very briefly, 
that under the cash-flow method all cash inflows from financial transactions (whether 
income or capital) received by a financial institution would be treated as taxable supplies 
on which VAT must be remitted to tax administration by the financial institution. All cash 
outflows (whether income or capital) paid by a financial institution \\"ould be treated as 
taxed purchases in respect of which the financial institution would be entitled to a refund 
of VAT from tax administration. The net cash inflows or outflows \\"ith respect to a 
particular financial transaction represent the value-added in the transaction, which should 
276 
be subject to VAT. Therefore the basic cash-flow method b l' d 
' may e app Ie to each 
transaction, allowing transactions with non-residents to be zero-rated and allowing 
registered customers to claim refunds of paid thereon Where th t . . d 
. e cus orner IS regIstere . 
all cash inflows received by the customer would be treated as taxable sales on which VAT 
must be remitted to the tax administration by the customer. All cash outflows paid by the 
customer would be treated as taxed purchases in respect of which the customer would be 
entitled to a refund of V AT from the tax administration. 
While the basic cash-flow method would result in VAT being applied to financial services 
in a manner that is consistent with the normal invoice-credit V AT system and would 
correctly allocate the VAT base between depositors and borrowers, several problems ha\'e 
been identified with respect to the application of the basic cash flow method to financial 
services (EC, 1996b). The most significant problems that would arise under the basic cash 
flow method are as follows: 
• Changes in tax rates can create problems in the implementation of the method (change 
of the basic rules and the structure of the method). There are also many problems in 
implementing the method in a multi-rate V AT system in Greece (in Greece additional 
reduced VAT rates are applied in many remote islands and areas, which requires 
different structure of the method) 
• Additional borrowing requirements and present cash-flow problems 
• Due to the volume of cash inflows and outflows between financial institutions and 
their customers, applying V AT to all capital and income cash flows would be 
burdensome to both the financial institution and their customers. 
• Administrative problems in calculating the VAT. 
The above-mentioned problems have been addressed in a modified cash flow system the 
so-called TCA (Tax Calculation Account) system (EC, 1999a). This system provides a 
means of measuring the value of the margin services on a customer-by-
customer/transaction-by-transaction basis. This system would be "truncated" in that only 
financial institutions would be required to compute the tax on financial services. Thus all 
tax computations would be based entirely on the computations performed by financial 
institutions which would have the necessary information. All financial services provided 
by financial institutions would be taxable under the TCA system. Financial institutions 
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would, therefore, be allowed to claim full refund of V AT'd 11 bl pal on a taxa e purchases. 
Financial services for which explicit fees or commissions are charged \,·ould be taxed in 
the same manner as non-financial supplies under the normal VAT system. 1\0 special rules 
would be required to extend the VAT to such services. Although this method address some 
of the problems mentioned above there is still place for improvement in the adjustment 
required of the system when the tax rates change or when the method has to be applied to 
tax insurance services (its operational merits is still under consideration by the 
Commission) (EC, 1999b). 
Under the approach of the subtraction method, the tax base would be determined by 
subtracting from the total financial revenues, the total financial expenses incurred by 
financial institution. Financial revenues would include interest receipts dividends on 
securities, gains from security transactions, while financial expenses would include 
interest payments and losses from securities. The total V AT base under the subtraction 
method would equal the VAT base determined under the basic cash-flow system. 
However, unlike the basic cash-flow method, the VAT base cannot be calculated on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis under the subtraction method. As a result refunds of input 
VAT which registered business customers may claim, can only be determined on a 
formula basis. The main attraction of the subtraction method over the basic cash-flow 
method is that no adjustment is required on implementation of the system or when the tax 
rates change. In addition the operationalisation of this method is straightforward and does 
not require any additional administrative tool for implementation in each Member State. 
The main problem with the subtraction method is that there is no precise way of 
identifying the value of services for export (exported financial services are not zero-rated), 
nor is there a precise way of allocating the financial margin to transactions with registered 
business customers to allow for claiming of refunds of input V AT. The approximations 
involved in determining these values would create inequities in tax system. 
All the above methods seem to be in accordance with the general rules and goals set by the 
invoice credit VAT system. However, from an operational point of view further 
comparative research will be required in order to determine the appropriateness of each 
method in taxing financial services in the EU context (see also Van Brederode, 1995: Ee. 
1999a). Finally, another preliminary question needing further research is the impact of 
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taxing financial services, usmg th b 
e a ove mentioned methods, on \lember States 
revenues. 
3. Common flat rate scheme for financial institutions 
Another method to tax financial services in the credit-invoice V AT system, which to our 
knowledge has neither been seriously discussed nor has been proposed as a method for 
taxation in academic literature (see Van Brederode, 1995) is the application of a special 
flat-rate scheme similar to the one applied to tax the agricultural sector (article 25 of the 
Sixth VAT Directive). From a principle of the goals that have been set and identified 
above (ability to be applied in an already existing V AT regime) this method is relatively 
simple from an operational point of view and already applied in taxing supplies of 
agricultural goods and services in ED Member States. In addition to study the economic 
effects of this method in taxing financial services on tax revenues the "National Accounts 
approach", already used in our thesis to study the impact on tax revenues in the case of 
Greece, can be easily applied in each Member State. As known, a similar method is 
already applied in Member States for the calculation of the value added in 
agricultural sector for EU budget purposes (Sixth VAT Directive: Annex C. 
"Common methods of calculation"). 
To begin with the general principles of the flat rate scheme for financial services, we have 
to note that financial institutions subject to this special regime will not have the right to 
deduct the VAT charged on their inputs. However, their customers will indirectly 
compensate the financial institutions for the VAT charged on their inputs since it \\ill be 
part of their sales price. In order to avoid the problem of the cascading of the tax in the 
production chain, the taxable entities participating in the financial transaction will have the 
right to deduct the average tax charged on the inputs of the particular financial institution 
which supplied the specific financial service, fixed at a percentage of the sales price. For 
non-business customers, financial services will be taxed due to lack of the right of 
deduction of tax. However, the taxation in this case is effected on a lower effectivc tax 
rate. From economic point of view the deduction of an average percentage of input tax by 
the business customers is quite problematic taking into account the principle of economic 
neutrality, which characterises the invoice-credit method. The flat-rate percentages may 
vary among the different sub-divisions of financial institutions, sectors etc. (i.e. banking 
and insurance) in order to take into account the different input (including gross fi:\cd-asset 
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fonnation); output ratios among these different financial institutions, so that the 
calculation of the input tax attributable to the financial institutions sales and supplies (i.e. 
flat rate compensation) will be more accurate. This problem as Van Brederode. (1995) 
argues can easily be solved if the compensation percentage will be determined by usina _ b 
input data for a fixed period (three or five years) for each financial institution indiyidually. 
giving an accurate estimate of the relative percentage. The common flat-rate scheme will 
apply only on financial institutions, which carries out financial services clearly defined by 
the special scheme rules. In the case of mixed transactions carried out by the same 
institutions the common pro-rata regulations may be applied. In addition where the 
financial institution will carry out a non-financial transaction subj ect to V AT, the normal 
V AT regime can be applied. The financial institution in this case can be entitled to a full 
deduction for the input tax charged on inputs. Other issues can be solved, as we will see in 
the following analysis, within the existing rules of the Sixth V AT Directive. These rules 
shall be mentioned where necessary in the following construction of the new scheme. 
Analytically the Member States may apply the following common flat rate scheme 
adopting the proposed design features: 
• Due to difficulties in taxing the value added in financial transactions the Member 
States may apply to financial institutions a flat-rate scheme tending to offset the value 
added tax charged on purchases of financial services provided by the financial 
institutions pursuant to this scheme 
• For the purposes of this scheme the following definitions shall apply: 
y "financial institution": a taxable entity which carries out its activity on financial 
services defined below. Since only financial institutions would be taxed under this flat 
rate scheme, the definition of financial institution is very important for the application 
of this scheme. Financial institutions could be defined to include: 
o banks, credit unions, and trust, loan and acceptance companies, 
o credit card companies, 
o investment dealers, life insurers, property and casualty insurers, and 
o any other person whose principal business is the business of lending money, 
accepting deposits, or purchasing or selling securities 
~ "flat-rate financial institution": a financial institution subject to the flat-rate scheme 
provided for below, 
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, "financial service": any service as listed below suppll'ed by fi . I' . . 
a manCla mstltutlOn by 
means of the equipment nonnally available on financI'all'nstl'tut' . . IOns mam premises or 
at any place related to financial institution (branches ATMs etc) . d 
, . m or er to carry out 
its activity, 
, "value added tax charged on inputs": the amount of the total \'alue added tax attaching 
to the goods and services purchased by all financial institutions of each Member State 
subject to the flat-rate scheme where such tax would be deductible under article 17 of 
the Sixth VAT Directive by a taxable entity subject to the normal value added tax 
scheme, 
, "flat-rate compensation percentages": the percentages fixed by Member States and 
applied by them in the cases specified below to enable flat-rate financial institutions to 
offset at a fixed rate the value added tax charged on inputs, 
.". "flat-rate compensation": the amount calculated by applying the flat-rate compensation 
percentage provided in this scheme to the annual turnover (exclusive VAT) of the flat-
rate financial institutions. 
• The Member States shall allow the financial institutions to fix the flat-rate 
compensation percentages, where necessary. The financial institutions shall notify the 
tax administration before applying them. These percentages shall be based on macro-
economic statistics for flat-rate financial institutions alone for the preceding three 
years. The necessary data will be based on the input V AT incurred by the specific 
financial institution (these amounts have been already calculated for Greece by using 
aggregate data for financial sector over the period 1995-1998 in chapter 6). The 
compensation percentages may not be used to obtain for flat rates financial institutions 
refunds greater than the value-added tax charged on inputs. The percentage may be 
rounded up or down to the nearest half point. 
• Member States, for simplification reasons, may release financial institutions from 
obligations imposed upon taxable persons by the article 22 of the Sixth V AT 
Directive, 
• The flat-rate percentages provided above shall be applied to financial services' value 
(exclusive VAT) supplied by flat-rate financial institutions to taxable entities other 
than those eligible within the territory of the country for this flat-rate scheme. 
• This compensation shall exclude any other form of deduction 
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• 
• 
Member States may provide for the flat-rate compensation to be paid by the taxabk 
entity to which the financial services are supplied. In this case the taxable entity shall 
be authorised, following the procedure laid down by the ;v1ember States, to deduct 
from the value added tax for which it is liable, the amount of the flat-rate 
compensation it has paid to the flat-rate financial institutions. 
Member States shall refund to the purchaser or customer the amount of the flat rate 
compensation he has paid to the flat rate financial institutions in respect of the 
following transactions: 
r Supplies of financial services to taxable customers established within the European 
Union but in other Member States or to taxable customers established outside the 
European Union provided that the services are used by those customers for the 
purposes of the transactions53 referred to in article 17 (3) (a) and (b) of the Sixth \'AT 
Directive or that these services are deemed to be supplied within the territory of the 
country and on which tax is payable solely by the customers under the article 21 (1) 
(b) of the same Directive. Member States shall determine the method by which the 
refunds are to be made. In particular, they may apply: a) the detailed rules laid down in 
Directive 79/1 072/EEC, for refunds made to taxable entities (or persons) which are not 
established within the territory of the country but they are established in another 
Member State and b) the detailed rules laid down by the Directive 86/560/EEC, for 
refunds made to taxable entities (or persons) which are not established within the 
territory of the EU. 
• Member States shall make all the necessary provisions to check properly the payment 
of the flat rate compensation to the flat rate financial institutions 
• Member States shall not provide for the years of the application of the flat rate scheme 
the financial institutions with the right to opt to the normal V AT regime to ensure the 
same method of taxation of financial services throughout the European Union, 
• 
The Commission shall: before the end of the fifth year following the entry into force of 
this flat rate scheme, present to the Council final proposal concerning the application 
of the normal VAT scheme to transactions in respect of financial services carried Ollt 
by financial institutions. 
q Th t' h' h w uld be deduchble if they had been performed within the territory of the 
, , ese are transac Ions, W IC 0 11 • 
country, 
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• Member States shall take all the necessary measures to ensu th . r. b' _ 
re e U1l110rm aSlS ot 
assessment of the VAT in this flat rate scheme in order to apply th h f h 
e sc erne 0 t e own 
54 . h 
resources usmg t e common method of calculation For the f I I . 
. purposes 0 ca cu atmg 
the value added in the own resources scheme shall be taken l'nto ac t I' h coun , exc USl\e t e 
VAT, the following: 
, The value added of the total final output of financial institutions including financial 
institutions' own consumption of financial services 
, the value of total inputs required to achieve the production of the supplied financial 
servIces 
, the value of the gross-fixed capital formation in connection with financial transactions 
listed below 
" the value added for flat rate financial institutions which, will be included in the 
calculations for the Member State's own resources statement, is equal to the difference 
between the value of total final output of financial institutions, exclusi\'c of \'alue 
added tax, and the total value of inputs together with gross fixed capital formation. 
4. Definition and list of financial services 
For the application of this flat rate scheme the definition of a financial service is \'cry 
important. The absence so far of any proper definition of what constitutes a financial 
servIce m tax literature could be solved by following in general, the principles and 
classification provided in the GATS Annex on financial services: "Definition of financial 
services". Therefore, for the application of this scheme, a financial service may be 
considered to be any service of financial nature offered by a financial institution of a 
Member State. Financial services include all insurance and insurance related services, and 
all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance). Financial sen'ices, for the 
application of this flat rate scheme, may include the following activities: 
• Banking and other financial services ( excluding insurance) 
~ Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from a taxable or non-taxable person 
(account operations and counter operations, including A TMs) 
54 Following the rules of this scheme the Member States assess the amounts payahle to Ell for bud~l't 
purposes. 
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, Lending of all types, including consumer credit, factoring and financing of financial 
transaction 
, Mortgages 
, Money transfer 
, Securities 
, Travel and overseas services including foreign exchange 
, All payment and money transmission services, including credit, documentary credit 
charge and debit cards, and banker drafts 
~ Financial leasing (equipment and contract hire) 
'r Financial guarantees 
, Trading for own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, in an 
over-the-counter market or otherwise, the following: 
o Financial instruments (including cheques, bills, certificates of deposits) 
o Derivative products including, but not limited to, futures, options, and exchange 
rate and interest rate instruments such as caps, swaps, forward rate agreements, 
sale and repurchase agreements, back to back/washable loans/parallel loans, deep 
discount and deep gain securities, zero-coupon bonds etc. 
o Other negotiable instruments and financial assets, excluding bullion 
'r Participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including underwriting and placement 
as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of services related to such issues 
'r Money broking 
~ Asset management, such as cash portfolio management, pension fund management, 
custodial, depository and trust services 
'r Settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivatiye 
products, and other negotiable instruments 
~ Advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services close linked to all the 
activities listed above. 
~ Electronic banking services 
• Insurance and insurance related services 
~ Life and non-life insurance 
~ Reinsurance and retrocession 
~ Insurance intermediation, such as brokerage and agency 
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,- Services auxiliary (close linked) to insurance such as actuan' 1 It . k a. consu ancy, ns' 
assessment and claim settlement services. 
5. The operationalisation of the flat-rate scheme 
As it appears from the following table la, as a method for taxing financial services the flat 
rate scheme can easily be adopted and to be operational in accordance with the basic 
principles of the existing invoice credit V AT system. The method satisfies the basic goal 
of an invoice credit system. It taxes only the final consumption through the deduction of 
the flat rate compensation by businesses (the taxable recipient of financial sen·ices). In 
this way the problem of the "cascade tax" in transaction chain due to the current applied 
VAT exemptions will be reduced. In addition, with this method, exported financial 
services are still exempted (zero-rated). Thus the method does not create any competitive 
disadvantage for the European financial institutions concerning supplies of international 
financial services. Of course, to ensure that the European financial institutions can operate 
on foreign markets on the same level as domestic competitors, it is not only necessary to 
untax their financial services supplied to business customers established outside the EU, 
but to provide to all foreign customers the right to refund of V AT whether their country of 
domicile grants a refund of VAT, especially when mixed services are supplied to them 
(e.g. financial advisory services). This implies amendment of the 86/560/EEC Directive so 
that the refund of V AT paid by business customers established outside the EU will be 
compulsory for all Member States in the above circumstances. In addition, the above 
designed flat rate scheme seems to hold considerable promise for Greece as a transitional 
alternative to the present exemption for financial services given that there is no need of 
additional variation of the scheme to be developed to deal with the taxation of insurance 
servIces. 
Moreover the above developed tax scheme provides two alternative methods for payment 
of the flat-rate compensation. One version of these methods would be for the taxable 
customer of the flat-rate financial institution's output to calculate the flat-rate 
compensation, on the invoice/receipt, attributable to the price\'alue55 and paid to the 
financial institution together with the price. One copy of this document should be returned 
55 Depending on the nature of financial service and on the existence of an expliCit charge on inH)lCe. for the 
good or service. 
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to the financial institution, and the other should be retal'ned b th t bl ' y e axa e customer In 
order to support the claim for the flat-rate compensation deduction from the output 
liability of the relevant tax period, Another method would be for th t th' , e ax au ontles to pay 
the financial institution the flat-rate compensation calculated either by them or by the 
financial institution on the basis of their sales or supplies of services, at the end of the 
relevant tax period. The first method is more open to abuse than the second one, since it 
would be in the interest of either the financial institution or the taxable customer (or both), 
for the latter to inflate the flat-rate compensation in collusion with the financial institution , 
while the second method relieves the taxable customer from having to finance the flat-rate 
compensation. With either method, the flat-rate financial institutions must be brought 
within tax administration control in order to enable the tax administration to cross-check 
samples of flat-rate compensation receipts or documents with those of taxable customers, 
and thus discourage abuse. However, as flat-rate scheme financial institutions \\'ill be 
within the tax administration's control system without contributing to the revenues, \\'ith 
the second method, this will inevitably raise the compliance cost. On the other hand, the 
flat-rate percentages cannot be correct for all financial institutions and at best may succeed 
in only rough approximation. More important, this method does not remove the 
disincentive to the financial institution to invest (e.g. on machinery). These purchases are 
taxed, and the amount of flat-rate compensation given does not vary with the individual 
financial institution's decision for the investment. Conclusively for Greece the first method 
seems more appropriate given the high amounts of inputs of financial institutions as we 
show in the chapter where we examined the impact of taxing financial services in Greece 
under the VAT system. 
Typically, under the flat-rate scheme, it is implied that the financial institution does not 
pass on the VAT paid on its purchases to the taxable customer (in the form of hidden tax-
"cascade effect"). This may be true where the flat-rate compensation is, to a certain extent, 
satisfactory in paying back to financial institution the input tax, or competitive conditions 
do not give to financial institution such an opportunity; otherwise the financial institution 
will have an incentive to pass some of financial institution's input tax to the taxable 
customers, which will lead the financial institution to inflate the flat-rate compensation as 
well. In this context, it should be noted that the flat-rate scheme encourages efficiency. in 
the sense that the less inputs a financial institution uses for a certain amount of output. the 
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more likely it is for the flat-rate compensation to offset or e\'en exceed the input tax 
incurred. 
We would like to clarify here that the flat-rate scheme of taxing financial institutions does 
not provide the financial institutions with the right to opt for the normal \" AI scheme or 
exemptions under any voluntary registration provision. Ihis option would not be 
justifiable. The reason is that this would create discrimination, as some of these financial 
institutions might supply some of their financial services and instruments to the non-
taxable customers, or exempt businesses; being outside the flat-rate or normal YA I rate 
scheme, they will charge services increased by irrecoverable input tax, whereas similar 
financial services supplied by other financial institutions under the normal V AT scheme 
would be subj ect to the normal VAT rate on the full value or selling price. 
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Taxable 
person 
Tax base 
Scope of tax 
Collection of 
tax 
Refund of 
input VAT 
Table la: Comparison offlat rate system to invoice credit system. 
Normal VAT system Flat t S h 
. ra e c eme 
Any supplIer of ta~able goods and services Only financial institutions would calculate 
must collect and remIt the tax. and remit tax. 
Explicit price charged for goods and services. ~inan~ial service's value (excluding \ 'A T) 
mcludmg flat-rate compensation, and 
financial institutions' own consumption of 
financial services. 
Transactions with non-residents are zero-rated. Transactions with non-residents are zero-
rated. 
Transactions between domestic fmancial 
institutions are taxable unless specifically Transactions with other domestic finanCiall 
exempted. institutions are taxable. 
I 
Transactions with shareholders, owners and Transactions with taxable customers are i 
affiliated persons are taxable unless VAT taxable and customer is entitled to refund of 
grouping allowed, and customer is a member tax paid (flat-rate compensation). 
of VAT group. 
Where customer is not entitled to full refund 
Tax on supplies made to non-registered of input VA T, the customer for 
persons resident in ED remitted to Member simplification reasons, could be required to 
State in which business establishment of remit tax through reverse charge mechanism 
financial institution making supply is located. (based on calculation of the compensation I 
percentages provided by financial: 
No tax collected by supplier of goods and institution). 
servIces to registered customer resident in 
another Member State. 
Where registered customer is not eligible for 
full refund of input tax, tax on imported 
supplies remitted by customer to Member 
State in which customer is resident through 
reverse charge. 
Transactions with other domestic registered 
customers are taxable and customer is entitled 
to refund of tax paid. 
~ax remitted to government equals tax due 
ifrom customer. 
K::ustomer entitled to full refund of input taxes 
~n supplies consumed 
lin course of making taxable supplies. 
Financial institution applies the: 
compensation percentages to financial: 
service's value (exclusive VAT). 
Financial institutions can offset at a fixed 
rate (flat-rate compensation) the V AT 
charged on inputs. 
Furthermore, in the case where some categories of financial services could be performed 
h . 56 on-line by electronic means, the method can use the so-called reverse charge mec amsm . 
56· h' 'd d fi r in article 9(2)(e) of the Sixth VAT Directive, stipulates that financial 
ThIS mec amsm provi e 0 h established his business to which the services 
services are taxed in the Member State where the customer as bl" h d " 
are supplied. The mechanism does not apply when the financial supplier and the customer are esta IS e III 
the same Member State. 
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This means that these services should be allocated t th 
. . 0 e country (Member State) of the 
recIpIent, where V AT IS due and deductible throu h th . 
.. g e same rules mentIOned above in the 
desIgn and applIcation of the flat rate scheme (see also figure la-lb). 
Figure 1 a: On-line supplies offinancial services b a f1 
a VAT liable customer (taxable entity). vat rate scheme financial institutioll to 
Member State 1 Member State 2 
Payment 
~OiCC/rcCClPtH----------+--------~ 
Fin.Inst. e1ec. means, Internet etc. 
Financial 
services 
-
Customer 
VA T liable 
'In most cases VAT is paid and is deductible in Member State 2. through the reverse charge mechanism 
[article 9(2)( e) of the Sixth VAT Directive]. 
As we can see from the above figure in the case where financial services are performed 
on-line through electronic means, these services should be allocated to the country of the 
customer where V AT is due and deductible through the reverse charge mechanism. 
However, the VAT treatment should not be depending on whether the order has been 
made through Internet, by phone or by writing. Therefore, although in the case of off-line 
services the main rule is that VAT is due in the country where the supplier of scr.iccs is 
resident or has his permanent establishment, in the case of financial services \. A T shall be 
due in the country where the customer is established through the above mentioned rc\ ersc 
charge mechanism. 
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Fi ure 1 b: On-line su 
illallcial institutioll to a non-taxable person. 
Member State 1 
\lember State 2 
Payment 
Invoicelreceipt/l-------__ --+ _______ ~ 
Fin.Inst. e1ec. means, Internet etc. 
Financial 
servIces 
-
Customer 
Non-taxable 
'No VAT charged. Application of the compensation percentages in the Member State 1. ~o deduction of 
VAT in Member State 2. 
When the customer is a non-taxable person (figure 1 b) the general principle that VAT 
should be levied in the country of destination (i.e. the Member State where final 
consumption takes place) cannot be applied in the flat-rate scheme. This would require 
having the financial institution registered in VAT system in the second Member State as 
well. Because of that, the basic rules of the flat-rate scheme shall be applied. No \'A T \\ill 
be charged to non-taxable persons and the deduction of the input tax of financial 
institution will occur through the compensation percentages in Member State 1. 
Finally if financial institutions would become subject to V AT under this flat rate scheme it 
appears that the changes in revenues can easily be calculated through a common method in 
EU Member States following the "National Accounts approach". This method has already 
been used in the case of the special scheme applied to tax the agricultural sector in El' 
Member States. 
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